STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

An Anthology of Articles by Scholars
Eastern and Western

VOL. I

Editor
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INTRODUCTION

Sponsored by the *Indian Council of Historical Research*, the present reprint of the studies in Indian philosophy by the earlier generation of Indologists is intended to meet the requirements mainly of the students of Indian history and culture, though it is hoped that it may be useful also for the general students of Indian philosophy. There is however a tendency among a section of recent Indian thinkers to take an all-absorbing interest in conceptual constructions based on certain thought-potentials supposed to be read in the works of the ancient and medieval Indian philosophers. The present anthology makes no attempt to cater to the special needs of those that share such a tendency. This accounts for the absence in it of the contributions of certain otherwise renowned interpretors of Indian philosophy, whose writings would be appropriate for an anthology with a more restricted theoretical interest. The interest of the present one being frankly historical, preference is given here to articles discussing chronological and other textual questions more directly relevant for the understanding of the history of ideas. This is done not to the exclusion of doctrinal discussions, though mainly because of consideration of space articles exhaustively discussing various problems raised in Indian philosophy could not be accomodated in the present volume. What is attempted instead is to include studies in the distinctive peculiarities of the major philosophical views of the different systems and of the different periods.

Indian philosophy is understood in the present collection mainly in its restricted traditional sense. In this sense, only the Lokāyata, Sāṃkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are secular philosophies. The other well-known Indian views, notwithstanding all their contributions to a very wide range of philosophical problems, have very strong moorings either in frankly religious convictions or even in the fundamental assumptions of primitive magical rituals—the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā

(alternatively known as Yajña-vidyā) being the typical example of the latter, while Jainism, Buddhism and Vedānta are the more important examples of the former.

It is well-known that in India there were and still are numerous magico-religious sects, some of which—with their distinctive ideological contents—did play in Indian history the role of profound socio-cultural movements. Such are Tāntrism, Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, Sufism, Sikhism—to mention only a few of the more prominent ones. In the present anthology no attempt is made to include papers on these, for it is felt that a collection of studies in these should preferably be done in the form of a separate volume, the present one trying to cover Indian philosophy in the restricted sense having become much bigger than originally visualised.

Though concentrating on Indian philosophy in this restricted sense, it is considered desirable to include in the present collection a few articles on subjects that do not form the characteristic peculiarity of any specific traditional system and the intrinsic philosophical significance of which is at best a matter of controversy. Such, for example, are the studies in *yoga* and *karma*. Whatever may be philosophical worth of the belief in these, the fact is that these became the floating mental possessions as it were of a very large number of Indian philosophers, irrespective of their sectarian affiliation. The literature produced on these by the modern scholars during the last hundred and fifty years is really vast and, what is unfortunate, the frequent tendency of rationalizing and re-rationalizing these have contributed to the entrenchment of certain ideological forces that are seriously hampering the cause of Indian progress today. In the present volume are included mainly those studies in *yoga* and *karma* that have more historical interest.

Excepting for only a few, the articles reprinted here are taken from periodicals, access to the copies of some of which is becoming increasingly difficult. The exceptions are : 1) *Schools of Vedānta* by S. K. Maitra (taken from his

Studies in Philosophy and Religion, 2nd edition, Calcutta 1956), *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* by S. Kuppuswami Sastri (the author's introduction to *A Primer of Indian Logic*, Madras 1951) and *Dignāga and Dharmakīrti* by Th. Stcherbatsky (from his *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. i). Besides these, two articles are taken from the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (ed. Hastings). These are 1) *Mahāyāna* by L. de la Vallee Poussin and 2) *Indian Atomism* by H. Jacobi. References to the periodicals from which the rest of the articles are taken are mentioned with the following abbreviations :

ABORI—*Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.*
IA—*Indian Antiquary*
IHQ—*Indian Historical Quarterly*
ISPP—*Indian Studies : Past & Present*
JAOS—*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JASB—*Journal of the Asiatic Society, Calcutta*
JRAS—*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland*
MASI—*Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India.*

Though it was originally thought that the articles were to be selected from the periodicals alone, the few exceptions mentioned had to be made because brief, authoritative and comprehensive studies in the subjects covered by these could not be traced in the standard periodicals available in the English language.

This leads us to explain another limitation of the present collection. There exists a very large number of outstanding contributions to the study of the Indian philosophical heritage written both in Indian vernaculars as well as in languages like German, French, Russian, Tibetan, Mongolian and Chinese. Only a handful of these is so far published in English translation. An anthology of the studies in Indian philosophy would have been much more enriched if it could include some articles not yet available in English. But such an attempt presupposes more resources than are at present available. Besides, what is already available in

the English language constitutes a vast general fund awaiting a more adequate utilisation by our historians.

It is not the place to attempt any critical assessment of the views expressed in the papers reprinted here. But it is necessary to try to be clear about a few points—particularly about the principles followed for selecting the articles.

Each paper included in the present volume is selected evidently because it is considered to have an importance of its own. But this does not mean that the views expressed in all the papers are taken as definite or finally established conclusions. On the contrary, as it will be noticed by the readers, the views expressed on the same problem—and sometimes even the basic understanding of the position of the same philosophers—in the different papers do not necessarily concur.

Here is just an example. The philosophical position of Uddālaka Āruṇi, as understood by Edgerton (*The Upaniṣads : What do They Seek and Why* ?) widely differs from the same as understood by Ruben (*Uddālaka and Yājñavalkya* : *Materialism and Idealism*). It is felt by the compiler of the present collection that on this particular point, the latter is much more true to the texts, besides being immensely important for the historical understanding of the ideological situation of the Upaniṣadic age. But, then, why include the former paper also ? The reason is that Edgerton's paper gives us an outstanding analysis of another aspect of the general drift of the Upaniṣadic speculations about which Ruben is silent. It is the strong spell of the primitive magical belief on a very wide range of Upaniṣadic thinkers. Edgerton does not unfortunately note that this belief is already largely displaced : what must have originally been the belief in the magical efficacy of the ritual acts appears in the Upaniṣads as the belief in the magical potency of "esoteric wisdom" (*rahasyam*). Nor has he raised the question concerning the socio-economic conditions under which alone such a cult of "esoteric wisdom" could

be possible. Nevertheless, his main point is extremely important particularly for the purpose of outgrowing the age-old myth about the Upaniṣads, namely that the Upaniṣads are revealed texts recording mystic intuitions of perennial truth. The other myth following from it is that the Upaniṣads contain a single or monolithic philosophical view, associated in popular mind with Vedāntic idealism. Ruben's paper explodes this myth effectively, for he shows how already in the Upaniṣadic period the basic struggle between idealism and its antithesis begun in Indian philosophy, though for the right understanding of this it is necessary to degeneralise Edgerton's claim that the *whole* of Upaniṣadic speculations is under the spell of magic belief: apparently a philosopher like Uddālaka outgrows this spell and becomes in a very important sense the pioneer of scientific method in philosophy.

All this is mentioned for emphasising one point. Articles expressing widely divergent views are included in the present collection and the purpose of this is to show that a considerable number of questions about Indian philosophy still awaits a more intensive investigation from various angles. Sometimes even the very data forming the basis of the views expressed remain open to basically different interpretations. Thus, for example, what Kauṭilya means by *yoga* in his list of logic-oriented philosophies (*ānvīkṣikī*) is differently understood by Jacobi (*A Contribution to the Early History of Indian Philosophy*) and Kuppuswami Sastri (*Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikā*). As will be seen by the readers, the interpretation of the word *yoga* in this connection is materially important for determining the antiquity of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Since as eminent an authority on Indian philosophy as Phanibhusana Tarkavagisa favours the same interpretation as offered by Kuppuswami Sastri and adduces more evidences to show that by *yoga* Kauṭilya presumably means the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, this particular point in Jacobi's paper seems to be in need of ammendment, though this does not at all mean that the modern students of ancient Indian history and culture can really do without the otherwise admirable

paper of Jacobi. In any case, it is felt that without the inclusion of both the papers of Jacobi and Kuppuswami Sastri—and without adding to these the two brief studies in Nyāya philosophy by H. P. Sastri (*An Examination of the Nyāya-sūtra* and *History of Nyāya-darśana from Japanese Sources*)—the present anthology would have run the risk of giving a false sense of chronological security about Indian philosophy, which, at the present stage of research, it is essential for the students of Indian history to avoid.

The chronological uncertainty about many aspects of the Indian philosophical development creates obvious difficulties in the preparation of an anthology like the present one. One of these is about the arrangement of the papers included, which, in certain respects, becomes more or less arbitrary. Perhaps an easy way out of it would have been to submit to the popular classification of Indian philosophies into *āstika* and *nāstika*—the former meaning those that are based on the Veda and the latter those that are opposed to the scriptural authority of the Veda. But this classification has itself the ugly history of being evolved neither by the philosophers themselves nor by the philologists and grammarians primarily responsible for determining the meanings of words but by the law-giver Manu, who came out with the declaration that by *nāstika* is meant those that vilify the Veda. This history is ugly, because Manu's own interest in philosophy is clearly extra-philosophical: it is nothing more than protecting the norm of the *varṇāśrama* or caste-based society. That a classification like this based on the law-giver's mandate should result only in confusions is only to be expected. Thus, it results in the quaint scripture-oriented picture of essentially secular philosophies like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya. Besides, it prevents one from seeing the basic philosophical affinity between the idealism of the Advaita Vedāntists and the Mahāyāna Buddhists so called —an affinity without seeing which much of the later phase of the Indian philosophical tradition remains incompletely understood.

Discarding the conventional *āstika-nāstika* classification

and failing at the same time to follow any well-established chronology, some other procedure had to be adopted for the purpose of arranging the articles in the present volume. A few points about this may be briefly explained here.

Reporting on the archaeological relics of the Indus religion, Marshall observes, "There is enough in the fragments we have recovered to demonstrate that, so far as it was capable of expression in outward concrete forms, this religion of the Indus people was the lineal progenitor of Hinduism. But these fragments give us a glimpse only of the popular, devotional and superstitious side of this religion. Of its other and more rational side—of esoteric ideas and philosophic concepts that may have been as fundamental to it as to later Hinduism—they have nothing to tell. This is the misfortune of our possessing no documentary material that can be deciphered. Yet that there must have been such another side to this religion can hardly be doubted, unless we are to believe that a people capable of evolving this highly complex and advanced civilization were yet incapable of progressing beyond primitive animistic beliefs with which the pre-Aryans have hitherto been credited ; or that, while they were superior to the Vedic Aryans in all that concerned material culture, they were yet hopelessly behind them in the ordinary process of abstract thought." (*Mohenjo-daro and the Indus Civilization*, London 1931, Vol. i, p. 77). Others do not admit the validity of this inference of the possible development of rational philosophy proportionate to that of the material culture, because the Indus relics are also indicative of a social structure in which superstitions had presumably been one of the most effective instruments for keeping the masses of people over a vast area under strong theocratic control. It could not thus be the kind of society that favoured the growth of rational philosophy.

But this does not mean that there is nothing in the ideological situation of the ancient Indus to connect it with the later Indian philosophical situation. The wide prevalence in the belief in *yoga* among the l ter Indian philosophers is already referred to and most of the scholars are agreed

that a considerable number of the Indus relics can be interpreted only as indicative of the prevalence of certain hoary practices in the Indus period—presumably as part of the ancient priest-craft—which later came to be called the *yoga*. R. P. Chanda is one of the earlier scholars to have argued this point, who moreover shows how an attempt can be made to understand some otherwise obscure passages of the early Vedic litarature in the light of the Indus relics. The present anthology opens with extracts from two of his contributions, the second of which draws our attention particularly to *yoga*—or proto-*yoga*—in the ancient Indus period.

Thematic consideration needs that this should be followed up by a more extensive discussion of the meanings, methods and aims of *yoga*, as found in the later literary records. For this purpose, one could have gone in for some study in Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra*. But that is not done in the present collection. Patañjali is not only a compiler of the different *yoga* practices that came down from an unknown antiquity ; he moreover wants to graft on these the philosophical fundamentals of the atheistic Sāṃkhya combined with a peculiar theism of his own. The philosophical basis thus given to *yoga* is arbitrary, for with the exception only of the Lokāyatas and Pūrvamīmāṃsakas practically all the traditional Indian philosophers subscribe to the belief in *yoga*. (In this connection, H. P. Sastri's view that the belief in *yoga* is only a later addition to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika needs of course to be noted : see his *History of Nyāyaśāstra from Japanese Sources*.) In any case, instead of an article on *yoga* with Patañjali's bias for a particular philosophical position—usually called *seśvara-sāṃkhya* or "Saṃkhya with God"—preference is given here to Hopkin's extensive study of the *yoga* in which, without ignoring the *Yoga-sūtra*, he takes into account a very wide range of floating tradition about *yogā* that came to be recorded particularly in the great epics.

With these preliminaries over about the Indus ideology and its possible hangover in later Indian thought, one

naturally passes on to the Vedic literature, the ending portions of which—the Upaniṣads—contain a clear picture of the emergence of philosophical activity proper. The need is felt for including a general review of the Vedic literature as introducing the discussions of the Vedic philosophies. The product of modern scholarship on the Vedic literature is vast and often highly specialised. It is not easy to select any specific study in the Veda for a general anthology like the present one. Fortunately, we have the masterly review of modern Vedic studies by R. N. Dandekar and those portions of it that are likely to be of special use for the students of ancient Indian history and culture are included in the present volume.

After this are given two articles on the Upaniṣads. These two are followed up by the studies in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā system. Since the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā is the direct outcome of the *Brāhmaṇa*-s to which the Upaniṣads are appended, stricter considerations perhaps demand that the discussion of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā should precede those of the Upaniṣads. But the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā as a philosophy presumably develops after the Upaniṣads—largely by contesting the theistic and idealistic trends of Upaniṣadic thought. Besides, if there is any arbitrariness in putting Pūrva-mīmāṃsā after the Upaniṣads,the procedure is not without some advantage of its own. It makes a rather smooth transition from the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of works to the theory of *karma*, which becomes a common possession of a large number of Indian philosophical views. In a sense, the problem posed by the *karma* theory receives in the *Gītā* a solution that has historically become most powerful. Therefore, notwithstanding the obvious chronological difficulties, to the extensive survey of the theory of *karma* by Hopkins is added Kosambi's study in the *Gītā*. As the theism of the *Gītā* draws much from the different trends of the Vedānta philosophy, Maitra's brief survey of the latter may be useful for certain theoretical clarifications about the *Gītā* just as De's note on Kṛṣṇa is likely to be

useful for further historical clarification of the background of the *Gītā*.

If all this is viewed as digression necessitated by thematic consideration, the anthology returns to follow the chronological procedure, roughly though it may be. Since the early canonical works of the Buddhists and Jainas mention Lokāyata and Sāṃkhya and since Jacobi's analysis of the evidence of the *Arthaśāstra* (*A Contribution to the Early History of Indian Philosophy*) makes it clear that Lokāyata and Sāṃkhya received philosophical recognition at a very early period of history, studies in these are put before those in Buddhism and Jainism.

The arrangement followed for the studies in Jainism and Buddhism is perhaps not in need of much explanation. Jacobi's article on the date of the philosophical *sūtra*-s, which has acquired practically the status of a reference work for the modern scholars, had to be put after the studies in Buddhism, because much of the evidences on which he relies pertain to the Buddhist tradition.

That which is frankly arbitrary about the arrangement of the articles in the present volume is the placing of the studies in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, with which is connected the one on Indian atomism. As a matter of fact too little is at present definitely known about the origin of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to enable us to determine its exact place in the historical development of the Indian philosophical views. This is one of the main problems on which the historical investigation into the Indian philosophical tradition awaits much more intensive investigation.

In view of the bulk acquired by the total manuscript, it was considered desirable to publish it in three separate volumes. The first volume—which is being now published—contains articles mainly on the proto-historic and Vedic period. The second volume will contain articles on the early Indian sects and secular philosophies of the post-Vedic period. The third volume will contain articles on Jainism and Buddhism, and also on the possible influence of Buddhism on Māyāvada.

I am particularly grateful to my young friend Professor Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, M.A., D.Litt., Department of Sanskrit, Calcutta University, for patient collaboration and technical help in the preparation of the present anthology.

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THE INDUS VALLEY IN THE VEDIC PERIOD

R. P. CHANDA

Many of the stanzas of the *Ṛgveda* contain references to Pura and Pur both of which terms mean *nagara*, 'town', in classical Sanskrit. In one stanza (7, 15, 4) an extensive (*śata-bhuji*) Pur made of copper or iron (*ayas*) is referred to. In another stanza (1, 58, 8) prayer is offered to Agni to protect the worshipper with Purs of *ayas*. In such passages *ayas* is evidently used in a metaphorical sense to denote strength. Śuṣṇa, a demon, is said to have a moveable (*cariṣṇva*) Pura (8, 1, 28). In the *Ṛgveda* Pura is much oftener connected with the enemies of the Āryas than with the Ārya Ṛṣis and warriors, Two of the famous Ṛgvedic kings, Divodāsa, the chief of the Bharatas, and Purukutsa, the chief of the Purus, are found engaged in war with hostile owners of Puras. Divodāsa was the son of Vadhryasva and grandfather of the more famous Sūdas who defeated a confederacy of ten tribes including the Yadus, Turvaśas and Purus on the western bank of the Paruṣṇī (Ravi). It is said (4, 30, 20) that Indra overthrew a hundred Puras made of stone (*aśmanmayī*) for his worshipper Divodāsa. The Puras that Indra overthrew for Divodāsa evidently belonged to Śambara who is called a Dāṣa (non-Ārya or demon) of the mountain (6, 26, 5). In one stanza (9, 60, 2), among the enemies of Divodāsa are mentioned the Yadu (the Chief of the Yadus) and Turvaśa (the chief of the Turvaśas) with Śambara. The greatest feat that Indra performed on behalf of Purukutsa, the chief of the Purus, is thus described in a stanza (6, 20, 10), "May we, O Indra, gain new (wealth) through your favour ; the Purus worship thee with this hymn and sacrifices. You destroyed the seven autumnal (*śaradi*) Puras with thunder weapon, slew Dāsas and gave wealth to Purukutsa''. The epithet *śaradi*, usually translated as 'autumnal', is explained by Sāyaṇa in different ways. In his commentary on the above stanza he

explains the term *śaradi* as 'belonging to a demon named Śarat'. But in other places (1, 131, 4 etc.) he explains it as 'annual Puras of the enemies strengthened for a year with ramparts, ditches etc'. The authors of the *Vedic Index* are of opinion that *śaradi* or autumnal Puras 'may refer to the forts in that season being occupied against Ārya attacks or against inundations caused by overflowing rivers.' The same exploit performed by Indra on behalf of the chief of the Purus is also referred to in certain other stanzas.[1]

Modern scholars interpret the term Pur or Pura as a temporary place of refuge. The authors of the *Vedic Index* write :

'It would probably be a mistake to regard these forts (Pur) as permanently occupied fortified places like the fortresses of the mediaeval barony. They were probably mere places of refuge against attack, ramparts of hardened earth with palisades and a ditch. Pischel and Geldner, however, think that there were towns with wooden walls and ditches like the Indian town of Pāṭaliputra known to Megasthenes and the Pali texts. This is possible, but hardly susceptible of proof, and it is not without significance that the work Nagara is of late occurrence.'

The terms Pur and Pura mean *nagara*, 'city', 'town', and not fort. The Sanskrit equivalent of 'fort' is *durga* which also occurs in the *Ṛgveda* (5, 34, 7 ; 7, 25, 2). In one stanza (1, 41, 3) not noticed by the authors of the *Vedic Index* Durga and Pura occur side by side. Śāyaṇa here takes Pura as an epithet of Durga meaning 'neighbouring'. But if we can shake off our bias relating to the absence of towns in the Ṛgvedic period we can recognise in this stanza references to both fort and town. The recovery of the ruins of cities at Harappa and Mohen-jo-Daro leaves no room for doubt that the Ṛgvedic Āryas were familiar with towns and cities of aliens'. It is futile to seek any more historical elements in the legends of Divodāsa and Purukutsa than perhaps the names of these heroes. But if we eliminate the mythical and fanciful additions there is no reason to doubt the possibility of the nucleus. There existed and the

1. Muir, *Original Sanskrit Texts*, Vol. II (London 1871), pp. 378-379.

folk memory remembered that there once existed Ārya worshippers of Indra who waged wars against civilized aboriginal neighbours living in towns and fighting from within strong-holds. Who, then, were these enemies of the Āryas ? Do the hymns of the *Ṛgveda* give us any more information about them ?

It appears to me that the aboriginal towns folk with whom the Āryas came into collision in the Indus Valley are called Paṇis in the hymns of all the books of the*Ṛgveda*. Yāska (*Nirukta* 6, 27) in his comment on *Ṛgveda* 8, 66, 10 says, 'The Paṇis are merchants', and in his comment on *R.V.* 10, 108, 1 (*Nirukta* 11, 25) he calls the Paṇis demons. The distinction between the human and the superhuman Paṇi is also recognised by Sāyaṇa, the author of the commentary on the *Ṛgveda*, and the context justifies the distinction. The word Paṇi is evidently derived from Paṇa, 'price'. The human Paṇis of the *Ṛgveda* are wealthy merchants who do not offer sacrifice and do not give gifts to Priests. In *R.V.* 1, 124, 10 the poet addressing Dawn says, 'Let the Paṇis who do not perform sacrifice and do not give gifts sleep unwakened (for ever). Another poet sings, 'Ye mighty ones (Aśvins) what do you do there ; why do you stay there among people who are held in high esteem though not offering sacrifices ; ignore them, destroy the life of the Paṇis' (*R.V.* 1, 83, 3). A poet prays to Indra (1, 33, 3). 'Do not behave like Paṇi' (*mā Paṇībabhūḥ*), which according to the scholiast means, 'Do not demand the price of kine.' Another poet, expecting a suitable reward for his offering of Soma drink, adresses the same deity as Paṇi (8,45, 14). The Soma-drinker Indra does not like to make friends with the rich Paṇi who does not offer Soma sacrifice (4,28,7). A poet prays (3, 58, 2). 'Destroy in us the mentality of the Paṇi' *(jaretham asmat vipaṇeḥ manīṣām)*. Sometime the *Ṛṣi* (poet) betrays a conciliatory mood. In one hymn (6, 53) the god Pūṣan is repeatedly requested 'to soften the heart of the Paṇi' and make the Paṇis obedient. This hymn occurs in a book (6) of the *Ṛgveda* composed by Ṛṣis of the family of Bharadvāja. In one hymn' of the Book (6, 45, 31-33) the poet, a Bharadvāja, praises Bṛbu, a Paṇi chief, for giving thousands and a thousands and a thousand liberal gifts. Indian tradition long remembered this

acceptance of gifts by Bharadvāja from the Paṇi Bṛbu as an exceptional case, an example of the special rule that a Brāhman who has fallen into distress may accept gifts from despicable men without being tained by sin. We are told in the code of Manu (10, 107) 'Bharadvāja, a performer of great austerities, accepted many cows from the carpenter Bṛbu, when he was starving together with his sons in a lonely forest', (Bühler). Sāyaṇa in his commentary on *R.V.* 6, 45, 31 describes Bṛbu as the carpenter of the Paṇis.

It is evident from the hymns of the *Ṛgveda* that the Āryas were divided into two main classes, the priests and the warriors. Cattle breeding appears to be the main source of their livelihood cows being the chief wealth. Agriculture was practised to a limited extent. A hymn (9, 112) refers to the different professions followed and the crafts practised by the Āryas. Trade finds no place in the list. So the conclusion that the much maligned Paṇis were the representatives of an earlier commercial civilisation seems irresistible. Among the antiquities unearthed at Mohen-jo-Daro are coins with pictographic legends that indicate the very early development of commercial life in the Indus Valley. The Paṇis probably represented this pre-historic civilisation of the Indus Valley in its last phase when it came into contact with the invading Ārya civilisation. During the second millennium B.C. there occurred in the Indus Valley events analogous to those that occurred in the Aegean World at about the same time, that is to say, successive waves of invaders of Aryan speech poured from the north-west. These invaders who in the *Ṛgveda* call themselves Ārya met in the southern part of the valley a civilised people who lived in cities and castles and mainly depended on commerce for their livelihood. The Ārya conquerors who were inferior in material culture either destroyed the cities or allowed them to fatl into ruin. Their great god Indra is called Puroha or Purandara, 'sacker of cities'. Like the pre-historic civilisation of the Aegean, the pre-historic civilisation of the Indus Valley also failed to survive the shock of the Aryan invasion....

(MASI, No. 31, 1926. Selections)

SURVIVAL OF THE PREHISTORIC CIVILIZATION OF THE INDUS VALLEY

R. P. CHANDA

The Vrātya and the Yati

If we are right in our assumption that in the Indus Valley the distinctions between the priest and the king, between the Ṛṣi families on the one hand and the warrior clans and the common people *(viśaḥ)* on the other, from the dawn of history, is to be traced to the fundamental cultural difference between the two groups, then we have got to abandon the orthodox view that the upper Indus Valley was wrested from the dark skinned and noseless Dāsa or Dasyus still in a state of savagery by a vigorous race of immigrants who descended from the mountains of Afghanistan near about the beginning of the second milennium B.C. The hypothesis that seems to fit in best with the evidence discussed above may be stated thus : on the eve of the Aryan immigration the Indus Valley was in possession of a civilized and warlike people. The Aryans, mainly represented by the *Ṛṣi* clans, came to seek their fortune in small numbers more or less as missionaries of the cults of Indra, Varuṇa, Agni and other gods of nature and settled in peace under the protection of the native king who readily appreciated their great merit as sorcerers and employed them to secure the assistance of the Aryan gods against their human and non-human enemies by offering sacrifices with the recitation of hymns. Now, if the hymns of the *Ṛgveda* enable us to reconstruct the proto-history of the Indus Valley in this way, the relics of an advanced pre-historic civilization unearthed at Harappa on the Ravi and Mohen-jo-Daro in Sind warrant us in taking a further step and recognising in the warrior clans—the Bharatas, Purus, Yadus, Turvaśas, Anus, Druhyus and others celebrated in the *Ṛgveda* the representatives of the ruling class of the

indigenous chalcolithic population. The main difficulty of this hypothetical reconstruction, a link between the Vedic traditions and the relics of the chalcolithic civilization of the Indus Valley, now faces us.

A group of stone statuettes found at Mohen-jo-Daro in a mutilated condition seems to me to supply this missing link between the pre-historic and the historic civilization of India. The only part of these statuettes that is in fair state of preservation, the bust is characterised by a stiff erect posture of the head, the neck and the chest, and half-shut eyes looking fixedly at the tip of the nose.[1] This posture is not met with in the figure sculptures, whether per-historic or historic, of any people outside India ; but it is very conspicuous in the images worshipped by all Indian sects, including the Jainas and the Buddhists, and is known as the posture of the Yogin or one engaged in practicing concentration. As examples images of a seated Jina or Tīrthaṅkara of a standing Jina and of a standing Buddhist deity called Bodhisattava Vajrapāṇi are reproduced for comparison. Most of the Buddhist, and the Brahmanic images, like our image of Vajrapāṇi, show some form of action with their hands, such, as calling the earth to witness, teaching, offering boon, offering protection, etc., but their face, like the face of the Jinas, invariably shows absorption in Yoga. The Hindu conception of the divine is modelled on the Yogin. The earliest known images of the Jina or Buddha are not earlier than the 1st century A.D.[2] So a distance of about three thousand years separates the statues of Mohen-jo-Daro and the earliest known Jina and Buddhist images. How, then, can the former serve as a link between the history and pre-history of India,—as a witness of the survival of the chalcolithic civilisation in the historic period ? Though no archaeological evidence supporting such an assumption has yet come to light, there are literary evidences that seem to bridge the gulf. In the

1. For other statuettes of the type see *A.S.I.A.R.*, 1926-27, Plate XIX. Plate I. fig a shows a head with wide open eyes evidently due to the loss of the shell inlay and the upper eyelid of paste.
2. See the Plates in Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, "The Origin of Buddha Image", *The Art Bulletin*, Vol. IX, No. 4 (New York), 192 .

Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, a text recognised as part of the Vedic canon and commented on by Śaṃkara, the religious practices known as *dhyāna-yoga* (*dhyāna*=contemplation ; *yoga*=concentration) are thus described (ii, 8-10) :

"If a wise man hold his body with its three erect parts (chest, neck and head) even, and turn his senses with the mind towards the heart, he will then in the boat of Brahman cross all the torrents which cause fear.

"Compressing his breathings let him, who has subdued all motions, breathe forth through the nose with gentle breath. Let the wise man without fail restrain his mind, that chariot yoked with vicious horses.

"Let him perform his exercises in a place level, pure, free from pebbles, fire, and dust, delightful by its sounds, its water and bowers, not painful to the eye, and full of shelters and caves."[3]

The *dhyāna-yoga* is thus prescribed in the *Bhagavadgītā*, vi, 11-13 :

"Fixing his seat not too high, nor too low, and covering it over with blades of kusa grass, a deer skin, and a sheet of cloth, in a clean place.

"Seated on that seat, there fixing his mind exclusively on one point, and restraining the activities of his mind and outer organs of sensation, he should practise *yoga* for the purification of the self.

"Holding his body, neck and head even, unmoved and steady *gazing at the tip of his own nose*, and not looking around.

"With a tranquil mind, fearless, observing the vow of an ascetic, restraining the mind, fixing the mind on Me (God) and making Me as the goal (the Yogin) should be seated (in meditation)."

In the *Bhagavadgītā* v, 27 it is also said that the Yogin should make his out-breathing and in-breathing even and breathe through the nostrils. According to the Yogasūtra of

3. English translation by Max Muller, *The Upaniṣads*, *The Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XV, Oxford, 1900, p. 241.

Patañjali (ii, 29)[4] there are eight limbs or constituents of Yoga, *yama*, abstentions ; *niyama*, observances ; *āsana*, postures ; *prāṇāyāma*, interruption of the flow of inspiration and respiration ; *pratyāhāra*, abstention from the objects of the senses ; *dhāraṇa*, binding the mind to a place (i.e., the tip of the nose) ; *dhyāna*, contemplation ; *samādhi*, rapt concentration.

We learn from some of the earliest Pali Buddhist *suttas* (belonging to the *Majjhima Nikāya*) that after his renunciation the Śākya monk Siddhārtha (the future Gotama Buddha) went to Uruvela near Gaya to practise what is called Dhyāna-yoga in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.* About the spot selected for the purpose we are told :

"Still in search of the right, and in quest of the excellent read to peace beyond compare, I came in the course of an alms-pilgrimage through Magadha, to the camp township of Uruvela, and there took up my abode. Said I to myself on surveying the place—Truly a delightful spot, with its goodly grooves and clear flowing river with ghats and amenities, hard by a village for sustenance. What more for his striving can a young man need whose heart is set on striving ? So there I sat down, needing nothing further for my striving."[5]

The *Yoga* exercises practised by the future Buddha at Uruvela are described in the *Mahā-saccakka-sutta* where in it is said that with teeth clenched and with tongue pressed against his palate, by sheer force of mind he restrained, coerced and dominated his mind till sweat streamed from his armpits. As a result :

"Resolute grew my perseverance which never quailed ; there was established in me a mindfulness which knew no distraction,—though my body was sore distressed and afflicted, because I was harassed by these struggles as I painfully struggled on, even such unpleasant feelings as then arose did not take possession of my mind."[6]

4. J. H. Woods, *The Yoga-system of Patañjali,* Harvard Oriental Series Vol. XVII, Cambridge, Mass., 1914.
5. English translation by Lord Chalmers, *Further Dialogues of the Buddha,* Vol. I, London, 1926, p. 117.
6. Lord Chalmers, *op. cit*, p. 174.

The exercise referred to here is evidently the *āsana* or posture. Then the future Buddha repeatedly performed *Prāṇāyāma* (*appanakam*), not breathing with *dhyāna* (*jhanam*), contemplation. He kept on stopping all breathing, in or out, through mouth and nose and ears. Then he undertook severe austerities and cut off food altogether. As these austerities did not enable the future Buddha to transcend ordinary human limits, he began to look for another path of *Bodhi* (Enlightenment). Then—

"A memory came to me of how once seated in the cool shade of a rose-apple *(jambu)* tree on the lands of my father the Śākyan, I divested of pleasures of sense and of wrong states of mind, entered upon, and abode in the First Dhyāna *(pathamaṃ jhanam)*, with all its zest and satisfaction,—a state bred of inward aloofness but not divorced from observation and reflection. Could this be the path to *Bodha* ? In prompt response to this memory, my consciousness told me that here lay the true path of Bodha".[7]

The description of *dhyāna* as a state of inward aloofness together with observation and reflection practically agrees with Patañjali's definition of *dhayāna* as *dhāraṇa*, fixed attention, joined to an idea (*Yogasūtra*, iii, 1-2). When the future Buddha remembered his first *dhyāna* he took solid food and seated himself to perform it. After the first *dhyāna* he rose above resoning and reflection and entered into second *dhyāna* which is described as samadhijim, 'a state bred of rapt concentration'. The second *dhyāna* corresponds to what Patañjali also calls *samādhi*. The third and the fourth *dhyānas* of the Buddhists correspond to different stages of *samādhi*. The future Buddha successfully practised the four successive *dhayānas* in the first watch of the memorable night of his enlightenment and as a first fruit recalled his previous births. Next he gained the *divyachakshu* or the Eyre Celestial which enabled him to see "beings in the act of passing hence and re-appearing elsewhere". Ultimately the future Buddha saw the four noble truths—suffering, origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path that leads

7. Lord Chalmers, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

to the cessation of suffering, and by now the fortunate possessor of *Bodhi*, perfect knowledge or enlightenment, that is to say, a Buddha, he realised, "Rebirth is no more ; my task is done".

Patañjali gives the collective name *saṃyama*, constraint, to the three exercises, *dhāraṇa*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi* (iii. 4), and "the knowledge of the past and the future" (iii. 16.). Indian tradition attributes the *Yogasūtra* to the famous grammarian Patañjali who flourished in the second century B.C. Questions such as, whether the *Yogasūtra* is an old, or much younger, and whether the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* is a post-Buddhist or pre-Buddhist work, are quite immaterial for the present discussion. These Brahmanic texts, read with the Pali Buddhist texts, furnish strong traditional evidence to show that *dhyāna-yoga* was regularly practised by ascetics of different sects as early as the sixth century B.C.

The Buddhist and Upaniṣadic traditions carry us backward beyond the earliest known images of Jina and Buddha by six or seven centuries only. But there is still left a distance of over two millenniums between Gotama Buddha and the stone statuettes of Mohenjodaro. Where is the bridge over this gulf ? The *dhyāna-yoga* itself, as outlined in the Pali canon, includes primitive elements that take us back to an earlier stage of culture than the one represented by Upaniṣadism and early Buddhism. In the *Sāmañña-phala Sutta* (the fruits of the life of a recluse) it is said that the practice of the four *dhyānas* enables a recluse to gain *Ṛddhi* or magical powers. There are these modes of *Ṛddhi* :—from being one to become many and having become many to become one ; being visible to become invisible ; to pass without hindrance to the further side of a wall or a battlement or a mountain, as if through air ; to penetrate solid ground, as if through water ; to walk on water, as if on solid ground ; to travel cross-legged in the sky ; to touch the sun and the moon with hand ; to ascend in body up to the heaven of Brahmā.[8] In the *Kevaddha Sutta*,

8. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, London, 1899, p. 88.

Kevaddha, a young householder of Nalanda, requests Buddha to command one of his disciples to perform wonders (*ṛddhi-pratihārya*) in order to win a larger number of devoted adherents among the population of Nalanda. Buddha in reply distinguishes three types of wonders or miracles (*pratihāryāṇi*), *ṛddhi* miracles, the marvellous power of mind -reading or guessing other peoples' character, and the miracle of instruction, and adds if a monk were to perform *ṛddhi* miracles, the unbeliever might say, O ! he was not an Arhant, he must have performed the miracles with the help of the Gandhāra charm (*Gandhārī nāma vijja*) ; if a monk were to guess the thought or character of another man, the unbeliever might say, he must have performed it through jewel charm (*maṇiko nāma vijja*). Buddha says in conclusion, "Well, Kevaddha, it is because I perceive danger in the practice of *ṛddhi* wonders (as well as mind and character reading), that I loathe, and abhor, and am ashamed thereof."[9]

Like the vedic sacrifices and penances, Dhyāna-yoga was probablly originaly practised as a means of gaining worldly objects and mircaulous powers. But the growth of belief in the doctrine of transmigration brought about a revolutionary change in the spiritual outlook. As a result of this change, the Vedic gods came to be classed as mortals and the Vedic sacrifices offered to these gods lost ground, while Dhyāna-yoga entered the arena in a new role as a means of acquiring perfect knowledge which alone could lead a man to final emancipation from the cycle of re-births. But in the older prose Upaniṣads which contain the earliest notice of the doctrine of transmigration.[10] Dhyāna-yoga does not find that recognition. These Upaniṣads recognise two paths *Pitṛyāna*, the path of fathers, and *Devayāna*, the path of the gods. The followers of *Pitṛyāna* perform sacrifices, works of piety and austerities (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, vi. 16), or living in a village, practise sacrifices, works of piety and alms-giving (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad,* v. 10. 3-7), and after enjoying the fruits of their works in heaven after death are

9. T. W. Rhys Davids. *op. cit.*, pp. 276-279.
10. Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda*, p. 573.

again reborn. The Devayānists worship the Truth with faith in the forest (*Bṛhadāraraṇyaka*, vi. 2, 15) or follow faith and austerities in the forest (*Chāndogya* v. 10, 1), and ultimately reach the world of Brahman from which there is no return.[11] According to the Buddhist texts Gotama Buddha taught that austerities were not absolutely necessary for gaining perfect knowledge ; Dhyāna-yoga (the practice of the four *dhyānas*) was enough for that purpose ; and that there was return even from the Brahmaloka (the world of Brahman). The futility of extreme penances and liability to death in the Brahmaloka make up the point of departure of early Buddhism from early Upaniṣadism as represented by the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, *Chāndogya* and *Kauṣītakī* Upaniṣads. It is therefore evident that Dhyāna-yoga was not originally practised even by Brāhmaṇas who sought final emancipation, but was confined to the heterodox Kṣatriyas like Buddha. The following legend preserved in the *Bhagavadgītā* (iv, 1-2) points to the same conclusion :—

"This immutable *yoga* I first exponded to Vivasvat (sungod) ; Vivasvat taught it to Manu and Manu thaught it to Ikṣvāku. Thus handed down by a succession of teachers this (*yoga*) was known to the royal sages, O punisher of enemies. that *yoga* has been lost here since a very long time".

If the orthodox followers of the Vedas did not adopt *yoga* in the early Upaniṣadic period for gaining the knowledge of Brahman, it is incredible that notwithstanding their elaborate sacrificial rites and penances (*tapas*), they practised postures (*āsana*) and regulations of breath (*prāṇāyāma*) in solitude in the pre-Uapniṣadic period for gaining magical powers. Therefore we have to conclude that *yoga* as a system of exercises for gaining magical powers originated among the non-Brāhmaṇa or pre-Aryan population of Northern India, or, rather North-Western India (e.g., *Gandhārī-vidyā*) in the pre-historic period.

The Vedic literature bears witness to the existence of two classes of non-Brāhmaṇa magician priests in the Vedic and the protohistoric period who are respectively called the Vrātyas and the Yatis. We first come across the Vrātya in the

11. Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 576.

Atharvaveda, book xv. In contents and style this Vrātya book is like the *Brāhmaṇas*, and like the *Brāhmaṇa* texts it is also in prose. The Vrātya, as described in the Vrātya book, is more or less an enigma. I shall give a few extracts from this book in Whitney's translation :—

1. "A Vrātya there was, just going about ; he stirred Prajā-pati.........He became Mahādeva... He became Īśāna. He became the sole Vrātya ; he took to himself a bow ; that was Indra's bow......

2. "Against both the *bṛhat* and the *rathantara* and the Āditya and all the gods doth he offend who revileth a thus-knowing Vrātya .... of him in the eastern quarter faith is the harlot Mitra the *Magadha*, discernment the garment, day the turban (*uṣṇīṣa*) night the hair, yellow the two *pravartas*, *kalmali* the jewel (*maṇi*), both what is and what is to be the two foot-men, mind the rough vehicle (*vipatha*)...the whirlwind the goad (*pratoda*)......

3. "He stood a year erect ; the god said to him : Vrātya, why now standest thou ? He said ; Let them bring together a settle (*asandi*) for me. For the Vrātya they brought together a settle............. That settle the Vrātya ascended.

* * * *

8. "He became impassioned ; thence was born the noble (*rājanya*). He arose towards the tribes (*viś*), the kinsmen, fond, food-eating.

* * * *

13......"Now in whosesoever house a thus-knowing Vrātya abides unlimited nights as guest, he thereby gains possession of those pure worlds that are unlimited. Now to whosesoever house may come as guest a non-Vrātya, calling himself Vrātya, bearing the nane only, he may draw him, and he may not draw him, For this deity I ask water ; this deity I cause to abide ; this, this deity I wait upon .....with this thought he should wait upon him.

* * * *

18. "Of that Vrātya—as for his right eye, that is yonder sun ; as for his left eye, that is yonder moon. As for his right ear, that is this fire ; as for his left ear, that is this

cleansing ('*wind*'). Day-and-night (are his) two nostrils ; Diti and Aditi (his) two skull-halves ; the year (his) head. With the day (is) the Vrātya westward ; wirh the night eastward ; homage to Vrātya".

This mystical Vrātya of the *Atharvaveda* (xv) has given rise to diverse theories.[12] The pious vagrant or wandering religious mendicant is certainly his prototype. Among the modern Hindus a wandering religious mendicant usually called Sādhu (saint), who is believed to be a *siddha-puruṣa*, 'one who has reached the goal', receives divine honours irrespective of his creed. This was also the practice of the Hindus in the past. To a great extent the Jainism of the laity is little more than saint worship. An old Jaina text, the *Kalpasūtra* of Bhadrabāhu, begins with this invocation. "Salutation to the Arhants, salutation to the Siddhas, salutation to the preceptors, salutation to the teachers, salutation to all saints on earth" (*namo loe savvasahunaṃ*). The inscription of Kharavela in the Hathigumpha on the Khandagiri hill near Bhuvanesvara (Orissa) opens with, *namo arahaṃtanam namo savasidhānām*. So it seems evident that the Vrātya to whom homage is offered in the *Atharvaveda* xv. is a true Vrātya or true Sādhu, a *Siddha-puruṣa*, who has reached his goal, i. e., acquired highest occult powers. In section 13 a true Vrātya is distinguished from a Vrātya in name only.

The inclusion of the turban (*uṣṇīṣa*), goad (*pratoda*) and *Vipatha* among the outfit of the Vrātya shows that the *hīna* (depressed) Vrātya described in the *Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa* (*Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa*), xvii. i. is the prototype of the Vrātya of the *Atharvaveda* xv. These depressed Vrātyas are described in the *Brāhmaṇa* as a class who "do not practise *brahmacarya* (asceticism) and do not engage in agriculture or trade", (xvii. 1.2) ; "who are eaters of poison who take food prepared in villages for feeding Brāhmaṇa ; who declare as unpronounceable words that are easily pronounced ; who wander about doing injury to innocent people ; who, though uninitiated, speak the

12. *Vedic Index*, Vol II, pp. 342-344 ; Winternitz. *op. eit*, p. 154 and note.

language of the initiated" (xvii. 1.9). According to the *Baudhāyana-śrauta-sūtra* (xxvi. 32) several persons were initiated into the Vrātya sacrifice at the same time. After the sacrifice the leading Vrātya of the group is required to give as the sacrificial fee the following articles belonging to himself turban goad, a bow without arrow, a rough vehicle (*vipatha*) covered with planks, black cloth, two black and white skins, silver *niṣka*. Each of the other Vrātya participants in the sacrifice is required to part with cloth with red fringes and a pair of skins. The *Baudhāyana-śrauta-sūtra* (xviii. 24) gives a more detailed account of the Vrātya sacrifice. According to this authority, when a Vrātya is initiated in the sacrifice he retains his peculiar outfit which includes black cloth with black hem, a gold and a silver *niṣka* and black turban. Even when initiated in the sacrifice, he is allowed to speak the *Vrātyavāda*, the dialect of the Vrātya. His goad serves as the sacrificial post. In the *Lāṭyāyana-śrauta-sūtra* (viii. 6, 7) it is said that the Vrātyas wear their turban in a slanting manner. Baudhāyana adds a white blanket (xxvi. 32) to the Vrātya's outfit. Thus attired, and riding on a ramshackle chariot drawn by a horse and a mule (*Lāṭyāyana-śrauta-sūtra*, viii. 6. 10-11 ; *Āpastamba-śrauta-sūtra*, xxii, 5) the Vrātya wandering mendicant must have been a very impressive figure. The statement in the *Atharvaveda* xv. 8, "Vrātya became impassioned ; thence was born the Rājanya (Kṣatriya)" shows his close connection with the Kṣatriya caste. Another statement in the *Atharvaveda* (xv. 3), "He stood a year erect" seems to indicate that the Vrātya practised *yoga* —standing erect like the standing Jina in a posture known as *kāyotsarga*, 'dedication of the body', with the both arms hanging on sides. In the *Lāṭyāyana-śrauta-sūtra* it is added (viii. 6. 29), "After performing the Vrātya sacrifice a Vrātya should adopt *traividyāvṛti*", i.e., the profession of the Brāhmaṇa priest—studying and teaching the Vedas, performing and causing others to perform sacrifice, and giving and accepting gifts. The Vrātya sacrifice is evidently intended to incorporate with the Brāhmaṇa caste a class of religious mendicants who were occasionally employed as priests in Non-Vedic, and indirectly

even in Vedic rites, for in *Atharvaveda* xv. 12 it is said that when a Vrātya is a guest in a house the householder should not perform *agnihotra*, fire-offering, without his permission.

The Vrātyas emerge only in the later Vedic period and are not mentioned in the hymns of the *Ṛgveda*. But some of the hymns of that collection refer to another class, the Yatis, who were probably the fore-runners of the Vrātyas. In *Ṛgveda* viii. 3, 9 Indra is said to have helped the Yatis and the Ṛṣis Bhṛgu and Praskaṇva. In viii. 6. 18 it is said that the Yatis and Bhṛgus (*Bhṛgavaḥ*) praised Indra. The Yatis are deified, like the Vrātya after them, in *Ṛgveda* x. 72. 7, wherein it is stated that like the Yatis, the gods created the existing things. In a stanza of the *Sāmaveda* (ii. 304) that does not recur in the *Ṛgveda* the Yati is classed with Indra and Mitra as the slayer of Vṛtra, and Bhṛgu is classed with Indra as the slayer of Bala.[13] Bhṛgu and Bhṛgus are mentioned in the *Ṛgveda* as ancient Ṛṣis ranking with the Atharvans and the Aṅgirases as Fathers or founders of the Vedic fire-cult. The Bhṛgus are particularly connected with the discovery of the fire, its lighting up, and its care.[14] The semi-divine founder of the Bhṛgu clan must have lived long anterior to the Ṛgvedic period, in what should be recognised as the proto-historic period, and the Yatis associated with him have to be assigned to the same age. But the later Vedic literature repeatedly refers to a legend which shows that the Yatis incurred the hostility of Indra and were destroyed as a consequence. Thus in the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* of the *Yajurveda* it is said :—

"Indra gave the Yatis to the Sālavṛkas ; them they ate on the right of the high alter. Whatever is left of the sprinkling waters he should pour on the right of the high alter ; whatever cruel is there that he appeases thereby". (Keith).

The legend is also referred to in the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* ii. 4.9.2. In the *Aitareya Brāmaṇa*, vii. 28. Indra's giving

13. Muir, *Sanskrit Texts, Vol* V., London, 1870, p. 49, note 72.
14. Keith, *op. cit*, p 225 ; Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 140.

away the Yatis to the hyaenas (Sālavṛkas), like his slaying Vṛtra, is included among sins that led the gods to exclude him from Soma drinking. The legend is thus narrated in the *Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa*, viii. 1.4 :—

"Indra gave away the Yatis over to the Sālavṛkas. Three among them survived : Rayovāja, Pṛthuraśmi and Bṛhadgiri, They said, 'who will support us as sons ?' 'I shall support you', said Indra and placing them on his three points wandered."

In the legend of the Yatis as given in the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*, i. 185-186, it is said that the three surviving Yatis who were mere boys praised Indra. Then—

"He (Indra) said to them : 'With what wish, O boys, do you praise me ?' 'Support Us O Bounteous one', they said. He threw them over his shoulders. They clung to his three points...... He said to them : 'What does the first wish ? What the second ? What the third ? Rayovāja said : 'I desire cattle', He gave to him the Ila. For the Ila is cattle. Again Pṛthuraśmi said : 'I desire nobility', He gave to him nobility (*kṣatram*). He is Pṛthu Vainya. Again Bṛhadgiri said : 'I desire food', He gave him his wish".[15]

From these extracts the story of the Yatis may be summed up thus. The Yatis were a group of priests ranking with the Bhṛgus and Praskaṇva and credited with superhuman powers like the gods. In course of time they incurred the hostility of Indra who caused the whole group to be slaughtered with the exception of three boys. One of these survivors obtained *kṣatra*, or the rank of Kṣatriya from Indra and became king as Pṛthu Vainya, the first of the consecrated kings and the inventor of agriculture ;[16] the others obtained cattle and food. It should be noted here that none of the surviving Yatis asked for and obtained *brahma*, or priestly function. Now the question is, how could the Yatis,

15. Translated by Hertel, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. XIX, pp. 124-125.
16. *Vedic Index*, Vol. II, p. 16.

who with Bhṛgu and Praskaṇva figure as worshippers of Indra, incur the hostility of that god, that is to say, of his orthodox worshippers? The only possible answer to this question is, that the Yatis were not originally priests of the vedic cult like the Bhṛgus and the Kaṇvas, but of non-vedic rites practised by the indigenous pre-Aryan population of the Indus Valley. In the legend of the slaughter of the Yatis by Indra we probably hear an echo of the conflict between the native priesthood and the intruding Ṛṣis in the proto-historic period. If this interpretation of the legend is correct, it may be asked, what was the religious or magico-religious practice of the Yatis ? In classical Sanskrit Yati denotes an ascetic. The term is derived from the root *yat*, to strive, to exert oneself, and is also connected with the root *yam*, to restrain, to subdue, to control. As applied to a priest, etymologically Yati can only mean a person engaged in religious exercise such as *tapas*, austerities, and *yoga*. Von Schroeder understands by the term a magician priest or a Shaman.[17] The marble statuettes of Mohenjo-daro with head, neck and body quite erect and half-shut eyes fixed on the tip of the nose has the exact posture of one engaged in practising *yoga*. I therefore propose to recognise in these statuettes the images of the Yatis of the proto-historic and pre-historic Indus Valley intended either for worship or as votive offerings. Like the Ṛṣis of the pre-Ṛgvedic and early Ṛgvedic period, these Yatis, who practised Yoga, were also primarily magicians. But the mythology, the poetry and the elaborate sacrificial rites of the Ṛṣis made a stronger appeal to the nobility and the Viś than the Yoga exercises carried on in solitude. So, as vedic religion became more and more popular, among, the Yatis receded into the background and were gradually reduced to the condition of the outcasted religious mendicants or Vrātyas. But when, with the growth of belief in the doctrines of transmigration

17. *Vienna Oriental Journal*, Vol. XXIII, pp. 11-15. I am indebted to Dr. Baini Prasad, Superintendent, Zoological Survey of India for an English translation of von Schroeder's valuable article.

and of *Ātman* (Self), the knowledge of self or of the Absolute came to be recognised as the way to final emancipation, the Yoga of the Yatis came to its own again as a means of gaining that knowledge and gave birth to the Brahmanic order of the Sannyāsins, who are Yatis *par excellence*, and to the non-Brāhmaṇa orders of the Śramaṇas like the Śākyaputrīyas (Buddhists), the Nirgranthas (Jainas), the Ājīvikas and others.

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YOGA-TECHNIQUE IN THE GREAT EPIC

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The elements of Yoga, even of Tāntric Yoga, are indefinitely antique. Their combination into a formal system represents a late stage of Hindu thought. Asceticism, devout meditation, speculation, magical power, hallucinations, as means of salvation, are factors of Yoga to which it would be idle to assign a starting point in the history of thought within or without India : but these ancient strands were not at first twisted together into the saving rope which, in epic metaphor, pulls up the Yogin's sunken boat.

The great epic speaks of Yoga-Śāstras and Yoga teachers, that is, it recognizes systematic Yoga, which, indeed, is discussed as a philosophical system in many passages scattered through the later parts of the poem. But Yoga in this sense is not only quite unknown before the secondary Upaniṣads, but even the word itself is scarcely recognized in the older Upaniṣads, a fact which, considering the subject-matter of these treatises, is strong negative evidence against any very primitive technical use of the word. It is not till the *Kāṭhaka Upaniṣad*, ii 12, *adhyātmayoga*, that we find any approach to the common philosophical sense of later times, and even in this Upaniṣad the formal equivalence of *yoga* and restraint (not of mind but of sense organs, so that *yoga* is merely a "firm grip on the senses", *sthira-indriya-dhāraṇa*, vi, 11) shows only the earlier conception of *yoga*-discipline, as corporal, though the passage as a whole with its parallel "immovability of the intellect", *buddhiś ca na viceṣṭate*, may be illustrated from the epic itself, when it describes the one who is *yuktaḥ, prakṛtim āpannaḥ*, xii, 307, 14ff :

sthirīkṛtye 'ndriyagrāmaṃ manasā

(v. 1. 195, 5, *piṇḍīkṛtye 'ndriyagrāmam āsīnaḥ kāṣṭhavan muniḥ*)

mano buddhyā sthiraṃ kṛtvā...na saṃkalpayate manaḥ
na cā 'bhimanyate kiṃcin na ca budhyati kāṣṭhavat.

A later Upaniṣad, the *Maitrī,* vi, 25, explains *yoga* as the unification of the manifold, with a consequent cessation of all forms of consciousness.[1]

Also the comparatively late character of the *Śvetāśvatara* is illustrated not only by its recognition of Sāṃkhya-Yoga but even by its use of *yoga* in ii, 12 and in vi. 3, *tattvasya tattvena sametya yogam.* The *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* refers to *yoga* only in its later chapters, withal only in the sense of restraint, *yogā ātma* and *saṃnyāsayoga,* viii, 4 and x, 10 (*Muṇḍ.* iii 2, 6). When the writers of this time wish to express their nearest approach to the later *yoga,* they employ *manasā* (*Mahan* xxvi, 1, explained by the commentator in this sense) while *dama* and *nyāsa* express the *yoga* of restraint and renunciation respectively. Thus in the Upaniṣad (*Taitt*, i. 9) as means of enlightenment, always *svādhyāyapravacane*, with *ṛta*, truth, austerity, *dama*, and *śama* (quiteness). The union-idea of the author of the *Muṇḍaka* is expressed not by *yoga* but by *sāmya*, i. 3.

It is certainly significant that in the oldest Upaniṣads the word *yoga* is almost unknown and that it appears in the simplest of its after-meanings as a philosophical word only in secondary compositions, while the word Yogin is not found till *Maitrī,* vi. 10. The words used in the oldest Upaniṣads, expressing, one at a time different functions of (later) Yoga, are non-technical, *dhyāna*, *medhā manīṣā,* on the one hand, *dama*, *yama,* etc. on the other. Nor can it be said that the authors of these Upaniṣads were indifferent to method, for they take pains to explain the means of emancipation. Only their method is not one of counted breathings and postures but of mental activity alone, *manasai 've 'dam āptavyam*, even in the *Kāṭhaka* ; or the Ātman is apprehended by "truth, austerity, and right knowledge :" "by

1. The unique *upayoga*, *ib.* vi. 36. has, like *yoga* in the same passage, the meaning of joining.

meditating, one sees Him, by means of clearness of knowledge" ; or by meditation and the "restraint of renunciation", as it is said in the *Muṇḍaka* ; while, still earlier, instead of the Yogin with his system we hear only of discussions of scholars *Ch. Up.* v. ; of the Muni with his "Veda-study, sacrifice, gifts, austerity, and fasting" (expressly given as the means of "knowing Him"), *BAU*, iv. 4, 22 ; or "purity and memory" and "silent meditation" (*mauna* from *manute*), *Ch. Up.* vii, 25 ; viii, 4 and 5. In a word, the later Yogin relies on *āsana*, the older Muni on *upāsana*. This and the doctrine of sleep-union with Brahman, the breaths, and the concomitant vein-theory belong to that back-ground of Yoga afterwards worked out into a system.[2]

But, as in contrast to the early Upaniṣads the epic treats of the formal system called Yoga, so it is conversant with technical terms afterwards elaborated into the scheme of Patañjali but foreign to early Upaniṣads. It is scarcely possible that when these works were composed there was none of the rigorous discipline which we associate with the name of that system, but it is evident that the technical nomenclature was still undeveloped. The counted suppressions of breath, the various forms of posture, the preliminary stages leading through an orderly succession of practices to the final consummation, were not yet become systematic enough to produce terminal technical of the Yoga-Śāstra. If one might hazard a guess it would almost seem as if the Yoga idea had been engrafted upon Upaniṣad

2. This does not, of course, preclude the possibility that, besides knowledge of Ātman and of Karman, the "secret doctrines", *gūhya ādeśaḥ*, of the Munis contained much that was wrought into the subsequent system of the later Upaniṣads and *Sūtra*. For example, the Yoga-teaching to regard to the limited sphere of the breaths, one *pradeśa* from the month, is given in *Ait. Āraṇ.* i. 2. 4. 21 (*pradeśamātra*), *etāvatā vai prāṇāḥ sammitāḥ* (the *bāhyaviṣaya* is twelve fingers in the system). So there is a *sāmyamāna* connected with breathing in *Kauṣ.* ii. 5. but it is merely a restraint of speech, and breath in speech is a symbol, a simple" "inner sacrifice".

literature from the "royal knowledge" which is demarcated from the Brahmanic wisdom of rites, ceremonies, austerities, and simple meditation. It is at least curious that Yoga is first found expressly named and emphasized in the Upaniṣads belonging to the *Yajur Veda*, which is prominently the "royal Veda", and that the Yoga epic draws particularly from the Upaniṣads of this school (*Great Epic* p. 368). In *Maitrī*, vi, 18, a late passage, is found the first mention of *prāṇāyāma*, and here "six-fold Yoga" suddenly appears complete (as in *Amṛtabindu*, cl. 6):

tathā tatprayogakalpaḥ prāṇāyāmaḥ pratyāhāro dhyānam dhāraṇā tarkaḥ samādhiḥ ṣaḍaṅga ity ucyate yogaḥ.

Here, too, are first found the other technical words (contrast the simpler Yoga of *Kāṭhaka* vi. 6-13 ; Śvet. ii. 8-15 being later), *pratyāhāra*, *dhāraṇa*, and *samādhi*. Of these commonplaces of the epic, the *Gītā* has *prāṇāyāma*, iv. 29 ; *samādhi*, ii. 54 ; while the rest are found elsewhere. Only *dhyāna* and *tarka* are antique and their general sense in older passages is far from connecting as in this passage, technical exercises (ib. 20, *athā 'nyatrā' pyuktam ataḥ para 'sya dhāraṇam, tālurasanāgranipīḍanād yanmanaḥ-prāṇanirodhānād brahma tarkeṇa paśyati.* This Upaniṣad recognizes a "six-fold Yoga", in contra-distinction to the "eight-fold Yoga" of the epic and *Pat*, ii, 29, as I have previously (*Great Epic*, p. 44) pointed out, an indication, not of course, conclusive but sufficiently significant, of the historical progression, secondary Upaniṣads[3], epic, Patañjali's system.

Probably no competent scholar will question (a) the improbability of a perfected system of Yoga exercises being known to the first teachers of Upaniṣads, who ignore them altogether, the authors of *Chānd BAU.*, *Ait.*, *Kauś.*, possibly

3. Their posteriority is based not only on content but on diction and style. Though the age of the different Upaniṣads is usually made greater, I fail to see any reason for believing that even our oldest Upaniṣads go back of the sixth century, or that the secondary Upaniṣads may not be as late as the fourth century. The later Yoga Upaniṣads may be as late as our era, for aught we know.

Taitt., and probably *Kena*, in which *tapo damaḥ karma* and the Vedas, respectively the foundation and the "limbs" (33), still reflect the older point of view without hint of special sub-divisions ; (b) the gradual growth of the Yoga idea reflected in secondary Upaniṣads, *Kāṭhaka, Maitrī* Śvetāśvatara ; (c) the further development in the epic and the recognized system.

The second form of Yoga was simply *dama*, control of sense and thought, intense concentration of mental activity acquired by quietism. It is this which is common to the practice of Buddhism and Brahmanism alike. The system is a refinement due to physiological as well as psychological study, and as such it bears about the same historical relation to the older Yoga as the modern study of knee-kicks bears to Hamilton's metaphysics.

The place of the epic in this development is midway between the secondary Upaniṣads and the completed system. It has many of the system's *termini technici*, but, despite long elucidations, it shows no trace of others. It lacks the completion, but it stands near in the completed system.

The exercise of Yoga imparts magical powers. This, as an attribute of the Mahātman, is recognized in early Buddhistic tracts, but the attainment of such powers was lightly set aside by Buddha himself as not conductive to perfection and the extraordinary fulness of detailed Yoga-technique in later Buddhistic works may be counted as a contemporary phenomenon with that in later Brahmanic literature. Nor are such powers the objective of earlier Upaniṣad teaching. They belong rather to the vulgar cult of magic, and as such are subordinated to the chief object of Yoga in the system itself. The epic on this point is explicit enough. It teaches that the attainment of supernatural powers is a stage of progress ; but this stage must be left behind like other stages in the onward course of the saint. To linger in this stage is damnable.

Here the popular Yoga parts from philosophical Yoga. The ordinary saint or ascetic of the epic is acquainted only

with Yoga as a means to the attainment of magical powers. All he cares for is to become a wizard of this sort in life and to continue after death as a superior god-compelling wisecre, as dreaded in heaven as he is on earth. Every harmless exercise of magic is a Yogin's per-quisite. His *prabhāva*, or magical power, it is that makes it possible for him to fly through the sky, for example in xii. 326, 8 (*na prabhāveṇa gantavyaṃ antarīkṣacareṇa vai*). The technical term for this, *vibhūti*, occurs first[4] in an Atharvan *Upaniṣad*, the *Praśna*, v. 4, *semāloke vibhūtim anubhūya*, but it may lack the technical meaning here. It is unknown in earlier Upaniṣads, though familiar to the *Gītā* and other parts of the epic, as its synonym, *aiśvarya*, is also unknown to early Upaniṣads in this technical sense.

In the completed system, Yoga is often synonymous with *samādhi*. Here it is to be noticed, however, that all these technical terms, recognized as such in the epic, are still used in their ordinary meaning as well. For instance, Yoga may be only a "means", and almost the same meaning attaches to *samādhi*, "arrangement" leading to some result, or, in effect, a means to it, as in xiii. 96. 12, *apanilasya samādhiṃ cintaya* (*yathā sukhagamaḥ panthā bhavet*), "excogitate some arrangement of this evil". So in the epic Sāṃkhya scheme, *ahaṃkāra* has it's special sense, egoism ; elsewhere it connotes "vanity" (*ahaṃkāraṃ samāvivat*, of Nahuṣa, xiii, 99, 10) ; *buddhi* and manas are equivalent terms (*nā 'sid palāyane, buddhih*, "he had no mind to feel" xvi. 3. 43 ; *yat te manasi vartate*, xiii 114, 176)[5] ; *svabhāva* is nature, *prakṛti*, or character, as is *prakṛti* itself (*na śakyase svābhāvat*, "it is not in your character", xviii. 3, 32) ; *vyakta* is both developed and clear (*asaṃskṛtam api vyaktaṃ bhāti*, iii. 69, 8) ; *rajas* and *tamas* are dust and darkness, as well as *guṇas* (*rajasā tamasā cai 'va yodhāḥ saṃchannacakṣuṣaḥ*, vii. 146, 85), *guṇa* is a string, *saguṇa*, or philo-

4. Formal *vibhūtis* are enumerated in *Ait. Āraṇ.* ii. 1 (p. 181), but they are not those of the system.

5. Compare (xii. 285, 18) ; *tvayi me hṛdapaṃ deva tvayi buddhir munas tvayi.*

sophical characteristic, or common attribute, *rājño guṇaḥ*, "a king's attributes" (to be a father a mother, Yama, etc. ; xii 139, 103, *vaiśeṣikā guṇāḥ*, 'excellent attributes", vii. 5. 15 ; xii. 47, 70).

The most important of these words is *yoga* itself. It may be (like *prayoga*) a mere "means" or "appliance" to make a horse run, iii. 67, 6. Its radical meaning of fastening (to a thing) gives this motion of "appliance" as of "application", which still lingers in the epic words *dambha-yoga*, "tricky appliances", xii. 105. 25 ; *kṛṣi-yoga*, "application to agriculture" xiii. 83. 18, and inheres in the verbal form. Hence it may be translated by "devoted to", as in this sentence, which contains two of these technical expressions still used in a non-technical sense ; *sa vedādhyayane yuktaḥ tapas tape tato vedān niyamād vācām anayat*. "He was devoted to the perusal of the Veda and mastered them by austerity and strict discipline", iii. 116, 1. The rather unusual *abhiyoga*, instead of *yoga*, preserves this meaning, as in the metaphor alluded to above, xii, 299, 33. :

> *yathā bhavā 'vasannā hi naur mahāmbhasi tantunā*
> *tathā mano 'bhiyogād vai śarīraṃ pracikīrṣati*

But the eventual meaning of *yoga* (*bhaktiyoga*, etc.) in a philosophical sense is not even devotion but union as disunion.[6] This is, indeed, the definition given in the preface to Patañjali's work, cl. 3, apropos of the *Sūtra*, *pumprakṛtyor viyogo 'pi yoga ity udito yayā*, "according to which, *yoga* is declared to be separation of Spirit and Prakṛti", or, in the *verba ipsissima* of the author, i.e., *yoga* is *cittavṛttinirodha*, "suppression of mental activity".[7] (compare *Tejab, Up.* viii).

6. In zii. 200. 11, *saṃyogavidhi* is interpreted by Nīlakaṇṭha as Vedānta, "the rule for union", of soul and Brahman.

7. That is, of those whose mental activity has been given up in favor of spiritual insight, *jñānatṛptā nirvāṇagatamanasaḥ*, as the epic calls them who are freed from the faults of *saṃsāra* xii.

The first hint of this paradox that *yoga* in *viyoga* is given in the *Gītā*, ii. 48, where *yoga* is defined as *samatva*, equanimity, and in vi. 23, of the state (20) where thought is suppressed.

yatrā 'paramate cittaṃ niruddhaṃ yogasevayā,
taṃ vidyād duḥkhasaṃyogaviyogaṃ yogasaṃjñitam

but it appears in full in iii. 213, 33 :

taṃ vidyād brāhmaṇa yogaṃ viyogaṃ yogasaṃjñitam

After the aphorism just cited, Patañjali i. 7, gives perception, inference, and tradition, *pratyakṣa, anumāna, āgama*, as the *pramāṇas* or accepted authorities. On pp. 51, 90ff. of my *Great Epic*, I have indicated the passages where the same proofs are given in the epic, but I have omitted one important passage, xii, 56, 41, where the Nyāya four are alluded to as authoritative ; *pratyakṣeṇa 'numānena tathan 'pamyā 'gamair api*, though I have given another like it (p. 93).

In the same work (p. 181) I have also noticed the fact that the "five faults" of the Yogin are *kāma, krodha, bhaya, nidrā, śvāsa*, and (or) *rāga, moha, sneha, kāma, krodha*, and (or) *kāma krodha, lobha, bhaya, svapna*, according to different passages of this heterogeneous work and compared the five *kleśas* of *Pat.* ii. 3 (the "obstacle" *śvāsa* is in the list of i. 31). The epic also occasionally uses *kleśa* in this sense ; *yadi vā dhārmiko yajvā yadi vā kleśadhāritaḥ*, xii. 287. 6-7 [8]

195, 2. The *Sūtra's citta* is synonymous with *manas* in the epic. e.g., *loc. cit.* 12 and 13 ; *evam evā 'sya cittaṃ ca bhavati dhyānavartmani, samāhitaṃ kṣaṇaṃ kiṃcit...punar vāyupathaṃ bhrāntaṃ ṃano bhavati vāyuvat.*

8. The original order may have been *kāma, krodha, lobha*, and these three as a group may have preceded the five. In xiii. 141. 66, we read of "one who has overcome the three", as if it were a recognized group (*triparikrānta*, so explained by the commentator Cf. v. 33. 66.)

There remains, to fulfill the promise given *op. cit.*, note to p. 182, an account of those Yoga principles with which begins the third book of Patañjali, and of which the first is *dhāraṇa*, defined as "confining thought to one place" (such as the tip of the nose); the second is *dhyāna*, etc.

Fixing the mind by looking only at the nose and gradually withdrawing the breath is alluded to in the *Gītā*, v. 27 ; vi. 13 ; viii. 10. The pseudo-epic knows of more than one *dhāraṇa*, however, as it knows other esoteric secrets of the later schoolmen.

But instead of following the course of the *Sūtras* in this sketch, I shall rather describe the Yogin and his practice as it is here and there elucidated in the epic.

After declaring that Yoga system is identical with the Sāṃkhya.

ekaṃ sāṃkhyaṃ ca yagaṃca yaḥ paśyati sa tattvavit.

Yājñavalkya, in xii. 317. 5, proceeds as follows :

rudrapradhāmān aparān viddhi yogān ariṃdama
tenaiva cā 'tha dehena vicaranti diśo daśa
yāvad dhi pralayas tāta sūkṣmeṇā 'ṣṭaguṇena ha
yogena lokān vicaran sukhaṃ saṃnyasya cā 'nagha
vedeṣu cā' ṣṭaguṇinaṃ yogam āhur manīṣiṇaḥ
sūkṣmam aṣṭaguṇaṃ prāhur ne 'taraṃ nṛpasattama
dviguṇaṃ yogakṛtyaṃ tu yogānām peāhur uttamam
saguṇam nirguṇaṃ cai va yathā śāstranidarśanam
dhāraṇaṃ cai 'va manasaḥ prāṇāyāmaś ca Pārthiva
ekāgratā ca manasaḥ prāṇāyāmas tathai 'va ca
prāṇāyāmo hi saguṇo nirguṇaṃ dhārayen manaḥ
yady adṛśyati muñcan vai prāṇān Maithilasattama
vātādhikyaṃ bhavaty eva tasmāt taṃ na samācaret
niśāyāḥ prathame yāme codanā dvādaśa smṛtāḥ
madhye svapnāt pare yāme dvādaśai 'va tu codanāḥ
tad evam upaśāntena dāntenai 'kāntaśīlinā
ātmāramena buddhena yoktavyo 'tmā na saṃcayaḥ

pañcānām indriyāṇāṃ tu doṣān ākṣipya pañcadhā
śabdaṃ rūpaṃ tathā sparśaṃ rasaṃ gandhaṃ tathai va ca
pratibhām apavargaṃ ca pratisaṃhṛtya Maithila
etc., etc.

' Learn now the special Yoga-practices depending on the breaths".

It is possible that *rudrapradhānam* does not mean "having breaths as the chief thing", but "having breaths and elements", *pradhāna.* The commentator takes the latter word as equivalent to *indriyāṇi* (' breaths and senses are the chief means for practicing *Yoga*), and cites *utkramaṇa-kāle dehināṃ rodayanti* for the meaning of *rudra* as breath (cf. *BAU.* iii, 9. 4 ; *Ch. up.* iii. 16, 3). He also cites *Sūtra* (i. 34) for the *prāṇa* exercises, *pracchardanavidhā-raṇābhyāṃ vā prāṇasya,* defining the former as *recaka* and the latter as *pūrakapūrvakaḥ kumbhakaḥ*, that is "stoppage of breath preceded by filling" (*Amṛtab. Up.* 9-12)[9].

"With such a (Yoga) body (Yogins) wander wherever they will".

That is, they obtain the power of wandering through the air as the result of restraining breath. Compare *Pāt. Sūtra,* iii. 42.

"At the moment of dissolution, with the subtile Yoga (body) of eight characteristics, wandering through the worlds and renouncing (bodily) pleasure".

Or perhaps "obtaining happiness" *vicaran* is used as if it were an absolute form, but this is probably a half-stanza cut of its proper connection, as the passage is related to others (see below). This is added, according to the commentator, merely to encourage faith with the hope of rewards.

"The wise declare in the Vedas that the Yoga has eight characteristics ; none other they declare than the subtile one having eight characteristics".

9. This is the *saṃdhi* of the two breaths, *Ch. Up.* i. 3. 3.

The eight characteristic powers beginning with *animā* are meant by *yoga aṣṭaguṇin* and by *aṣṭaguṇa* is meant *aṣṭāṅga* or the six practices referred to in *Maitrī Up.* (vi. 18) with *yama* and *niyama* added, according to the commentator (the *Sūtra*, ii, 29 also substitutes *āsana* for *tarka*). It is quite possible, however, that both the adjectives refer to Yoga interpreted in the same way, namely eight-fold Yoga-science.

> "According to the explanations in the Śāstra, they declare that the highest Yoga-practice of Yogins has a double characteristic (is two-fold), being either with or without characteristics".

The second of the two characteristics implied in the first clause is negative. There is a double Yoga–practice. One kind has and one kind has not certain characteristics. The epic not infrequently employs this *yogakṛtya* for Yoga practice.

> "Just steadiness of the mind and restraint of *prāṇa*, and concentration of the mind and restraint of *prāṇa*. The form with characteristics is breath restraint ; the one without is mental concentration".

The two have in common *prāṇāyāma*, but the first is merely fixing the mind and the second concentrating it. Compare the common epic expression *ekāgramanas*. Steadiness is induced by regarding certain objects ; concentration goes further and produces a merging of the objective in the subjective ("Absence of distinction regarding thinker, thought, and thinking"). The common *prāṇāyama* is interpreted differently, however, according as it is united with *dhāraṇa* or with *ekāgratā*, in the former case being physical, in the latter being mental (restraint of senses). Compare *Sūtra* i. 35-41. the *ādhāras* or objects of contemplation, says Nīlakaṇṭha, are sixteen as named in the Śiva-yoga, beginning with the great toe and the heel. The last clause of the text literally carries *nirguṇa* over to the mind : "mind he should fix without characteristics", that is without activity, *nirvṛttikaṃ dhārayet, sthiraṃ kuryāt* (comm.). The stanza elsewhere appears in other form (below).

"If one expels the breaths when no visible object is at

hand there results merely an excess of wind; hence one should not begin the practice in this way".

The commentator says *adṛśyati* is equivalent to *adṛśyamāne mocanasthāne*. He cites (*Pavanayogasaṃgraha*) : *prāṇāyāmena yuktena sarvarogakṣayo bhavet/ayuktābhyāsayogena mahārogasamudbhavaḥ*, a verse which occurs in slightly different form in the *Haṭhadīpikā*. This is the principle of the *cittaprasādanam*, as explained in *Sūtra* i. 33 and 34. The *tam*, I suppose, refers to *prāṇāyamam* understood. The "visible object" seems to refer to place on which the attention is fixed rather than time measured by prayer.

> "In the first watch of the night twelve compulsions, *codanaḥ*, are traditional; likewise twelve compulsions in the middle watch after sleeping".

Urgings is the literal meaning of *codanaḥ* (probably from the use of the verb in the Gāyatrī), but the commentator rightly takes the word to mean "restraints of breath". The parallel passage has *saṃcodanaḥ* (below).

> "The spirit should without doubt be exercised in Yoga in this way by one at peace, controlled, devoted to one thing, delighted with spirit only, and fully enlightened. In five ways expelling the five senses' faults, sound, form, touch, taste and smell, removing distraction and inertness"[10] (the text continues) "placing the whole group of senses in the mind, establishing mind in consciousness, consciousness in intellect, and intellect in Prakṛti,—by thus proceeding in regular order *parisaṃkhyāya* (Yogins) meditate the sole, passions, spotless, eternal, endless, pure, undeficient, firm Spirit, *tasthuṣaṃ puruṣum*...the Eternal Lord, Brahman".

Then follow the "signs of the Yogins", *yuktasya lakṣaṇāni*; "the sign of peace", *prasāda*, as when one sleeps well; "as a lamp filled with oil in a windless place would burn.

10. On *pratibhā* and *apavarga* as equivalent to *vikṣepa* and *laya*, see below.

so is the *yukta*", etc., as given in full in my *Great Epic*, d. 109, etc.

It is scarcely possible that one acquainted with the *Sūtra's* use of *apavarga* and *pratibhā* in ii. 18 and iii. 33 could have written this passage. The commentator explains the former as *laya* and the latter as *vikṣepa*, having evidently in mind the passage in *Maitrī* vi. 34, where it is said that the mind must be freed from these two. Such, too, is the regular meaning of *pratibhā* in the epic, phantasy, distraction of mind. On the other hand, the passage, as a whole upon which I have animadverted *op. cit.*, p. 108, shows a recognition of Yoga practices and Yoga-technique, especially interesting in the warning against *Vātādhikya*, as proving that Yoga was already regarded, as in Haṭha treatises, as a means of health. On the union of heat and breath, compare xii, 187, 7 ; *prāṇān dhārayate hy agniḥ sa jīva upadhāryatām, vayusaṃdharaṇo hy agniḥ sa jīva upadharyatām, vāyusaṃdharaṇo hy agnir nāśyaty ucchvāsanigrahāt*, etc. The *Sūtra* meaning of *apavarga* as emancipation appears in another passage, xii. 271. 31, *apavargamatir nityo yatidharmaḥ sanātanaḥ*. This is preceded by *saṃtoṣamūlas tyagatmā jñānādhiṣṭhānam ucyate* (compare *Sūtra* ii, 32, *śauca-saṃtoṣa* etc.) and followed by *sādhāraṇaḥ kevalo vā*, perhaps for *sādhāraṇaḥ* (see below).

In xii. 241, the author gives "complete *yogakṛtya*" which has much in common with this passage. It is the "highest knowledge" to unite intellect and mind and senses with the *ātman vyāpin* (compare *śvet.* vi. 11). Instead of *ekāntaśīlin* the same verse as that above has *'dhyātmavilin* and it ends with *boddhavyaṃ śucikarmaṇa śl.* 4, while the next *śloka* has *yoga, doṣān samucchidya pañca yān kavayo viduḥ kāmam*, etc , giving the five faults (as above). Further in the sense of *Sūtra* 1. 37 (*vitarāgaviṣayaṃ vā cittam*); "One that is wise subdues wrath by quietness, desire by avoiding purpose, *saṃkalpa*, and one may cut off apathy, nidra, by the cultivation of the good *(sattvasaṃsevanat)*, etc. One should also (*śl.* 8) honor fires and priests and bow before divinities ;

avoid lascivious talk and that which is joined with harm, *hiṃsā*. ......one should seek Brahman; having concentrated (thought) and uniting, *kṛtvai 'kāgryam*, mind and senses in the fore-night and after-night, *pūrvarātrāparārdhe ca*, one should fix mind on self (spirit)", *dhārayen mana ātmani*, 14. After this comes the subjugation of the sense, which one should constrain, *saṃyamya*, and "establish in mind", 17, and then follows the rule for observing these practices for "a limited time",[11] to gain likeness with the imperishable; ending with parallels to *Kāṭhaka* iv. 13; *śvet.* vi. 19-21; *Gītā*, v. 26, etc. (the other points are discussed in my *Great Epic, loc. cit.* and elsewhere), and with the following verses, which give a number of *Sūtra* technicalities (23-24).

pramoho bhrama āvarto ghrāṇaṃ śravaṇadarśane
adbhutāni rasasparśe śītoṣṇe mārutā' kṛtiḥ
pratibhām upasargaṅś ca 'py upasaṃgṛhya yogataḥ
tāṅs tattvavid anādṛtya ātmany eva nivartayet

In this list, besides the technical words with which the stanza begins, *upasargas* is the "obstacles" of *Sūtra* iii, 37 (referring back to *prātibhaśrāvaṇavedanādarśāsvādavartā* in 36), the faults of *saṃyama*, including varta, smell as a celestial phenomenon (compare Svet. ii. 11-12). The added warning, *anādṛtya*, may be compared with xii. 107, 7, where it is said that a Yogin who is set on "practicing mastery", *aiśvarya-pravṛtta*, with a view to worldly results, goes to everlasting hell".[12] This passage also emphasizes (in 196. 18, *arāgamohaḥ*, etc.) the *vītarāgaviṣaya*, and gradual giving up even of *samādhi*; as in 196, 20; *dhyāne samādhim utpādya, tad api*

11. Six months, as stated afterwards (*Great Epic*. p. 45). The times of practicing are here three, *traikālya* (241, 25). The exercises may be practiced on a mountain, in a deserted place, a temple, *caitya*, cave, etc. The goal is *akṣarasaṃyata* (22).

12. This, by the way, is not a common penalty, as hell is no more than purgatory to the Hindu. But in this case *sa eva nirayas tasya nā 'sau tasmāt pramucyate*, "Hell is his, and from it he is not freed".

tyajati kramāt, and here, too, *manaḥsamādhi* is paired with *indriyajaya* (9), though *manasy eva mano dadhāt* (15) shows a general rather than a particular discipline. The student should sit on *kuśa* grass a renounce objects *viṣayāḥ* ; and *japa* or muttering prayer is the means of fixing attention.

In my *Great Epic*, I have pointed out that there are three distinct epic versions of the same *Teaching of the Vedānta* in three several chapters. So here, besides the two related chapters already discussed we find what is virtually a third version of the same matter in xii, 307, where Vasiṣṭha appears as the expositor of Yoga-kṛtya : "The wisdom-knowing men declare that meditation is two-fold, *dhyānaṃ dvividham* ; meditation being the highest power of Yogins". Then comes the stanza above, but with a varied reading :

> *ekāgratā ca manasaḥ prāṇāyāmas tathai 'va ca*
> *prāṇāyāmas tu saguṇo nirguno manasas tathā*,

"Concentration of mind and restraint of breath (are the two) ; restraint of breath is (meditation) with characteristics, mental (restraint) is without characteristics". Then follows 307, 9-10 :

One should be intent on contemplation, *Yuñjīta*, all the time except at the three times, *trikālam* (when hunger and other natural necessities prevent). Being pure, one should by thinking divert the senses from their objects and urge the spirit (self) beyond the Twenty-Fourth (principle) by means of the ten or twelve *saṃcodanaḥ*, restraints of breath".

I have pointed out, *op. cit.*, p. 127, that this verse has been torn from its connection and repeated in xiv. 48. 4, and that the number of *saṃacodanas*, evidently the *codanas* of the passage above, is reckoned as twenty-two, *daśa-dvādaśabhir vā 'pi caturviṃśat paraṃ tataḥ saṃcodanābhir matimān ātmānaṃ codayed atha. śl.* 10. The following verses repeat the passages cited above (*parvaratre pararātre dhārayitā mano 'tmani*, 13 ; "as a lamp in a windless place," 18, etc.), some of the verses being in xii 241 and some in xii, 317. The

Anugītā version has *prāṇāyāmas* for *saṃcodanas*, and here Nīlakaṇṭha explains the numbers in two ways. But in xii. 307 he recognizes only twenty-two as the meaning of *daśa -dvādaśabhir vā 'pi* and explains them as restraints caused by intentness, contemplation, concentration, recognition of duality and eighteen stoppings of breath (according to Yājña-valkya), at the crown, forehead, brows, eye, nose tongue throat, heart, navel, penis, middle of body (fire-place), anus, thighs, knees, *citimūla*, calves, ankles, toes.[13]

The "embodied one going like sound", *śabdavat*, in xii 217, 21-22 is brought through purity into a subtile form *vairāgyāt prakṛtau sthitaḥ*, by a practice described in several places besides *Gītā* vi. 13. In xii 200, 16-22, it is called *viṣayapratisaṃhāra* (ib. 237, 33, expressed as *viṣayāt prati-saṃharaḥ*, the "sign of the rule" in Sāṃkhya). One en-gaged in this "withdrawing from objects fixes the five breaths on mind, mind on the two (chief) breaths, and holds the two breaths under control, *upāsthitakṛtau*. Then, looking at the end of nose, by mental effort one brings the two breaths gradually between the brows. If it were not for the commentator, who supplies, *paśyantaḥ*, it would be more natural to interpret: "By wrinkling the brows and by men-tal effort bring the breaths below the nose gradually to the nostril". This is a mere description and not a precept, and we are told that the next step was to put the spirit in the head

13. Compare the list, corresponding but with v. l., comm. to *Kṣurikā Upaniṣad* 7, which itself gives ten places. I record these eighteen as representing the complete Haṭha list (a shorter one of the text itself is presented below), though the number of stoppings is given by N. at 317. 9, vol. xxii. (above) as sixteen, and here it is evidently part of an artificial interpreta tion, the true meaning being "ten or twelve", not "twelve plus ten". In regard to the loss of the ending besides *catur* for the accusative (p. 371), of Roth, *Ueber gewisse Kurzungen,* etc., and Pischel-Geldner. VS. i, pp. 42. 116. all Vedic. But the late text and expressed *vā* give this example a peculiar interest (*saptāṣṭa* alone means "seven or eight". v 160, 40) The *Kṣurikā Up.*, cl. 3-4, has twelve mora-applications and uses *saṃcarayet* (for *codayet*, above).

by overcoming the spirit with a moveless body and fixed gaze. The culmination of the exercise is in a light breaking through the crown of the head and going to heaven. This was the "span-long spirit", *pradeśamātraḥ puruṣaḥ.* On an example of *Yoga jīva* and *videhamukti* in the epic, I have spoken, *op. cit.*, p. 111. In regard to the theory that the fate of the soul depends on the part of the body it bursts through, compare *op. cit.* p. 186, on xii. 318.

Another account says: "If a man is one whose actions are done merely to sustain life, he becomes emancipated when, at the hour of death, he equalizes the three *guṇas* and then by mental effort forces the breaths toward the heart-canal". *Guṇānāṃ sāmyam āgamya manasai 'va manovaham* (*sic*), *dehakarma nudan prāṇān antakāle vimucyate,* xii. 214, 25.

In *ib.* 17-19, the veins are thousands (ten chief) *dhamanyaḥ*, and the principal is *manovaha* (*Great Epic*, p.35), like *cittavahā nāḍī* (comm. to *Sūtra* iii. 38). Precise is the account of the Yogin's "soul path" in xii. 185, where are described the fire in the head, protecting the body, and the accompanying breath, *prāṇa*, which here is the spirit itself. The breaths I have discussed, *Great Epic*, pp.36 and 172 and referred to this chapter with its "ten breaths" ("seven breaths", ib. p. 37, may be referred to in still another passage *sapta mārgā vāyoḥ*, xii, 51-6), of which the usual five are described (e.g. *vahan mūtraṃ purīṣaṃ ca 'py apānaḥ parivartate*). It touches on the Yogin's path, as well. The single *prāṇa*, bearing heat, descends to the anus and returns upward again, all the *prāṇas*, however, being collected (?) in the navel, *nābhimadhye śarīrasya sarve prāṇāś ca Saṃsthitāḥ* (185, 14). Urged by the ten *prāṇas*, the veins bear food-essences all over the body, starting from the breast (*hṛdaya*, 15). Then follows 16.

eṣa mārgo 'tha yogānāṃ yena gacchanti tatpadam
jitaklāmaḥ sama dhīrā murdhany ātmānam adadham.

The corresponding passage, iii, 213, 17, has *yogināṃ* and *adadhuḥ* in the last stanza and *pratiṣṭhitaḥ* in 14 (signifi-

cant of the relation between the pseudo-epic and earlier epic, even in philosophy). The section thus recognizes the main duct of the Yogin's soul-path, the *suṣumnā*, which is first known by that name in *Maitrī* vi. 21, *ūrdhvag nāḍī suṣumanākhyā* (*Kāṭhaka* vi. 16; *Praśna* iii. 6; *Taitt.* i. 6). Ordinarily, the simple rule is: *manaḥ prāṇe nigṛhṇīyāt prāṇaṃ brahmaṇi dhārayet, nirvedād eva nirvāṇaṃ na ca kiṃcid vicintayet*, xii, 189, 16-17 (compare also the note below, p. 362, on *prāṇas*).

A more general description, in vii. 143. 34-35, says that one "offered his vital breath in breaths sunk his eye in the sun his mind in water; and became *yogayukta*. In a corresponding, passage ib. 192, 52, a man *sāṃkhyam āsthitaḥ* as well as *yogaṃ āsthāya*, 49, takes a fixed posture, bending his head up[14] and his stomach out. The Yoga postures, *āsana*, *sūtra* ii. 46, are alluded to again xiii. 142, 8-10, described as *vīrāsana, vīraśayyā, maṇḍakayoga*, between two fires. But in this case of popular *yogacaryā*; the Yogin is born again in the Nāga-world or as a king as the result of his piety (38-43), although he is supposed to have "put *dhāraṇa* in his heart". I do not know what the *maṇḍakayoga* (*śayana*) is, but the commentator says it is explained in the *Haṭhaśāstra*.[15] These *yogas*, however, are in the part only austerities of the older type, on a par with and grouped with *cittayagniyoga* and *sthaṇḍile śayana, śl* 10, which is also called a *yoga* in 141. 111, *sthaṇḍilaśayana yogaḥ śākaparṇaniṣevaṇam* (such as are described also in iii. 200, 105 and often). The confusion shows clearly that

14. So Viṣṇu stands (in xii. 344. 60) *ekapādasthitaḥ ūrdhvabāhur udaṅmukhaḥ*. The *mahāniyama* austerity recognized as "Vedic" consists in standing on one leg, "up-looking" and "holding up arms", with devoted mind or a thousand years of the gods (*ūrdhvadṛṣṭi, bāhu, ekāgraṃ manas, ekapāda*), xii, 341, 46-48.

15. It is mentioned again in the list at xii. 304. 9 ff., where appear *vīrāsana*, *Vīrasthāna*, and the *maṇḍūkaśāyin*, together with a long list of ascetic observances. Compare also *vīrayoga*, (xiii. 142. 57 In vi. 120, 36. etc, *vīraśayyā*), is merely a "hero's bed".

the term *yoga*, applied inferentially to the *āsana* or posture of the regular Yoga practice, had also absorbed the meaning of *tapas*, so that any austerity, whether in *prāṇāyāma* exercises or not was called *yoga*. Austerity is thus caused by *yoga*, xii, 153, 36. Both are the sign of *nivṛtti*, or renunciation for the sake of the soul of him who is *yukto yogaṃ prati sadā prati saṃkhyānam eva ca* (xii. 141. 83), whether he be an ascetic, now at the foot of a tree, now lying on the ground, now wandering about, or engaged on the technical *vīraśayyā* etc. So far as I know, the term *āsana* is not an early techinicality. It is not found in the first Upaniṣads, but is recognized (apparently) by the *Gītā*, where it seems to have the sense it has in the *Kṣurikā* and other late Upaniṣads and in Buddhistic language (e.g. *Buddhacarita*, xii. 117). The meaning of *dharmarātrisamāsana* in xiii. 141, 9 is unknown to me.[16]

Those recognized in the Anuśāsana as Yogins thus include ascetics of every sort, though they have formal divisions. "Beggars of this class, *muktaḥ*, and *yuktaḥ*, are grouped in four species the Kuṭicaka and Bahūdaka are Tridaṇḍins, the former living alone in a hut and the latter visiting Tīrthas; the Haṃsa and Parama-haṃsa are Ekadaṇḍins, the former living in a hermitage, the latter being "freed from the three *guṇas*", according to Nīlakaṇṭha explanation of xiii. 141, 89, where the names alone of the four classes are given with the statement that their superiority is the order of their names.[17]

The Yati, a term equivalent to Yogin, and expressing the

16. It is the second of the five first mentioned duties called (as a group) *ṛṣidharma* (a Gauḍa v. 1. is *dharmacakraṃ sanātanam*). N. rays *samyagāsana*.

17. The following discourse treats of the Froth-drinkers, Pheṇapas (cf. v. 10 2 6), Vālakhilyas (Munis, perfect in austerity, living in the sun's disc, the size of a thumb-joint, *aṅguṣṭhaparvamātraḥ*), Cakracaras (divinities living in the moon), Samprakṣālas, Aśmakuṭṭas, Dantolūkhālikas (141. 104; 142. 11), saints who husk rice with their teeth, etc.; cf. ix. 37. 48. The "thumb-long seers" adorn a tale in i. 31, 8.

sense sometimes given by the desiderative *yuyukṣat*, "one desiring to concentrate his mind,"[18] *jijñāsamāna* "desiring knowledge", must be not only *nirmanyu* (as also *nirdvandva* and *nirveda*) but also *nirvāṇa*, studying not Śāstras but *Om*. It is added here that if a Brahmin will not be a Yati, he should travel *pravāsin*, for a home-staying priest gets no glory, xiii, 36 ; so ii. 55. 14.

The *dhāraṇa* referred to above, is the cause of Yoga power. First the five faults must be cut off, and then, according to xii. 237, 3 (*chinnadoṣo munir yogaṃ mukto yuñjīta dvādaśa*). one should consider the twelve points of Yoga, namely :

> *deśakarmānurāgārthān upāyāpāyaniścayaḥ*
> *cakṣurāhārasaṃhārāir manasā darśanena ca*,

that is, in a free version of the texts free syntax, he should see to the place (being pure), the acts (proper), his inclination (being restrained), the objects (of his thought or senses being propitious to Yoga-discipline), the means (that is, the posture as a means of Yoga, being correct) his (mind) renouncing (passion), his determination (in faith), his sense-organs (being controlled), his food (pure) his nature (subdued), his will (perfected), his system correct. Then comes the *dhāraṇas*. These are here trials of mental concentration of a severe sort. The faults are a net. *vāgurā*, out of which he must escape by cutting it, as in the passage above, and Dr. P. 370, and elsewhere, xii. 301, 15-17. So in xii. 99, 3-4 ; *āsaṅgaḥ śreyaso mūlam...chitvā 'dharmamayaṃ pāpam*, "The root of fellcity is freedom from ties ; on cutting the bond of wrong," etc. The cutting is done, of course, with the "sword" of Yoga equanimity, xii, 255, 7. It may be remarked, parenthetically, that the Yogin, besides laboring for the abstraction desired, also (naturally

18. Also metaphorical : *atha sāṃtvaramāṇasya* ratham (=*yogam*) *eva yuyukṣataḥ, akṣaraṃ gantumanaso vidhiṃ vakṣyāmi śīghragam*, 237. 13.

but inconsequently) pravs for it ; *manasaś ca samādhir me vardheta 'har ahaḥ*, xii. 199. 13. But ordinarily the state is induced by restraint of breath. as in xii. 192. 13-14 (cf. xv. 90, 59) ; *prāṇadhāraṇamātraṃ tu keṣāṃ cid upapadyate, śramena mahatā kecit kurvanti prāṇadhāraṇam.*

For *samādhi* is really gained only by intense effort and fine work. The terms are indifferently *samādhi* or *samādhāna* (though the latter is united with *manas* or *ātman*), *dhāraṇā* or *dhāraṇam*, e.g., *ātmanaś ca samādhāne dhāraṇāṃ prati nidarśanāni*, "the indications of the spirit's concentration as regards fixing the mind," xii. 301. 30 ; *ātmasamādhānaṃ yuktvā yogena tattvavit*, *ib.* 35 ; *yogī dhāraṇāṣu samāhitaḥ*, *ib.* 37.

The general preliminary process is the placing of the spirit in different parts of the body :

nābhyāṃ kaṇṭhe ca śīrṣe ca hṛdi vakṣasi pārśvayoḥ
darśane śravaṇe cā 'pi ghrāṇe cā 'mitavikrama
sthāneṣv eteṣu yo yogī mahāvratasamāhitaḥ
ātmanā sūkṣmam ātmanāṃ yunkte samyag viśāmpate
sa śīghram acalaprākhyaṃ karma dagdhvā śubhāśubham
uttamaṃ yogam āsthāya yadī 'cchati vimucyate

"A Yogin who, devoted to the great observance,[19] properly fixes his subtile spirit on these places, the navel, neck, head, heart, stomach sides, eye, ear, and nose, having quickly burned away all good and bad actions, though they be like a mountain (in size) by applying himself to the highest Yoga is released, if he wishes".

In this passage, xii, 301, 39 ff., the *dhāraṇas* may be acts conducive to fixedness of mind, that is, besides this fixing of the mind, abstemiousness and subduing the passions. A passage to be cited presently gives another meaning to this term which perhaps applies here as well. According to

19. The *mahāvrata* may be the one described, or that called in the *Sūtra* (*sārvabhauma-*) *mahāvrata*, i.e , *yamaḥ*, ii. 31 (30).

the present exposition, the whole discipline of Yogin lies first in fixing the spirit on different parts of the body and then dieting, in chastity, and in renouncing sensual pleasures of all kinds.[20] The Yogin eats but once daily, *ekāhāraḥ*, of dry barley or rice-grains and sesama, avoiding oil, *snehānāṃ varjane yuktaḥ*, and drinking less and less milk and water, which "after a long time" imparts Yoga-power, *bala*. Or he may avoid meat altogether (as an alternative means of acquiring power), *adhandam* (unusal word, also xiii, 75. 8) *māṃsam upoṣya*. The text continues: "By overcoming desire, wrath, cold and heat, and rain, fear, care breathing, *śvāsa*,[21] and human sense-objects, *pauruṣān viṣayān* ("sounds pleasant to men", says the commentator), sensuality, thirst, (delights of) touch, sleep, nidra, and sloth hard to overcome, *tandriṃ durjayāṃ*, the wise and great Yogins, *mahātmānaḥ*, void of passion, *vītarāgaḥ*,[22] make glorious the spirit through the spirit (self), by means of meditation and study, *dhyānādhyayanasampadā*.[23] Hard is the great path, *mahāpanthā* (like wandering through a forest on a way beset with robbers), and few hold it to the end, but he is called a great sinner, *bahudoṣa*, who entering the way, *yogamārgam āsādya* gives up. Easy is it (in compa-

20. The logical order is not closely kept. Subjugation of the senses is, of course, the "prior path", as it is called in xii. 195, 10, though here also *ekāgraṃ dhārayen maṇḍlī* (*piṇḍīkṛtye 'ndri yagrāmam*) precedes in the description. In xiii. 141. 8, it is said that "those who have subdued their senses must learn the Ātman, and then afterwards, *tataḥ paścāt*, desire and wrath must be overcome".

21. The word used in *Pāt. Sūtra*, ii, for in breathing, as opposed to *praśvāsa*, out-breathing, in *prāṇāyāma* (after correct posture has been taken). On the five seven, and ten epic "breaths", cf. *op. cit.* p. 171 ff.

22. Compare *Pāt. Sūtra*, i. 37, *vītarāgaviṣayam vā cittam*.

23. Patañjali's definition of *niyamaḥ* also includes study, *śaucasaṃtoṣatapaḥsvādhyāyeśvarapraṇidhānāni*, ii. 32. This may be mere muttering of texts. The epic has a whole section on the rewards of the *japaka*, xii. 197 (also 196 and 198). Compare *Pāt. Sūtra*, ii. 44.

rison) to stand upon the sharpened edges of razors, *kṣur-adhārāsu* (compare *Kāṭhaka,* iii. 14, and *Kṣurikā up*), but hard for the uncontrolled to stand by the Yoga discipline of fixing the mind", *dhāraṇāsu tu yogasya duḥstheyam akṛtāt-mabhiḥ*, xii, 301, 54.

On the *dhāraṇās* occur the following stanzas, xii. 237, 14-6.

sapta yā dhāraṇāḥ kṛtsnā vāgyataḥ pratipadyate
pṛṣṭhataḥ pārśvalāc cā 'nyas tāvatyas tāḥ pradhāraṇāḥ
kramaśaḥ pārthivaṃ yac ca vāyavyaṃ khaṃ tathā payaḥ
jyotiṣo yat tad aiśvaryam ahaṃkārasya buddhitaḥ
avyaktasya tathai 'śvaryaṃ kramaśaḥ pratipadyate
vikramaś cā 'pi yasyai te tathā yukteṣu yogataḥ
tathā yogasya yuktasya siddhim ātmani paśyataḥ

As this description of the would-be Yogin is prefaced by the image of him "eager to hitch his (mental) ear", *rathaṃ yuyukṣataḥ* the goad of which is "all the Tantras", *sarva-tantrapratoda*, it may be suspected that we have a bit of real Tantric literature before us,—only suspected, since *tantra* in the epic is synonymous with any manual of instruction, for example, *dharmatantra* is *dharmaśāstra*, but reasonably, so, since, on the other hand, Yoga-Tantras are specifically mentioned in the pseudo-epic besides Yoga-śāstras.[24] The general sense of the verses is clear enough. The author gives the "speedy rule" of the Yogin's progress, until he "steps out, released, after passing beyond the Yoga-mastery", *yogaiśvaryam atikrānto yo niṣkramati mucyate, śl.* 40. The account thus naturally begins with the fixation of mental activity on one object, as does that of Patañjali, iii. 1, and as Patañjali reckons *prajñā* as "sevenfold", *sap-tadhā*, at ii. 27, so the author first reckons the fixations,

24. The simplest meaning, however, is perhaps the best, and *tantra* would then be identical with the discipline alluded to in xii. 215. 21 : *atha vā na pravarteta* (v. 1. *prakāśeta*) *yogatantrair upkramet* ; *yena tantrayātas tantraṃ vṛttiḥ syāt tat tad ācaret.*

of mind as seven (*saptadhā* may be the original here also) to which he adds seven more, then gives eight "masteries" or "lord-ships", proceeds with the Yogin's "(victorious) progressions" (mental stages, as the commentator says, *vikramā anubhavakramāḥ*), and ends with their "fruit" and the Yogin's perfectoin, *siddhi*, "according to the (regular) Yoga-discipline". As appears from what follows (see below), the "progressions" or "stages" are the hallucinations, which arise before perfection but after the attainment of "mastery". The latter is exercised, according to the text, over the five elements, egoism, intellect, and *prakṛti* (the regular *tattvas* of the system in their order), not according to the regular "eightfold mastery", of miraculous powers. But to that are the *dhāraṇās* applied. The commentator is inclined to omit Prakṛti, *avyakta*, and refer them to the other seven mentioned (that is, five elements, *ahaṃkāra* and *buddhi*), while the *pradhāraṇās* (*pra* as in *praviśya*, *prapautra*, meaning connected but remote) apply to the "intercepted" applications *vyavahitaḥ*, which are in fact one of three divisions of knowledge in *Pāt. Sūtra*, iii, 25, *sūkṣmavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭajñānam*. The distinction between *pṛṣṭhataḥ* and *pārśvataḥ* is explained as ' farther and nearer", namely, fixing the attention on the *maṇḍala* of the moon, sun, or pole star (as in *Pāt. Sūtra*. iii, 26-28), or ("nearer" on the end of the nose, the brows, the throat-well, *kaṇṭhakūpa*, (as in *Pāt. Sūtra*, iii. 30, *kaṇṭhakūpe kṣutpipāsānivṛttiḥ*, that is, "*samādhi* in reference to the throat well results in averting hunger and thirst").

The use of *dhārayām āsa*, the constant expression of Yoga-practice, naturally led to the companion-noun being employed as object of concentration. As such, though with doubtful application in regard to the numbers, it is correctly explained here, and this use is rendered still more certain by the following description of Bhīṣma's death, xiii, 169, 2: (*tūṣṇīm babhūva*).

dhārayām āsa cātmānaṃ dhāraṇāsu yathākramam.

"in regular succession he concentrated his soul upon the objects of concentration" (*ādhārādiṣu*, N), when "his

breaths, forced together *saṃniruddhaḥ*, ascenced, and his soul being forced together in all the resting places, after cleaving his head went like a meteor, *maholke 'va*, to the sky", as is added in 7, where *saṃniruddhas tu tenā 'tmā sarveṣv āyataneṣu* shows *ātman* as *prāṇas*. The *dhāraṇās*, then are objects of contemplation. The earlier description, by the way, has here only *tūṣṇim āsīt...yojyā 'tmānaṃ vedanaṃ saṃniyamya*, vi. 121. 56.

A "seven-fold province" of the "four-fold *samādhi*" is recognized by the commentator to *Sūtra* iii. 51, and very probably the first division made was meditation on the senses and two higher *tattvas*, egoism and intellect.[25] Seven may be used in the sense of "many" but *tāvatyas* is rather against this supposition.[26] In any case, the passage indicates a numbered arrangement of subjects of contemplation and seems to imply a full systematization. The *pradhāraṇās* might be "intenser", but if taken as remoter concentrations they would answer to the general terms of *Pāt. Sūtra*, i. 39, *yathā, 'bhimatadhyānād vā* ("objects without, such as the moon"). I believe, however, that the application of *pṛṣṭhataḥ pārśvataś ca* has been misunderstood by the commentator (and by the English translator),[27] in consequence

25. On the Yogin's 'subtile seven', compare *Great Epic*, p. 173. The epic's *bhuvanāni sapta* may be the "seven spheres" named in the system xii. 187. 26. Seven over-worlds, *lokāḥ* and, seven under-worlds are traditional, iii. 3. 45 ; v. 102. 1 (*rasātala*).

26. Curiously enough, *Pāt. Sūtra*, iii. 16 to 29, gives seven and fourteen "near and remote" forms of knowledge resulting from a combination of *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna*, *samādhi*. They are not enumerated however, but possibly they were in the mind of the writer who gives the seven *pradhāraṇās*.

27. He is *not* that esteemed gentleman whose name appears on the title page and who did not understand English at all, but Mr. K. Mohan Ganguli. His translation (very useful in many ways) gives not only the substance of the text but sometimes the gist of the commentary as well, and even (as part of the *Mhb.*) *Sūtras* cited by the commentator, as in this instance, where *Pāt. Sūtra*. iii. 1, *deśabandhāc cittasya dhāraṇā* (cited by N.) appears as a verse of the epic !

of his ignoring here the metaphor of which this verse still forms a part. For, as I have said, we have to do in this passage with an allegorical war-car, *yoga*, with which the would be *yogin*, when once equipped hastens on to victory (compare the opening of the *Amṛtabindu Up.*). Hence the strange use of *vikramāḥ* for stages in his progress, and hence also the use of *pṛṣṭhataḥ pārśvataś ca*, to understand which, in connection with the metaphor, we must remember the position of the chariot guards, *pṛṣṭhagopās* and *pārśvagopās* or, as they are called in a similar description of another allegorical war-car, viii, 34, 45, *pṛṣṭharakṣās* and *paripārś-vacarās*. For the van and rear and flank and technically known (adverbially) as *purataḥ*, *pṛṣṭha* and *pārśvayoḥ*, vi. 90. 37, while *yoga* in camp-parlance, is hitching up or harnessing up. The preliminary description of this Yogin's chariot explains that *upāya* and *apāya* are its pole, the *apāna* -breath its axle, the *prāṇa*-breath its yoke, all the Tantras its goad, knowledge its charioteer, faith and restraint, *dama*, the fore-guard, *puraḥsara*, renunciation its more distant protector behind, *anuga*, meditation, *dhyāna*, its field of action, *gocara* (with other parts here omitted). Next follows the phrase cited above of the *rathaṃ yuyukṣataḥ*, whose rule, *vidhi*, will be described, and then come the *dhāraṇā* verses; so that the whole passage should be translated : "The silent Yogin (in this mental chariot) acquires all the seven intentnesses and as many different fore-intentnesses (as his immediate guard), in the rear and on the flanks (respectively); (guarded by these) step by step he acquires what (is called) the mastery of earth and air, space and fluid (mastery), and that of light, of egoism, and mastery in respect of intellect ; and also by another step (that) of Prakṛti ; and so he beholds in himself success (victory) when thus equipped with Yoga-practice ; and there comes next, in consequence of his equipment, *yogataḥ*, the following victorious advances" (stages).

These "victorious advances" are preliminary hallucinations (compare *Śvet. Up.* ii, 11), which show the spirit first as having a smoky appearance. Then appears a *rūpadarśana* of the spirit, "like water in space". Then this passes away

and a fire-worm, become visible. After this the spirit appears in a wind-form, attaining wind-like (air-like) subtility and whiteness, *śvatāṃ gatiṃ gatvā sūkṣmām apy uta.*

The powers attained are then described. They have the following effects[28]: Earth-mastery gives one *sṛṣṭi*, the ability to create things "like Prajāpati"; air-mastery, to make earth shake, with one's finger, toe, hand, or foot, this being the attribute, *guṇa*, of wind (air-element); mastery of space (or ether), the power to appear of the same color with space (ether) and conceal one self. Then one at will can drink up all *āyaḥ* (of water, such as tanks, etc.); and become too glorious to be seen and have this glory diminish (as one will, by applying the mastery of the water-element, and the fire-element, respectively, as is to be inferred. These five (elements) are thus brought into the power (of the Yogin) *vaśānugaḥ*, as he subdues egoism (compare *Pāt. Sūtra*, i. 40, *paramāṇuparamamahattvānto 'sya vaśīkāraḥ*); and when he has subdued these six and intellect, *buddhi*, which is the soul of these six, then at last *vyakta* self becomes *avyakta* and there appears in him "complete faultless illumination", *nirdoṣapratibhākṛtsna*. Such is the *siddhi*-process of the Yogin (*ib.* 16. 21-26). This *pratibhā* is the objective of the Yogin, till he surpasses mastery (as cited above); compare *atikrāntaguṇaksaya*, cited *op. cit.* p. 162.[29]

The hallucinations are referred to again, for example, in xiii. 73. 4, where it is said, "They who are firm in their observance with their unpolluted mind even here on earth have visions of (heavenly) worlds appearing like dreams",

28. No notice is taken here of the Yoga-power which is most named in Brahmanic and Buddhistic literature, memory of previous births. The epic elsewhere indicates its universality in having several forms of the names for it, *jātismaraga, jātismaratā, jātismaratva* (xiii. 109. 15).

29. The rest of this passage relating to the twenty-five *tattvas* of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga has been discussed in my *Great Epic*, pp, 113, 117. On p. *ib.* 165, I have cited the 'impediments' of *Sūtra*, iii. 37.

svapnabhūtāṃś ca tan lokān paśyantī 'hā 'pi Suvratāḥ i. e., in the *samādhi* or Yoga-concentration of their last hour. This is introduced as an argument to prove the existence of such worlds. Compare *Pāt. Sūtra*, i. 38, *svapnanidrājñānā 'valambanaṃ* vā. By Yoga-power the Great Vision of the Dead is produced at the end of the epic story, where all the heroes appear "like visions in the night", *niśi suptotthita* xv 31. 1.

Another passage says in regard to the hour of death that the Yogin, as he frees himself from the objective world, attains the original *ādyā*, Prakṛti, just as rivers attain the ocean ; but if not freed, he sinks down like a house built of sand in water, xii, 299, 34-35.

> *Yathā samudram abhitaḥ saṃśritāḥ saritoprāḥ*
> *tathā 'dyā prakṛtir yogād abhisaṃśrīyate sadā*
> *snehapāśāir bahuvidhāir āsaktamanaso narāḥ*
> *prakṛtisthā viṣīdanti jale sāikataveśmavat*

There is here, apparently, no recognition of Prakṛtilaya as a stage preliminary to perfected emancipation, as taught in *Pāt. Sūtra*, i. 17 and 19 (the latter, *bhavapratyayo videhaprakṛtilayānām*). This verse has the Vedānta image of absorption, like a river in the ocean, and is preceded by the Mahāyāna image of the one who is perfect being unwilling to return to the further shore of the river he has crossed, *ib.* 31.

> *na hy anyat tīram āsādya punas tartuṃ vyavasyati*
> *durlabho dṛśyate hy asya vinipāto mahārṇave.*

The same section contains a passage on the *vītarāga*, *śl.* 10, which has several *Sūtra* terms, though it is doubtful whether they are technical ; but I cite, it as it gives at least parallels to the image of the house (which is here one's own), of bhrama, as used above, notes the importance of *abhyāsa* (*Sūtra*, i. 32 has this term as applied to one principle to oppose the obstacles of *samādhi*) or constant

practice, and mentions again the *kleśas*, which is the *Sūtra* term for the usual epic 'faults'. The twentieth stanza according to the commentator, whom (with Bohtlingk) I do not follow, employs *vistarah* and *saṃkṣepaḥ* as if they were recognized equivalents of ceremonial and spiritual exercises; 299. 18-22 (20=37, repeated):

18, *Yathā 'ndhaḥ svagṛhe yukto hy abhyāsād eva gacchati*
tathā yuktena manasā prājno gacchati tāṃ gatim
(Comm. Yogābhyāsaḥ kārya ity āha)

19, *maraṇaṃ janmani proktaṃ janma vai maraṇāśritam*
avidvān mokṣadharmeṣu baddho bhramati śakravat

20a, *buddhimārgaprayātasya sukhaṃ tv iha paratra ca*
b, *vistaraḥ kleśasaṃyuktaḥ saṃkṣepas tu sukhāvahaḥ*
c, *parārthaṃ vistarāḥ sarve tyāgam ātmahitaṃ viduḥ*

21, *yathā mṛṇāla 'nugatam āśu muñcati kardamam*
tathā 'tmā puruṣasye 'ha manasā parimucyate

22, *manaḥ praṇayate 'tmānaṃ sa enam abhiyuñjati*
yukto yadā sa bhavati tadā taṃ paśyate param.

"As a blind man in his own house goes by being intent and only by practice, so the wise man goes the right way by having an intent mind. Death and birth are interdependnet; one ignorant of the rules for emancipation revolves about, bound like a wheel; but eternal happiness is his who has advanced upon the path of knowledge. Vast riches bring sorrow; *res angusta*, happiness. All wealth is for another's sake, but renunciation (or worldly things) they say is one's own happiness. As the lotus-stalk leaves the mud attached (to it), so a man's spirit is freed from thought One controls thought and so makes his self (spirit) intent. When he gets intent he sees him (self) the highest", (himself as Ātman). The words in 20b, *saṃkṣepas tu sukhāvahaḥ*, embody the idea in *Pāt* ii. 42, *saṃtoṣād uttamāḥ*

sukhalābhaḥ. The thought is common, iii. 2, 41-46 (ills of wealth).

The Yoga of meditation is fourfold, *dhyānoyogo caturvidhaḥ* but just what divisions are meant are not apparent from the discussion. The commentator, referring to several *Sūtras*, e.g., i. 34, and 38-39, attempts to solve the problem ; but the only fourfold division that can be got from the text is that of *dhyāna* itself with three accessories. The Yogin, it is said, should be free of *kleśas* and *nirveda*, *anirvedo gatakleśaḥ*, and then, xii. 195, 15 :

> *vicāraś ca vivekaś ca vitarkaś co 'pajayāte*
> *muneḥ samādadhānasya prathamaṃ dhyānam āditaḥ*

One is reminded of *Pāt. Sūtra*, ii, 26, where complete *viveka* is said to be a means toward the rejection of the visible ; while in ii. 33. *vitarka*, preceded (as is this passage by *kleśa*) by *lobha krodha*, *moha*, is questionable practices open to argumentation, which may be here implied (as power to avoid these questionable practices). At any rate this group of "consideration, discrimination, and argumentation, (which) are subsequent in the case of one engaged in *samādhi*", may be compared with the group in *Sūtra* i. 17 where *samādhi* is "conscious" because accompanied with *vitarka* and *vicāra* (as well as joy and egoism, *vitarkavicārānandāsmitānugamāt samprajñātaḥ*). The gradual growth of intentness, *tathā yogaḥ pravartate*, is likened to the focussing of sunlight with a burning-glass, *yathā bhānugataṃ tejo maṇiḥ śuddhaḥ samādhinā ādatte*, xii. 299, 12.

One passage cited above in regard to the eight *guṇas* might be an allusion to the eight *mahāsiddhis* (or *siddhis*) called *aṇimā*, *laghimā*, *garimā*, *prāpti* (=*mahimā*), *prākāmya*, *īśitva*, *vaśitva*, *kāmāvasāyitva*, indicated by *Pāt. Sūtra*, iii. 45, *tato 'ṇimādiprādurbhavaḥ* (cf. i. 40). These Yoga-powers often alluded to as *aṣṭaguṇam aiśvaryam*, e.g., xii 340. 55, and are called, in general *bhūtis*, *vibhūtis*, *aiśvarya*, or *yogeśvaratva*, powers or masteries and are grouped in the epic

as *aṇimālaghimāprāptiḥ* at xii, 303, 16. They are attributes of God. In the invocation at xiii. 14. 420, the form is *aṇimāmahimāprāptiḥ,* but in Tantric lists the two last (as indicated above) are synonymous and C. 1015 has for *mahimā* the v. l *laghimā.* The *vaśitva* of the Tantric list is in the epic *prabhaviṣṇutva* (*Great Epic,* p. 108). The form *prabhaviṣṇu* is applied to the (divine) lord of the treasury ; *prabhaviṣṇuś ca kośasya jagataś ca tathā prabhuḥ,* xii. 290, 8. In ordinary language, the *aiśvaraṃ balam* of a priest in Brahmin, "unthinkable, undual" i. 78, 38. Further, instead of Yoga-practice, austerities alone are said, in xii. 161, 5, to give "mastery" (the old view), *aiśvaryaṃ ṛṣayaḥ prāptas tapasai 'va.*

Examples of these powers are given in the epic, one or two at length and of considerable interest.[30]

Through Yoga one becomes the size of an atom, *aśivaryayogād aṇumātro bhūtvā,* and enters a lotus-stalk, xii. 343. 42. The power of the Yogin can be projected into the body of another and the latter be powered perpetually with it. Thus when Vidura dies, his body rests against a tree, but he himself by Yoga enters the body of the king, who thus becomes stronger and is filled with Vidura's many virtues, while the sage, leaving there his power, "obtained the Santānika worlds," xx. 26, 26-29.

Another term for Yoga-power is *manīṣā.* By means of this, Cyavana, at xii. 55, 19, hypnotizes his subject and makes appear a grove, mansions, jewels, etc., "as in a vision", *ib.* 53. 68 and 54, 15.

A very clear case of the exercise of hypnotic power (*cittasyaparaśarirāveśaḥ, Pāt. Sūtra,* iii. 38) exploited as Yoga-power is that narrated in xiii. 40 ff. The sage here projects him-

30. What a Yogin can do, in epic theory, has been told in my *Great Epic,* p. 108, etc. The present cases give examples in epic narrative. I have no example of some of the powers. But making oneself many thousands", which is alluded to in the epic, *op. cit.,* and is recognized as *kāyavyūha* in the commentary to *Sūtra,* iv, 4, is in iii. 82, 23 a power of Śiva; who in iii. 83, 163 is a Yoga-lord.

self into the body of the subject by means of the subtile spirit, which is described as of the size of the thumb, xii. 285, 175 and 290, 12. The latter passage describes how Uśanas being Yogasiddha, that is, possessed of the *mahā-siddhis*, projected himself into Kubera and so got power, over him (by Yoga) to take away his wealth and slip away, *yogātmakena ruddhvā...yogenātmagataṃ kṛtvā niḥsṛtaś ca.* This angered the Mahāyogin (Śiva), who tried to throw a weapon at Uśanas, but the latter through Yoga-power, *yoga-siddhātmā*, appeared on the end of the weapon, *śūla*, directed against him, being able to do this in the form of knowledge, *vijñātarūpaḥ...tapaḥsiddhaḥ* (16 and 17).

To return to the hypnotic trance narrated in Anuśāsana. This pupil of a sage, being left in charge of his Guru's wife and finding her inclined to be too familiar toward a visitor, projects himself into her by Yoga-power, *yoga-bala*, and restrains her from following her own inclination, making her change the words she intended to speak. He abides in her "limb by limb", like a shadow, like a person stopping in an empty house which he finds on his way, soiling her as little as a drop of water soils a lotus-leaf, standing in her like a reflection in a mirror, xiii, 40, 46, 47, 50-51, 58 ; 41. 13, 18.

Though the tale is supernatural of the tricky deceiver Indra, *māyāvin*, 40, 43, it illustrates clearly enough the conception of Yoga-power. The subject is unconscious of the influence, *uvasa rakṣaṇe yukto na ca sā tam abudhyata*, 40, 59. But the operator's eye is "fixed", for his spirit is away from it. His body is "moveless, like a picture", *dadarśa...kalevaram, niścestaṃ stabdhanayanaṃ yathālekhya-gataṃ tathā.* The subject wished to rise at the entrance of the guest and politely say "who art thou ?" but "being stiffened and restrained" by the operator "she was unable to move". The guest says, "Constrained by Anaṅga, Love, I come for thy sake, O thou dulce ridens", but she was still "unable to rise and speak", for the virtuous pupil "restrained her senses by the bonds of Yoga", *nijagrāha mahātejā yogena balavat, babandha yogabandhaiś ca tasyāḥ*

sarvendriyāṇi saḥ, so that she was *nirvikāra*, unalterable, 41, 3-12. The process of acquiring influence is described with some detail. The operator sat beside the fair subject, before the expected guest arrived, and caused her to have virtuous desires, *samāsīnaḥ...upāsīnām anindyāṅgīṃ yathārthe samalobhayat.* "Uniting, *saṃyojya*, the beam of his own eyes with the beams of her eyes, he entered her body, as wind does space", 40. 56-57. Her restrained state is described as due to confusion of mind induced by Yoga-power *yogabalamohita*, 41, 13. The subject is unconscious of the power but not otherwise unconscious; for when Indra addressed her again, saying "come", she "wished to reply", but the operator "turned aside this word", and the word that actually escaped her (instead of being a welcome) was "Sir, what business have you to come here" ? And since these words were prompted by the learned saint, they were spoken in excellent Sanskrit, *vāṇī saṃskārabhūṣaṇā* (instead of the patois she would naturally have used, *ib.* 15). But though speaking thus "under another's will", *paravācā*, "she felt ashamed (of her rudeness). After this the operator, "releasing the woman and entering into his own body addressed Indra", *ib.* 19.

The later pseudo-epic of the Anuśāsana and *Aṇugītā* (with the last part of Śānti) introduces us to some new words and ideas in connection with Yoga. Thus we have the remarkable phrase *niryoga*, reminding one of the *Maitrī* and epic term (*Great Epic*, p. 41) *nirātman*, but used in a different sense. Personified Intellect, who had Yoga-power, *aiśvaryayogastha*, came to Hari and he, *yogena cai 'naṃ niryogaḥ, svayam niyuyuje tudā*, xii. 350. 23, where *niryoga* means superior to *yoga*. In a preceding section, the equivalent of the *yoga aiśvara* of *Gītā* xi. 8, is found in the words, *aiśvaryeṇa prayogeṇa dvitīyām tanum āsthitaḥ* (where the god, as in the *Gītā*, changes his form by Yoga-power), xii. 348. 17 (in 63, *nidrāyogam upāgataḥ*, sleep-*yoga*). Among the powers or masteries is that of knowing another's thoughts by Yoga. It may be merely a divine power to be able to do this by simple meditation, but

apparently *dhyānam prāviśya* in xii. 343, 48, which gives this power is the equivalent of *yogaṃ praviśya*, for it can scarcely be the other's thought that is entered here. Compare *dhyānam agamat,* ii 17. 27. Something quite new, again, is the wind called *paravāha* (*paro vāyuḥ*), which, in the after-time, *anukāle*, followed by Death and Yama. "takes away the breaths of all animate creatures and in the case of those that have made proper investigation of the subject and are pleased with *dhyānābhyāsa* (i.e., Yogins) fits for immortality, O ye metaphysicians."[31] This is the wind "because of which, when one is overcome, he comes back no more", xii. 329, 49-52, one of the seven *Vāha* winds unknown to the frequent writers on breaths and winds in the earlier epic, but known to the end-maker of the epic and to the makers of late Purāṇas. The saint's departing soul becomes 'wind' and by Yoga-power, here *yogavīrya*, enters the sun, for "the highest course cannot be attained without Yoga", xii. 332, 52-53. The later pseudo-epic gives the rite in detail. One faces the east, sitting on *kūśa-grass*, in a place that is level and clear ; then "in accordance with the *śāstras* and in accordance with rule, one who knows the proper order puts his soul in all the limbs, beginning with the feet, in regular succession, drawing in his hands and feet". :

> *dhārayām āsa cā 'tmānaṃ yathāśāstraṃ yathāvidhi*
> *padaprabhṛtigātreṣu krameṇa kramayogavit,*[32]
> ..... *pāṇipādaṃ samādāya.*[33]

This was Śuka, a *mahāyogeśvara*, who thus 'overcame space', *vihāyas*, and flew through the sky as wind, through

31. The inconsequent vocative of a careless text.
32. Here *yoga* has the meaning of application (of the order) as in xiv. 21. 11, *vijñānayoga* is 'application of discrimination'.
33. In *nirvikārāḥ samāhitāḥ*, xii 330 15 ; *samādhāya manaḥ* (after *yuṅkṣvā 'tmānam*), xv. 37. 28 and 30, *samādhāya* is mental, but it is physical (of a stone) in the case cited in the next paragraph and should perhaps be read here.

the power of his *buddhisamādhāna*, attaining to 'success' and abandoning (apparently after he had attained success) the "four kinds of faults", xii. 333. 2. and 334 1 ff. and 20-26. The process is in marked contrast to that of the *ūrdhva-bāhuḥ samāhitaḥ*, 'up-arm devotee', described in xii. 339. 2, and shows again the mingling of śāstra rule in Yoga-practice with the half *tapas* or untutored asceticism which is confounded with it. According to xv. 34. 9, the component parts of the wise (Yogines N.) are eternal. The Yoga-practice of Vidura is that of an ascetic. With unkempt hair, naked, *digvāsāḥ*, he wanders through the woods, eating air and holding a stone in his mouth,[34] *viṭamukhaḥ, vīṭaṃ mukhe samādhāya*, xv. 26, 17 ; 37. 12 ; by which means of asceticism, *tapobala*, he won 'success', *siddhi*, 35, 3, as well as by mental discipline, *yogadharma, dhāraṇān manasā dhyānād yaṃ dharmaṃ kavayo viduḥ*, 26, 30 ; 28, 16.

New, too, is the division of *samādhi* into seven, with a new meaning, found in connection with the "seven *dīkṣās*", that is, seven concentrations as exhibited in regard to the usual group of seven, viz., the five senses, mind,[35] and intellect. The occurs in the *tad vanam* allegory of xiv. 27. 2 ff., which, by the bye, seems to me to be the most probable explanation of the esoteric *tadvanam* found ln *Kena Up.* 31, *tad dha tadvanaṃ nāma.* Here the one who tells tbe allegory of the great forest of life says, "after passing through the *mahādurga* I entered a *mahad vanam*", and is

34. This is the usual form of common *tapas* (except for the unusual stone). Cyavana's form was soaking in water, *udavāsa*, xiii. 50 3 ff., equally inconvenient for the practice of high Yoga in the Rāja-yoga sense. Compare *Buddhacarita*, vii. 17, where soaking is a *tapas*.

35. Sometimes mind and sometimes egoism. The five senses, *manas*, and *buddhi* are also the seven tongues of *agni-vaiśvānara*, which is within all the breaths, xiv. 20 19. But Yoga *aiśvarva*, mastery, is sometimes over the ' six", senses and mind alone. This is a simpler phase, as is indicated by the companion-piece, *indriyadhārāyām*, in iii. 211. 20 and 21 (the whole passage is from the *Kāṭhaka Up.*), the latter phrase here embodying" the whole Yoga-rule."

asked *kva tad vanam*, when he explains it as Brahman, which some look on as a great tree of life and some as a great forest, 48, 1 (compare 51, 9, *brahmavanaṃ nityam*). Likely as not, the Upaniṣad name was originally indicative of just such an allegory of *tad vanaṃ brahma*.

It is, perhaps, unprofitable to discuss the still later development of the *prāṇa* theory in connection with Yoga, and I will merely refer to what has already been said above on this point, calling attention to the theory (also held by Max Muller) that speech precedes thought, in xiv. 91, where word comes into being before thought, since mental activity depends on breath (speech) because of the priority of one breath over another (*apāna* makes *prāṇa* into *apāna*); together with the sacerdotal character of breaths (as five priests); the peace-making character of *vyāna* alone, *vāntyarthaṃ vyānam ekam* (as often in late passages, neuter form);[36] the quarrel of breaths as to their relative superiority (imitation of older matter) and the judgment:

sarve svaviṣaye śreṣṭhāḥ sarve cā 'nyonyadharmiṇaḥ

as given in xiv. 21. 10 ff., ib. 23. 22, and 24, 17. The whole discourse in regard to the *āyatana* or resting-places of soul, where Brahman dwells with Soma, Agni and *Dhīra* as veins (*Ch. Up.* vii. 6. 1), ib. 20, 9. Here the breaths are enclosed in pairs, thus: *udāna* is between *apānaprāṇau* (it is called *udāna* because of its *āyatatva* of the breaths); *prāṇāpānau* are between *samānavyānau,* and the latter are each used up or absorbed, *līna* or *pralīna*, when that (*prāṇa*, presumably) is in the same condition.[37]

36. Compare *idaṃ dhyānam idaṃ yogam*, xiii. 17, 19 and other forms cited passim in *Great Epic.*

37. In a previous chapter there is enunciated a theory of disease which has some interesting points. According to this, the *prāṇas* all over the body are restrained by wind which causes bodily best. The heat then pierces the *jīvasthāna,* the place of the spirit, and to escape from this affliction the spirit leaves the

This passage contains two Yoga dogmas, first that because he has obtained 'mastery' can have no master (he is lord, *prabhu* hence no one is his master, *īśvara*), therefore a Yogin can take any form he will *anyānyaś cai 'va tanaśo yathe'ṣṭaṃ pratipadyate*, xiv. 10. 24-25; and that the mind should be kept within (and not without, *bāhyataḥ*) on the following *avasathās* or retreats the, teeth, palate, tongue, throat, neck, breast, and the (veins) *hṛdayabandhana*, *ib.* 37[38] (compare above, p. 350).

To the first of these may be added conjoined 'masteries' implimed in xiv. 16. 22-23; *kramamānaś ca sarvaśaḥ antardhānagatijñaś ca*, going at will and disappearance from sight, Yogin powers like those of the gods, for, as is said elsewhere, the gods, too, have the mastery" (Yoga-mastery), *devāś caiśvaryavanto vai*, xv. 30 10 and 31, 14). Again, in xiii. 75, 12, it is said of the fruit of restraint (various *niyamas*, and *dama*):

Yatrecchāgāmino dāntāḥ sarvaśatrunisādanāḥ
prāthayanti ca yad dāntā labhante tān na saṃśayaḥ,

"Yogins can go as they will, kill all their foes, and get what they wish", powers especially attributed to them in the *Sūtra* (the last being *kamāvasāyitva*, 'doing as one will'). Another form of statement is found in xiii, 29, 11:

brāhmaṇaḥ kurute tad dhi yathā yad yac ca vāñchati,

body. The wind, *vāyu*, which is in the *prāṇāpānau* breaths, goes up and abandons the body, leaving the man without breath, his senses no longer being sensible, xiv. 17, 15 ff. Here the word for *srotas*, *srotobhir yair vijānāti indriyārthān*, 24; the same word for senses as in *Śvet. Up.* i. 5, and indicative of late authorship in both cases. In i. 3 152, *srotas* is aperture, (*apāna*, anus); in xii. 185, 11, both canals and aperture.

38. Ib. 22 repeats the *iṣika-muñja* phrase, *Kāṭhaka* iv. 17; and 66 gives again six months as the time for learning Yoga.

"a priest does how and what he will", making Yoga unnecessary. But some of a Yogin's powers surpass even a priest's. Thus in xiii, 31-32 Pratardana, owing to Bharadvāja's entering into him by Yoga, *"as soon as he was born became thirteen years old,* and recited the whole Veda and the Veda of the how, attaining universal glory", *tejo lokyam.* But what the Yogin accomplishes as a perfected and supernatural lord, the ascetic[39] often accomplishes bv secondary means. Thus Raika was a great ascetic, *mahātapāḥ*, and through his grace his wife and mother-in-law obtained children. But each had to embrace a tree and eat messes of food into which the sage had injected warrior-power and priest -power. By an unfortunate exchange of tree and food each woman got the child intended for the other, xiii. 4. 23-37.

The austerities performed by the divinities are pure *tapas.* Thus, for example, besides the instance already given, Aditi stands on one foot constantly to become Viṣhṇu's mother (in the Devayuga), and Surabhi for eleven thousand years :

atapyata tapo ghoram
vyatiṣṭhad ekapādena paramaṃ yogam āsthitā

xiii. 83, 26-29. This is an especially good instance of the way in which the terms were interchanged, for finally this "Yoga" results only in the goddess pleasing Brahmin who grants her the boon she desires. Only the highest gods employ Yoga alone, as when Śiva becomes four-faced through *yoga-uttama*, xiii. 141. 4.

There is here, in general, no distinction between the two forms, just as in the case above so in xiii. 29, 6, Mātaṅga, an emaciated saint, stands one hundred summers on one toe *aṅguṣṭhena*, all skin and bones :

39. The *naive* anthropomorphizing of the Hindu does not shrink from imputing austerity and its potency to animals. Thus a parrot performs *tapas*, austerity, and by this means recognizes a disguised god, xiii. 5. 14. Even the trees in Hiraṇapura "go about at will," *kāmacāriṇaḥ*, v. 100. 15.

sudurvahaṃ vahan yogaṃ kṛśo dhamanīsaṃtataḥ
tvagasthibhūto dharmātmā,

a passage worth citing also for its late use of *Yogaṃ vahati*, 'endure'.

Although there is no mention by name of Haṭha Yoga, there is a clear indication of the difference (between this and what was latter called Royal Yoga) in the account at xiv. 30 (where Nīlakaṇṭha in fact, points out the distinction). Here a pious fool who wishes to shut his mind and organs of sense ("east arrows on the seven", 26) finally becomes sage and exclaims (30) :

aho kaṣṭaṃ yad asmābhiḥ sarvaṃ bāhyam anuṣṭhitam.

"the folly of my attending to all the externals", where appears the same antithesis as that noticed above (*bāhyataḥ*).

The expression *mahāyoga* seems to be a (logical) derivative of *mahāyogin*, the latter being analogous to *mahātapāḥ*. Viṣṇu and even saints have the title, *mahāyogin*. In v. 68, *ad fin.*, Viṣṇu, his *ātmayoga* and *māyāyoga* are mentioned together ; Vyāsa is a *mahāyogin*, xii. 334. 40. The sense is evidently not one who has *mahāyoga* but a 'great Yogin'. One who is a 'great Yogin', however, must have "great Yoga" and this seems to be all the meaning of *mahāyoga*. In xvi. 4. 21, it is the first stage of Kṛṣṇa's demise, *mahāyogam upetya*, who in *Gītā* ii. 9 is *mahāyogeśvara*, and in xvi. 4. 26, *yogācārya*.

The compounds of *yoga*, other than those already mentioned, vary between the sense of (loose) attachment and (close) union. The latter is the meaning is *ātmayoga*, which is equivalent to *brahmabhūtasya saṃyogaḥ*, iii, 211, 15, union with the absolute. But *saṃyoga* may be a "sign of ill", if the union is with the objective world.[40] The word *anuyoga*

40. Thus, *saṃyogā viprayogāntaḥ* (life ends in death), xii. 331. 20 ; *yaḥ sajjati sa muhyati na taṃ sa duḥkhamokṣāya, saṃyoga duḥkhalakṣaṇam*, xii. 330. 8. So the 'rope' already referred to may

I have discussed in a previous volume of the journal, xx. p. 24. It means 'fastening on', and so in one place 'question', in another, 'annoyance'. But no radical meaning is left in some compounds. Thus *mokṣayoga* is the equivalent of the later Rājayoga : "The Yoga-śastra says that one should restrain the senses concentrate the mind on the soul, *mana ātmani dhārayet,* and, having passed through austerities, should cultivative *mokṣayoga* (the Yoga of emancipation). Such an one, devoted to one thing, *ekāntaśīlaḥ* (as above), sees soul in soul (self in self) if he can join soul to soul, *yoktum ātmānam ātmani,* beholding his soul as a form, *rūpam,* as if in sleep", xiv. 19. 17-21. Here *yoga* has the same technical meaning as it has in *karmayoga* and *jñānayoga,* not literally application to work or knowledge, but the kind of *yoga*-science characterized by necessary external actions as compared with that characterized by discarding this in favour of psychical perfection, or in modern parlance Haṭha and Rāja Yoga, the latter occurring first in *Gītā* ix. 2, as *rājvidyā rājagūhyam,* while Haṭha comes as near to being differentiated in xiii. 14. 22 as anywhere : *janmasiddhikriyāyogaiḥ* (*sevyamānaś ca yogibhiḥ*), where the *Sūtra's kriyāyoga,* ii 1 (comm. to ii. 2), or practical Yoga is uniquely contrasted with higher wisdom, as in the next verse with *karmayajña* (*kriyāyogaiḥ sevyamānaḥ*), the god worshipped with Rāja and Haṭha Yoga or with ceremonial sacrifices and Haṭha Yoga, as the words may, perhaps, be divided and understood. The expression *pradāhnavidhiyogastha* in xii. 14. 428 appears to me to be equivalent to *brahmayoga,* but this and the preceding compounds (above) can be interpreted differently.

Other points of the Yoga system and discipline, such as *suṣupti,* which are explained in the later epic, have

be a 'tie' instead of a means of salvation, withal in the same nautical image; for on the one hand it is a *nibandhana-rajjuḥ* or tie that binds, and, on the other, an essential part of the ship that brings one safely across the river of life, *dharmasthairyāvatāraka* (*nauḥ*), xii. 330. 37 and 39.

been more or less fully treated in my *Great Epic.* The epic, for example, gives the complete Sāṃkhya scheme of Tattvas (with the addition of the Twenty-sixth Principle) as belonging equally to Sāṃkhya and Yoga. On the subtile bodies, the colours of the soul, etc., see *op-cit.*, pp 173, 179, etc. Especially interesting is the insistence on the physical (sensual) delights experienced hereafter by a Yogin, whose aim, according to other passages, should be renunciation of all of them. The whole section, xiii. 107 (with the preceding) should be read, to get an idea of the practical reward of asceticism, *śl.* 130 emphasizing the fact that it is not an ordinary priest but a Yogin who is blessed with carnal felicity, *sukheṣva* (here described) *abhirato yogī.* He rides around attended by self-luminous women, etc., and enjoys in heaven all the delights intensified which he renounced on earth. This teaching of asceticism is equivalent to saying, "Be virtuous now, that you may sin hereafter." It is the result of blending two ideals. One appears from the time of the oldest Upaniṣads, *Ch. Up.* viii. 12. 3 ; *Kāṭhaka*, i. 25 ; and the older epic, where one is chaste on earth in order to enjoy a body in heaven, i. 46. 5 ; naturally enough there, but out of place in the perfected view of the philosopher, whole ideal (isolation or unity with Brahman) is incompatible with it. For to the true Yogin of the epic such practices as are here held up as desirable are not only foolish but hellish (*niraya* is the fruit).

The technicalities of philosophical Yoga have perforce been drawn from the latter epic. The earlier epic shows scarcely a trace of technical terms. Yet it cannot be maintained that the earlier epic does not offer abundant opportunity to divulge the science of Yoga or that the writers of this time were prone to hide their wisdom as a secret.

In Ādi, in the many tales of saints and asceties, we are practically in a world not of Yogins but of Munis, who endure corporal pains and thereby attain power over the elements, get "divine sight," etc. The terms are largely for-

mulate, *tapas tape, tapasy eva mano dadhe,* first of Vasiṣṭha, i. 99, 7 and 34, and then of Viśvāmitra, i. 175. 47, the former having divine sight and the latter getting "success", *siddhi.* It is not *yoga* but *tapas,* austerities, that sends Yayāti to heaven, i. 90, 21, and the doors of heaven", seven in number, include *tapas,* peace and self-restraint, but no Yoga is mentioned even when the *gṛhastho 'paniṣat,* the true teaching of one order, is expanded into a description of all the orders, as in i. 91, 3 ff., where the Muni is exhorted to be *nirdvandvaḥ, tapasā karśitaḥ.* Even the word *yoga,* except in the sterotyped *yogakṣema,* e.g , 92. 17, which has nothing to do with Yoga is conspicuously absent from this and most of the descriptions contained in the old tales of saints, and it is not till we reach the tale of the "world-renowned impaled one" who was impaled (Hindu equivalent of crucified) between two thieves, that we find anyone of these devotees recognized as a Yogin. The last mentioned one, however, though a Mahāyogin is still merely an "up-arm silent" ascetic, i. 107. 3. The discipline is purely physical, restraint of tongue, *mauna,* excessive torment, *atīva-tapas* and "drying up the body" by various means, both in the case of saints and ascetic kings, i. 115. 24 ; 119. 7 and 34 (*ekāntaśīlin*). To propitiate the gods is a common reason for such discipline. Mental intentness occasionally plays a part. Devoted to severe austerities, Pāṇḍu stood on one foot all day with the most extreme concentration, *samādhi* but all this was merely in order to propitiate Indra, *ārirādhayiṣur devam,* i. 123 26. He is credited, however, with the possession of *tapoyogabala* (cf. *tapoyukta,* i. 209, 8) in i 121. 37 (like *tapavīrya* in i. 75. 45, etc). The Mahātapas, or great ascetic Droṇa, practices only austerities, *tapas,* in Ādi (180. 40) ; though when dies, in the later expanded epic, it is as a perfected Yogin. So striking is the absence of the Yoga expression, that when Vyāsa tells his mother to live in the wood practicing *yoga, yogam āsthāya yukta vāsa tapovane,* we are surprised only at the formula, *yogam āsthāya* (*passim* in the later epic), and not surprised that the advice to try *yoga,* as here expressed was

carried out by horrible austerities, *sughoraṃ tapas*, i. 128. 13, or in other words that *yoga* here is not philosophical *yoga* at all, but only Vedic asceticism.[41] Gifts of the gods are sometimes free as, in the Nala's case, but generally they are wrung out by austere discipline. Besides special favors, such as having a son or accomplishing some end that would not ordinarily necessitate à miracle[42], these gifts are, in short, control of the elements (the power of going at will, implied in *kāmagama* ; disappearing ; taking any form, *kāmarūpir* seeing what one will, etc.) ; as, for example, the first three in i. 31 ; 100. 21 ; 89. 19 ; and the "seeing wisdom", *cākṣuṣī nāma vidyā*, bestowed by the Gandharva upon Arjuna, which is get by his *tapas* united with divine kindness.[43] But ordinarily, six months' standing on one foot was the *vrata*, "observance", *ekapādena ṣaṇmāsaṃ sthito vidyāṃ labhed imām*, i. 170. 41-46. So in i. 86. 15, *dāntaḥ...niyatavanmanāḥ*, eating air, between fires, six months, on one foot, of Yayāti. The wonders of the Muni are as the result (in these tales) not of *Yoga-bala*, which is so conspieuous elsewhere in the epic, but of *tapo-bala*, Thus in i. 3, the Muni lives on air and has *tapo-bala* ; in 40, 25, he is Mahātapas and, 41, 4, has *tapaso balam* (in 43. 8, his *vidyābala* revives a dead tree). Through this *tapas* comes the "know-

41. A girl. in v. 120 5 ff.. on being brought out to elect a husband at her Election-ceremony, "chooses as husband the forest and becomes an ascetic, with fasts, *dīkṣās*, and restraints, *niyamas* ; all as *tapas* (*tepe*).

42. In iii. 126. 19 ff.. ascetic power, *tapovīrya* (as *brahman*) impregnates water, after the priest has "endured hard asceticism" *tapa āsthāya dāruṇam*, to make the water effective, in getting a son for a king.

43. So Sañjaya sees and hears by *yoga-ba'a*, vi. 15. 5 ff. Simple "illusion" is what the Yogin's tricks are called when practiced by less holy experts (*vayam api...khaṃ gacchema māyayā...darśayema ca rūpāṇi svaśarīre bahūny api* ; "we, too, can fly to the sky and appear in various shapes (not really but) by illusion, v. 160. 55-57.

ledge divine'', which presages death and sees the past as well as the future, 43, 8 ; 73. 25. Viśvāmitra, here, as in the passage above, has *tapas* only, wherewith he "burns his faults", 71. 37 : and all 72. The technical terms of philosophical Yoga, when used at all, are without their later connotation, as in the case of *samādhi*, above, and in i. 75, 54 ; *Samādhi*, above, and in i. 75, 54 ; *Samādhāya mano buddhyā*, "composing his thougts by using his reason" ; *caran dīkṣām* (as *tapas*, 45. 1, etc.).[44]

The great saint Vyāsa is a conspicuous cxception to what has been said of the powers thus attained. The ability he possessed could not be got by study or study or tapas, i. 60. 4 ; but Vyāsa's case may fairly be regarded as exceptional. In other cases, all that a Yogin can do is done in the early epic by an ascetic,[45] and up to a certain point the two are one. Consequently the later technique carries on both the old discipline and its phraseology ; but the earlier form knows only the ascetic side, and not even that in its Haṭha refinements. "Posture" is a chief concern of the Yogin, but to the Muni this technicality is unknown. Through the whole of the earlier epic I believe there is but one case even suggesting the Yogin "posture", whereas the tales are many which show that the Munis either stood, or hung themselves upside down, though the aim in doing so was attainment not only of power but of highest bliss. The conclusion seems to be inevitable that the whole tone, the practice and ideal of these ancient tales of saints differs entirely from that of the pseudo-epic. The practice of Yoga in these tales of Ādi is quite unknown, and the word in its pregnant sense is almost lacking,[46] except when Hari is introduced

44. So in iii. 165. 13, good conduct *śīla*, and *samādhi*, iii. 177. 22, *tapodamacarasamādhiyuktas*, *tṛṇodapatravaraṇāśmakuṭṭaḥ*.

45. In one point the teaching is contradictory Great ascetics aquire the Veda without study, like Māṃdhātar, iii. 126. 33, *dhyānamātra* ; but *tapas* of the hardest sort cannot teach it, ib. 135. 16 ff.

46. It is common enough, however, in the sense of means, way,

as "lord of Yogins" and Śukra as Yogācārya, i, 34, 14; 66. 43, and in *veda yogaḥ* in i. 1. 48. The term Mahāyogin is used, I think, only as indicated above (and then implying *tapas* only); but in ii. 68. 43 we find, in the miracle-scene that Kṛṣṇa calls out, Kṛṣṇa, Kṛṣṇa, Mahāyogin, ii. 68. 43; and Sanatkumāra is Yogācārya, *mahātapāh*, in ii. 11. 23; as in the late Tīrtha tale of the birth of the war-god Skanda, Kumāra is "lord of Yogins" and has *mahāyoga*, ix. 44. 33; 46. 96.

In so far as the Vana has tales of this sort, the same thing is true there. Thus in the ancient Flood-story, the venerable Manu stands on one leg and hangs upside down[47]

application, energy, and other untechnical meanings, as in compounds throughout the epic, such as *kālayoga*, *svāduyogin* (but Kālayogin in the pseudo-epic, epithet, of Śiva), *kramayoga* etc. Compare iii. 106. 23, *anema kramayogena.* "in this order"; 107, 70; *tapaḥsiddhisamāyogāt...kālayogena*, "by means of *tapas* in course of time".

47. Thus : *ūrdhvabāhuḥ...ekapādasthitas tīvraṃ cakāra sumahat tapaḥ, avākchiras tathā cā pi netrair animiṣair dṛḍham*; so '*tapyata tapo ghoraṃ varṣaṇam āyutam tadā.* The upside-down form of asceticism is gradually fading out in India. A few years ago there was a colony of the Avākchiras sort in the grove by the lake in Ajmere. They numbered nearly an hundred and hung like bats from the trees, by the knees or by the ankles, in a position sure to destroy their brains if they had any. But in 96 only one or two were to be seen. So, too, the iron spiked-bed, a later form of asceticism, is now out of fashion. In the village beside the lake at Kurukṣetra, I saw one ascetic who showed his spiked bed, but his body did not look as if he had used it except for exhibition. There was also such a bed near Brahman's lone temple at Puṣkara; but the owner did pretend to use it, and only kept it as a relic or for show. Ordinarily, multilation, ashes, *śiśnabandhana*, and posing the arms not are the modern methods, but they are sometimes more elaborate (keeping one leg behind the neck, etc.), not as Yoga, however, but as *tapas*, through, of course the creatures call themselves Yogins. So far as I could discover, they have absolutely no notion of higher Yoga, and, indeed, most of them are nearly idiotic. They live on the charity of the poor, and are still dreaded by the powerful One of these Yogins in a capital city

for ten thousand years, like other old Munis, iii. 187, 4 ff.; but this book, also a mixture of old and new, shows as well the features of the pseudo-epic. I am not entering here any vicious circle; for I suppose, for example, that no good historian would deny that the chapter of Vana where the sun is adored under its "one hundred and eight" (twelve) names, one of which is Mihira, is a late chapter, as has been maintained by every competent scholar since Lassen. Here, for the first time in the epic, we come upon (*yogam āsthāya*) *prāṇāyāmena tasthivān*, and the Yogin sings in his *Stotra* to the sun *tvaṃ gatiḥ sarvasāṃkhyānāṃ yoginām*[48] *tvaṃ pārāyaṇam*. This passage, iii. 3, 34-37, 61, is led up to by the first allusion to the *Yogaiśvarya* of the gods, iii. 2 80-81, and *yogasiddhi*, 82, to be gained by *tapas*, and here, too, we find mentioned *aṣṭāṅga būddhiḥ*, iii. 2, 18 (which Nīlakaṇṭha refers to the eight parts of Yoga)[49] and *kriyāyogadvaya*, which may, but does not necessarily, imply Yoga. In the same way, we find that the saints, though in the same circumstances as those old saints who enjoy *tapabala*, are now furnished in the later tales with *yogabala* as in the case of Kuvalāśva who gets Viṣṇu's own power and as "a Yogin by Yoga" extinguished a fire, iii, 201. 34; 204. 31.

Of course, one may say, How can one prove that the Kuvalāśva story is not as antique as that of Manu? But

of North India, refused to budge when the Raja wanted to enlarge his wall to cover the Yogin's stand, and the king was afraid to remove him, but built the wall all round him so that he sat in a sort of a brick well till he got tired of starving and came out of his own accord. The first *adhomukhas* were the Vālakhilyas, who hand thus from a tree i. 20. 2.

48. Compare iii. 149. 17 (brahma) *sa gatir yoginām parā...śuklo Nārāyaṇaḥ*. The later Puranic form Yogi, for Yogin, in found, by the way, only in this case at C. xiii. 916, where B. 14. 323 has *Sanatkumāro yogānāṃ* (C. *yoginām*) *Sāṃkhyānām Kapilo hy asi*.

49. Bohtlingk compares the "eight characteristics" of *medhā* in the description at iii. 45, 8-10: *sāṅgapaniṣadān vedān colur ākhyānapañcamān yo 'dhīte guruśuśrūṣām medhām cā 'ṣṭaguṇāśrayām...sthūlalakṣyaḥ*.

it surely implies less acuteness than unreasonableness to ignore the apriori improbability of this assumption. In short, there is a difference, and that difference hangs together with the other factors, marking the steps between asceticism pure and simple and the technique of philosophical Yoga. Each age absorbs the preceding, and we have *tapas* and *yoga* used as one as soon as the latter has become vulgarized. Thus the two are interchangeable in the Arjuna tales. After his brother teaches Arjuna the mystery, *upaniṣad,* of arms and the science of memory, *vidyā pratismṛtiḥ,* iii. 36. 30 and 37. 10-12, he says *tapasā yojayā 'tmānaṁ*[50] *ugreṇa* (the same phrase in 91. 19), and in consequence (59) ; *tasthau Yogasamanvitaḥ,* which is repeated as *tapasy ugre vartamānaḥ,* 38, 22, and this *yoga=tapas* is as follows (23ff.) : Clad in grass, deer-skin, and supported on a staff, he ate, *samupayuktavān,* old leaves that had fallen on the ground ; for one month eating fruit every three days, then every six, then every fifteen ; then living on air and holding his arms up, without any support, and standing on his toes, *pādāṅguṣṭhāgrādhiṣṭhitaḥ*[51] ; so that the gods, *ib.* 34, did not know what he expected to gain, heaven, long life or "mastery" *aiśvarya.* This hero was "in the greatest hurry" to be devout, *tvarayā parayā yuktas tapase dhṛtaniścayah,* 38. 14. So in the Tīrtha tales, which, considering the attitude taken towards the Tīrthas by Manu and other early priestly writers, may be reasonably assumed to belonging to a rather late stage of development, Viṣṇu gives the "eight-fold mastery", *aṣṭaguṇaiśvarya* to the seers at the Saptacaru Tīrtha, when he was praised with the seven *ṛcas,* iii. 82. 97 ; that is,

50. Compare i. 89. 6, *tapasā yojya deham.*

51. The same phrase in v. 186. 22, of a female ascetic, who indulges for twelve years in the same discipline, eating air for six months and soaking herself in the same discipline, eating air for six months and soaking herself in the Jumna, *udavāsa* ; all to become a man : In the sily exaggeration of the later epic, the girl Death soaks herself eight thousand years and stands on one leg and one toe for hundreds of billions of years, vii. 54, 17-25, to avoid her duty.

the "mastery" is here a part of the paraphernalia of *bhakti*; and here also, but without any suggestion of its real significance, in iii. 83. 63 : *śvāvillomāpanāyane prāṇāyāmāir nirharanti svalomāni dvijottamāḥ, pūtātmānaś ca prayānti paramāṃ gatim*, "the Brahmins pull out their hair with suppression of breath and purified go the highest way", a passage hall-marked by the later form *adhigatvā* (the *antardhānam*, power of "disappearance" is "obtained by *tapas*", at Kapila's, or Kapisthala's Kedāra, 72-74).[52] Here Viṣṇu is a Mahāyogin, iii, 90, 31. In one of these tales it is formally taught that the exercise of "mastery" diminishes the store of *tapas*. Thus, Lopāmudrā wants luxuries and tells her ascetic husband that he is "able by his *tapas*, *īśaḥ tapasā*, to get all the wealth in the world", but Agastya replies. "That's as you say, but it would cause a diminution of the *tapas*", *evam etad yathā 'ttha tvam, tapovyayakaraṃ tu tat*, iii. 97. 21-22.

Most of the tales here use *yoga* indiscriminately with *tapas* "great *tapas* and *yoga*", iii. 106. 11 ; *Pārthas tapoyogaparaḥ*, iii. 164. 12 : *pareṇa tapasā yuktaḥ...yogasiddhaḥ*, iii. 163. 24. The ascetic wanders about with Yoga-powers, *yogaiḥ*, iii. 129. 7 ; "they that are *yogayuktaḥ* and *tapasī prasaktaḥ*", iii. 182. 90.[53] The last is in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* of the epic, which has several striking novelties, e.g., the "god-created original body", *ādiśarīra*, which is "for the more part destroyed" when at once, one is born without intermediate non-existence in another womb, iii. 183. 76 ff. The passage xii. 298 18, *Great Epic*, p. 39, allows "some time" between births. Another passage of the Vana discourse repudiates asceticism as a means of holliness, but

52. So in iii. 84, 58 a pure man obtains *jātismaratva*, at the Kokamukha Tīrtha.

53. This passage explains that above (p. 356) in regard to the *res angusta* : Those that have vast wealth, *dhanāni vipulāni*, and are pleased with bodily comforts win earth but lose heaven : Yogins and devotees afflict the body and win heaven but lose earth ; those who are pious and rich opportunely win worlds ; but those who are neither wisely devout nor rich lose both worlds".

recognizes "sitting" as one of many forms of austerity:

na sthānakuṭikāsanāt...na tu sthaṇḍilaśayyayā...
na co 'dakapraveśena na ca kṣmāśayanād api, etc.

The whole passage, opposing the asceticism of the early tales (though a case follows immediately, in 204, 2, of such an ascetic standing on one leg, emaciated, all veins), Buddhistically teaches that : 'They that do no evil with thought, speech, act, or intelligence, they are ascetics,[54] they are Mahātmans. Asceticism is not affliction of the body. Sinful deeds are not purified by fastening and other austerities. Virtue alone makes the pilgrim and the pious man, not living on roots and fruits, not silence and living on air, not shaving the head, not standing (e.g. on one leg) or sitting in a crooked position, not carrying matted locks, not lying on stony ground, not fasting, not worshipping fire, nor immersion in water, not lying on earth. But one's faults, *kleśaḥ*, must be burned away by knowledge, for the body without the Ātman is but as a log of wood", *ātmanā viprahīṇāni kāṣṭhakuḍyopamāni ca* (*śarīrāṇi*), iii. 200, 99-109.

The same antithesis is found here as that presented by Buddha in the case of the asceticism of Munis (who are immersed in water and are undergoing other austerities) on the one hand, and the purifying knowledge preferred by Buddha himself, on the other. Buddha ends his contemplation of just such ascetics, Munis, *tapaḥpradhānāḥ*, with words almost one with the epic text just cited, *cittād ṛte kāṣṭhasamaṃ śarīram*, *Buddhacarita*, vii. 27, a poem which elsewhere recognizes the Yogin by that name, ix. 36. Besides knowledge, the epic passage inculcates as "divine fasting"

54. So in v. 63. 9 ff., Vidura's Muni is a Yogin of the old type, though not so called. The comparison here, cl. 23, may be added to the end of the second note on p. 39 of my *Great Epic* : *śakunīnām ivā 'kāśe pādaṃ nai 'vo' palabhyate, evaṃ prajñānatṛptasya muner vartma na dṛśyate.* But in v. 20, *jñāna* is recognized only as *dhruvam indriyadhāraṇam.*

morality and quietism, *indriyāṇāṃ prasādena, ib.* 117 (cf. *dhātuḥ Kāṭhaka,* ii. 20).

This is, I believe, the only place in the earlier epic where *āsana* may possibly be taken in a *Yoga* sense, and it is clearly part of a late interpolation, probably Buddhistic in origin. The nearest approach to it is in iii. 122, 2, (*tapas tape*) *sthāṇubhūto mahātejā, vīrasthānena...atiṣṭhata ciraṃ kālaṃ ekadeśe...sa valmīko 'bhavad ṛṣiḥ,* etc., where an ordinary old-fashioned Muni's "heroic stand" has really nothing in common with the Yoga "posture" *vīrāsana.*

There is one passage in the *Sanatsujātīya* to which the commentator ascribes a recognition of *āsana,* postures, under the head of *aṅgāni,* which are made to include suppressions of breath and postures. I doubt, however, whether the word refers to Yoga at all, and certainly *yoga* as used in the passage does not mean Yoga. The writer describes how the good "extract that the Ātman, *ātmānaṃ nirharanti,* from the body, like the *iṣika* from the *muñja*", and then the four *pādas* of *brahmacarya* are given with the addition (v. 44. 7 ff., 16-17).

kālena pādaṃ labhate tathārtham
tataś ca pādaṃ guruyotaṭaś ca
utsāhayogena ca pādamṛchcc
chāstreṇa pādaṃ ca tato 'bhiyāti;
dharmādayo dvādaśa yasya rūpam
anyāni cā 'ṅgāni tathā talaṃ ca
ācaryayoge phalatīti cā'hur
brahmārthayogena ca brahmacaryam

Teland very properly takes no notice of the interpretation of *aṅgāni* as implying *āsanas.*

The Triśiras legend, which, when told in the pseudo-epic, xii. 343, 88-42, introduces, within the compass of a few sentences, not only the *aiśvaryayoga* ignored in the Udyoga parallel referred to below, but also Dadhīca as a Mahāyogin, is told in Udyoga without either of these

words being used, and the whole account, offering every opportunity for *yoga*, speaks only of *tapas* and *dama* (while the corresponding narration in regard to Dadhīca in iii. 100. 21 is also without ascription of *yogitva*, not to speak of *mahāyogitva*, to that bony saint). It is not till the extension of the tale that *yoga* appears at all, and here Nahuṣa's claim, in the Bombay text, that he possesses *māhātmyayoga* (15, 21, *paśya māhātmyayogaṃ me*) and greatness, not only does not imply Yoga, but is undoubtedly a later reading for the simple Calcutta version, 467, *paśya māhātmyam asmākam ṛddhiṃ ca*. The claim that Nahuṣa exhibits *yoga*[55] could apply only to what he proceeds to do, *vimāne yajayitvā ca ṛṣim*. He is *tapasvin*, not *yogin*, even in his own estimation, as is express stated both by himself and in Bṛhaspati's following account.

Apart from the *Sanatsujātīya*, 45, 18, and the late refrain of ch. 46, *Yoginas tam prapaśyanti* (Ch. 45 being, in all probability, an addition, to the original, as Telang has shown, and the refrain being simply inserted between old Upaniṣad citations), Udyoga has few references to Yoga. There is a long collection of proverbs where something of the sort might be expected, but here there is only 33, 61, *paricaran yogayuktaḥ*", a wandering devotee", showing that no Yoga, in the system's sense, can be intended. Even in the warning against "cultivating one's *vīrya*", or ascetic power, "like dogs they consume their own vomit" (who cultivate the 'power'), 42. 33, only the Muni is mentioned, not the Yogin. The Buddhistic admonition, *maunaṃ na sa munir bhavati*. "Not through silence (alone) does one become a mute (ascetic)", ib. 60, is merely ethical. In v. 14. 12 ff., there is a scene where, in like circumstances, as already shown, the later epic stresses Yoga-power as the means by which one can creep

55. The ascetic cat, in the Buddhistic tale of v. 160, 14 ff., has all the Muni's characteristics, but *yoga* occurs here only in the remark, *dvayor yogaṃ na paśyāmi tapaso rakṣaṇasya ca śl*. 27, where *yoga* is combination (compatibility).

into a lotus-stalk. But here the same thing is done without any such reference to *yoga-bala.* In one or two passages, however, *yoga* is mentioned by name : *āgamādhigamād yogād vaśī tattve prasīdati.* "By scripture-study and by Yoga he that has his senses under control becomes serene in truth",[56] v. 69. 21 (*āste sukhaṃ vaśī, Gītā,* v. 13). So in v. 70 4, *maunād dhyānāc ca yogāc* ca, Kṛṣṇa (derived from *kṛṣi* and *na=nirvṛti*) is called Mādhava (!) "because of his silence, contemplation, and Yoga".

But it is in the later proclamations of the supreme divinity of this Kṛṣṇa, whom the ignorant are accustomed to despise as a "mere man", that, beginning with the *Gītā,* we find Yoga and Yogin employed with the greatest frequency and predilection. It may, perhaps, seem to some that these terms were held in reserve for just this employment ; that the one and only author of the epic deliberately refused to speak of Yogins and *Yoga-bala* in the tales of the Munis of the first book ; that he gradually introduced the substitution of *yoga* as an expression equivalent to *tapas* in the hymns and Puranic material of the third book, and then at last revelled in the words *yoga* and *yogin* when applied to his new-made God[57] as revealed first in the *Gītā* and then in the hymn given by Bhīṣma vi. 65, where piled together we find, 47 ff. : *viśveśvaro vāsudevo 'si tasmād yogātmānaṃ daivataṃ tvām upaimi...jaya yogīśvara vibho jaya yogaparavara...jaya lokeśvareśvara...sarvayogātmān...na balaṃ yogayogīśa janimas te yogaṃ prāpsyasi tattvataḥ...(tvām) anādimadhyāntam aparayogam...pravadanti viprāḥ* (the follow-

56. Or "in real being," though the simple meaning of truth is also common. Viṣṇu's power is expressed by this word and its negative to indicate *māyā,* in v. 70 14 ; *atattvaṃ kurute tattvam,* "He makes the unreal (objective world) real".

57. vi. 66. 187-20 ; *nā 'vajñeyo Vāsudevo mānuṣo 'yam iti prabhuḥ yaś ca mānuṣamātro yam iti brūyāt sa mandadhīḥ, hṛṣīkeśam avajñānāt tam āhuḥ puruṣādhamam ; yogināṃ taṃ mahātmanāṃ praviṣṭaṃ mānuṣīṃ tanum, avamanyed Vāsudevaṃ tam āhus tāmasaṃ janāḥ* cf. *Gitā,* ix. 11).

ing sections keeping up the strain with *yogād viditam*, *yogin*, *yogabhūta*, *dhyānayoga*, *yogavit*).

If we compare, or rather contrast, the praise of Kṛṣṇa ascribed at ii. 38 to the same admirer, we shall find that, though the man-god is here also the All-god, *Kṛṣṇa eva hi lokānaṃ utpattir api cā 'vyayaḥ*, 23, etc., yet *yoga* and *yogin* are as conspicuously absent from the earlier laudation as they are favorites in the later.

If we examine the use of one of these epithets, in the list of vi. 65, we shall find that *yogātman* is applied to the sun, when that god, to beget Karṇa, comes to earth and impregates Pṛthā by touching her navel with *yoga*-power, not in the earlier accounts of this marvel at i. 67 and 111 (compare also v. 145). but only in the secondary account narrated at iii. 307, 23 and 28 (*ib.* 306, 8, *yogat kṛtvā dvidha 'tmānam*), where the sun-god, "by Yoga" dividing his personality,[58], remains in heaven with one part and descends to earth with the other, when, being "all Yoga", he enters Pṛthā and controls her, without depriving her virginity, *yogenā 'viśya 'tmasaṃstham cakāra*. The style here,

58. The division of personality as an attribute of Yoga may perhaps have begun with the sun, indentified with the year, dividing himself into twelve parts. As a general thing, epic usage recognizes only the doubling or quadrupling of a god, or multiplication into many parts, each part, however, being the same and like the whole. In v. 186. 41, however, the poet makes a girl ascetic divide into two distinct entitles. One half of her becomes a crooked river, becaused she practiced crooked (wrong) austerities and the other half continued as a girl, which half afterwards became a man. Of the multiplication of gods I have given a case above (p. 358), Skanda thus quadruples himself, ix. 44. 37, *yogam āsthāya*, and again multiplies himself, 46, 92. But heroes possessed of magical "illusion" play the same trick without Yoga: "deceived by his glory him one they saw many", vii. 113 13, of Sātyaki: also in 141. 7 (cases of "illusion" are found passim in accounts of demons and half-gods). A case of the sun *dvādaśātman*, appearing in the twelve months as dividing himself into twelve, "*kṛtvā dvādaśadhā 'tānam*, is found at iii. 3. 26 and 59.

especially in the following Pṛthā's Lament,[59] is a sufficient indication that this version is a late product, even without the parallels, which show that, according to the earlier tale, the sun-god on being summoned by mantras fulfilled his mission without recourse to hypnotism. The same *yoga-mūrti* characterizes the late account of Pṛthā's second conception (by Dharma) at i. 123. 6.

Young heroes dying in battle go to Yama's world or Indra's world, according to early battle-accounts, but when we get to the late (inflated) book of Droṇa we are taught that a boy-hero of only sixteen not only goes to the worlds he deserves by his bravery and moral character, but with a sudden addition of verses in another metre, that "he has gone the way pursued by Yogins whose insight has been clarified by meditation; and he has assumed a lunar body", vii. 71. 12-17. Here in Droṇa there is a case of hypnotism exercised by the so-called Supreme God, who is acting as the servant ("a charioteer is only a servant") to the hero Arjuna. Both go to bed in separate tents, and then Kṛṣṇa, "applying Yoga", *yogam āsthāya yuktātmā*, vii. 79, 9 ff. causes a vision of himself to appear to Arjuna and hold a long conversation with him. In this, seventh, book Kṛṣṇa makes darkness in daylight by Yoga-power, *Yogi Yogena saṃyukto yoginām īśvaro hariḥ*, vii. 146. 68 (in 202, 15, *yoga-yogeśvaraḥ* is *śambhu*).

The next book apart from a reference to Droṇa's death when engaged in Yoga, viii. 9, 38, has, I believe, no reference to Yoga. This is originally an older book, showing, for example, both views in regard to the time of exile, an indication that it is composed of pieces of various dates. Droṇa recognizes only thirteen this view in other passages, holds also the older view that the exile was only twelve years

59. Pṛthā's Lament is a close literary parallel to Simonides Fig. 22. The expression used in invoking the god, *prāṇam upaspṛśya*, iii 306. 10. does not imply *prāṇāyāma*, as Mr. Ganguli translates, but wetting the month, *adbhiḥ* being supplied as in *Manu* iv. 143.

long, a view dating from the time before the intrusion of Virāṭa. Compare viii. 11. 27, "the arrow (or frief) would be removed, which has been mine for twelve years", (later on, "the grief of thirteen years", 68. 9; 74. 47; 91. 4). Śalya also reserves Yoga allusions for the late Tīrtha tales. Here Vyāsa and Asita Devala get their "greatest Yoga" (*mahāyoga* not being enough, it is now *paramā* and *parā*) simply by visiting a bathing place, ix. 49. 23-24, as does a saint at 50. 7. *yoganityaḥ*. Here (a saint's) "supernatural power belongs to austerities but is born of Yoga", *dṛṣṭvā prabhāvaṃ tapaso yogajam.* The *prabhāva* or mastery here extolled is to disappear and to go and come with supernatural speed, to ascend to Brahman, and descend again, at will 50, 23 ff. The union of the Yoga and *bhakti* idea is conspicuous here. Thus in the tale of the jujube-girl, another of the many ascetic women whose tales adorn the epic and probably reflect the influence of Buddhism, the divinity is pleased "with her faith, austerities, and ascetic rule", *bhakti, tapas*, and *niyama*, ix. 48. 30, and so grants her desires. Another, "a chaste Brahmin women," went to heaven on being *yogayukta* 54. 6. These stories are merely to advertise bathing resorts, each one of which must have a miracle. This book contains a clear reference to Yoga regulations and śāstra in the Tīrtha tale of ch. 50, already referred to. One saint, seeing that another's magic power was much greater than his own, took lessons of him "learned the regulations, *vidhi*, of *yoga*, according to the śāstra, and, by performing all the practices, *kriyas*, according to rule, got the highest, *para*, Yoga, and attained emancipation, "50. 53-64 (practical Yoga has the technical name of *kriyāyoga*).

In the next two books I have noticed nothing of interest for this subject except the inversion in xi. 7. 23 of the image of the steeds and the chariot. In this figure, instead of the untamed senses being steeds to be held in check, the saints chariot is dragged to victory by the steeds called Restraint, Renunciation, and Carefulness, controlled by the reins of good conduct, *śīla*.

A comparison of the passages cited above, before the remarks on the later battle-books, will show that there are several distinct cases where the same scene is without Yoga in the earlier epic, but full of Yoga ideas and expression in the later epic. What is the bearing of this and of the other facts adduced in this paper ?

If the epic, as one whole, was composed at a date earlier than that to which we can possibly assign the third-class Upaniṣads, which first reveal acquaintance with Yoga-technique, how happens it that the pseudo-epic shows so intimate an acquaintance with that technique ? Or if, irrespective of date, the work was originally one whole, why is if that some tales show the author to be well up in this technique, while others, although the scenic environment is the same lack all application of the ideas and even lack the word ? And even if this difference between the early and late tales be belittled as much as possible, there still remains to be explained the almost complete absence of Yoga-technique prior to the Book of Peace, where it is fully recognized. One may say, that is the place to explain it, and so it is explained there and not elsewhere. But there are many parts of the early epic where didactic chapters have been placed, and moral and technical allusions of all sorts are scattered through the poem, but Yoga *prāṇāyāma*, Yoga *āsana* Yoga-technique, in short, is scarcely recognized. Apart from the pseudo-epic, Yoga is either not recognized at all, its place being taken by austerity, *tapas,* or it is considered as synonymous with *tapas.* In the pseudo-epic, *tapas* is only a preparation for Yoga. Roughly speaking, there are three epic groups, old *tapas* tales and teaching, void of Yoga ; tales and teaching in which *tapas* and *yoga* are synonymous, and both are merely a means of magic : tales and didactic masses in which is found an elaborated systematic Yoga philosophy.

But to most scholars, the pseudo-epic's familarity with Yoga śāstra, Yoga-teachers, and Yoga-technique will of itself probably be sufficient to settle the question whether the

date of the Book of Peace is nearer 500 A.D. or 500 B.C. The examples of technique given in this paper (especially the use of *dhāraṇā*) place the technical part of the pseudo—epic on a par chronologically with the late Kṣurikā rather than with the older Upaniṣads.

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TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF VEDIC STUDIES

R. N. Dandekar

Chronology of Vedic-texts : The problem of the chronology of Vedic texts has engaged the serious attention of scholars throughout the history of Vedic studies. The starting point of all the discussions in this connection was naturally to determine the age of ṚV, which was universally regarded as the oldest Vedic text. Some scholars have approached this problem from the linguistic standpoint, while others believe that the only way of arriving at a reasonable solution is to go backwards from the more or less definitely fixed dates of Buddha and Alexander. The discovery of the Boghazkoi inscription (Bog. ins.) and the recent excavations in the Indus Valley have again given an altogether novel turn to the whole problem. Scholars are generally of the opinion that the question of the age of ṚV is closely related to that of the entry of the Aryans into India. Geological, astronomical and religio-historical considerations have also played their own part in this engrossing field. The result of all this is the enunciation of a large number of theories, admirable resume and review of which have been attempted by Hillebrandt (ZDMG, 81), de la Vallee Poussin ("Indo-Europ. et Indo-Ir.", Paris, 1936), and Keith (Woolner Comm. Vol., 1940). Indeed one is sometimes inclined to feel that in this veritable plethora of hypotheses, interesting as they might be, one hypothesis would easily cancel the other. Nevertheless a careful study of all these view-points will give us a clear idea of several aspects of this important problem.

Starting with the assumption that Buddhism anticipates the completion of all the four periods of Vedic literature—the period of stray hymns, the period of *saṃhitā*, the period

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For abbreviations, see end of the article.

of Br̥. and the period of Up.—and assigning arbitrarily about 200 years for the development of each of these periods, Max Muller had tentatively proposed that the *saṃhitās* were formed between 1000 and 800 B.C. On the strength of Bloomfield's estimate regarding the R̥V-repetitions, Whitney thought that the era of Vedic poets must have preceded, even considerably, the time allotted to it by Max Muller. Bloomfield himself proposed (*Religion of Veda*) to place the oldest part of R̥V about 2000 B. C. In his *Vedic Reader*, Macdonell rests content with moderate estimate of the 13th century B. C. as the approximate date of the R̥V-period. Dr. Winternitz's arguments, in this regard, are mainly based on the consideration of the several distinct stages in the history of Indian literature, on the one hand, and of the manner of the Aryan expansion in India, on the other (CR, Nov. 1923). The activity of Mahāvīra and of Buddha presupposes, according to Winternitz, the completion of the Vedic literature before 750-500 B.C. The Br. and Up., which represent the last stages of that literature, must have needed a long time for their development. All *saṃhitās* are older than Br., and the *R̥V-saṃhitā*, as a whole, is considerably older than AV and YV. Winternitz further maintains that the origin and growth of the *R̥V-saṃhitā* must have required a long time, perhaps several centuries. He therefore concludes that the beginnings of the Vedic literature are to be placed nearer 2500-2000 B.C. than 1500-1000 B.C. Winternitz claims that this conclusion is substantiated also by the evidence of the Aryan penetration into India. According to him, the process of the expansion of the Vedic Aryans in this country must have been very slow. During the whole time from the first beginnings to the last off-shoots of the Vedic literature the Indo-Aryan people had only conquered the comparatively small area from the Indus to the Ganges. There is, at the same time, clear evidence of the Āp. and Baudh. schools of Veda having established themselves in South India in the 3rd century B. C. The beginnings of the Vedic literature have therefore to be placed long anterior to this time. Dr. H. C. Raychaudhari (CR, Oct.

1924) seriously doubts the validity of Winternitz's contention regarding the slow process of the Aryan expansion in India. He produces evidence from Br., such as reference to Vidarbha (AB VIII, 34) ; (SB XIV. 5. 5. 22) Niṣada (SB II.3.2.1) to show that the Aryans had by that time already penetrated into Central India and Deccan. Even the *ṚV-saṃhitā*, according to him, shows traces of knowledge of Eastern and Central India. These objections of Raychaudhari are met by K. Chattopadhyaya (IC, III). He suggests that the words, Vidarbha, Niṣada etc., should be understood not as names of places but of the tribes. Further he believes that the ṚV clearly depicts the Aryans still confined to the west of the Ganges. Chattopadhyaya thus agrees with Winternitz in maintaining that the Vedic Aryans took a very long time to penetrate into the whole of Hindustan. But Winternitz's view that the *ṚV-saṃhitā* is in its entirely earlier than the rest of the Vedic literature is not accepted by him. Chattopadhyaya asserts that the *ṚV-saṃhitā* contains materials from the earliest to almost the latest period of Vedic literature (VIII.AIOC, 1935), which fact however does not materially affect Winternitz's estimate of the age of the Veda.

Keith discusses this question principally with reference to the age of Zoroaster and the history of Indian literature. As a matter of fact after examining various theories in this regard (*The Age of ṚV*, Woolner Comm. Vol., 1940) he feels convinced that the only argument, which would take us somewhere, must be from the history of literature. According to Keith (*Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and the Up.*), it is not possible to carry Zoroaster far enough back to make any earlier date than 1200 B.C. or 1300 B.C. for the ṚV reasonably possible. He assumes that the *Sūtras* date between 400 and 200 B.C. and that the *Āś ŚS* may be assigned with reasonable probability to about 400 B.C. A date before 500 B.C. may reasonably be assumed for the older Up. texts. The priority of the Br. proper to the Up. is quite undoubted. The lower limit for the latest Br. may therefore be fixed at about 600 B.C. This leads one to the

conclusion that 800 B.C. is the lowest possible date for the completion of ṚV.

In his paper *ṚV Orthoepy* (IC, III), B. K. Ghosh has attempted a linguistic approach to the problem of the age of ṚV. He maintains that the language of ṚV is so much akin to the language of the *Avesta* (Av) that they may be safely considered to belong to approximately the same age. The language of the Av is again by no means very far removed from that of the old Persian inscriptions of the Achaemenian monarchs of the 6th century B.C. This line of argument gives 1000 B.C. as the date of the ṚV. Ghosh brings in historical and archaeological evidence also to substantiate his view. Ed. Meyer has pointed out that the brachycephalic Indo-Europeans appear in history for the first time in Egyptian sculptures of the latter half of the second millenium B. C. The Achaeans are mentioned in the list of prisoners of Ramases II (1200 B.C.). The Mitanni records of 1400 B.C. contain the names of some Vedic gods. All these facts indicate, according to Ghosh, that various tribes of IE people were traversing the regions of Eurasia, circa 1500 B.C. A particular branch pushed on to India after spending some time in Iran. They were the forefathers of the Vedic Aryans. Dr. Woolner had already put forth (I. AIOC, 1919) a philological argument for an upper limit to the date of the ṚV. A comparison with the Av showed that the Aryans could not have been in the Punjab long before 1300 B.C. The fact that Zoroaster was antagonistic to *daevas* and that in the ṚV-hymns we often come across references to *devanid* and *brahmadviṣ* have led Hertel to the supposition (IF, 41) that there was a regular conflict between the Vedic poets and the followers of Zoroaster. This would consequently indicate a late date for the ṚV.

In the opinion of Hüsing (*Die Inder von Boghazkoi*, Krakau, 1921), the finds of El Amarna and Bog. offer the first definite points of Indian chronology. They prove in a striking manner that, in about 1000 B.C., the Indians had gone to Afganistan from Armenia. And, according to

Hüsing, it must have been in Afganistan that the major part of the ṚV was composed. He even goes to the extent of suggesting that some at least of the hymns of the ṚV date after 200 B.C.[1] Dr. Kretschmer too has taken his clue (*Varuṇa und die Urgeschichte der Inder*, WZKM, 33) from the Mitanni records. He accordingly speaks of the 'seats of the Ur-Indians in the north of Mesopotamia' or of the 'Mitanni seats of the Ur-Indians'. All Indians, according to Kretschmer, must have passed through a fore-Asiatic epoch, which has left clear traces in their religion, language and culture. The Vedic gods, Varuṇa and Indra, the God, Kubera, and the game of dice are, among others, derived by the Indians from the Hittites and the Mitannians. The views of Hüsing and Kretschmer are naturally open to several objections. One cannot be sure as to whether the gods mentioned in the Bog. ins. are specifically Indian. Is it further not likely, it may be asked, that the so-called Indians there represented a wave of adventurers from India ? Or they may have been the remnants of the Indians who had already advanced towards the east. Sten Konow firmly believes (*The Aryan Gods of the Mitanni People*, 1921) that the gods mentioned in Bog. ins. are Indian in the sense that they are deities worshipped by those Aryans, who reached India and composed the ṚV. Indeed on this basis he argues in favour of the high antiquity of the great bulk of the ṚV.

The recent excavations at Mohenjodaro (M) and Harappa (H) have brought forth prominently the question of the relation between the Vedic Aryans and the people who were responsible for the Indus Valley civilisation (I. V. civil.). Since the age of the I. V. civil. can be fixed with reasonable probablity, on the strength of archaeological evidence,

1. A reference may be made in this connection to the view put forth, long ago, by J. Halevy. He doubts the possibility of the *ṚV-sam.* being handed down in oral tradition. There must have existed, according to him, written texts, which fact would place them not before the time of Candragupta Maurya.

scholars have, of late, sought light from that quarter for determinnig the age of the ṚV. In his paper, *Zur Frage nach den Asuras* (Garbe Comm. Vol., 1927), St. Konow maintains that the Vedic Indians overthrew the I. V. people about 3000 B. C., which is also the time when the major part of the *ṚV-saṃhitā* was composed. W. Wust has expressed his views on this subject in a remarkable article entitled *Über das Alter des ṚV und die Hauptfragen der indoarischen Frühgeschichte* (WZKM, 34, 1927). Harappa lies definitely in the field of the Aryan invasion of India. The I.V. civil., dating circa 3000-2000 B.C., has positively an unindogermanic character. ṚV, on its part, again, does not exhibit even the slightest traces of the Indus culture. On the strength of this evidence, Wust concludes that the Vedic people must not have come, even once, in direct contact with the I.V. people. The centres of the I.V. civil. were destroyed by some other people even before the Vedic Aryans entered India. The latter saw only the ruins. The early stages of the literary activity of the ṚV-people ought to be therefore placed, in Wust's opinion, between 2000 and 1500 B.C. In an article contributed to the Hirt Comm. Vol. (1935), Hauer affirms that the Indians invaded India about 2000 B. C. Before that, for a thousand years, they lived together with the Iranians as the Aryan people. Hauer would consequently put back the period of IE unity to 6000-5000 B. C. Some other scholars like Dr. Sarup (*The ṚV and M*, IC, IV), on the other hand, assume that the ṚV-period preceded the I.V. period and therefore assign Vedic literature and culture to hoary antiquity.

The astronomical arguments of Jacobi and Tilak have generally not found favour in recent years. It should however be noted that Hillebrandt again falls back on astronomical evidence (*Die Anschauungen uber das Alter des ṚV*, ZDMG, 81). Starting with the more or less definitely fixed date of the Vedāṅga Jyotiṣa and the astronomical reference in the *Kauṣ. Br.*, Hillebrandt comes to the conclusion that the Br.-period has to be placed between 1200 and 1000 B.C. It is again on the strength of astronomical evidence that Mr. P. C. Sengupta assumes that the age of the Br. is

between 3102 and 2000 B. C. (IHQ, X), that the mean date for the Baudh. rules for sacrifices should be taken as the year 887-86 B.C. (JASB, VII) and that the date of the Vedic seer, Atri, is 3928, B.C. (JASB, VII). According to Mr. Vader (*Further Researches into the Antiquity of the Vedas*, IHQ, V), the most active portion of the Vedic period may be carried back to the scorpio period, that is, beyond 15,000 B.C.

Besides the question of the age of ṚV, there is also the question of the internal and the relative chronology of Vedic texts, which has interested scholars recently as in the past. Hummel has, for instance, attempted to fix the relative chronology of the old prose-Up. (*Die relative Chronologie der alten Prosa-Up.*, 1925) while Caland has, in his usual thorough manner, undertaken to throw light on the *Relative Chronology of some ritualistic Sūtras* (Actā Or., IX, 1931). But by far the most engrossing topic in this connection has been the chronology of the ṚV-hymns. In a paper, presented to the II. AIOC (1922), on the subject of *Literary Strata in the ṚV*, Dr. Belvalkar suggests that a critical analysis of the Nighaṇṭu-lists will offer new evidence for determining the lateness of certain hymns of the ṚV. Many attempts have been formerly made to fix the chronological order of the *ṚV-maṇḍalas*. By employing his "infinitive test" Brunnhofer came to the conclusion that the 4th book is the most ancient and the 9th belongs to the latest period. According to Lanman, the 8th is the oldest book, while Bloomfield opines that that book contains late material on a large scale. Porzig assumes (IF, 41) that the 7th is the latest family book. Prof. Arnold has applied a novel test, namely, the use of 1 in ṚV, to determine the chronolog cal stratification in that *saṃhitā* (Roth Comm. Vol.). On linguistic grounds B. K. Ghosh concludes (*ṚV* orthoepy IC, III) that *maṇḍala*s, 2 to 7, form the oldest part of the ṚV, that the 10th is decidedly the latest and that the 9th is linguistically heterogeneous. Books 1 and 8 are, according to him, really old but hymns of various groups of priests are collected in them. If will be seen that in spite of so

much varied work in this field only very meagre results have so far been achieved. Wust had suggested (WZKM, 34, 1927) that, in view of the fact that Indra, Nāsatya, Mitra and Varuṇa are together mentioned in VIII. 26, there must have been some definite connection between the 8th *maṇḍala* of ṚV and the Bog. ins. As a matter of fact he assumes that the 8th *maṇḍala* is contemporaneous with the Bog. ins. and thus belong to the 14th cent. B.C. In his learn ed monograph, *Stilgeschichte und Chronology des ṚV* (Leipzig, 1928), the same scholar has approached this question from a different standpoint. Wust believes that it is possible to trace extensive stylistic developments in the ṚV itself. Following strictly statistical methods he has tried to ascertain how the 17 stylistic criteria of 'lateness', such as superlative expressions, *vṛddhi* formations, cumulation of adjectives etc. are distributed over the different books. The order of succession, thus arrived at by him, is, beginning from the youngest book, 10, 1, 8, 5, 2, 6, 3, 7, 4 and 9....

Vedic Religion, Ritual and Legends: Though, in recent years, out of the three notworthy types of Hindu religion—Vedic, Tantric or Yogic, and Bhakti—the most ancient cult, namely, the Yogic or Tantric, is receiving greater attention from the scholars, work in the field of Vedic religion also has been neither meagre nor unimportant. Apart from the books about the religions of India in general and about Hinduism in particular, which invariably treat at great length the Vedic religion and cult, such as Farquhar's *An Outline of the Religious Literature of India* (Oxford, 1920). Glasenapp's *Der Hinduismus* (Munchen, 1928), Barth's *Religions of India* (London, 1932) etc., and many articles on the same subjects, such as, *The Older Elements in Indo-Aryan Religion* by Sten Konow (Vis. Bh., 1925), *The Religieux of Ancient India* by N. Dutt (*Mahābodhi*, 1935), *Religio-philosophical Culture in India* by Dr. R. C. Majumdar ("Cultural Heritage of India," 1937) etc., excellent contributions have been made, during the last twenty-five years, to the study of Vedic religion exclusively. Grisworld's *The Religion of ṚV* (New York, 1923) deals, besides an-

ecdotes of ṚV-age, the ṚV-age itself, and the ṚV-literature, with the Vedic gods, including Soma, and ṚV-eschatology. As a matter of fact this book should have been called "Vedic Gods", since the ṚV-cult has been practically neglected. In the concluding chapter of the book, Griswold makes not a very satisfactory attempt of discussing ṚV-religion from the point of view of Christianity. *Der arische Weltkoning und Heiland* (Halle, 1923) by H. Guntert is far more learned and thorough. It is truly encyclopaedic in scope. With surprisingly able marshalling of comparative philological and mythological facts, Guntert proves his main thesis, namely, that the conception of 'bondage' is manifested in the ṚV through Varuṇa-Ṛta-Mitra ideology and the conception of 'emancipation' or 'release' through the Vedic saviour-gods. Varuṇa is the Aryan 'Weltkonig' and *māyā* is his magic potence. Guntert generally follows in the foot-steps of Soderblom in conceiving of a high divinity without the basis of any natural phenomenon. His views about the Vedic gods, Viṣṇu, Agni, Yama, Aśvins etc., are highly thought-provoking and have inaugurated quite a new method of approach to Vedic religion and mythology. This remarkable book is enriched by several useful references and indexes which evince the author's great command over linguistics and comparative religion. Still more encyclopaedic in scope but less original in outlook is Keith's *The Religion and the Philosophy of the Veda and the Upaniṣads* (HOS, 1925). Keith's work may be justly said to be one of the most important publications in the field of Indology in recent years. The title of the book does not give a true idea of the astonishingly wide range of subjects therein dealt with, Keith has, with his usual thoroughness and brilliance, subjected to a critical examination all the earlier views regarding Vedic religion and philosophy. One however feels that he is often over-cautious and over-sceptical and usually avoids arriving at any conclusions. But as a register of all that had been said, till then, about Vedic people, Vedic literature, and Vedic religion, mythology, cult, magic etc., this work is incomparable. Hertel's approach to the

Vedic religion as seen in his *Die arische Feuerlehre* (Leipzig, 1925) is distinctly tendentious. According to him the whole Vedic religion revolves round the central conceptions of light and fire. In his book he interprets some important words from the Veda, like *brahman*, *dhenā*, *yakṣa*, *citra*, *vasu* etc. in the sense, primarily, of heavenly light, and secondarily of light and fire in general. Even in his other monographs, *Die Himmelstore im Veda und im Avesta* (Leipzig, 1924) and *Die Methode der arischen Forschung* (Leipzig, 1926), Hertel has reiterated these theories which are indeed more ingenious than plausible. It must however be said that he has produced considerable evidence in support of his theories. The second edition of Hillebrandt's *magnum opus*, *Vedische Mythologie*, was issued by Schermann and Wust in 1927-29. Hillebrandt is neither as brilliant as Oldenberg nor as critical as Pischel and Geldner ; but no work offers more exhaustive and systematic treatment of Vedic gods than Hillebrandt's *Vedische Mythologie*. In many cases he has found it necessary to revise his old theories. Hillebrandt puts great emphasis on the identification of Soma and the moon, and he often brings forth the evidence of late Vedic ritual to explain the ṚV-mythology.

In *Gottheit und Gottheiten der Arier* (Giessen, 1932), Otto has attempted to explain the genesis of the Aryan gods on the basis of his favourite theory regarding the origin of religion which he has enunciated in *Das Heilige* and *Das Gefuhl des Uberweltlichen*. Vedic gods do not owe their origin to the effects produced on the minds of the people by the great phenomena of nature. According to Otto, we find the explanation of the conception of the divine in the specific and a *priori* faculty of apperception of a power, which may best be called a numen. This feeling has various characteristics, such as terror, a sense of otherness, a consciousness of might and power etc., and through it wrath and mercy are associated. Varuṇa is, for instance, born of the numinous apperception of disease in man and beast. The Maruts again are demonic because man knows, before he encounters them, what demonic is. It is particularly from the point of view of

the origin and evolution of religious thought that Otto's book is remarkable. Dr. Deshmukh's *The Origin and Development of Religion in Vedic Literature* (London, 1933) cannot claim to be original in any sense. He refutes, with familiar arguments, the contentions that Vedic nature-worship is to be traced to animism and that Vedic sacrifice developed from magic. H. Lommel attempts, in his *Die alten Arier* (1935), a synthesis of the earlier views regarding the Vedic divinities, Varuṇa, Indra, Maruts, Rudra, Pṛśni, Śabardughā and Aditi. His attitude is unbiased and his treatment thoroughly reasonable. Lommel's expert knowledge of the ancient Iranian literature and religion is evident almost on every page. In the introductory part of the book he deals with such topics as the legal, ethnographical, linguistic and historical significance of the word. 'Aryan', the Aryans and the Indians, and the ṚV as poetry. Dr. Coomarswamy's main purpose in *The Darker Side of Dawn* (1935) is to discover the origin of symbols and iconographical motifs in the Vedic and kindred literature. Incidentally he gives an exposition of the duality of Vedic deities with special reference to the Titans and the Angels. *Birth of Gods* (IC, VII, 1940) by B. K. Ghosh is a religiophilological study. A passing reference may be made, in this context, to Dr. Rele's *Vedic Gods as Figures of Biology* (Bombay, 1931), E. Ghosh's astronomical and meteorological interpretations of Vedic deities (JASB, XXVIII) and Mr. Shah's interesting articles on Vedic gods (ABORI, Vol. 21). Terza's *La religione del ṚV* (1921), Geldner's *Vedismus und Brahmanismus* (Tubingen, 1928) and V. Papesso's *Vedismo e Brahmanismo* (Bologna, 1931) present plain statements of Vedic and Brahmanic religious thought, based on original sources, and are thus very useful as reliable manuals for the study of Vedic religion.

In addition to the works on Vedic religion, mentioned above, there are several minor studies which deal with some particular aspects of that religion. M. Bannerji discusses the *Aryan Attitude to Female-Deities* (JBORS, 1939), and Formichi refers to *The Dynamic Element in Indian Religious*

Development (Vis. Bh., 1926-27). The question of Vedic monotheism is taken into consideration by Dr. Coomarswamy (S. K. Aiyangar Comm. Vol., 1936) and Zimmermann (Srinivas Comm. Vol., 1928). In a paper on *Origins of Hindu Iconism* (IHQ, III, 1927), Venkatesvara suggests that some ṚV-passages would remain obscure unless resort is taken to iconographic explanation. Dr. Modi, on the other hand, points out in his article, *Idol Worship* (Asutosh SJ Comm. Vol., 1925) that there was no iconism in ṚV-times. Dr. Banerji-Shastri seems to agree with this view (IHQ, XII, 1936). Sten Konow has contributed some papers on the Aryan element in Indian religions to ABORI (1924-25) and Vis Bh. (1925). In his article, *Beginnings of Liṅga-cult in India* (ABORI, XIII, 1931-32), Mr. Sur propounded the theory that phallus-worship, which was of non-Aryan origin, was a flourishing cult in the ṚV-period. Discussing the word, *śiśnadeva*, which, according to him, can mean nothing but 'lustful' (IHQ, IX, 1933), V. Bhattacharya definitely denies that there are any traces of phallus-worship in ṚV. It would appear, however, that this question is still an open one :

Turning from books on Vedic religion, as a whole, to independent studies about individual Vedic gods, we come to a branch of Vedic Philology, which is full of eternally absorbing interest. In no other field have scholars differed from one another, to such a great extent, even on fundamental points, than this. Several conflicting theories, for instance, have been put forth, during recent years, regarding the essential personality of Indra, who is the most celebrated god of the ṚV-pantheon. In his paper on *Indra as God of Fertility* (JAOS, 1917), after having discussed and discarded Roth's view that Indra is a god of universal character, Oldenberg's view that Indra is a rain-god, and Hillebrandt's view that Indra is the sun-god, Hopkins concludes that, in Vedic as well as in epic mythology, Indra represents a god of fertility as well as of battles. On the strength of the evidence of the Mitanni records, Kretschmer suggests in *Zum Ursprung des Gottes Indra* (Wien, 1927) and *Indra und der hethitische Gott Inaras* (KF, 1, 1928) that the

Hittite mythology about Inaras. The Vedic god is merely a development of the god of the Ur-Indians of Mitanni. Kretschmer seems to have however accepted the linguistic connection between the words, *indra* and *nṛ*, suggested by Jacobi and Friedrich (Hirt Comm. Vol.). Anantalakshmi speaks of *Indra, the RV-Ātman* (JOR, 1927) while Fateh Singh believes (JBHU, 1940) that Indra is the deity of universal light and energy. The latter scholar further points out (JBHU, V) that the myth of Indra's birth through the side of his mother refers to the first light of dawn which is visible in a circular way. In his paper, *Indra in RV and the Avesta and before* (IV. AIOC, 1926), K. Chattopadhyaya has examined all the earlier theories regarding Indra and has then enunciated his own theory. Indra's character as a god of war and victory is, according to Chattopadhyaya, the original one. The naturalistic extension of this conception was to transform the killer of human Vṛtras to be the killer of atmospheric Vṛtras. Indra thus stepped into the shoes of Trita Āptya, who is the original god of rain in ṚV. The national war-god of the Aryans appeared as Verethragna in Iranian mythology and as Vṛtrahan in ṚV. This Vṛtrahan further developed into Indra on the one hand and the rain-god on the other. The name Indra, which is linguistically connected with *indu*, is purely Indian. The demonhood of Indra in *Avesta* is explained by Chattopadhyaya as the result of an individual poet's fancy. The cradle of the Indra-Vṛtra-myth is, according to him, the Saptasindhu country (VI. AIOC, 1930). By far the most suggestive monograph on this subject is *Vṛtra et Vṛthragna* (Paris, 1934) by Benveniste and Renou who are real masters of Iranian philology and Vedic philology respectively. They have critically analysed all the available sources and conclude that, in Av., Vṛtra (neuter) has conserved the only original sense, namely, resistance. According to them, there did not exist any old Aryan myth about a demon Vṛtra slain by an ancient god. There was however an old god, Vṛthragna, the destroyer of resistence rather than the victor of attacking foes,

and the Indian myth is a later development due to a combination of several inherited tales with new, partly borrowed, elements. We thus find a confused mythology made up of three main themes—of victorious god, of dragon-slaying Indra, and of the liberated waters.

Still more original are the views expressed by scholars about the intriguing personality of Varuṇa. Betty Heimann starts by saying (Kant Stud., XXX) that the Varuṇa-conception in ṚV is simultaneously macrocosmic and microcosmic. In early Veda that god seems to have hardly been an independent god—he is only the instrument of Ṛta. According to Heimann, Varuṇa is also the extended cosmic representation of an earthly kingship. In *Zur Frage nach den Asuras* (Garbe Comm. Vol., 1927), Sten Konow tries to trace the development of the Asura-conception and incidentally points out that thc religion of Asura Varuṇa, which represents an ethical-religious law, has been greatly influenced by the vicissitudes in the political conditions of the Aryans. The starting point of Kretschmer's views on the subject, expressed by him in *Varuṇa und die Urgeschichte der Inder* (WZKM, 33, 1928), is again the evidence provided by the Boghazkoi inscription. He assumes that *Aruna* (=sea) appearing in the Mitanni king's version of the treaty is the original name, while 'Uruwana' in the Hittite version and 'Varuṇa' in Veda are the results of popular etymology. The Ur-Indians borrowed a god of sea from Western Asia, who is preserved in the form of the Vedic Varuṇa. In his paper, *Varuṇa, God of the sea and the sky* (JRAS, 1931), J. Przyluski derives all the three names, Aruna, Uruwana, and Varuṇa, from the Austro-Asiatic *baru* (=sea). Varuṇa is thus identical with a non-Aryan god of the sea (*baru-Baruna*). Przyluski brings in also the evidence of the legend of king Bharu in this connection. Keith refutes (Modi Comm. Vol., 1930) the theory that Varuṇa's character as god of sea is the original one. He adheres to the Varuṇa-Ouranos-Skygod theory. In his monograph, *Ouranos-Varuṇa* (Paris, 1934), G. Dumezil too accepts that the words, Varuṇa and Ouranos, are linguistically connected but adds

that they are to be derived from "*uer* (=fasten) Varuṇa is essentially a god who binds with his fetters and Ouranos is also the binder of the rivals. Dumezil has produced interesting evidence from the myths relating to Varuṇa and Ouranos to show the basic similarity of these gods. Recently Dr. Dandekar has examined (ABORI, 21, 1940) all the important theories regarding Varuṇa's essential character and has come to the conclusion that the conception of bondage—both cosmic and ethical—is fundamental in the Varuṇa-Ṛta-religion. He has also tried historically to account for the rivalry between Indra and Varuṇa, which is patent in ṚV.

Arbman's monograph, *Rudra* (Uppsala, 1922) is a noteworthy contribution to the critical study of ancient Indian religion and cult. Through an analytic and synthetic study of all Vedic and post-vedic material, Arbman evolves the theory that in Rudra-religion one finds the mixture of popular element in ancient Indian religion and the mechanised and ritualised religion of the Vedic priests. In his original character Rudra is a gruesome demon originating from the primitive conceptions of death and its horrors. The development of this figure, entirely within popular cult, into Śiva is quite natural. According to Arbman, Rudra of the later Vedic tradition is not a direct descendant of ṚV-Rudra, but represents a far more original type, of which the celestial Rudra of ṚV is a hieratic adaptation. Mr. N. Chaudhari considers Rudra-Śiva to have been an original agricultural deity (IHQ, XV, 1939), while Fateh Singh makes him (IHQ, XVI, 1940) the god of the arctic nocturnal sky of winter combined with the phenomenon of storms. In his monograph, *Rudrā-Śiva*, (Madras, 1941) Venkataramanayya tries to account for the demonical qualities and beneficent activities of Rudra. Mr. M. S Gladstone has studied the Viṣṇu-hymns in ṚV and has pointed out the changes brought out by ritualism in the character of that god (Cambridge, 1928). Starting with the assumption that the Vedic god, Viṣṇu, has no counterpart

in IE mythology, Przyluski connects him (QJMS, 1934-35) with the non-Aryan race, Vith, living in Vethadipa in the Deccan. Dr. Dandekar sees (Kane Comm. Vol., 1941) in Vedic Viṣṇu an original god of fertility and shows that there is quite a logical development in the character of that god till he finally becomes the most important member of the Hindu Trinity of gods.

The twin-gods, Aśvins, have all along been a veritable puzzle to the Vedists. Prof. Jhala accepts (JBU, I, 1933) the view first propounded by Yāska and later endorsed by Hopkins and Goldstucker, namely, that the Aśvins represent the morning twilight. Mr. Chandavarkar, on the other hand, traces them back to historical origin (JBU, III, 1935). Dr. Shamashastri (V. AIOC, 1928) and Mr. Vader (IHQ, VIII, 1932) are inclined to see, in these divinities some astronomical phenomena. As usual Przyluski has proposed in his paper, *Les Aśvin et la grande Deesse* (HJOS, 1936), quite a novel theory regarding the Aśvins and the Great Goddess. His main argument is based on the evidence of the earlier religious phenomena in Asia. Aśvins are, according to him, the attendant-gods of the Goddess-Mother in Veda. The latter, namely, Aditi, is described as *madhukaśā* in AV (IX. I) and is therefore connected by Przyluski with flagellation and fertility or invigoration rites. The conception of the Mother-Goddess supported by two cavaliers had spread far and wide in ancient times. The name Aditi, for instance, has its prototypes in Anaitis, Anahita, Anahid (Iran), Tanais (Asia Minor and Syria), Tanit (Carthage) etc. Przyluski asserts that a group of Austro-Asiatic sounds forms the central part of all these names. He derives the name Nāsatyau also from a non-Indian word *satya* (=horse; *sadam* in modern Munda), *na* being an affix similar to *na* in Varuṇa. Przyluski's theories are undoubtedly ingenious, but the Vedic evidence would not seem to support them. A reference may be made, in this connection, to Geldner's suggestive article *Das Wunder-bare Feuerzug der Aśvin* (ZII, V, 1927) wherein he has discussed the *kaśā madhumatī*

mentioned in ṚV (X. 184.3). According to Leumann (ZII, VI, 1928), Aditi indicates the unfixed route of certain planets (comets ?). Mr. Agrawala indentifies Aditi with the great Mother Goddess (IC, IV, 1938).

Dr. Atkins has undertaken a comprative study of Vedic deities commonly regarded as solar, and the first monograph, *Pūṣan in the ṚV* (Princeton, 1941) has recently been published. Collitz discusses Pūṣan's connection with Wodan and Hermes (Hugo Pipping Comm. Vol., 1924). Another so-called solar god, Savitṛ, represents, according to Venkataramiah, Aurora Borealis (*Savitaṛ or Aurora Borealis*, Vizianagaram, 1941). Dr. Dandekar denies that Savitṛ and Pūṣan are originally solar divinities. Savitṛ is according to him, an aspect of the god Varuṇa (ABORI, XX, 1938-39) and Pūṣan is the pastoral god of the Veda (NIA, June 1942), whose later development can be reasonably explained on the basis of what he calls 'evolutionary' or 'historical' mythology. Mr. N. Chaudhari believes (*Man in India*, XXI, 1941) that certain features of folk worship of the sun had persisted from the early vedic to the present times. Prof. Shembavanekar points out that Vedic Uṣas appears as Lakṣmī in later times (ABORI, XVII, 1935).

Among the minor gods of the Vedic pantheon, Yama has received a critical treatment in Dr. Barnett's paper, *Yama, Gandharva and Glaucus* (BSOS, IV, 1928). All data about that god has been discussed in detail and an attempt has been made to connect him and the Gandharva with the Hellenistic lands and the Near East. Mahadevi Verma has published an independent monograph on *Yama* (Allahabad, 1939) Fateh Singh has explained the Yama myth (JBHU, IV) to show that it originated in the polar phenomenon of light and darkness. Collitz has attempted a comparative study of *Konig Yima and Saturn* (C.E. Pavry Comm. Vol., 1933). A reference may be made here to Keith's paper on *Gandharva* (Coomarswamy Comm. Vol., 1938), where he has reviewed all the philological and mythological explanations of the word and the conception of Gandharva. A similar study of the

conception of the Apsaras in the Vedic and epic literature is made by G. Borsani in *Contributo allo studio sulla concezione e sullo sviluppo storico dell' Apsaras* (Milano, 1938). The author accepts the character of the Apsaras as water-nymphs and adds that their appearance as *dryads* is essentially a case of contamination with Dravida faiths. A. Getty collects together, in the monograph, *Gaṇeśa* (Oxford, 1936), all material relating to that mysterious Indian deity ; but greater emphasis seems to have been put on the iconographic aspect. L. Renou refers to the Vedic origin of Gaṇeśa (JA, 1937). Johanssohn's excellent monograph, *Uber die altindische Gottin Dhisana und Verwandtes* (Uppsala, 1917), makes a remarkable contibution to the study of ancient fertility cult and is full of many useful suggestions. To the Uppsala tradition of Vedic studies is also due K. Ronnow's scholarly treatment of Trita Āptya (Uppsala, 1927). The same scholar has contributed an interesting article on *Viśvarūpa* (BSOS, VI, 1930-32), a demon in ṚV and chief adversary of Trita Āptya. According to Ronnow, Viśvarūpa was originally a serpent deity of the class later styled Nāgas. Viśvarūpa is an appelative and alludes to his power over cattle and its procreative activities. P. E. Dumont supports Bloomfield's view that Aja Ekapāda is the sun-god and adds (JAOS, 1933) that his one foot is a sort of pillar which supports the sun in his journey through the sky.

The institution of sacrifice played a very important role in the Vedic age. Several aspects of Vedic culture bear an unmistakable mark of its influence. But in modern times the tradition of the practical side of sacrifice is almost extinct. Whatever is recently written on the subject of Vedic ritual is therefore bound to be purely theoretical. In his monograph, *L' Aśvamedha* (1927), Dumont offers a systematic treatment of this important sacrifice. According to him the origin of Aśvamedha can be traced back to IE antiquity. While suggesting *A Parallel between Indic and Babylonian Sacrlficial Ritual* (JAOS,

1934) Albright and Dumont have shown similarities between the Vedic and Babylonian horse-sacrifice. They assert that the Babylonians have certainly borrowed the practice of sacrificing the horse from the Indo-Iranians. A reference has already been made to Dr. Bhawe's work on the Yajus of Aśvamedha. He also points out (XI, AIOC, 1941) that Jumbaka in the Aśvamedha represents some evil spirit and owes his origin to the non-Vedic element in YV. Goosens discusses (JA, 1930) a text relating to the Aśvamedha. The IE character of Aśvamedha is now beyond question. Koppers has lucidly analysed all the ideas connected with this IG cult in his excellent book, *Pferdeopfer und Pferdekult der Indogermanen* (Wien, 1936). His is essentially an ethnological and religio-historical approach.

Dumont has described in detail also the Agnihotra in the Vedic ritual according to the ŚS Kātrāyana (SYV), Āpastamba, Hiraṇyakeśin and Manu (KYV), Āś. and Śāṅkh. (ṚV) and the *Vitāna-sūtras* (AV) (*L'Agnihotra* 1939). A comparative study of the Vedic and Avestic systems of fire-worship is attempted by Dada chaṇaji (J Anth S, XIV, 1929). *Das indogermanische Neujahrsopfer im Veda* (Leipzig, 1938) by J. Hertel is, like his other books, exceedingly ingenious. According to him a parallel to the new-year-festival is to be found in the Āprī hymns of ṚV ; which the Br.-tradition connects with the animal sacrifice. Hertel's favourite theories, such as, that Indra is merely the parallel of Agni among certain Aryan clans, and that Agni is the lord of life and death and personifies the heavenly powers of light occur again in this book. Mr. Goswami elucidates the *Philosophy of the Pañca-Yajñas* (CR, 1937) and Mukherji discusses the Vrātyas and their sacrifices (JASB, 1925). In his paper, *Zur Erklarung des Pravargya, Agni-cayana und der Sautrāmaṇī* (MO, XXIII), K. Ronnow points out some pre-Vedic traces of ritual in Vedic sacrifice, such as human offering and the use of wine. Dr. J. B. Chaudhari has contributed to several journals (IHQ, XIV to XVIII ;

NIA, IV etc.) an interesting series of articles dealing with the position of women in the Vedic ritual.

From among the minor details of the Vedic sacrifice, Bloomfield takes into consideration *The Home of the Vedic Sacrifice* indicated by words like *vṛjana* and *vidatha* (JAOS, 1928). Dr. Raghu Vira discusses the *Implements and Vessels used in Vedic Sacrifice* (JRAS, 1934) and Dr. Raja examines the words *svāhā*, *svadhā* and *svasti* (JOR, I, 1927). An interesting point is made out by Faddegon (Act. Or., V) who sugtests that the *stobhas* in the Sāma-gāna are the result of ritualistic dadaism.

A veritable compendium of ancient Indian cults, mainly referring to vegetation and fertility, is offered by Meyer through his *Trilogie der altindischen Machte und Feste* (Zurich, 1937). The Indian deities, Bali, Kāma, Indra and Varuṇa, are studied solely in their ehthonic aspects, with copious illustrations from early literature and later ritual and cult tradition. The importance of this work from the point of view of ethnology, folklore, myth and cult is very great. The idea of an Aryan religious cult is emphasised by Dr. Wikander in his *Der arische Mannerbund* (Lund, 1938). He points out that myths are not to be regarded merely as linguistic phenomena. He explains, for instance, the word *marya* not only in the sense of a lustful young man but also in that of a member of particular society vowed to a particular cult. The view-point of the author is quite novel, but, his arguments are not convincing. A mention may be made also of Dikshitar's paper on the *Lunar cult in India* (IA, 1933), Paure-Davoud's paper on *Mithra-cult* (JBORS, 1933) and Shamashastri's *Eclipse-cult in the Vedas, Bible and Koran* (Mysore, 1940).

Some quite interesting studies about Vedic legends have been produced in recent years. Writing about the *Proselyting the Asura* (JAOS, 1919), W. N. Brown discusses ṚV X. 124 and throws considerable light on the relation of the Devas and the Asuras. On the strength of the evidence of some passages from TB and TS, Mr. Pantulu assumes

(QJMS, 1937) that Devas and Asuras originally belonged to the same stock but afterwards they gradually divided into two distinct groups owing to the differences in moral qualities and spiritual practices. The legend of Cyavana has been traced from Veda downwards by Prof. Jhala (Bh. Vid.—Hindi-I). After having studied the flood-legends of the East, Mr. Vaidya-Nath Ayyar comes to the conclusion (JBHS, 1929) that the ŚB-flood-legend is the parent flood-legend. In *Die Suparṇa-Sage* (Uppsala, 1921), J. Charpentier not only analyses the several motifs of the Suparṇa-legend, but also makes a learned contribution to the study of Indian legends in general. Prof. Velankar explains the legend of Saptavadhri and Vadhrimatī (Kane Comm. Vol., 1941) on the basis of ṚV V. 78. According to him Saptavadhri and Vadhrimatī are husband and wife. Saptavadhri is Atri himself and the hymn is an invitation to the Aśvins to a Soma-sacrifice performed by Saptavadhri who remembered the help which he and his wife got from them when they needed it. Mr. H. G. Narahari shows (Kane Comm. Vol., 1941) that there are three different versions of the Śunaḥśepa-legend and not two as suggested by Roth.

Vedic and Upanisadic Philosophy : Indian philosophy in general and Up. philosophy in particular have all along been popular subjects with Indian and foreign writers alike. The reason for this, as suggested elsewhere, is the universal appeal which this branch of Indology commands. Quite a good number of works of the nature of histcries of and introductions to Indian philosophy, such as those by Dasgupta, Radhakrishnan, Hiriyanna, Jwalaprasad, Chatterji and Dutt, Masson-Oursel etc., have been published during the last twenty-five years. The very scope of such books demands that they should deal with the Vedic and Up. philosophy only to a limited extent. There are however some excellent works which treat that branch of Indian philosophy more or less exhaustively. A reference has already been made to Keith's *The Religion and the Philosophy of the Veda and the Up.* (HOS, 1925). Ranade's *Constructive Survey of Up. philosophy* (Poona, 1926) is one of the sixteen volumes

in an ambitious series planned by the Academy of Religion and Philosophy. The author's approach to the subject is entirely unbiased, unlike that of many Indian and some foreign writers. He does not assume an exaggerated estimate of the Up. The whole Up.-material is first of all critically analysed and then presented synthetically under several philosophical topics, such as cosmogony, psychology, epistemology, ethics, eschatology etc. Ranade has thus presented the whole Up.-thought in the form of a philosophical system. His choice of sources, which are given at the end of each chapter, is excellent. One cannot however fall to notice his partiality for the mystical interpretation of the Up. As a matter of fact the mysticism of the Up., as propounded by Ranade, must be regarded as his special contribution to Indian philosophical studies. *The Creative Period* (Poona, 1927), which forms the second volume of an encyclopaedic history of Indian philosophy undertaken jointly by Belvalkar and Ranade, is certainly of greater value, particularly on account of the authors' refreshingly original approach to the Up. philosophy. This work claims to place the Up. in their historical setting. Deussen and Barua among others had already attempted to stratify the Up.-literature into chronological periods, on the basis of style and other purely external features. But their method cannot be said to be quite convincing. The joint authors of *The Creative Period* divide the whole Up.-material, according to its predominant tendencies, into four groups-Brahmanic, Brahmano-Upaniṣadic, Upaniṣadic, and Neo-Upaniṣadic—the first and the last groups being further subdivided into early and late periods and the second and the third groups into early, middle and late periods. It must however be said that this meticulous splitting up of the Up. into smaller units and arranging them elaborately in chronological strata cannot always be accomplished from an entirely objective point of view, which should be, as a matter of fact, the main guiding principle in the writing of any history. At the same time one has to admit that what Belvalkar and

Ranade have achieved in this work is much more scientific than all that has been done in the field so far. In his *S. G. Basu Malik Lectures on Vedanta Philosophy* (part I, Poona, 1929), Belvalkar has followed the same lines of investigation as in *The Creative Period.* The purpose of the lectures is therefore obviously philologico-historical rather than synthetico-philosophical. Prof. S. C. Chakravarti claims to have made quite an original approach to the Up. in his *The Philosophy of Up.* (Calcutta, 1935), by divesting the Up.-literature of its mystical and religious note and by freeing it from the overshadowing systems of commentators like Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja and others. He lays great stress on the objective truth of the Up., that is to say, on what is true not only as the spontaneous intuitive experience of an individual but what may be reexperienced and checked scientifically by everyone. The main practical teaching of the Up., according to him, is that both God and Law are not imposed upon Man from outside, but are his own free and active Will—his Ātman.

Apart from these independent works on Vedic and Up. philosophy, several important articles on the subject are published during the period under review. Edgerton has tried to present systematically the philosophical materials of the AV (Bloomfield Comm. Vol., 1920). In another paper, *The Up., what do they seek, and why?* (JAOS, 1929), he observes that by *knowledge* of the truth the Up.-seers expect to master their destiny, wholly or partly, and not by a course of action dictated by that knowledge, but directly, immediately, and by virtue of that *knowledge* in itself, in brief, *magically*. W. Ruben throws some light on the nature of Vedic philosophy in *Zur Fruhgheschichte der indischen Philosophie* (Jacobi Comm. Vol., 1926). G. W. Brown discusses the sources of Indian philosophy with particular reference to the pre-Aryan elements in it (Bloomfield Comm. Vol., 1920). In *The Spirit of Indian Philosophy* (CR, 42), S. K. Das explains how and why the first flutter of the new-fledged philosophic impulse on Indian soil, which is to be seen in the

Veda, clothed itself in poetry of unending charm. Vedic poets 'got' the vision and Up.-thinkers tried to 'justify' it. While estimating the *Life-value of Indian Philosophy* (CR, 63), Aurobindo Ghosh refutes the charge generally levelled against Vedic philosophy that it denies all value of life. In a series of articles, *Studies in the Up.* (JOR, 1929 onwards), Ammal has discussed in detail several topics, philosophical and otherwise, relating to Up. Mention must also be made of the valuable papers on Up. philosophy and philosophers contributed by U.C. Bhattacharya to several journals (IA, IHQ, IC etc.). C. Formichi indicates *A point of agreement between Indian Philosophy and Western thought* (I. Ind. Phil. Con., 1925), while Glasenapp deals with *The influence of Indian thought on German Philosophy and Literature* (CR, 1928). Dr. Katre discusses *Some fundamental Problems in the Up. and Pali ballads* (RPR, 1934). A more or less comparative study of the Up. philosophy and Buddhism has been attempted by Przyluski and Lamotte in *Boud dhisme et Up.* (Hanoi, 1932-33) and by Mrs. Rhys Davids in *The Relation between Early Buddhism and Brahmanism* (IHQ, 1934).

Among the Up.-texts, the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (KU) has been most thoroughly worked out by scholars in recent years. B. Faddegon has given a scholarly interpretation of this Up. in *De interpretatie der KU* (Amsterdam, 1925). A translation of KU from the stand-point of the general Sanskrit scholar, is provided by J. Charpentier (IA, 1928). Exegetical and critical notes on the text are supplied by E. Sieg in *Bemerkungen zur KU* (Garbe Comm. Vol., 1927) and by Coomarswamy in *A study of KU* (IHQ. 1935). Glasenapp considers the *Buddhism in the KU* (NIA, 1938-39). Otto's German translation of this Up. (Berlin, 1936) is certainly the best in the field. In his *The Kaṭha Up.* (London, 1934), J. N. Rawson gives a commentary on the Up. on the lines of Bible-exegesis. His analysis of the text clearly betrays a spirit of propaganda. Rawson contends that the KU has a preponderant belief in personal deity of grace. Senart's French translation of the *Chāndogya-Up.* (CU) was published (Paris, 1930) from among the papers left behind

by that scholar. Therein he has succeeded in bringing out clearly the primitive character of the thought. Though not very exhaustive, his notes are very suggestive. Senart has not however used the excellent text-critical and exegetical notes on CU by Luders ("Zu den Up.", Berlin, 1922) and by Faddegon (Acta Orient., V). Further critical notes on the Up. have been supplied also by Oertel in *Zur CU* (Geiger Comm. Vol., 1931) and by Carpani (IC, 1937). *A Sanskrit Index to the CU* (NIA, I-III) and *A Philosophical Index to the CU* (IC, IV and VI) given by Carpani are exceedingly useful for the study of that Up. As the result of a critical consideration of words like *bhallākṣa* (CU IV. 1.2), Przyluski comes to the conclusion that considerable element of popular superstition is embodied in CU and that the authors of CU were outside the pale of Brahmanism (BSOS, V). Senart has based his translation of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Up.* (BU) on the Kāṇvarecension of the text (Paris, 1934). In his notes he has tried to discover the connections between the Up. and the later philosophical systems. In *Due Up.* (Lanciano, 1932), F. Belloni-Filippi gives an Italian translation of BU and KU, which is perfect from every point of view. The philosophical insight of the writer is quite evident in the introduction, which he has added to his work. The Yājñavalkya-dialogues in BU are systematically studied by E. Frauenweller (ZII, 1926). Through his English translation of KU (1919) and *Īśā-Up.* (IU) (1924), Aurobindo Ghose has presented his own original philosophy. A critical study of the IU has been attempted by Schrader (IA, 1933) and the stanza, *kurvanneveha karmāṇi* etc. in the beginning of that Up. has been subjected to a critical examination by Strauss (Winternitz Comm. Vol., 1933). In his German translation of the *Śvetāśvatara-Up.* (Stuttgart, 1931), J. Hauer characterises it as a monotheistic tract belonging to the Rudra-Śiva-cult. Johnston brings out clearly some Sāṃkhya and Yoga conceptions of that Up. (JRAS, 1930). A special reference must be made in this section to the Italian journal, *Samādhi*, edited by Carpani. In this journal

several Indian philosophical texts are planned to be translated and explained. Among minor Up.-texts, which are recently worked out, one finds the *Kucumara-Up.* by R. Schmidt (Garbe Comm. Vol., 1927), the *Kaivalya-Up.* by Glasenapp (Konigsberg, 1931), the *Maitrī-Up.* by Cowell (Calcutta, 1935) and the *Avyakta-Up.* by Dumont (JAOS, 1940).

So many important studies bearing on several topics in Vedic and Up. philosophy have been published during the last twenty-five years that it is not possible to consider all of them in this section. A reference will however be made to some outstanding work in this field. Vedic cosmogony has been studied more or less thoroughly by Chakravarti (IC, 1938). Dr. Pusalker views (Bh. Vid., II) the cosmogony of ṚV from mythological and philosophical view-points. Przyluski speaks (JA, 1937) of a common cosmological theory in ancient Iran and India. Several aspects of the Up.-mysticism have been treated by Heiler (Z Buddh., VI), Hillebrandt (Z Buddh., VII), Sircar (*Eastern Light*, London, 1935) and Mukerji (*Theory and Art of Mysticism*, London 1936). Discussing *Materialismus im Leben des alten Indien* (Acta Orient., 1935) W. Ruben points out that there is no trace of materialism in ṚV while only relative materialism is presented in CU. M. H. Harrison makes an exhaustive study of *Hindu Monism and Pluralism as found in the Up.* (Oxford, 1932). In his paper, *The Background of the Pantheistic Monism of the Up.* (Pravry Comm. Vol., 1933) Oertel deals with the monistic tendencies tending toward a simplification of the polytheistic pantheon in the Vedic hymns and with monistic tendencies in the Br. tending toward a simplification of empirical multiplicity. Betty Heimann's noteworthy papers *Die Tiefschlafspekulation der alten Up.* (Z Buddh., 1923) and *Die Dingbeziehungen in den alten Up.* (ZII, 1928) are of great value for the study of Up. ontology, psychology and epistemology.

In his monograph, *Die Idee der Schopfung in der vedischen Literatur* (Stuttgart, 1932), Scharbau presents a systematic study of the idea of creation in Vedic litera-

ture. A large number of Vedic passages bearing on the subject are carefully classified under several topics, but not a single original text is given. Scharbau tries to reconcile the two conceptions of creation and emanation by explaining emanation as a form of revelation. He further maintains that, in Veda, creation always means continuous creation. Arbman undertook an exhaustive investigation into the problem of death and immortality in Vedic literature. The two volumes of his *Todund Unsterblichkeit im vedischen Glauben* (1927) deal with the primitive conception of soul in general and the Vedic conception in particular. In his remarkable book, *Unsterblichkeit und Erlosung in den indischen Religionen* (Halle, 1938) glassnapp has attempted a comparative and historical study of topics, such as immortality, length of earthly life, life after death, soul-theory, *karman*-theory etc., as they occur in various Indian religious systems. W. Norman Brown sees in RV VII, 104 a reference to *The ṚV-equivalent for Hell* (JAOS, 1941) H. W. Schomerus has examined the ancient Indian theories of transmigration and salvation (Allg. Ev. K. Z., 52). *The Vedic Idea of Sin* by H. Levever (Trivandrum, 1935) makes a purely theological approach to the subject *The Conception of Sin in the Vedas* by Shamashastry (Winternitz Comm. Vol., 1933) and *Sin and Salvation in Early ṚV* (Modling, 1933) by T. N. Siqueria are other notable contributions to the subject. G. W. Brown discusses the descriptions of the human body in the Up. (Jubbulpore, 1921) and E. N. Ghosh contributes a paper (VII. AIOC) on *Human body according to Garbha-Up*. In his *Der vedische Mensch* (Heidelberg, 1938) Dandekar undertakes to trace the complete development of the conception about Man in ṚV and AV. According to W. N. Brown (JAOS, 1931) the *puruṣa* of the *Puruṣa-sūkta* is a blend of a number of lexical and mythological integers drawn from the sphere of the related deities, Agni, Sūrya and Viṣṇu. J. Singh expounds the *Status and Role of buddhi in KU ahd BG* (RPR, 1941).

The origin and development of the conception of

Brahman have been thoroughly examined by many scholars and several theories have been recently put forth in that regard. According to Osthoff and Schrader the word, *brahman*, is philologically connected with old Irish *bricht* and Old Icelandic *bragr*, and originally denotes prayer or spell and the mental attitude which induce them. Hertel connects *brahman* with Greek *phlegma* and Latin *flamma* (IF, 41). Brahman therefore represents primarily and properly cosmic fire, which reveals itself through breaks as sun, moon, constellations etc. In ṚV it denotes power of thought situated in the heart. Hillebrandt assumes (Jacobi Comm. Vol., 1926) that Vedic Brahman and Avestic Baresman are originally identical. Both denote a bundle of plants used as a spell to secure growth. This original idea ultimately led to the conception of magical creative power of Up. Brahman. In his remarkable monograph, *Brahman* (Uppasala. 1932) J. Charpentier attempts a thorough investigation into this problem from linguistic, exegetical and religio-historical points of view. He accepts Hillebrandt's view that Brahman and Baresman are identical. He further indicates how this original conception of Brahman later on developed in the direction of magical power, hymn or spell, and the ultimate principle of the universe. Dr. Belvalkar believes (IV. AIOC) that the Up. Brahman represents the merging together of the two conceptions of Brahman as a ritualistico-magical principle and as a fire-light-substance. Quite an original theory in this respect is advanced by Dumezil in his *Flamen-Brahman* (Paris, 1935). According to him, the word *brahman*, is to be traced back to an idg. root *bhelgh*, which had a religio-magical sense. Greek *pharmakos* and Latin *flamen* are also to be derived from the same root. Thus Brahman, like 'Flamen', originally means a scapegoat. Dumezil contends that Brāhmaṇas achieved historical importance mainly as substitutes for the royal victim, who, according to be primitive belief, had to be sacrificed for reviving life in nature. He quotes the legend of Śunaḥśepa in support of his contention. He further maintains that the

magical conception of a scapegoat underwent a parallel development in India, Greece and Rome. This theory of Dumezil, however ingenious it may be, fails to explain the true significance of Up. Brahman.

It is true that psychology, as a separate science, giving a complete account of man, on his mental and emotional side, was unknown in early India. But several aspects of it are found to have been explored in the Vedic Literature, with objects in view different from those of modern psychologist. In a paper contributed to III. Ind. Phil. Con., Jwalaprasad studies YV 34, 1-6, and brings out clearly the psychological tendencies in that Veda. *New Light on Dream-psychology*, particularly from the Up.-sources, has been thrown by R. Naga Raja Sharma (JOR, 1925). According to Dandekar, *Manas* was originally regarded in the Veda as a kind of 'matter' and its activities were therefore described as mechanical and dynamic modifications of that 'soul-matter'. He calls this (p. 60) peculiarity of Vedic psychology *Somatism of Vedic Psychology* (IHQ, 1941). Dr. Varadachari considers in his article, *The Psycho-physiology of the Minor Up.* (AVOI, I) the descriptions and functions of *nāḍīs* and *cakras*. In his two excellent monographs, *Die Anfange der Yogapraxis* (Stuttgart, 1922) and *Der Yoga als Heilweg* (Stuttgart, 1932), J. Hauer makes a detailed study of Yoga both from theoretical and practical points of view. He discovers the beginnings of genuine Yoga-ecstacy in the Veda and views ṚV and AV in the light of religio-ecstatic experience. By Yoga Hauer understands the whole of Indian ecstatic practices, whether they aim at the attainment of spiritual powers, communion with gods or union with all-soul. He has not however developed the theory, which is widely accepted today, namely that the beginnings of Yoga are to be traced back even to the Indus Valley Civilisation.

Several manuals dealing with Indian ethics, such as *Hindu Ethics* (London, 1922) by J. McKenzie, *Ethics of India* (New Haven, 1924) by Hopkins and *Indische Ethik*

(1928) by Strauss, contain chapters about Vedic and Up. ethical teachings. Starting with Schopenhauer's dictum, '*Moral predigen ist leicht, Moral begrunden schwer*', Tuxen has made some interesting observations regarding the foundations of Indian ethics, in an article entitled *Die Grundlegung der Moral nach indischer Auffassung* (Acta Orient. XIV). Dealing with *Aryan Morality in the Br.-period* (Pathak Comm. Vol., 1934) B. C. Bannerji observes that the ŚB specially emphasises the virtues of truthfulness and chastity. Winternitz has written about the *Ethics in Bṛ.-literature* (Pr. Bh., 1936), while Hiriyanna has expounded the main ethical teaching of the Up. (ABORI, V). *Place of Feeling in Conduct* is the subject on an important article (Phil. Quart., 1936) by N. Venkataraman. W. N. Brown (JAOS, 1940) and Venkatasubbiah (JOR, 1940) have discussed the basis for the act of truth in the Veda.

Apart from this work bearing on topics directly related to Vedic and Up. Philosophy we come across several interesting papers dealing with general ideas and conceptions in the Veda. Just as many scholars have undertaken a comparative and critical study of Vedic words and expressions, Dr. Coomarswamy has undertaken a similar study of Vedic conceptions. In *Vedic Exemplarism* (HJAS, 1936) he discusses the traditional doctrine of the relation, cognitive and causal, between the one and many. Elsewhere ("Lila", JAOS, 1941) he maintains that the notion of a divine playing occurs repeatedly in ṚV. Among other topics treated by Coomarswamy are *Parāvṛtti* (Winternitz Comm. Vol., 1933), *L'Idee de creation eternelle dans le ṚV* (Etud. Trad., 1936), *The inverted tree* (QJMS, 1938), *Sun-Kiss* (JAOS, 1940) etc. He further finds ample, though not very systematic, material in Br., Up., and even *saṃhitās* for the reconstruction of a theory of aesthetics in India (*The Transformation of Nature in Art*, Harvard Univ., 1934). A mention may be made in this connection to Barua's view (IC, 1934) that, according to ŚB (III. 2. 1. 5), art consists in intelligent working up a desired form on a

normal material, making manifest what is hidden or potential.

The very important conception of Ṛta in Veda has been made the subject of several remarkable papers. S. K. Das believes (Phil. Quart., 1938) that Ṛta corresponds with Avestic 'Ashavaista', Greek 'Nemesis', and Chinese 'Tao', Zimmermann seems to accept (I. AIOC) the view of Luders that Ṛta is Truth and not Right. In his *Schick-salsidee im Altertum* (Erlangen, 1926) Engel regards Ṛta as the intuitively comprehended holy order which governs all physical and phychic being. According to Betty Heimann Ṛta represents the Law, which preserves the condition of cosmos and its several aspects. In a paper contributed to X. AIOC, Gadgil considers Ṛta in relation to law of Karman. The problem of Vrātya has been thoroughly examined by J. Hauer in his *Der Vrātya* (Stuttgart, 1927). Among other conceptions so studied a special reference must be made to that of *Pūjā* by Charpentier (Jacobi Comm. Vol., 1926), of *Dharma* by Schrader (Jacobi Comm. Vol., 1926) and Willman-Grabowska (Rocz. Or., 1934), of *Śraddhā* and *Bhakti* by Das Gupta (IHQ, 1930), and of 'Yoga-Ksema' by A. Ray (BSOS, 1933).

Abbreviations

ABORI	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.
Acta Orient.	Acta Orientalia.
Ad. Lib. Bull.	Adyar Library Bulletin, Adyar.
AIOC	All India Oriental Conference (Proceedings).
Allg. Ev. K. Z.	Allgemeine Evangelische Kirchliche Zeitschrift.
All. U. Stud.	Allahabad University Studies.
Archiv Orient.	Archiv Orientalni.
AVOI	Annals of the Venkateshvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati.

BDCRI	Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute, Poona.
Bh. Vid.	Bharatiya Vidya, Bombay.
Bibl. Ind.	Bibliotheca Indica.
BSL	Bulletin de la Societe de Linguistique.
BSOS	Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, London.
COJ	Calcutta Oriental Journal.
Comm. Vol.	Commemoration Volume (Festschrift etc.)
CR	Calcutta Review.
Etud. Trad.	Etude Traditionelle.
Ges. der idg. Spw.	Geschichte der indogermanischen Sprachwissenschaft.
HJAS	Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies.
HJOS	Harvard Journal of Oriental Studies.
HOS	Harvard Oriental Series.
IA	Indian Antiquary.
IC	Indian Culture, Calcutta.
IF	Indogermanische Forschungen.
IHQ	Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta.
IL	Indian Linguistics.
Ill. Weekly of India	Illustrated Weekly of India, Bombay.
Ind. Hist. Con.	Indian Historical Congress (Proceedings).
Ind. Phil. Con.	Indian Philosophical Congresss (Proceedings).
JA	Journal Asiatique.
J Anth S	Journal of the Anthropological Society, Bombay.
JAOS	Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JASB	Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.
JBBRAS	Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
JBHS	Journal of the Bombay Historical Society.
JBHU	Journal of the Benares Hindu University.
JBORS	Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society.
JBU	Journal of the Bombay University.
JOR	Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.

JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London.
Kant Stud.	Kant Studien.
K. F.	Kleinasiatische Forschungen.
KZ	Kuhn's Zeitschrift (fur vergleichende Sprachwissenschaft).
Man in India	
Mahābodhi	
MO	Monde Oriental.
NIA	New Indian Antiquary.
Phil. Quart.	Philosophical Quarterly.
PO	Poona Orientalist.
Pr. Bh.	Prabuddha Bharata.
QJMS	Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society, Bangalore.
Rocz. Or.	Rocznik Orjentalistyczny.
RPR	Review of Philosophy and Religion.
Samādhi	
SBBW	Sitzungsberichte der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaft.
SBE	Sacred Books of the East.
Vis. Bh.	Visva Bharati.
WZKM	Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde des Morgenlandes.
Z Buddh.	Zeitschrift fur Buddhismus.
ZDMG	Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenlandischen Gesellschaft.
ZII	Zeitschrift fur Indologie und Iranistik,

(ABORI, 1942. Selections.)

UPANISAD : WHAT DO THEY SEEK, AND WHY ?

F. Edgerton

It[1] may seem presumptuous at this late day to suggest that a restatement is needed of the fundamental attitude of the Upaniṣads, those fountain-heads of all classical Hindu thought. After all that has been written on the subject by so many distinguished scholars and brilliant thinkers, both eastern and western, surely it would seem that at least the general intellectual viewpoint of these famous treatises must be fairly clear and fairly familiar. In one sense it is. The detailed dogmatic beliefs of the Upaniṣads which we recognize as philosophical or religious have been, on the whole, sufficiently sifted, classified, arranged, and interpreted. That is, it is easy to find in our reference-books comprehensive statements of what they say about the nature of the world and its guiding principle, the nature of man, his origin, his duty, his destiny, and his relation to the outside world and its Supreme Principle. I do not mean that no further study of these matters is required. Problems still remain. But I am not attempting to solve them ; and they are mostly problems of detail. What I am now concerned with is a more general and more fundamental matter, and one which has been commonly ignored by modern writers, both Hindu and western. The few who have referred to it seem to me not to have given it its proper place in relation to the philosophy, that is the dogmatic theories, of the Upaniṣads.

I refer to the instinctive and unquestioning belief in the inherent power of *knowledge*, as such, which underlies the whole intellectual fabric of the Upaniṣads, as it appears to

1. Presidential address delivered before the American Oriental Society at it sannual meeting in Cambridge, April 2, 1925.

me, and furnishes the motive force behind their speculations. Typical passages found constantly in all parts of them seem to me to make it abundantly clear that the reason why they seek the "truth," any truth, is precisely this, that by *knowledge* of the truth they expect to master their destiny, wholly or partly; and not by a course of action dictated by that knowledge, but directly, immediately, and by virtue of that knowledge in itself; in brief, we may say, magically. In this paper I shall try to suggest the range of evidence supporting this view, and also to sketch briefly the history of this idea in Indian thought before and after the Upaniṣads.

Let us turn first to the *Atharva Veda.* It is, as every one knows a collection of incantations, designed to accompany magic rites for the attainment of almost every conceivable human desire and aspiration. Now it is a commonplace of Atharvan psychology that *knowledge* of the end to be gained is a prime means of gaining it. "We know thy name, O assembly!" says the author of *AV.* 7. 12. 2, in a charm to get control of the public assembly or town-meeting. "I have grasped the names of all of them," says a medical charm, 6. 63. 2, of the scrofulous sores *(apacit)* which it is striving to overcome. And so on; similar expressions are numerous and are perfectly familiar to all readers of the *Atharva Veda.* The "name," I may say in passing, is to Vedic India, as to early human psychology the world over, the essence of the person or thing; so in our oldest Upaniṣad, *BṛhU.* 3. 2. 11, the "name" is that eternal part of man which does not perish at death. He who *knows* the name of anything therefore *knows* the essential thing itself; and in Atharvan conceptions, if he knows it he controls it and can mold it to his purposes, magically, by immediate power of that knowledge. No more fundamental or commonplace idea can be found in the whole range of Atharvan magic.

But it is not limited to that sphere. We meet it again, clearly and insistently set forth in innumerable expressions,

in the ritualistic texts of the *Brāhmaṇas*, which are to the Vedic hymns approximately what the Talmud is to the Jewish scriptures. No better authority on the *Brāhmaṇas* has ever lived than the late Hermann Oldenberg who has made this point abundantly clear in his masterly treatise called *Vorwissenschaftliche Wissenschaft, die Weltanschauung der Brahmana-Texte* (Gottingen, 1919). Of their view of the ritual he says (p. 5): "The *knowledge* of a procedure,[2] its psychic image, is magically connected with the procedure itself. The knower, precisely thru the fact that he *knows*—not because thru his knowledge he *acts* skillfully and correctly,[3] but by reason of the power of the knowledge in itself....—possesses power over the entity or event known." It is, therefore, even said to be unnecessary actually to perform a rite. If you know it, you have as good as performed it; that is, you can be sure of the benefits which are promised to the performer; and furthermore, ignorant performance, that is mechanically going through the motions without real knowledge of their esoteric meaning, does not bring the desired result.[4] Knowledge, not physical action, is the important, the all-important thing. That is why the whole enormous bulk of the *Brāhmaṇa* texts is devoted to explaining the mystic, esoteric, or magic meaning of the various elements of the ritual. We constantly find in them, after such an explanation, the added statement that he who "knowing thus" *(evaṃ vidvān)* performs the rite, gets such and such a benefit; or more directly and simply, that he "who knows thus" *(ya evaṃ veda)* gets the benefit. That this doctrine in its extreme form is dangerous to the perpetuation of

2. The word used is *Vorgang* and, as applied to the *Brāhmaṇas*, means of course primarily a religious rite, since it is with such *Vorgange* that they mainly deal. But the statement is equally true of any act or entity, and this was clearly in Oldenberg's mind; hence his carefully generalized expression.
3. Note this point; it is a highly important one.
4. Oldenberg, *op. cit.*, 140, 201; *Lehre der Upanishaden und Anfange des Buddhismus*, 2d. ed., p. 29.

the actual performances, is obvious. All the more impressive is the fact that despite their absorbing interest in the rites, the *Brāhmaṇa* texts frequently do not shrink from drawing this conclusion.

In particular this belief in what I shall call, for short, the "magic" power of knowledge manifests itself in the *Brāhmaṇas* in their passion for *identification* of one thing with another, on the slenderest possible basis ; indeed, often on no basis at all that we can discover. These identifications have struck every reader of the *Brāhmaṇa* texts. Their rationale has never been more clearly or correctly stated than by Oldenberg.[5] As he says, the purpose is to "set in motion" the cosmic forces dealt with, and to "get from them the desired results." To this end it is said that they *"are"* this or that other thing, which other thing we can control. "The Maruts are water. Viṣṇu is the sacrifice. The cow is breath." As oldenberg remarks, 'By grasping or controlling one of the two identified entities, the possessor of the mystic knowledge as to their identity has power over the other, which is in fact no other (but really the same) ; "that is, for instance, since "the cow is breath," and I control a cow, therefore I control breath, my own life-breath, or some one else's. That is the only reason for the fantastic identification. We want to control breath ; so we earnestly and insistently identity it with something that we can control, and the trick is turned.[6]

5. *Vorw. Wiss*, p. 110 f.

6. Oldenberg adds, very acutely, that we find clear traces of this sort of identification even in the hymns of the *Ṛgveda*, and cites instances. There is indeed no reason whatever to doubt that this concept was as familiar to the authors of the Ṛgvedic hymns as to the Atharvan charm-mongers and the *Brāhmaṇa* theologians. The reason why it does not appear there clearly is simply that the highly specialized purpose of most of the Ṛgvedic hymns gives little chance for its expression. The *Ṛgveda,* is broadly speaking, simply a hymn-book containing chants to be used in the hieratic ritual, addrest to the gods of that ritual.

Now the question will arise, what has all this to do with philosophy? Are not the Upaniṣads, the "New Testament" of the Veda as they have been called, occupied with a wholly different order of ideas from those of the magicians of the *Atharva Veda*, and the ritualists of the *Brāhmaṇas?* So it has been generally supposed. Some have even gone so far as to hold that the Upaniṣads originated in a different social order; the Vedic priests, it has been thought, could not have conceived the Upanisadic ideas, which move on another intellectual plane. Most scholars have not gone to this extreme; they admit the growth of Upaniṣad thought in priestly circles, but think of it as the product of a small group of intelligents among the Brahmins. It is, to be sure, generally granted that the Upaniṣads contain traces of ritualism; occasionally even evidences of magic are recognized in them. But these, when noted at all, are regarded as intrusions, as foreign elements which are mixed with their philosophy but have no proper connexion with it. Conversely, the adumbrations of Upaniṣad philosophy which are occasionally met with in the Vedic hymns and in the *Brāhmaṇas* are held to belong to a different intellectual sphere from the great mass of those earlier texts. In short, it is customary to make a sharp division between Vedic ritualism and Vedic magic, on the one hand, and Vedic (or Upanisadic) philosophy on the other; and even those who recognize the occurence of both side by side in the same texts think of this juxtaposition as a mixture of basically unrelated things. The same Oldenberg whose clear characterization of the *Brāhmaṇas* I have quoted finds a completely different spirit

Since all the rest of the Veda abounds in evidence of implicit belief in the magic power of knowledge, we should be justified in assuming that the Ṛgvedic poets also held it, even if it were not expressed there at all; they would not have been Vedic Hindus if they had not held it. But, in fact, we find indiciations of it even in the *Ṛgveda*, quite as often as we should expect, considering the limitations of its practical purpose. This is to be borne in mind in connexion with the philosophic hymns of the *Ṛgveda*; see below.

in the Upaniṣads, whose authors in his opinion are true philosophers, seeking the truth about the universe for the pure joy of knowledge in itself, not for the sake of using that knowledge for practical ends. They constitute for that reason, to his mind, a "genuine novelty," altho of course he recognizes traces of their ideas in the early literature.[7]

For years the conviction has been growing upon me, as a result of repeated study of early Indian philosophic texts, that this interpretation involves a redical misunderstanding of the point of view of those texts, and indeed of all classical Indian philosophy. It commits the very natural but unfortunate error of attributing to Indian thought the objects which we associate with "philosophy" in the west, at least at the present day, but which have never been associated with it in India, until the most modern times. To our kinds, I take it, "philosophy" implies a search for abstract truth about the nature of the universe and man's place in it, as an end in itself. We do not expect a philosopher to do anything with this truth, if and when he gets it, except to enjoy the intellectual pleasure of cognizing it, and to share it with others. If practical motives are concerned, we say it is no longer "pure" philosophy, but religion or something else. But to the Hindus, even of later classical times, and a *fortiori* of the Vedic age, such a conception never occurred; and if it had been suggested to them, they would have regarded it as fantastic and absurd. Oldenberg's figures of a Vedic philosopher seeking "to unfold a picture of things as they are for its own sake, out of the pure joy of perceiving and understanding"[8] is more than "rare," as he calls it.

7. See his *Vrow. Wiss.*, p. 3 ff., 7 f. Winternitz (Gesch. d. ind. Lit., I *passim,* notably p. 203) also separates the streams of ritualistic magic and "true" philosophy; the latter in his opinion originated in non-Brahman circles, the he makes it clear that both streams are found both in the Upaniṣads (pp. 206-209) and in the philosophic hymns of the *Atharva Veda* (p. 131).

8. *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

Such an individual never existed at all, either in the Vedic period, of which he is speaking, or in later India, as far as our records show. The picture is utterly un-Indian.

Abstract truth for its own sake, as an end in itself, has never for a moment been conceived by Indian philosophers as a proper objective of their speculations. Their intellectual quests have always been associated in their minds with practical ends. The later systems of philosophy are all supposed to be practical means of attaining salvation, *mukti* or *mokṣa.* That is their one and only justification for existence. Typical are the two most famous of the later systems, the Vedānta and the Sāṃkhya. In both, as is well known, human salvation is the sole object of their speculations ; and in both alike it is to be gained by knowledge. He who has true knowledge is saved, directly and immediately, and precisely by virtue of that knowledge. They differ as to what true knowledge is, but agree to this extent, that it is knowledge of the real nature of the soul and its position in the universe, its relation to the rest of the universe and its guiding principle. Such knowledge gives its possessor control over his soul's destiny, that is, salvation.

Now salvation, literally "release" *(mukti, mokṣa)*, is understood in later India as meaning "release" from the cycle of rebirths, determined by *karma* ; that is from the *saṃsāra*, with all the evil and pain inevitably connected therewith.[9] In the early Upaniṣads this conception of the round of existences, the *saṃsāra*, had not yet fully developt. We see it in process of developing in them. But the word and concept of *mukti* are found there, with the same general connotations as in later times, subject to the qualification just indicated. That is *mukti* means "release" from the evils of ordinary human existence. In *Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.1 are listed four *muktis :* the first, release from death ; the second and third, from "day and night" and

9. So first in *Śvet. U.* 6. 16, *saṃsāramokṣasthitibandhahetuḥ*.

from "the waxing and waning moon" (that is, ravages of time); and the last is ascent to the "heavenly world" (*svarga-loka*). And, most characteristically, these "releases" are magically gained by *knowledge* of certain thoroughly ritualistic identifications, of elements of the sacrifice with cosmic and human powers, quite in the style of the *Brāhmaṇas*. Thus, by the identification of the *hotar*-priest with fire, as a cosmic power, and with speech, as a human faculty, one wins release from death. This ritual-magic wisdom is put into the mouth of no less a personage than Yājña-valkya. the most celebrated of all Upanisadic teachers, at the beginning of his contest in learning with the other Brahmins at the court of King Janaka which is one of the high points of Upaniṣad philosophy.

Along with "releases" from evils, the Upaniṣads speak of "attainments" of desiderata. The very same passage just quoted, after disposing of the "releases beyond (evil)," proceeds to described "attainments" through ritual-magic knowledge.[10] The "attainments" here are certain natural and supernatural "worlds" (*loka*) which are gained by ritual knowledge. Many of the later systems also promise to the adept not only the supreme goal of salvation, but various incidental benefits which he is to enjoy while progressing towards that goal. I am thinking primarily of the magic powers, (*mahā*) *siddhis*, promised by the Yoga and other later systems to the philosophic adept. They are secondary and incidental to the main aim, but none the less real.

Nothing seems more natural to the Hindu of ancient times, as indeed to the popular mind in medieval Europe,[11] than that very practical and worldly benefits, of many sorts, should ensue magically from superior knowledge. The word *vidyā*, "knowledge," means in classical Sanskrit also "magic" out and out, as all Sanskritists know well. Again and again throughout the Upaniṣads, just as throughout the Brāhmaṇas, we meet the phrase *"he who knows thus," ya evam veda*

10. *ity atimokṣaḥ, atha sampadaḥ, BṛhU.* 3. 1. 8.

11. See the Epilog to this paper, below.

(or *vidvān*). The same phrase is equally familiar in the *Atharva Veda*, especially in its philosophic hymns. And everywhere it almost always follows the promise of some extremely practical reward for him who "has such knowledge." Not only long life and release from death, or from that "second death *(punar-mṛtyu)* beyond the first grave which is such a bugbear to the Vedic Hindus in the birth—throes of the doctrine of transmigration ; not only the winning of various heavens ; but wealth is this life, wordly success of all kinds, ascendancy over one's fellows, the discomfiture of one's enemies, even success in love—all these and other worldly benefits are among the things to be gained by the practice of Upanisadic speculation, as they were to be gained from the ritualistic and theological speculations of the *Brāhmaṇas* and from the magic practices of the *Atharva Veda*. The passages are so numerous that it is hard to see how their significance can have been so generally overlooked. It ought not to be necessary to quote any of them. The list of references in the footnote will be sufficient to show how they permeate the two oldest Upaniṣads, the *Bṛhad Āraṇyaka* and *Chāndogya*.[12]

12. *BṛhU.* 1. 2. 1, 3, 5, 7-8 (to be understood together as meaning that he who knows the identity of the *arka*-fire and the *aśvamedha*-sacrifice with Death "wards off death, death does not attain him'') ; 1. 3. 7, 9, 16, 18, 25, 26, 28 (*Madhy* 1. 3, 8, 10, 17, 19, 27, 28, 33) ; 1. 4. 1, 6, 7, 10, 15, 16, 17 (*Madhy*. 1. 4. 2, 10, 14, 18, 22, 28, 29, 31) ; 1. 5. 1, 2, 12, 15, 16, 20 (*Madhy*. 1. 5. 1, 6, 19, 23, 24, 29) ; 2. 1. 1. 2. ff. (a long series of philosophic doctrines which are all declared to be partial or incomplete ; nevertheless each brings its possessor its appropriate benefit ; e. g. in 5 it is proposed by Gārgya to consider the *puruṣa* in the ākāśa as Brahman, to which Ajātaśatru replies : 'Speak not of him to me ; I revere him as the full and non-departing ; who so reverses him is filled with offspring and cattle, and his offspring do not depart from this world.") ; 2. 2. 1, 2. 4. (M. 6) ; 2. 3. 6 (M. 10) ; 3. 3. 2 ; 3. 9, 28 (M. 34) ; 4. 1. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (M. 4. 1. 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19) ; 4. 2. 4 (M. 6) ; 4. 3. 37 (M. 43) ; 4. 4. 8, 12. 14, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24. 25 (M. 11, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 31) ; 4. 5. 4, cf. 15 (M. 4. 5. 4 and 25 ; immor-

In my article on "The Philosophical Materials of the *Atharva Veda*"[13] I pointed out that in seeking practical benefits through the magic power of knowledge the Upaniṣads touch upon the special sphere of the *Atharva Veda*. Its aims are identical with theirs, and one of its familiar methods of attaining those aims is through that same power of knowledge, as set forth above. And, in fact, the *Atharva Veda* is the special home of early Vedic speculation. This fact is obvious and undisputed; the *Atharva Veda*, this book of spells and incantations, contains far more philosophic materials than the *Ṛgveda* or any other Vedic Saṃhitā. Every one has always observed this circumstance, and found it surprising—indeed, inexplicable. It is inexplicable from any other point of view than that which I am here proposing, and which I first proposed in the article cited. Those who think of Vedic speculation as the work of abstract, disinterested "philosophers" in our western sense, can only regard the

tality to be gained from the knowledge set forth in this chapter); 5. 1; 5. 3 (M. 4); 5. 4 (M. 5); 5. 5. 1, 3, 4 (M. 5. 6. 2, 4, 5); 5. 7; M. 5. 8 (=K. 5, 6, which omits *ya evaṃ veda)*; 5. 11; 5. 12 (M. 5. 13, 3); 5. 13. 1-4 (M. 5. 14. 1-4); 5. 14, 1-8 (M. 5. 15. 1-12); 6. 1. 1-6 (M. 6. 2. 1-6); 6. 2. 15, 16 (M. 6. 1. 18, 19);—ChU. 1. 1. 7, 8, 10; 1. 2. 8. 14; 1. 3. 1, 7; 1. 4. 5; 1. 6. 7; 1. 7. 7, 8; 1. 9. 2; 1. 13. 4; 2. 1, 4; 2. 2. 3; 2. 3. 2; 2. 4. 2; 2. 5. 2; 2. 6. 2; 2. 7. 2; 2. 8. 3; 2. 10. 6; 2. 10. 6; 2. 11. 2; 2. 12. 2; 2. 13. 2; 2. 14. 2; 2. 15, 2; 2. 16. 2; 2, 17. 2; 2. 18. 2; 2. 19. 2; 2. 20. 2; 2. 21. 2; 3. 6. 3-4; 3. 7. 3-4; 3. 8. 3-4; 3. 9. 3-4; 3. 10. 3-4; 3. 12. 7; 3. 13. 1-7; 3. 15. 2; 3. 16. 7; 3. 18. 6; 3. 19. 4; 4. 3. 8; 4. 5. 3; 4. 6. 4; 4. 7. 4; 4. 8. 4; 4. 11. 2; 4. 12. 2; 4. 13. 2; 4. 14. 3; 4. 15. 2, 3. 4; 4. 17. 8-9; 5. 1. 1-5; 5. 2. 1; 5. 10. 10; 5. 18. 1; 5. 24. 2; 7. 1. 5; 7. 2. 2; 7. 3. 2; 7. 4. 3; 7. 5. 3; 7. 6. 2; 7. 7. 2; 7. 8. 2; 7. 9. 2 etc. (this series is similar in spirit to *BṛhU.* 2. 1. 2 ff., see above); 7. 25 and 26 (climax to the preceding; perfect knowledge brings unlimited powers); 8. 1. 6 with 8. 2. 1-10; 8. 3. 5; 8. 7. 1; 8. 12. 6.

13. *Studies in Honour of Maurice Bloomfield*, pp. 117-135; see especially p. 133.

inclusion of so much of their work in a book of magic charms as a strange anomaly. But the Atharvan philosophic materials themselves, to a very large extent, and still more the manner in which they are used in the *Kauśika Sūtra* and the other ritual handbooks of the *Atharva Veda*, indicate clearly the practical, magical ends which their esoteric knowledge was designed to gain. And so they themselves furnish the reason for their inclusion in the *Atharva Veda*, to which they are perfectly appropriate.

Typical is the hymn *AV*. 11. 4. Its subject is the *prāṇa*, the cosmic "breath," that is the wind, most strikingly manifested in the storm-wind ; hence the obvious naturalistic allusions to storms which the hymn contains. This breath of the universe is, quite naturally and yet acutely, made the enlivening principle of the cosmos. The author is thoroughly at home in the phraseology and ideology of Vedic higher thought, and applies it to his subject with a freshness and vigour which suggest an unusual amount of intellectual acumen. He is certainly no mere ignorant witch-doctor. Yet that does not mean that he is free from natural human desires. Not only the last stanza,[14] but several stanzas scattered throughout the hymn, give expression to the active desire that the cosmic "breath" shall confer boons on him who knows and glorifies it, particularly, of course, by means of its counterpart, the individual "breath" or "life" in the human being. So *Kauśīka* very appropriately uses the hymn in magic performances for long life. In so doing *Kauśika* does no violence to the thought of the hymn ; on the contrary, this was quite clearly the intent of its author. His thought is thoroly Upanisadic, quite as lofty as the average of Upaniṣad speculations : and an Upaniṣad author would typically conclude such a passage with an expression like

14. Cf. Bloomfield, *Hymns of the Atharva Veda*, p. 623 ; Oldenberg, *Vorw. Wiss.*, p. 6, note. These authors overlook the similar passages in stanzas 9, 11, 18, 19 of the hymn, and speak as if the last stanza were the only one that shows traces of magic ends.

this : "Long life he attains, the breath of life *(prāṇa)* does not leave him, who knows thus *(ya evaṃ veda)* !"

There is here no question of a secondary fusion of unrelated activities, philosophy and magic. On the contrary, all Vedic philosophy may (from our point of view) be described as a sort of philosophic magic, or magical philosophy.[15] That is precisely why it belongs primarily

15. As set forth in these words in my article, *op. cit.*, p. 134. I must refer to this place, especially p. 121 ff., for further details as to the evidence for the magical intent of Atharvan philosophy. (A limited number of reprints of this article are available for free distribution, on application to the author.) I am pleased to note that the views there advanced have been noticed favorably by such good scholars as Winternitz (OLZ., 1924, p. 424) and Keith *(Religion and Philosophy of the Veda*, p. 510, n. 3). To be sure I must add with regret that I have failed to find in Keith's book much evidence that he has been influenced by my arguments. Winterniz points out that he expressed long ago views similar to some of mine ; I hope I am not wrong in understanding that he would now agree even more closely with me ; cf. note 7 above.—I would add here that the case for the practical application of *AV*, philosophic hymns is really stronger than appears from my former article. While the Atharvan ritual texts fail in some cases to record the uses to which they are put (*loc. cit.*, p. 119), the hymns themselves do so more regularly than I there indicated. Thus I observed that *AV.* S. 10 is ignored in all the ritual texts ; but I should have added that the hymn itself emphatically states (vss 2-7, 17-29, 33) the practical benefits to be own by him who "knows" *(ya evaṃ veda)* its mysteries, quite in Upaniṣad fashion. So also the recurring refrain of *AV.* 11. 3. 32-49 ; and for other similar references see *AV.* 4. 1. 7 ; 9. 10. 24 ; 10. 2. 29, 30 ; 10. 7. 40, 41 ; 10. 8. 22, 43, 44 ; 11. 3. 51 ; 11. 5. 10. 25. With so much *primary* evidence, in the hymns themselves, the partial lack of *secondary* evidence of magical employment in the ritual handbooks is not important. I should further have noted the fact that even the famous Ṛgvedic Hiraṇyagarbha hymn, *ṚV.* 10. 121, ends with the definite statement that it was designed to win practical desiderata. It is true that this tenth verse is perhaps a later addition to the hymn. But even vs 9, unquestionably part of the original text, prays "May He (the One) harm us not."

to the *Atharva Veda.* The fact that the *Ṛgveda* also contains a few hymns of this sort is exactly analogous to its inclusion of some magic spells, also. Both are equally "*Atharvanic*" and equally foreign to the primary purpose of the *Ṛgveda,* which is a hymn-book for use at the hieratic ritual services. The rare and scattering philosophic materials of the *Ṛgveda* are all found in the tenth or first books (mainly in the tenth), which are recognized as late additions to the collection, and which also contain most of the other "Atharvanic" materials, the incantations, wedding and funeral hymns, etc.[16] Not that the "magic" power of knowledge was unknown to the *Ṛgvedic* poets.[17] Of course this belief was common to the age as a whole. But, equally of course, no one, or at least few, relied upon it exclusively for protection. Even the Atharvanists engaged in magical *performances*; with all their faith in the power of knowledge in itself, they reinforced that knowledge by active measures. The theory behind most of the *Ṛgveda* is, as is well known, that human desires will be granted by the gods, when they have been propitiated by the ritual of sacrifice and praise. Cross-bred with the theory that magic rites, performed with true esoteric knowledge, must bring the desired results of themselves,

And the Viśvakarman hymn, *ṚV.* 10. 81, is as definitely practical in its aim as any Atharvan incantation (*vas* 6, 7). Whether thus stated in terms or not, *all* Vedic philosophy has practical aims.

16. It is not an argument against this view that the text-tradition of the Ṛgvedic philosophic hymns is better than that of the corresponding Atharvan ones, as I showed, loc. cit., p. 123 ff. The same is true of the entire Ṛgvedic tradition. It is simply due to the fact that the Ṛgvedic schools were better educated. The Atharvanists were not the scholars that the Ṛgvedic poets were. Even the magic charms, which strayed into the collection of the Rigveda, are generally found there in a more intelligent form than the corresponding ones of the *Atharva Veda.* No one would argue from this that the *Ṛgveda,* rather than the *Atharva,* is their original home.

17. Cf. above, note 6; and further see *ṚV.* 1. 164. 16, 39.

this ritualistic theory gave birth in *Brāhmaṇa* times to the belief that the gods are negligible intermediaries, or even play no part at all in the process; a rite, performed with proper knowledge, must of itself result in the benefit that is sought. Or, even more drastically, the actual performance of the rite is unnecessary; if one knows its true nature, by virtue of that knowledge he controls the desired result, and need not actually do anything. Here is, if you like, a true "blend"; but not a blend between magic and philosophy. Rather, a blend between ritual religion on the one hand and magical philosophy or philosophic magic on the other. And in this blend, ritualistic religion is the moribund element. Magical philosophy constantly tends to get the upper hand. We are drifting into the intellectual sphere of the Upaniṣads.

For few would now dispute that the *Brāhmaṇas* are the womb of Upaniṣad thought. They are far more intimately related to the Upaniṣads than to the *Ṛgveda*, precisely because of their emphasis on the importance of knowledge, of a true understanding of the esoteric meaning of things. Their hair-splitting theological disquisitions give birth to the cosmic and metaphysical (but at the same time largely ritualistic) speculations of the Upaniṣads. And just as the Upaniṣads contain many external and internal indications of their intimate connexion with the *Brāhmaṇas* (the oldest of them, the *Bṛhad Āraṇyaka*, is part of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*; and large parts of them deal wholly with ritualistic entities and concepts)—so they never lose sight for long of the practical ends which they also inherit from the *Brāhmaṇas*, and which like them they conceive to depend upon true, esoteric, or mystic knowledge of the entities with which they deal. These ends and this method of gaining them are inherited by the *Brāhmaṇas* directly from the intellectual sphere which we call Atharvanic, and are then passed on to the Upaniṣads.

If there is any general difference in spirit between the *Brāhmaṇas* and the Upaniṣads, it lies in just this, that

the Upaniṣads carry out fully, to its logical extreme, the Atharvan-*Brāhmaṇa* doctrine that esoteric knowledge is the only thing that counts in the last analysis; that it is the supreme method of gaining all one's desires. The Atharvanists and the *Brāhmaṇa*-authors may tell us that knowledge is all that is necessary; but with natural and pardonable inconsistency, they still continue to act, to perform ritual and magic practices, as if they believed in the efficacy of actions. The Upaniṣads attach little or no importance to action, ritual or other. Far more consistently than the *Brāhmaṇas* (though even they, as we saw, occasionally go as far as this), they take the position that if one knows the mystic meaning of a performance, he need not actually carry it out in order to get the benefit of its fruits. They constantly sing the same song: "he who knows" this or that, gets his desire fulfilled. To be sure, by reading chiefly between the lines, we may find evidence that ritual and magical acts were still performed. But little importance is attached to the actual performance. For instance, several passages tell us that ritual acts, if performed without knowledge of their esoteric meaning, are not only useless,[18] but dangerous; the presumptuous performer is likely to have his head burst asunder.[19] Again, "he who knows" a particular rite, of which the mystic meaning has just been explained, "and he who knows it not, both perform it; but" when performed with knowledge it becomes more effective.[20] The world of men is attained by begetting a son, the world of the manes by sacrifice, the world of the gods by knowledge; but the world of the gods is the best of worlds, therefore "knowledge is best."[21] People say that by offering with milk for a year one escapes re-death *(punar-mṛtyu)*; but this is an error; on the very (first)

18. *ChU.* 5. 24. 1.
19. *ChU.* 1. 8. and 1. 10-11.
20. *ChU.* 1. 1. 10.
21. *BṛhU.* 1. 5. 16 (Mādhyamdina rec. 24).

day on which *one who knows* makes such an offering, on that very day he escapes re-death.[22] And even such qualified tributes to the power of actions as these are rare in the Upaniṣads. Generally it is knowledge, alone and of itself, which brings the desired end, no other method being recognized as even possible. "He who knows" gets anything he wants, by the direct and magical power of his knowledge.[23]

An important further question now arises. Is any relation discernible between the kind of knowledge sought, at a given point, and the nature of the practical benefit to be derived from it ?

In some cases it is hard for us to discern any reason for the association of a particular boon with a particular quantum of esoteric knowledge. In an Atharvan hymn (13. 3) the sun is glorified as the cosmic First Principle ; and, in the constantly recurring refrain of each verse, this "ruddy one" (Rohits) is invoked to destroy any enemy of the

22. *BṛhU.* 1. 5. 2 (Madhy. 6). We also find clear evidence that what we should call purely magic practices were carried on in these same "philosophical" circles ; thus additional proof is furnished for the intimate connexion between the spheres of the *Atharva Veda* and the Upaniṣads. *BṛhU.* 6. 3 and 4 deal with such practices in a thoroly Atharvan manner. They include even love-charms, charms, to compel a woman to yield her love, birth-control charms to prevent conception, and conversely charms to bring about conception when it is desired ; parturition charms, etc., etc. But the knowledge motif is dominant throughout. Thus, at the very outset, the sexual act is explained mystically as a kind of ritual performance, the elements of which are identified, *Brāhmaṇa-wise*, with the parts of the woman's body ; and then we are told that if a man practises sexual intercourse knowing this, he gains a world as great as he who sacrifices with the Vājapeyarite, and takes to himself the merit of women ; but if he practices it without knowing this, women take to themselves his merit (*BṛhU.* 6. 4. 3).

23. Some later religious and philosophic texts are more catholic, and recognize other ways of gaining salvation, although "knowledge" remained perhaps the favourite on the whole ; at

wise man "who knows thus." The idea seems to be simply that one who is fortified with such mystic knowledge must be safe from attack by human foes. But any other desideratum would seem to us equally appropriate. Similarly in the Upaniṣad passage last quoted (*BṛhU.* 1. 5. 2.) we saw that escape from re-death is promised to

any rate, the late Sāṃkhya and Vedānta systems clung to it exclusively. In the philosophy of the epic, on the other hand, various courses of action are recognized as possible roads to salvation, as alternatives to the way of knowledge. These active methods are called Yoga, "activity" (see American Journal of Philosophy, 45, 37 ff. for a brief account of them), and are distinguished as such from the method of knowledge, known as Sāṃkhya, "reckoning, reasoning, ratiocination.". In the epic and in all earlier Sanskrit literature the terms Sāṃkhya and Yoga do not refer to metaphysical systems, but to ways of gaining salvation; see my article, "The Meaning of Sāṃkhya and Yoga," Am. Jour. Phil., 45. 1-46. For the relation of this early meaning of the word Sāṃkhya to the later Sāṃkhya system, see *ibid.*, 32 ff.; and for yet other ways of salvation than "knowledge" and "action", p. 46.—Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda.* 2. p. 543 f., rejects the conclusions of this article, but adduces little reason for doing so; his remarks amount to hardly more than a dogmatic refusal to accept what I still think I showed to be the plain and unmistakable evidence of the texts themselves as to the meaning of the two words. As an example of the cogency of such arguments as Keith offers, I may mention his treatment of *Mbh.* 12. 13713- ff. (p. 543 *infra*). Here he says; "In this passage we find two very distinct views set out: the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga accept a multiplicity of souls, while Vyāsa insists that all the souls at bottom rest on the world soul." But, as I pointed out (p. 28), this doctrine of Vyāsa "that all the souls at bottom rest on the world soul" is definitely stated in vs 13763 to be "Sāṃkhya and Yoga"! What becomes of the distinction on which Keith lays such great weight? One "distinct view" is as much Sāṃkhya and Yoga as the other, according to the text. Is the text mere gibberish—or is Keith wrong? I prefer to assume that the text knows what it is talking about. (In actual fact the text does not intend to make the distinction between the two "views" which Keith supposes, as I clearly showed.)

one who performs with esoteric knowledge a certain milk-offering for a single day. Why precisely release from re-death, rather than any other boon ? The only answer (if it be considered an answer) probably is that ritualistic tradition made this particular association.

This condition is, however, just what we should expect, after all. It is what we very commonly find in connexion with Atharvan magic rites and with the ritual performances of the *Brāhmaṇas.* Often we can discern no special reason for the clearly expressed expectation of a certain result from a particular rite or incantation.

On the other hand, it would be an error to think of such cases as typical of philosophic magic in general. Much more often we can see very definite reasons for the association. If the *prāṇa*-hymn which we discust above[24] is used to attain long life, this is obviously because knowledge of the universal *prāṇa,* the life-breath of the cosmos, may naturally be expected to give the knower control over that "life-breath," and hence over its manifestation in himself, namely, his own "life-breath." Just so, times without number, in the Upaniṣads the name of the thing or concept known suggests the boon to be derived from the knowledge. Scores of examples could be quoted ; they occur on almost every page. It will suffice to refer to *Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2. 1, where e.g. in paragraphs 4 to 6 he who knows the "glorious" gets "glorious" offspring ; he who knows the "full and undeparting" is "filled" with offspring and cattle, and his offspring "do not depart" from this world (sc. before him) ; he who knows the "unconquerable" becomes himself "unconquerable." Sometimes the identification is made only by what we should call verbal distortions or bad puns ; but to the authors these are just as serious as what we might term sound "philological" identifications.

So far we have dealt with knowledge of special, limited

24. *AV.* 11. 4 ; see page 105.

subjects. It results, we have seen, in particular boons for the possessor, boons which are generally appropriate to the name or nature of the thing known. The essential idea is that "he who knows" any one thing, gets that thing, or something corresponding to it. But from this it is only a short step to the logical conclusion that if one could only know everything, he would thereby get—everything. Universal knowledge, omniscience, must be a short-cut to omnipotence, to the power of satisfying any desire. If what you know you control, then by knowing the all, you can control the all. If, then, a formula can be discovered which will provide you with the fundamental truth of all that is, the knowledge of that formula will make you master of the Universe. And specifically, in true *Brāhmaṇa* spirit, that formula is to be sought in a mystic identification. You must discover something which "is" the essence of the all : especially, if possible, something which you can control, so that thereby you can control everything.[25]

This is the secret of the famous "quest of the Upaniṣads" after a formulaic identification of something or other with the First Principle of the universe. The regular answer to the question : "With what shall we identify the one thing, by knowing which all is known ?" is "with the soul, *ātman,* of man." Obviously : for the one, whether it be called Brahman,[26] or the Existent (*sat*), the Real, or what-not, is naturally the essential self or "soul" (*ātman*) of the universe. If it is *ātman,* and my soul, my real self, is also *ātman* , then is not the mystic identification ready-made ? Just as the "life-breath" of the universe is the same as the "life-breath" of man, and by "knowing" the

25. Although the mere knowledge of a thing is enough to give you control over it, there is clearly a feeling that you strengthen your hold on it if you can identify it mystically with something over which you have more obvious power. This is exactly the notion underlying the identifications of the *Brāhmaṇas* ; see p. 99 above.

26. As so why it is so regularly called that, see below 116 f.

one you control the other.[27] And surely there is nothing which I control more perfectly than my own "self." If then I "know" that the Brahman, which is the *ātman* of the universe, is my own *ātman*, then not only do I control the fundamental principle of the universe, because knowledge is magic power ; but even more than that, I am the fundamental principle of the universe, by that mystic identification. For this double reason, there is nothing out of my control or beyond my grasp.

The *knowledge* of the One which is All, and its identification with the human soul, is then a short-cut to the satisfaction of all desires, the freedom from all fear and danger and sorrow. Just as knowledge of individual or partial truths gives to its possessor the individual and special boons appropriate to each partial truth, as in the passage quoted above, so knowledge that the one true essence of everything is my soul gives me control over everything.[28]

27. *AV.* 11. 4 ; above p. 105.

28. The passage in *BṛhU.* 2. 1, referred to above, p. 111, is very significant. In its famous conversation between Gārgya and Ajātaśatru, Gārgya proposes twelve different entities, one after another, as expressions for the Brahman, the cosmic One. Ajātaśatru denies that each in turn is the Brahman, but explains what is really is, and assigns a particular boon to the possessor of this knowledge. He then proceeds to give his own view of what the Brahman is in very truth ; namely, it is to be identified with the spirit or soul *(ātman)* in man, which in sound sleep is naturally united with the cosmic soul or Brahman, and which is "the real of the real". No statement is here found of the profit ensuing to one "who knows thus". But it is conceivable that *perfect* knowledge should have *no* practical reward, when inperfect and partial bits of knowledge have just been asserted to have each their appropriate rewards ? It seems clear that the omission is only due to the author's considering it so obvious as to need no statement. And this is confirmed by the occurrence elsewhere of the missing statement of the practical rewards for this knowledge. For the same doctrine is found in a much fuller and more perfect form in *BṛhU.* 4, 3 and 4. In 4. 3. 19 ff. we find the closest possible parallel to the latter part of 2. 1, with its identification

When and because I *know* that, I am identical with the

of the soul, particularly in its state of deep sleep, with the One. This is the soul's *true form*, in which all his desires are satisfied, in which he is *without desire and without sorrow* (21). And why is he so? Just because the soul is one with the One which is All, and therefore his senses cannot operate on anything, for there is no *object* on which they might operate—nothing outside of himself (29-31); this is this highest goal, the highest bliss, the *summum bonum* (32). To be sure, this state is attained permanently only after death, and then only by the soul "who has no desire" (4. 4. 6 = Madhy. 8). But who is this soul that "has no desire"? None other than be who *knows* the soul—*knows*, that is, the esoteric truth, that his *own soul* is one with the universal soul or Brahman. This is emphatically stated, over and over again, in the conclusion of this passage; note particularly 4. 4. 12 = Mādhy. 16. "If a person understands the soul (*ātman*), knowing 'I am He,' then desiring what, for the love of what, could he eling to the body?—12 = M. 7: "Who has found out and become awakened to this soul......he is the All-creator, for he creates everything; the world (or, heaven) in his; nay, he is tl e world (or, heaven) himself." That is, when he knows the world soul as himself, he controls it, which is the soul of everything and so controls everything; nay rather, he is everything. What wonder, then, that he can no longer have any desire? All his desires are thereby fulfilled. The conclusion of this passage, 4. 4 19-22 = Mādhy. 21-31, is a magnificent pacan of triumph celebrating the consummate perfection of bliss of the soul who attains this perfect knowledge. The whole passage deserves to be read in this connexion; I will quote only a few extracts: "Therefore, he who has this knowledge......sees only himself (his soul, *ātman*) in the self (the universal soul, *ātman*). He sees everything as the self; (Mādhy. adds. 'every one becomes his self, he becomes the selfof everyone;) he gets past all evil; evil cannot affect him; free from evil, from impurity (Mādhy., from old age), from doubt (Mādhy., from hunger and thirst), he becomes a *brāhmaṇa* (a varitable possessor of the Brahman), *who knows* thus!" And finally, at the very *end*: "This is that great unborn soul (*ātman*), free *from old age*, from death and from fear (or, danger), immortal—the Brahman. Fearless, verily, is Brahman. HE BECOMES THE FEARLESS BRAHMAN —WHO KNOWS THUS!"

One, which in the very nature of the case cannot be affected by any unsatisfied longing or by any evil or sorrow, because there is nothing outside or independent of me for which my senses and mind might long.[29]

The famous dictum of the identity of the human soul with the world-soul will now appear in a somewhat new light. People never tire of quoting the phrase "I am the Brahman" as a brilliant philosophical *apercu.* I am not here to deny that it deserves such praise. But I think its real meaning, and the rationale behind it, have never been quite understood. Its context has generally been neglected. The passage[30] where it occurs says : "Whoever *knows* that 'I am Brahman,' becomes this all", and later, "from that same self he (who knows this) *creates whatsoever he desires.*" That is, the possessor of this mystic knowledge can do whatever he pleases. That is obviously the very practical reason for knowing it. The idea is not so new as it has often been represented as being. It is essentially contained in the magical-philosophic hymns of the *Atharva Veda.*[31] It rests on the same basis as the doctrine that "he who knows the unconquerable one becomes unconquerable," and countless similar expressions throughout both the Upaniṣads and the older Vedic literature. The practical, magical benefits of such mystic knowledge are clearly stated in connexion with almost all similar expressions. The *Atharva Veda* passage which contains the very earliest occurrence of the word *ātman* in its philoso-

29. Cf. *BṛhU.* 1. 4. 2 ; 4. 3. 23-31.

30. *BṛhU.* 1. 4. 10 and 15, = Mādhyaṃdina 22, and 28.

31. *AV.* 10. 7. 41 (originally the concluding verse of the hymn to Skambha as First Principle ; so it still is in the Paippalāds, see Whitney's note *ad loc.)* clearly says that "He who knows" the First Principle, "he verily is the mystic Lord of Creatures," that is, he becomes the First Principle. And what he is to gain thereby is stated with equal clarity in *AV.* 9. 10. 24 ; "in his (the First Principle's) control are what has been and what is to be. He shall put in my control (because I know him) what has been and what is to be !"

phic sense takes pains to make clear the reason for knowing that *ātman*;[32] such a knower is possessed of all the qualities attributed to the soul of the universe. And the like is stated over and over again in the Upaniṣads.[33]

In the light of such passages we can understand better the true meaning of such a passage as the famous sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.[34] It sets out to find the one thing "by knowing which all is known." It is, explained as the "existent" (*sat*); it is in everything, and everything is in the last analysis nothing but that. It is moreover, mystically identified with the human soul: "What that subtle essence is, a state-of-having-that-as-its-essence is this universe, that is the real, that is the soul,

32. *AV.* 10. 8. 44: "The desireless. intelligent, immortal, self-existent, satisfied with contentment ('sap', *rasa*), not lacking in anything —*he who knows* this Soul, the intelligent, ageless, (ever) young, has no fear of death."

33. A few examples: *BṛhU.* 1. 5. 20=Mādhy. 29: "He who *knows* this becomes the Self of all beings. As is that divinity (the One), so is he. As all beings favour that divinity, so all beings favour him knows this. Whatsoever these creatures suffer, that remains with them alone. Only good reaches him. Evil, verily, does not reach gods." *BṛhU.* 4. 3. 37=Mādhy, 43: "All beings wait upon him who *knows* this, saying: 'Here comes the Brahman!" *ChU.* 7. 25. 2: "He who beholds, thinks on, *knows*, and enjoys only this (self, *ātman*)...is independent (self-ruling): he has unlimited freedom in all worlds. While they who know other-wise than this are dependent (ruled by others); their worlds are destructible; they have no freedom in all worlds." *ChU.* 8. 12. 6: "He obtains all worlds and all desires who *understands* that Self." *TU.* 2. 1: "He who *knows* Brahman...attains all desires." *TU* 2. 4: "Who *knows* the bliss of Brahman never fears anything." *AU.* 5. 4: "So he, having ascended on high from this world with that Self of *knowledge*, obtained all desires in that heavenly world, and became immortal." *MausU.* 1. 7.: "Whatever conquest is Brahman's, whatever attainment, even that conquest he conquers, that attainment he attains, who *knows* this." *MuṇḍU.* 3. 2. 9: "He who *knows* that supreme Brahman becomes Brahman itself....He is beyond sorrow, beyond evil. Freed from the knots of the heart, he becomes immortal."

34. *ChU.* 6.1.3.

that art thou (*tat tvam asi*) ;"[35] There is, to be sure, in this chapter no definite statement of the practical benefit to be gained by the "knowledge." Are we then to suppose that here is an isolated example of a "disinterested" philosopher, seeking nothing but the abstract truth for the pure joy of knowing it ? Let those believe it who may. For my part, such an opinion would seem to me strangely blind, in view of the overwhelming mass of contrary evidence. No : the philosopher of this passage seeks "knowledge" of the essence of the universe for the same reason that all the men of his time (and even of much later times in India) sought it ; because he believes that if he knows that One, and identifies it with his own true self, he can by that knowledge control all cosmic forces, and therefore his own destiny. His "that art thou" is motivated in the same way as the *Bṛhad Āraṇyaka's* "I am Brahman." He who *knows* that he is mystically the All, partakes of its essence, is at one with it, and therefore cannot be subject to any outside influence which might cause any fear, danger, sorrow, or unsatisfied desire. That for once the author does not say so in definite terms means only that to him it was a perfectly obvious matter of course.[36] It went without saying. It is really surprisingly lucky that practically all other similar passages do take the trouble to state it so definitely.

This belief in the power of knowledge gives us the clue to the employment of the term *brahman* as a name for the ultimate First Principle, about which there has been such endless discussion. Brahman means simply "holy knowledge", or, concretely, a Vedic hymn or incan-

35. *Ibid.* 6. 8. ff.

36. As in *BṛhU*. 2. 1 it is also not stated, but clearly must be understood, for the reasons explained in footnote 28, above. Apart from these two, I can find no other early Upaniṣad statement of this doctrine (the unity of the human soul with the world-principle) which does not make clear the "fruit" or benefit to be derived from knowing it. Certainly the Yājñavalkya dialogue, *BṛhU*, 2, is not an exception. It not only indicates

tation, that is, a concrete expression of this mystic wisdom ; the Vedic mind feels no difference between the abstract and the concrete sides of this concept. Moreover, all knowledge is, to the Vedic mind, holy, mysterious, religious or magical knowledge. It always possesses this magic power. The wise man and the priest or religious (magical) practitioner (*vipra, kāru, brahman* masc., etc.) are completely identical from the Vedic standpoint. Since knowledge means absolute, direct power, what is more natural than that the holy, mystic knowledge (*brahman*) of the universe should be half-personified as the First Principle, the Controller of the universe ? He who knows this, knows the essence of the cosmos, and so controls it ; in fact, upon the identification of this "soul" of the universe with the "soul" of man, he who has this knowledge is identical with it. It is natural that this Brahman, this holy knowledge of the universe, should appear at times, especially in the earliest texts in definitely personified forms, as the feminine Vāc, "Holy Utterance," or the masculine Bṛahaspati Brahmaṇas-pati, "the Lord of Holy Wisdom," both of which are well-known as expressions for the First Principle.[37] But in the philosophic hymns of the *Atharva Veda*, and in the similar passages of the *Brāhmaṇas*, it is the neuter Brahman itself which more regularly occupies this position, just as it does later in the Upaniṣads, alongside of more abstract expressions like "the Existent" (*sat*, also

at various points in its course (e. g. 3. 1 *passim*, see p. 102 above ; 3. 2. 12=Mādhy. 11 ; 3. 3. 2 ; 3. 5=Mādhy. 4 ; 3. 8. 10). that knowledge of its mysteries is to bring fruition of desires ; but it concludes with the climatic statement that "Understanding, bliss, the Brahman, the highest goal of the giver of bounty, belong to him who stands steadfast in *knowledge* of this" (3. 9. 28=Mādhy. 34).

37. So *ṚV.* 10. 125=*AV.* 4. 30 is a hymn to Vāc personified as the One ; and in *ṚV.* 10. 81. 7 the cosmic Viśvakarman, "the All -maker," is the Lord of Vāc, "Holy Utterance ;" cf. also *ṚV.* 10. 71 for a like treatment of Vāc. For Bṛhas-pati or Brahmaṇas-pati in the same role see *ṚV.* 10. 71. 1 ; 10. 72. 2.

known to the older texts). Let us remember the important and highly significant fact that in the *Atharva Veda* the regular meaning of the neuter *brahman* is "charm, incantations," that is, a hymn of the *Atharva Veda* itself, as an expression of mystic wisdom. How many times do the magic charms of the *Atharva Veda* allude to the power inherent in the incantation *(brahman)* to bring about the desired end, be it release from disease,[38] advancement over one's fellows,[39] injury to rivals,[40] or what-not ! The very first hymn of the *Atharva Veda* invokes the Lord of Holly Utterance, Vācas-pati, to abide in the Atharvan practitioner, that is, to endow him with the all-important mystic knowledge which is to enable him to gain any end he pleases. As we pointed out above, and as every Vedist knows, the word and the thing denoted are one to the Vedic mind ; he who knows the Holy Word knows the concept behind it, and controls it ; speech—knowledge. And it is because of the all-embracing power of knowledge that the Brahman, Holy Knowledge, *alias* the power of its concrete expression the magic charm, is already in the *Atharva Veda*, and remains for all later time, a favourite expression for the supreme power of the universe.

SUMMARY

The Upaniṣads, then, seek to know the real truth about the universe, not for its own sake ; not for the mere joy of knowledge ; not as an abstract speculation ; but simply because they conceive such knowledge as a short-cut to the control of every cosmic power. The possessor of such knowledge will be in a position to satisfy his any desire. He will be free from old age and death, from danger and sorrow, from all the ills that

38. E. g. 2. 10. 1.
39. 1. 9. 3.
40. 1. 14. 4,

flesh is heir to. By knowledge of the One which is All, and by mystically identifying his own self with that One which is All, he has, like that One, the All in his control. Knowledge, true esoteric knowledge, is the magic key to omnipotence, absolute power. By it one becomes autonomous.[41] From the Upaniṣads this idea was inherited by the later Hindu systems, such as the Vedānta and the epic and classical Sāṅkhya, which regard true knowledge as the key to man's salvation, as giving man *ipso facto* control of his destiny. But it is the earlier, rather than the later, history of the idea which has been our chief concern here. It has been shown that it is identical with the belief in the magic power of knowledge which is such a commonplace in the *Brāhmaṇas*, and above all in the *Atharva Veda.* It is of the essence of Atharvan magic practice that by knowledge of any entity, directly and magically. Precisely for this reason the *Atharva Veda* is the particular home of Vedic philosophy, which is simply an attempt to gain at one stroke all possible human ends, by *knowing*, once for all, the essential truth of the entire cosmos. If *all* can be know at once, and especially if it can be mystically identified with one's own "soul," one's very self, then all will be controlled, and there will be no need of half-way measures ; no need of attempting by magic to gain this or that special desideratum. That such minor, special desiderata are, in spite of this, frequently sought in the Upaniṣads, just as in the *Atharva Veda*, and that too generally by means of mystic knowledge, is natural enough, and is only an additional confirmation of the fact that the spheres of the Upaniṣads and of the *Atharva Veda* are identical. Finally, the Brahman, as an expression for the supreme power of the universe, is simply this same magic knowledge ; its concrete manifestation is an Atharvan incantation.

41. *Svarāj*, *ChU.* 7. 25. 2.

EPILOG

It is impossible here to attempt to trace the history of this idea of the magic power of knowledge in countries outside of India. The subject is much too vast. I may, however, point out that, as I have remarked elsewhere,[42] the same notion prevailed in Europe down to quite modern times. In Robert Greene's play, *Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay*, produced in England at the end of the sixteenth century, we find it in full force. Roger Bacon, the greatest of medieval English scholars, is there represented simply as a mighty magician, and a contest between him and a rival German scholar resolves itself into a mere test of their powers of necromancy. Shakespeare's *Tempest* shows the same thing; Prospero, the scholar, is, as a matter of course, a magician. In short, knowledge meant primarily magic power. The ordinary man could hardly conceive the pursuit of knowledge for any other reason. Roger Bacon himself may perhaps have had a different point of view; whether he was completely free from the popular ideas of his time, I doubt. But he was, in any case, an exceptional man, intellectually far in advance of his time.

In India, likewise, the more advanced thinkers gradually freed their speculations from the common aims of what we think of as sorcery. With the passage of time, we can see what might be called a gradual spiritualization of the notion of the magic power of knowledge. This is marked by a change in the objects commonly sought. There is a tendency to neglect the cruder, lower, human interests as ends to be attained by esoteric wisdom. The Upaniṣads, like the *Atharva Veda*, are still interested in quite ordinary, often all-to-human ends. Not only heavenly worlds, and freedom from old age and death, from danger

42. In my book on *The Bhagavad Gītā*, Chicago, Open Court, 1925, p. 6. f.—Much might also be said of the views of the early Gnostics in this connexion.

and sorrow, but also worldly riches, conquering of enemies, sexual enjoyment, in short, all kinds of human desires are sought by them thru mystic wisdom. But if we examine even such a comparatively early text as the *Bhagavad Gītā,* we shall hardly find there traces of the magical use of knowledge for what we might call trivial, worldly ends.[43] Nor do the best of the later systems attach much primary importance to such matters. The method is the same; but after all it does make a difference to what purposes it is applied. To be sure, some later Indian systems refer to *Mahāsiddhis*, supernatural powers, as incidental benefits to be gained by the adept while he is progressing towards the final goal.[44] And we must not forget that the very word for knowledge, *vidyā*, means in classical Sanskrit also "magic". But the later philosophic systems in their highest moods make it clear that, while magic powers do indeed come with superior knowledge, they are quite unimportant. So far from being worthy ends in themselves, they are beneath the notice of the truly wise, who must seek only final salvation. For him who has that in his grasp, those lower aims simply cease to exist.

But the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the later systems, in so far as they follow the "way of knowledge",[45] agree with the thinkers of the Upaniṣads in their practical attitude towards speculation. They all seek the truth, not because of its abstract interest, but because in some sense or other they think that he who realizes the truth about man's place in the universe has *ipso facto*, directly, and by virtue of that knowledge, freed himself from all the troubles of life; in short, attained the *summum bonum*,

43. The *Gītā*, by the way, prefers the "way of disciplined activity" *(yoga)* to the "way of knowledge" *(sāṃkhya)*, tho it admits the validity of both. See footnote 23, above.
44. These include such things as the powers of levitation, of making oneself indefinitely large or small, etc.
45. See footnotes 23 and 43.

whatever they conceive that to be. They are primarily religious rather than abstractly philosophical. And the historic origin of their attitude, in primitive ideas about the magic power of knowledge, is still perfectly clear in them, altho they sought to apply that power to loftier aims than their early predecessors did.[46]

I would not, however, be understood as minimizing the philosophic importance or the intellectual interest even of Vedic and Upanisadic thought. Some of the thinkers of those times show very keen mental powers. At their best their ideas strike every one as brilliant and fascinating. My admiration for them is warm and sincere. All I have tried to do is to sketch the intellectual background of the age in which they lived. They were children of that age; how could they be otherwise? The case is analogous to the humanization of the *Ṛgveda* by the modern school of Vedists, typified by my teacher Maurice Bloomfield, whose recent loss we mourn so deeply. He, perhaps more than any other, has taught us that the Ṛgvedic hymns are the work not of naively poetic dreamers raptly admiring the loveliness of the world about them, or meditating abstractedly on the grandeur of their gods, but of extremely practical professional priests, whose thoughts in these hymns never stray for long from the technical details of their ritual performances. But that does not mean that no poetry is left in the Ṛgveda. A practical priest, with one eye fixed on his professional interests, may and often does have the other eye open to impressions of beauty in nature. In the same way we can still do full justice to the magnificence of not a few

46. It need hardly be said that all the higher forms of religion are recognized by every intelligent student and containing inheritances from very primitive times. Scholars who as well aware of this historic fact are not thereby prevented from remaining true to the religion they hold. In the same way a recognition of the historic origin of Śaṃkara's doctrine of salvation by knowledge need not imply a doubt of its philosophic validity. That is a question with which I am not concerned.

speculative passages in the Vedas and Upaniṣads, even tho we must recognize that these philosophers had very definite practical ends in view in seeking truth.

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UDDĀLAKA AND YĀJÑAVALKYA : MATERIALISM & IDEALISM

Walter Ruben

The problem of when and how philosophy in India began is of great importance. In 1954, I started the theory that the first Indian philosopher was Uddālaka Āruṇi in *Ch. Up.* vi.[1] According to my interpretation, he was a hylozoist, which means a primitive materialist. Such an interpretation must provoke criticism, because it seems at first sight impossible and is in contrast to all tradition that in the ancient Upaniṣads the doctrine of a materialist has been preserved.[2] In 1955, I published a German translation of this chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* along with other chapters from some other ancient Upaniṣads, e.g. of Yājñavalkya in *Bṛ. Up.* iii-iv.[3] In 1961, I wrote finally a paper about "the beginning of rational thinking in India",[4] describing how the fight between materialism and idealism—between Uddālaka and Yājñavalkya—began in ancient India when a few and small Indian states in the Ganges-valley had been just founded in the iron-age in contrast to the mass of tribes, when class-struggle was beginning, when accordingly,

1. W. Ruben, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, Berlin 1954, 87 *seq.;* in my previous book, *Die Philosophen der Upanishaden*, Bern. 1947, 156 *seq.*, I had called him a realist.
2. Cf. my review of a book *Die schosten Upanishaden* (German translation of *The Upanishads, Breath of Eternal* of the Vedanta Press in Hollywood) in *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*, 1953 Nr. 9/10, p. 462.
3. W. Ruben, *Beginn der Philosophie in Indien*, Berlin 1955, 167 seq.
4. W. Ruben, *L'origine de la pensee rationelle dans l'Inde, La Pansee*, revue du rationalism moderne, no. 99, Sept.-Oct. 1961, 75 seq.

ideological competition started, visible to us in the discussions between Vedic ritualists and their opponents—as, e.g., some hermits in the forests—when others, as the Vedic ritualistic intellectuals, started opposing Indra, criticising him as a brahmicide, or when some critics attacked the main mythological teachings of the epic as regards the war of the Vedic gods against the demons. There is already recognisable some clash between Brahmins and Kṣatriyas ; enlightened Brahmins like Yājñavalkya, Uṣasti, etc. protested against orthodox ritualism with its old tabus. Sciences like medicine started fighting against religion, physicists against Brahmins ; astronomy, geography, law, state-doctrine etc. began ; discussions became characteristic of this new period of ancient Indian history, doubt was in fashion in all fields of consciousness, and only then the fight between materialism and idealism began on the basis of all this social and ideological struggle, especially after scientific thinking had begun, although the sciences were not yet fully developed. Uddālaka shows in his philosophy this new scientific type of thinking in his ways of arguing and proving his doctrines with reasonings and analogies, as a forerunner of later logicians who developed the analyses of *anumāna*, *dṛṣṭānta*, etc.

If Uddālaka was a hylozoist (primitive materialist) and the oldest Indian philosopher, as I argued, then he stands side by side with the oldest Greek philosopher, Thales, who also was a hylozoist and lived only a short time after Uddālaka. Perhaps Chinese philosophy also began in nearly the same period of the history of mankind with a similar type of materialism.[5] Thus, the world-history of philosophy might come to the conclusion that philosophy and materialism had to begin with such steps of development, there being no other traditions of philosophy than

5. It seems that the Chinese materialistic conception of tao was developed from something similar to *ṛta*. (Cf. Jang Ching-Schun, *Der chinesische Philosophie Laudse und seine Lehre*, Berlin, 1955).

those of India, China and Europe. Side by side with the types of Indian hylozoism—as that of Thales (water), Anaximenes (air) and Heraclitus (fire)—mankind has developed the Indian and perhaps Chinese types, and comparing and contrasting all these hylozoist-materialisms, our historians of philosophy will one day come to a proper and comprehensive definition of hylozoism and its rôle in the development of philosophy, namely as the first or one of the first primitive forms of materialism. In similar ways Yājñavalkya's idealism is to be compared and contrasted with Greek idealism of the Eleatics—Parmenides etc.—and the oldest Chinese idealism. In this way, the general history of philosophy helps the Indologist to understand the history of philosophy of India, while at the same time the Indologist with his interpretation of Indian materials enriches the general history of philosophy, which is the highest possible theory of history of all the different philosophies.

But was Uddālaka's doctrine really hylozoist-materialism ? My revered teacher Herman Jacobi was the first to maintain that Uddālaka taught some materialistic elements. He started from the struggle between the later Sāṃkhyas who claimed that the *sat* of Uddālaka was matter (*prakṛti*) while later Vedantins interpreted it as *brahman*.[6] Jacobi stressed the point that in Vedic mentality the distinction between mind and matter was not yet quite clear and he illustrated this fact with the help of Uddālaka's text in whose cosmogony, *sat*, *tejas* etc. were thinking and willing. Although, thus, in Uddālaka's teaching the material elements were living, although, moreover, the distinction between matter and mind was not yet quite clear, he maintained that Uddālaka's doctrine was basically materialistic.[7]

In 1940, H. V. Glasenapp quoted Uddālaka's philosophy

6. In *Festschrift Kuhn*, Breslau 1916, 37 seq.
7. H. Jacobi, *Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern*, Bonn 1923, 11 *seq.*; and *Das Licht des Ostens*, ed. by Maximilian Kern, Stuttgart-Berlin-Leipzig, p. 146 seq.

with the same intention in order to show that the ancient Indians did not distinguish between mind and matter.[8] But in 1949 he criticised Jacobi, maintaining that this doctrine could not be labelled as materialistic philosophy because the distinction between mind and matter was not clear in that ancient period.[9] This is the reason why I, in 1954, characterised Uddālaka as hylozoist, which just means that according to his philosophy, matter was living and thinking indeed. Glasenapp, in 1954 and 1956 attacked my interpretation without adding new arguments.[10] The problem is, accordingly, whether hylozoism is to be regarded as materialism or idealism (pantheism). In 1961 Dale Riepe, following my interpretation, characterised Uddālaka's philosophy as "a hylozoist and perhaps even materialistic" view of the world.[11] On the other hand, E. Zeller characterised Thales as early as 1851 as "pantheistic hylozoist", stressing the point that in accordance with the old fantastic interpretation of nature which everywhere preceded science, Thales thought everything to be living,[12] and the cosmos to be ensouled and full of spirits,[13] but that he did not teach the doctrine of a world-soul. Correspondingly, H. Jacobi already had observed that *brahman* was not mentioned in Uddālaka's philosophy.[14]

8. H. V. Glasenapp, *Entwickhuugsstufen des indischen Denkens*, Halle 1940, 289 seq.
9. H. V. Glasenapp, *Die Philosophie der Inder*, Stuttgart 1949, 126.
10. H. V. Glasenapp, *Der indische Materialismus*, Asiatische Studien 8, 1954, and his review of my book in ZDMG 1956, 230.
11. Dale Riepe, *The Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought*; Seattle 1961, 29. Cf. E. Frauwallner, *Indische Philosophie* I, Salzburg 1953, 90, about Uddālaka's cosmogony: it is not of the kind of an idealistic doctrine.
12. E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* I, 1 (7th edition, Leipzig, 1923. 265 seq.)
13. H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* I (3rd edition, Berlin, 1912) frgm. A 1 37 (Diogenes Laertius) and A 23 (Aetius).
14. Jacobi *loc. cit.* 1923, 13.

In this regard Uddālaka is similar to Thales, both being hylozoists, not idealist, but rather primitive materialists.

When Jacobi and Glasenapp underlined the fact that in those old times mind and matter were not clearly distinguished, Glasenapp himself quoted Yājñavalkya describing *ātman* as mind, as *vijñānaghana*, *vijñānamayapuruṣa* etc. in contrast to all other things,[15]—contrasting, thus, matter and mind as a full-fledged idealist. There is, on the other hand, in his idealism this link between mind and matter that mind is the origin of matter, as Glasenapp also held. But this thesis of Yājñavalkya does not, as Glasenapp pretends, involve that at that period the distinction between mind and matter was not yet perfect and that, therefore, one cannot differentiate between the idealism of Yājñavalkya and the materialism of Uddālaka. On the contrary, the doctrine that mind is the primary reality and matter the secondary one is typical for idealism while materialism regards nature as the primary one.[16] The doctrine of *māyā* and *vivarta* is not yet to be found in Yājñavalkya's philosophy, indeed, in so far as his idealism is still primitive, just as Uddālaka's materialism is. Everything was just developing, and what we find in the ancient Upaniṣads is just the beginning of philosophy in its two antagonistic forms, materialism and idealism.

Let us now compare and contrast both these thinkers in some details in order to show their difference in materialistic and idealistic thinking. Both, being contemporaneous, deal to a great extent with similar topics which were eminently important for the Brahmanical thinkers of that old period ; but both do so in different ways.

1. Death

Uddālaka describes a dying man,—how he loses first his mind (the faculty of recognising his relatives), then his

15. H. V. Glasenapp *loccit.* 1940, 321.
16. V. I. Lenin, *Materialismus* und *Emperiokritizismus*, Berlin, 1949, 88.

speech, after that his breath and finally, his warmth. This is quite a rational description of death based on sound observation. It is, at the same time, in fairly good—but not quite perfect—concordance with Uddālaka's cosmogony, according to which out of *sat* developed *tejaḥ*, *apaḥ* and *annam*; *annam* becoming mind, *apaḥ* breath, and *tejaḥ* speech. He does not mention an eternal soul or the doctrine of *karman* in his chapter on death. Mind, speech, breath and warmth enter *sat*, *sat* being the ultimate or first living material which is eternal, and is truth: *tat tvam asi.*

Yājñavalkya, on the other hand, deals with the problem of death in several places. He teaches first how a man can become free from death by the help of Vedic priests, climbing up to heaven (*Bṛ. Up.* iii. 1, 3-6). He teaches then how the body of a dying man dissolves into earth etc., the mind enters the moon, eye the sun, breath the wind, speech the fire etc., but he adds, man himself,—his eternal soul,—is following the way of *karman* (*Bṛ. Up.* iii. 2, 13). Yājñavalkya gives later on a hint that after death man's soul goes to Indra in the heart, the soul being indestructible (*Bṛ. Up.* iii. 2). He teaches finally how the soul (*puruṣa*) leaves the weakening body like a ripe fruit leaving the tree, and turns to its origin, the *ātman.* Just as a king leaves a village, accompained by warriors, judges etc., the soul is accompanied by the *prāṇas* and enters the heart together with them. When then the eye leaves for the sun, the *puruṣa* and enters the heart together with them. When then the eye leaves for the sun, the *puruṣa* does not see any longer,—he does not smell, taste, speak, think, etc. Together with the *prāṇas* he leaves the body, guided by his knowledge and *karman* in order to be reborn or to reach *mokṣa* (*Bṛ. Up.* iv. 3, 35 seq.).

Uddālaka observed rationalistically how thinking (recognising) of a dying man, speaking and breathing stop one after another and how the body finally becomes cold.

Yājñavalkya also taught that all the faculties of seeing, smelling, tasting, speaking, hearing, thinking, touching and knowing of a dying man disappear. But while Uddālaka observed death with commonsense or even with the eyes of a physician, Yājñavalkya had no such scholarly interest but enumerated all faculties from seeing to knowing, regarding this only as a minor point, and described with much details the wandering of the eternal soul first into the heart and then out of the body, a wandering which he had never observed. He did not care for proper observation which can be controlled by everybody. His main interest was a religious one, not scientific. He was an idealist in contrast to the materialist Uddālaka.

Uddālaka next described a dying tree, which is being felled. The *rasa* leaves one bough after the other and finally the whole tree ; he adds the *rasa* does not die. This life is *satya (Ch. Up.* vi. 11). According to Uddālaka, water *(apaḥ)* is life or breath *(prāṇa) (Ch. Up.* vi. 5, 2), and a man while fasting is obliged to drink water in order to preserve his life *(Ch. Up.* vi. 7, 1). The *rasa* of the tree is some kind of water and is at the same time the life of the tree. When a bough is cut, *rasa* and life leave it ; but *rasa* or life is not destroyed but goes on existing in the *sat* into which it has gone after the death of the tree. *Sat* is living matter, it is eternal according to this hylozoism.

Yājñavalkya also described at the end of his long discussion the death of a tree, comparing the tree with the body of a man, especially the *rasa* with the blood, coming out of a wounded tree, tree and body, respectively *(Bṛ. Up.* iii. 9, 28 *śloka* 2). But his interest is not focussed on the *rasa.* He cares for the fact that a tree, when felled, is growing again from its root. Only if the root is destroyed, the tree cannot grow again. He asks his adversaries in the discussion : What corresponds to this growing again of the tree out of its root as regards a man ? He also knows the answer : Rebirth out of *brahman.*

Here again the difference between Yājñavalkya's religious intention and Uddālaka's materialism becomes clear.

Yājñavalkya in another place maintains that at death blood and semen enter water, just as the body enters earth (*Bṛ. Up.* iii. 2, 13), when the soul follows the ways of *karman*, whilst Uddālaka taught that the ultimate living material into which the decaying body enters is eternal. Yājñavalkya taught that the individual body dissolves in the dead material which might be eternal, but the individual soul is what matters, being born again and again according to *karman*. Here again the religious idea of rebirth prevails in the doctrine of Yājñavalkya.

And his idealism becomes also clear in another place where he teaches that the heart is the base on which the semen is founded just as water is based on the semen and as Varuṇa, the protector of the western region, is based on water. In similar ways the other human faculties, like seeing etc., are based on the respective objects, the forms etc., which are founded in the heart, the faculties being on the other hand the base for a respective goddes in one of the different regions. Thus the heart is the ultimate base of the world,—the subjective heart being the base of the objective forms etc.—which is an idealistic outlook.

In order to persuade his opponent Yājñavalkya adds that people, regarding a son who similar to his father, say that he has come out of the heart of his father. This custom proves, he pretends, that the semen descends from the heart (*Bṛ. Up.* iii. 9, 21). But this cannot prove the doctrine that water is based on semen, Varuṇa on water in the western region,—in short, the idealism of Yājñavalkya cannot be proved in this way.

2. Sleep

Uddālaka interprets sleep (*svapna*) with the help of an etymology as *svam apitaḥ* : a sleeping man is gone into himself.

He illustrates this fanciful etymology with the example of a bird which flies all around and finaly sits down at the place of its binding. It seems that a falcon is ment which is bound to some place as long as it is not used for hunting. Thus, Uddālaka goes on, the *manas* flies all around till it sits down at its binding place, the breath (*Ch. Up.* vi. 8, 1-2). This means : The mind of a person awake wanders from object to object till the man gets tired, then *manas* comes back into the man (*svam apitaḥ*) and settles on the breath. A sleeping man does not think indeed, but his breath goes on. Without breath there can be no thinking, as all the so-called magicians of the doctrine of breath-wind[17] had shown. Breath binds mind to body according to Uddālaka.

This doctrine reminds us of the discussion between Yājñavalkya and Uddālaka where Uddālaka asks for the string which binds this world and the world beyond and all beings together, and Yājñavalkya answers : This string is the wind (*Bṛ. Up.* iii. 7, 1-2). Uddālaka agrees to this answer. Wind and breath were regarded as the ultimate realities in macro-and-micro-cosms by the above-mentioned magicians of wind and breath, and Uddālaka was closely related to their way of thinking.[18] Yājñavalkya in this case answered the question of his opponent according to what he knew of his,—i. e. Uddālaka's-conception of the importance of the binding wind-breath. But Yājñavalkya's own doctrine of sleep was quite different from that of Uddālaka.

Uddālaka imagined *manas* when awake as migrating out of the body and when it falls asleep returning into it, into *svam*, that is into *ātman* into the Self, *svam ātmānam* meaning body in this hylozoist-materialistic theory in concordance with the very old conception that the self is the body.[19]

17. About these representatives of the Vāyu-prāṇa-doctrine cf. W. Ruben, *loc. cit.* 1954, 80 and 84 *seq.*
18. But he regards *prāṇa* as a product of *āpaḥ*.
19. P. Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, I, 1 (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1920), 285, *seq.*, 326 *seq.*

Yājñavalkya, on the other hand, spoke also in connection with sleep of the bird, of an eagle or falcon which, out of fatigue, sits down. Similarly he goes on, the *puruṣa* hurries to the *antaḥ* where he sees no dream (*Bṛ. Up.* iv. 3, 19). The *manas* in Uddālaka's doctrine wanders outside the body in order to come into contact with reality to get proper knowledge. But the *puruṣa* in Yājñavalkya's theory wanders to a region far away from the body in dream and sleep in order to enjoy freedom of the objective world of daily life. This difference marks again the difference between materialism and idealism.

This *antaḥ* (end) of sleep is opposed to the *antaḥ* of being awake (*ib.* 18), and the *puruṣa* wanders along both *antaḥ* just as a fish swims along both sides of a river. The *antaḥ*-s are also called *loka*-s (worlds) or *sthāna*-s (places), and there is a third *sthāna*, the region of dreams, which connects the two other *sthāna*-s. Standing in third dream-place, the *puruṣa* looks at both the worlds, the world of suffering here and that of bliss beyond. And when he falls asleep, he creates with the material which he takes from this world the objects in the world of dreams-chariots, lakes, rivers, rejoicings, etc. On this occasion Yājñavalkya quotes some stanzas which deal with the phenomenon of dream in somewhat other ways. They have a shamanistic outlook. According to them the soul of a sleeping man leaves the body, does not fall asleep itself, looks at the sleeping body, which is protected by breath, roams around as it wants, being eternal, the golden man, the single swan (*ib.* 11-12). So far this theory of sleep and dream is in full concordance with primitive shamanistic ideas which are well-known from Central Asia, etc.[20] According to them mind or soul leaves the body in contrast to Uddālaka's conception that in sleep mind comes back into the body.

Then the next stanza goes on: In sleep he creates many forms, enjoying women, eating or seeing dangers

20. Cf. Ruben in *Acta Orientalia* xviii, 191 *seq.*

(*ib.* 13). This corresponds with Yājñavalkya's idealistic conception of the *puruṣa* creating in dream rivers etc., which is also in complete contrast to Uddālaka's description of sleep which looks very realistic, in correspondence with his general contrast of the materialism with Yājñavalkya's idealism.

Uddālaka later on describes how a man, falling asleep,[21] enters *sat* and becomes unaware of his individuality, just as the *rasa*-s of different flowers lose their identity and the knowledge of it when they become one and the same mass of honey. But when the man awakes he gets back his individuality and its consciousness. Just as rivers become united in the ocean and (by evaporation and rainfall) come out of the ocean[22] again without being conscious of having been united and having forgotten their individuality during their stay in the ocean, thus men also, when awakened, do not remember that they have been in sleep united in *sat*, losing their individuality and its consciousness (*Ch. Up.* vi, 9-10).

Correspondingly, Yājñavalkya taught that in sleep a father becomes a non-father, a mother a non-mother, worlds become non-worlds, gods non-gods, Vedas non-Vedas, the thief a non-thief and in the same way a murderer of an embryo, a Cāṇḍāla, a Paulkasa, a *śramaṇa* and a *tāpasa* lose their identity (*Bṛ. Up.* iv. 3, 22), because in sleep there is neither good nor evil. This stressing of the moral aspect is missing in Uddālaka's teaching of sleep whilst Yājñavalkya is interested in describing sleep as something happy, free from the sufferings of this world. He goes on : Sleeping, one does not see anything, but seeing itself (or rather the faculty of seeing) goes on being a faculty of the eternal subject which in sleep does not practically see, because there is no object

21. I follow Deussen in contrast to Jacobi (*loc. cit.* 1923, 10 : death).
22. Yājñavalkya uses the term *ekāyana* in Bṛ. Up. iv. 5. 12 for the organ of sense.

to be seen. The same holds true for all the other faculties—of smelling, tasting, speaking, hearing, thinking, touching and recognising. When the subject in this way stands alone without an object, it is in the stage of the *brahman*-world, the highest bliss (*ib.* 23-33). Here again the idealism of Yājñavalkya is obvious: In sleep not only the subjective activities and characters of men disappear but also the objective world and the Vedas; of course they are extinct for the sleeping man only, but Yājñavalkya omits to make this restriction clear. Idealism is quite overt in Yājñavalkya's views of the eternal soul as eternally seeing etc. Here again one observes the idealistic escapism of Yājñavalkya, for whom the highest bliss is to be free from this world, a point totally absent in Uddālaka's materialism.

3. Mind

This materialism is further expressed in Uddālaka's doctrine that mind is becoming out of food just as breath (life) out of water and speech out of fire (*Ch. Up.* vi. 5). It was common among the old thinkers to identify speech with fire and breath (life) with water. But to claim that mind is food was something stupendous. It was the climax of this text of Uddālaka teaching his son Śvetaketu (*Ch. Up.* vi. 1-7) and he felt the necessity to prove this thesis. Therefore, he used the churning of milk as analogy to human digestion: just as milk is separated in three parts, food becomes threefold—its finest parts become mind, the middle ones flesh, the coarsest ones excrements. And finally he made his son undergo the experiment of fasting in order to show that drinking water keeps him alive but avoiding food makes him lose his thinking (rather memory). When he eats again, his knowledge, his mind, comes back, as we would say, or his mind is re-created by food, as Uddālaka taught. This conception reminds us of the later Sāṃkhy ideas according to which *buddhi* is the first product of *prakṛti*. But in Sāṃkhya *buddhi* works only in connection with soul (*puruṣa*), while

in Uddālaka's materialism there is no *puruṣa*, no eternal soul as the ultimate and only subject.

Yājñavalkya, on the other hand, identified *ātman* with *brahman* and mind, breath, seeing, hearing, earth, water, wind, etc. (*Bṛ*. *Up*. iv. 3, 5) in concordance with his radical idealism, according to which the spiritual soul is the ultimate reality. He agreed in this respect with Śāṇḍilya who declared *brahman* to consist of mind *(Ch. Up*. iii. 14, 2*)*, with Satyakāma who identified one sixteenth of *brahman* with mind (*Ch. Up*. iv. 8, 3) or mind with *brahman*, as Yājñavalkya quoted him *(Bṛ Up*. iv. 1, 6) and with the anonymous idealist of *Ch. Up*. iii. 18, 1. On another occasion Yājñavalkya taught that the mind of a dying man went to the moon (*Bṛ*. *Up*. iii. 2, 13) in agreement with the teaching of one of the breath-wind magician in *Bṛ*. *Up*. i. 3, 16. Perhaps Yājñavalkya in this context understood mind as the material base of thinking in the body. At all events he once stressed the point that there is inside mind the real subject, the *antaryāmin*, who is governing not only mind but also breath, speech, seeing, hearing, knowing, semen, earth, water, fire, air, wind, heaven, sun moon, stars, all beings, in short, the whole world (*Bṛ Up*. iii. 7, 3 seq.). This subject is the unseen seer, the unthought thinker, i.e. the absolute subject, the only thinker besides whom there is no other thinker. Yājñavalkya confessed that this ultimate subject cannot be recognised. Quite in contrast to Uddālaka he did not strive to prove the existence and power of this spiritual subject. And, it is remarkable that he described this subject just in his discussion with Uddālaka who had heard of such a 'governor of the whole world from inside' from a demon who had taken possession of a woman. Uddālaka listened to the unproved description of this *antaryāmin* which was in sharp contrast to his own hylozoistic conception of mind being created out of matter in the form of food, and he kept silent at the end. The author, an idealist of this discussion, did not dare to make Uddālaka accept this idealistic reli-

gious doctrine of Yājñavalkya, but he avoided also to maintain Uddālaka's repudiation of it.

In his discussion with Uṣasta, one of the breath-wind magicians, Yājñavalkya also referred to this unknowable subject: You cannot think the thinker of the thinking (*Bṛ. Up.* 4, 2.) and he called this unknowable subject the *akṣaram* (*ib.* 8, 11) which is *ātman-brahman*. Knowing (of the supreme existence of) this innermost *ātman*, real Brahmins give up all desire for practical success, reach childhood beyond all learning and become silent (*Bṛ. Up.* iii. 5). In this way Yājñavalkya connects his agnostic doctrine of the ultimate reality of this only and unthinkable subject with his highest goal of world-detesting pessimism which stands in contrast to Uddālaka's materialism.

4. *Monism.*

Uddālaka wants to teach his pupil the one real which, being known, makes everything known, and this reality is the *sat*. He illustrates this monism with the examples of clay which being known make all pots known, of copper and iron which being known make all products of these metals known. Knowledge of matter, of *sat*, is the goal of this materialistic monism. As proof he gives illustrations from well-known handicrafts in Indian villages (*Ch. Up.* vi. 1).

Yājñavalkya, on the other hand, when he taught his beloved Maitreyī, declared that the main object of his philosophy was *ātman*. By seeing, hearing, thinking and understanding *ātman* all is known (*Bṛ. Up.* iv. 5, 6). Everything, the Brahmin-caste, the Kṣatriya-caste, the worlds, the gods, the Vedas, all beings are in *ātman*. Just as when a drum is beaten, the drum might be grasped but not the sounds outside the drum, in the same way the *ātman* should be grasped and then all the worlds, gods, Vedas, beings, etc. are grasped. The conch-shell and the sounds resulting from its blowing, and the *vīṇā* and her sounds are other examples given by Yājñavalkya in this connection, being three altogether, just as Uddālaka had given three illustrations for his monism (*Bṛ. Up.* iv. 5, 8-10).

Here again the idealism of Yājñavalkya stands in contrast to the materialism of Uddālaka. The illustration of clay, copper and iron is easily understood; but that of the sounds is strange. What the average man sees, observes and knows is the objective world (which corresponds to the sounds), and Yājñavalkya has himself on several occasions pointed out that it is impossible to know, see, hear etc. the ultimate subject, the *ātman-brahman* (which corresponds to the drum etc.). But here he pretends that knowledge of the *ātman* makes all the world known.

Uddālaka so understood his materialistic monism that he was not satisfied in maintaining only that it is sufficient to know *sat* the ultimate material; he moreover worked hard to teach his pupil how primary matter became the objective world of sun, moon, lightning and fire, of all the different things with their names and forms, of the human body, breath, mind etc.; how sleep, hunger, thirst and even an ordeal and teaching worked. In short he taught an encyclopaedic materialistic monism.

Yājñavalkya, on the other hand, turned again and again to *ātman-brahman* although he knew that it was impossible to know it. When asked, he could answer to a lot of questions as regards the phenomena of the world, but his main interest was, in contrast to Uddālaka, not to explain the becoming of the world but to become free from the world.

Correspondingly Uddālaka maintained that the world, being nothing else than a transformation of *sat*, was eternal and the *sat* could not develop out of an *asat*, because this was unthinkable (*Ch. Up.* vi. 2, 2). Today we would formulate: *sat* is according to definition being, not becoming out of something else, out of *asat*.

Yājñavalkya maintained quite the same as regards *ātman*. He is eternal, he is born without a birth in a *saṃsāra*, without any beginning and even in so called rebirth he cannot be born again (*Bṛ. Up.* iii. 9, 28, 7). Reborn

is *ātman* only insofar as he received a new body. The progressive modern scientist agrees with Uddālaka that matter is eternal, without beginning and always changing its form. But he cannot understand Yājñavalkya who teaches religion rather than scientific philosophy.

Uddālaka in his philosophy does not deal with problems of rebirth, of an eternal soul, *karman* or *mokṣa*. With scholarly observation and understandable examples, he tries to convince his pupil to accept his materialistic hylozoist monism, quite in contrast to Yājñavalkya's idealism which is founded on introspection and the tradition of shamanism which was certainly living in prehistoric India and developed into *yoga*. Thus, it is possible to show the fundamental difference between the materialism of Uddālaka and the idealism of Yājñavalkya, but insofar as hylozoism to a great extent looks similar to pantheism, the redactors of the *Chāndogyopaniṣat* accepted this materialistic philosophy into their idealistic-religious text-book and preserved this highly valuable document of old thinking.

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A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE PŪRVA-MĪMĀṂSĀ

P. V. Kane

......The word Mīmāṃsā goes very far into antiquity. In the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*[1] it is said 'the expounders of Brahma discuss (the question) whether (a day) should be omitted or not; on this (they) say that it must be left out. 'Here the word *mīmāṃsante*' is used in the sense of investigating a doubtful point and arriving at a conclusion thereon. In numerous other places similar doubtful points introduced by the words 'the expounders of *brahma* say' are put forward without employing the word '*mīmāṃsante*' (e. g. *Tai. S.* II. 5. 3. 7). In the *Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa* we read 'one should not discuss the merits of a Brāhmaṇa.'[2] In another passage of the same *Brāhmaṇa*, the form '*mīmāṃseran*' occurs.[3] In the *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa*, the form '*mīmāṃsante*' occurs very frequently. For example, in one place (II. 9) it is said 'they investigate (the question) whether oblation should be offered to fire when the sun rises or before the sun rises' and, after making remarks on each of the two alternatives, the conclusion is established that the oblation is to be offered before sunrise.[4] In another place, the word *mīmāṃsante* is used and the opinions of Paiṅgya and Kauṣītaki are opposed to each other (*Kauṣītaki Br.* 26. 3). The word *mīmāṃsā* occurs in the *Kauṣītakibrāhmaṇa* (18. 4) 'now begins the discussion of the *paridhāna* (conclusion) itself.' In the Kānva recension of the Śatapatha *Brāhmaṇa* we have the word *Mīmāṃsā* (S. B. E. vol. 26 p. 25, note 1). In the Upaniṣads we frequently meet with the verb. In the *Chāndogya* it is

1. VII. 5. 7. 1.
2. Tāṇḍya-mahābrāhmaṇa 6. 5. 9.
3. *Op. cit.* 2 3. 4. 2.
4. *Udite hotavyā 3 manudita iti mīmāṃsante*

said that several learned students like Prācīnaśāla Aupamanyava came together and discussed the question 'who is the self, what is *brahma.*'[5] In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (II. 8. 1) occur the words 'this is the (result or fruit of) discussion over Bliss.' From all these quotations it is clear that the verb '*mīmāṃsante*' and the word '*mīmāṃsā*' had from the remotest times to the times of the Upaniṣads been employed to designate discussions of doubtfnl points in ritual or philosophy.

In the *Nirukta* (chap. VII) we have a very interesting discussion about the form of the deities invoked at sacrifices and in *mantras* and various views are put forward viz. that they have an anthropomorphic aspect or that they have no such aspect and so on. This very subject is discussed in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra* (IX. 1. 6-10), where the authoritative conclusion seems to be that the deity in a sacrifice has no corporeal form. Pāṇini has a special *sūtra* to explain such forms as '*mīmāṃsate,*' '*bībhatsate*'[6] &c. In the Baudhāyana (I. 4. 10) and Vaśiṣṭha (22. 2) Dharmasūtras we meet with the very '*mīmāṃsante*'. Some of the Dharmasūtras contain purely Mīmāṃsā rules and doctrines. The Gautama Dharmasūtra says (I. 5) 'when there is a conflict of two texts of equal potency, there is an option.' Āpastamba says 'a positive Vedic text is more cogent than usage that leads to the inference (of the existence of a Vedic text).'[7] This resembles Jaimini's dictum.[8] In another place Āpastamba says 'where an action is due to the finding of pleasure therefrom, there is (inference of) Śāstra.'[9] This is the same as Jaimini's teaching.[10] Āpastamba seems to apply the word '*nyāya*' to the maxims of Mīmāṃsā (e. g.

5. *Chāndogya* 5. 11. 1.
6. Pāṇini III. 1. 6. A *Vārtika* on this says *māner jijñāṣāyām.*
7. Āpastamba Dharmasūtra I. 1. 4. 8.
8. Jaimini I. 3. 3.
9. Āpastamba I. 4. 12. 11.
10. Jaimini IV. 1. 2.

II. 4. 8. 13 and II. 6. 14. 13).[11] Āpastamba (II. 6. 13. 11) bears a close resemblance to Pūrvamīmāṃsā (VI. 1. 15). The *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali speaks of Mīmāṃsakas (Kielhorn, Vol. I. page 239). Patañjali instances a Brāhmaṇī, who studied Kāśakṛtsni i. e. the Mīmāṃsā propounded by Kāśakṛtsna.[12] A Kāśakṛtsna is referred to as a teacher of Vedānta in the *Brahmasūtras* (I. 4. 22). It is possible that the word Mīmāṃsā here does not stand for the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, but for the Vedantaśāstra. Patañjali gives the well-known example of Parisaṅkhyā, 'the five five-nailed animals may be eaten' and remarks that this sentence implies that other animals are forbidden as food.[13] These considerations enable us to assert that centuries before the Christian era the doctrines of the Mīmāṃsa had been well developed and that they had been embodied in the form of works before the time of Patañjali (140 B.C.). This conclusion is further corroborated by the *Śrautasūtras*. Many of the *Śrautasūtras* were composed several centuries before Christ and presuppose most of the general principles of interpretation that are embodied in Jaimini's work.

It is very difficult to arrive even at an approximate conclusion as to the age of Jaimini. His Sūtras do not contain any express reference to Buddhist dogma and philosophy. The *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* speaks of Dharmaśāstra (VI. 7. 5) and Smṛti (XII. 4. 42). If we rely upon the interpretations of Śabara, the *sūtras* of Jaimini presuppose the existence of the *Kalpasūtras* (I. 3. 11) and of certain words borrowed from the Mlecchas (I. 3. 10). All these facts naturally render it highly probable that the *sūtras* of Jaimini are not amongst the earliest products of the *sūtra* period. The *sūtras* of Jaimini stand in a peculiar relation to the *Vedāntasūtras*. It is to be noted that Jaimini refers to Bādarāyaṇa

11. The two *sūtras* are *aṅgānāṃ tu* etc. and *athāpi nityānuvādam* etc. For the first, compare Jaimini I. 3. 11-14 and VI. 7. 30. for the second.

12. Vol. II. pp. 206, 249, 325.

13. Vol. I. p. 5.

as an authority in several places (I. 1. 5, V. 2. 19, VI. 1. 18, X. 8. 44, XI. 1. 64). In all these cases except one (in X. 8. 44) the views of Bādarāyaṇa do not appear to be different from those of Jaimini. Except in one case all the points on which Bādarāyaṇa is cited are concerned with matters of ritual and there is nothing in the extant *Vedāntasūtras* corresponding to the views of Bādarāyaṇa quoted in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsasūtra*. The only exception is the view of Bādarāyaṇa that the connection between word and sense is eternal (Pūrva M. I. 1. 5), which may be said to correspond to the views underlying *Brahmasūtra* (1. 3. 28-29). On the other hand in the *Brahmasūtras* Jaimini's views are cited at least ten times (I. 2. 28, I. 2. 31, I. 3. 31, III. 2. 40, III. 4. 2, III. 4. 18, III. 4. 40, IV. 3. 12, IV. 4. 5, IV, 4. 1). It is only in two cases out of these that it is possible to select sutras from the extent Pūrvamīmāṃsā that seem to adumbrate the views attributed to Jaimini, viz. *Brahmasūtra* I. 3. 31 is parallel to *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* VI. 1. 5. and *Brahmasūtra* III. 2. 40 to *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* II. 1. 5.[14] Besides in five out of these ten places, the views of Bādarāyaṇa are expressly cited in the *Brahmasūtras* as opposed to those of Jaimini (i. 3, 33, III. 2. 41, III. 4. 1, III. 4. 19, IV. 4. 11) and in one place as somewhat different (IV. 4. 7). It has further to be borne in mind that in several *sūtras* of the *Brāhmasūtra* some Mīmāṃsā work dealing with similar topics is expressly referred to e. g. *Brahmasūtra* III. 3. 33. and 50 contain the words '*taduktam*' and refer to some such *sūtras* as Pūrvamīmāṃsā III. 3. 9. and II. 3. 3. respectively. Similarly *Brahmasūtra* III. III. 3. 44 and 49 have in view the well-known *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 'Śruti-liṅga &c.' III. 3. 13. The state of things suggests several probable conclusions. From the fact that Jaimini's views are cited on topics of *brahmavidyā* and Bādarāyaṇa's on topics of Vedic sacrifices and *minutiae* of ritual, it may be urged with good reason that both had composed works on Vedic ritualistic interpretation as well

14. *Brahmasūtra* i. 3. 31 = *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* vi. 1. 5. *Brahmasūtra* iii. 2. 40 = Pūrvamīmāṃsā ii. 1. 5.

as on the interpretation of the Upaniṣads. It is also probable that, without there being actual compositions of the two *ācāryas* on both the branches of Śruti texts, there was an oral tradition handed down in their respective schools about the views held by the founders of the two systems on seveval moot points in the Vedic texts. The former seems to be a more likely hypothesis. There is another hypothesis that there were several Jaiminis and several Bādarāyaṇas, all writing on the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā and that they were promiscuously quoted without giving any hint as to their diffence. But this seems to me quite unlikely at so early a date. The extant *sūtras* going under the names of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa are the final redactions of the teachings of the schools founded by the two great *ācāryas*. But as the extant *Brahmasūtra* contains words like '*taduktam*' and the extant *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* does not contain any allusion to the existence of a work dealing with the interpretation of the Upaniṣads it seems highly probable that the extant *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtras* are anterior to the extant *Brahmasūtras*.

The other authorities quoted in ths *Pūrva-mīmāṃsāsūtra* are Jaimini himself (III. 1. 4, VI. 3. 4, VIII. 3. 7, IX. 2. 39, XII. 1. 7), Ātreya (IV. 3. 18, V. 2. 18, VI. 1. 25), Aitiśāyana (III. 2. 43, VI. 1. 6), Kāmukāyana (XI. 1. 57), Kārṣṇājini (IV. 3. 17, VI. 7. 35), Bādari (III. 1. 3, VI. 1. 27, VIII. 8. 6, IX. 2. 33), Labukāyana (VI. 7. 37). Of these the *Brahmasūtra* also quote Ātreya (III. 4. 44), Bādari (IV. 3. 7, IV. 4. 10, III. 1. 11, I. 2. 30) and Kārṣṇājini (III. 1. 9).

As Śabara[15] wrote his *Bhāṣya* at least before 500 A. D. and as he was preceded by the Vṛttikāra and also by other commentators on the *sūtras*, the lowest limit to which the extant *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras* can be brought down is about 100 A. D., the highest limit being about 300 B. C. Yājṇavalkya, who is comparatively an early writer and not latter than 200 A. D., mentions Mīmāṃsā as one of the

15. Vide JBBRAS for 1923 pp. 83 ff. for Śabara and Vṛttikāra.

fourteen *vidyās* (1. 3). If Āpastamba's references are made to a *sūtra* on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, then the antiquity of the *Jaiminīyasūtra* will be pushed back a few centuries even beyond 300 B. C.

The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtra* is divided into 12 books, each book containing four *pādas*, except the 3rd, 6th and 10th, which contain eight *pādas* each. Each *pāda* contains several *adhikaraṇas* (or topics for discussion). Popularly there are supposed to be about 1000 *adhikaraṇas*. The *Mīmāṃsāsārasaṅgraha* of Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa attempts to make out this total, but other authorities like Mādhava calculate a smaller number than 1000. The conclusion established in each *adhikaraṇa* is called a Nyāya. There are roughly speaking about 2700 *sūtras*. It would be impossible to convey in the space at my disposal an accurate idea of the contents of this vast work. The following is a very brief resume of the contents :—

I. The purpose of the work is the inquiry into what is *dharma* ; *dharma* is defined as a desirable object indicated by a (Vedic) injunctive passage ; the connection between word and senses is eternal ; the relation of *vidhi* and *arthavāda*, the later forming part of a connected whole and therefore being authoritative only as expatiating upon the injunctive passages ; the meaning of the *mantras* employed in the ritual is intended to be conveyed ; the Smṛti rules like those on Aṣṭakāśrāddha are authoritative ; in a conflict between *śruti* and *smṛti*, the latter is to be discurded, but there is no conflict then *smṛti* may be inferred to be based on a lost *śruti* ; meaning of certain words borrowed from Mlecchas is the same as is conventional among the latter ; usages like the Holaka festival are authoritative ; grammatically correct words are to be employed and not *apabhraṃśas* like *gavi* for a cow ; identity of words used in the Vedas and in popular language ; the primary meaning of a word is *ākṛti* or class notion ; certain words like '*udbhid*', '*citra*', '*agnihotra*', '*śyena*' are names (*nāmadheya*) of certain rites and not subsidiary *vidhis* ; such sentences

as 'the sacrificer is the *prastara* or *yūpa*' are *arthavādas* and not *guṇavidhis* ; when there is a doubt as to the meaning of a word, the rest of the context should be employed for determining the meaning.

II. The principal word in an injunctive passage is the verb, which declares the result to be brought about ; the performance of the acts enjoined in the Veda gives rise to an unseen potency (Apūrva) ; actions are either principal or subordidate ; definition of principal and subordinate actions ; illustrations of subordinate and principal acts ; the verbs occuring in *mantras* do not lay down *vidhis* as those in the *Brāhmaṇas* do ; definition of *mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa* ; definition of Ṛk, Sāma, Yajus ; Nigadas are Yajus ; how to determine what portion of a Yajus constitutes one sentence ; each different verb (like *juhoti, yajeta, dadāti*) denotes a distinct act, having a separate unseen potency ; illustrations of this ; difference of acts on the ground of number, appellation (Saṃjñā), difference in deity ; *agnihotra* is prescribed as a life-long duty ; *agnihotra* and other rites prescribed in the several Śakhās of the Veda are not so many distinct rites in each Śākhā.

III. The meanining Śeṣa ; *Śeṣa* is that which subserves the purpose of another ; not only are substances, *guṇa* and *saṃskāras śeṣa*, but even rites are also *śeṣa* to the result, the result to the agent and the agent to certain acts ; such sentences as 'he cleanses the cup' the singular stands for the plural ; illustrations of *śesa* and *śeṣin* (subordinate and principal) ; the primary meaning of a word is to be taken ; means of determining the application (*viniyoga*) of texts viz. *śruti, liṅga, vākya, prakaraṇa, sthāna, samākhyā* ; rule of decision in case of conflict between two of these principles ; the prohibition of speaking falsehood in Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa is a *vidhi* and not an *anuvāda* ; the prohibitions against killing or injuring a Brāhmaṇa are general and not restricted to the time of Darśapūrṇamāsa ; several examples of Vedic rules that are addressed to the agent and have no relation to the sacrificial act (such as wearing gold) ;

the procedure to be followed as regards the principal is to be followed for the substitute also; the hiring of *ṛtviks* is to be done by the sacrificer and not by the *adhvaryu* and the *saṃskāras* such as shaving, paring the nails are also to be performed on him; only he who is learned in the Vedas is authorised to perform sacrifices.

IV. Inquiry into what is *Kratvartha* (what is enjoined for the sacrificial act, is therefore obligatory and if unperformed or badly performed will cause defect in the sacrificial act) and *puruṣārtha* (what is addressed only to the agent, is therefore not such as to cause defect in the sacrifice, if not obeyed); definition of *puruṣārtha*; illustrations of both; the Prajāpati vow 'one should not see the sun rising or setting' is *puruṣārtha*; discussion of which out of two substances or actions is the *prayojaka*; illustrations of *arthakarma* and *pratipattikarma*; the Śruti texts declaring the time, place and agent of certain actions are not *arthavādas*, but *Niyamas* (restrictive injunctions); what is the principal as opposed to the *śesa* so far described; the description of rewards with reference to substances, *saṃskāras* and subsidiary acts are merely *arthavādas*; the maxim of Viśvajit, viz. that all such rites as Viśvajit for which no reward is proclaimed by the texts have heaven as their reward; *Kāmya* rites as their reward the object desired and not *svarga*; Vaiśvanareṣti performed on the birth of a son is for the benefit of the son and not for the father and is to be performed after *jātakarma* on the full moon or new moon; the *piṇḍapitṛyajña* is not an *aṅga* of the new moon ritual.

V. This deals with *karma*; whether the order of the things mentioned in the texts as regards a rite is to be followed or there is a choice; the rule is that the order of the text is to be followed; various determining elements as to the order of doing things, such as *Śruti*, *artha*, *pāṭha*, *pravṛtti*, &c.; decision in case of the conflict of these.

VI. This deals with *Adhikāra*. *Svarga* is not *dravya* but is a state of bliss and is principal, while sacrifice is

subsidiary to it and is a means of attaining it; he is authorised to perform sacrifice who desires *svarga*; only men (not deities nor lower animals) are authorised to perform sacrifice; both males and females can perform *yāga*; husband and wife are together authorised to perform *yāga*; but the wife has only a limited part in the *yāga*; Śūdra is not capable of performing *yāga*; persons devoid of a limb or suffering from incurable disease cannot perform *yāga*; the *rathakāra*, though not of the three castes, can consecrate fire on account of a special text and so the Niṣāda can perform the Raudra *yāga*; in a sacrificial session (extending over a long period) each person engaged in the *sāttro* secures the reward; the rules about following and saluting the teacher apply only after *upanayana* and not before; the paying of the three debts is obligatory on the three castes; as regards obligatory duties they are to be performed by all but according to ability; there is no substitute in the case of the deity, the fire, the subsidiary acts, the *mantras*, nor for the sacrificer; in the case of *sattras* a substitute for a sacrificer is allowed; *prāyaścittas* in case of total or partial breaking or spilling out or burning of substances; *sattras* can be performed only by Brāhmaṇas; in the Viśvajit one cannot give away one's parents, wife &c., but only that over which one has absolute ownership; a sovereign cannot give away the land, as it is common to all, nor horses, nor *śūdra* who serves as a duty; the word '*samvatsara*' means a day in the case of sacrifices prescribed for a thousand *samvatsaras*; the oblations to be offered by the *brahmacārin* are offered in domestic fire and not in consecrated fire; the same is the case with the sacrifice of the chief who is a *niṣāda*; *Daiva* rites are to be performed in *udagayāna*, bright fortnight and on auspicious days.

VII. This deals with the principle of Atideśa (extension by analogy of the procedure and details of *darśapūrṇamāsa* to other sacrifices). The details of the *darśapūrṇamāsa* are to be extended to all sacrifices such as Aindrāgna

according to requirements ; Atideśa may be brought into play by express words or by implication and inference ; examples of the first, such as the extension of the procedure and details of Śyena *yāga* to Iṣu *yāga* ; Atideśa is indicated by the employment of the same technical term (*nāma*) in other sacrifices ; such as the employment of the word *agnihotra* in Kuṇḍapāyinām-ayana.

VIII. This book deals with the application of the principle of Atideśa to individual cases. The rule of guidance is that those details and that part of the primary (*prakṛti*) sacrifices shch as Darśapūrṇamāsa are to be extended, of which an indication (by words or sense) is conveyed by the injunctive passage of the modificatory (*vikṛti*) sacrifices and by other passages subsidiary to them ; but the reward, the agent (desiring heaven), the restrictive rules (such as *agnihotra* for life) and the definite collocation of actions (such as Darśa-pūrṇamāsa) are not extended by Atideśa ; if there is doubt on account of the *havis* and the *devatā* pointing to the Atideśa of different items, then it is the identity of *havis* that decides the matter ; *Darvīhoma* is an appellation and not a *guṇavidhi* and is an appellation of both *smārta* rites like the Aṣṭakās and of Vedic rites.

IX. This book deals with the subject of Ūha ; when applying the principle of Atideśa, certain alterations and adaptations are necessary in the case of *mantras*, *sāmans* and *saṃskāras* ; the various details of the Agnihotra have Apūrva as the motive of their performance ; it is the result (*apūrva*) of the sacrificial act that is principal and not the deity and therefore it is not the deity that is the moving spring of the details of a *yāga* ; examples of *ūha* ; examples of the non-application of *ūha*, for instance in the Jyotiṣṭoma the Subrahmaṇya *nigade* has the words *Harīva agaccha*,' which should not be modified by *ūha*, when the same *nigada* is repeated in the Agniṣṭut.

X. This book deals with *bādha* and *abhyuccaya* everything pertaining to the model (*prakṛti*) *yāga* is not to be done in the modifications of it (*vikṛti*), but the technical

appellations, the purificatory acts and materials (of the model *yāga*) may have to be omitted in the modifications if there is no purpose to be served by employing them; examples; the Ārambhaṇīya *iṣṭi* is not to be performed in the Dīkṣaṇīya rites, though performed in the model *yāga*; in the *sattras* such as Dvādaśāha there is no choosing the *ṛtviks* as in the Jyotiṣṭoma, nor is there engagement of services for a reward; the word '*śveta*' in the passage '*vāyavyaṃ śvetamālabheta*' conveys a white goat and not any other white animal; the cows that are the *dakṣiṇā* in the Jyotiṣṭoma should be divided among the priests by the sacrificer himself; instances of addition (*samuccaya*); the deity must be addressed in the *yāga* by the appellation contained in the injunctive passage and not by a synonym (such as *pāvaka* for *agni*); of several items mentioned in order, if only some are to be employed then those in the beginning are to be taken and not those mentioned last; in *sattras* (such as *dvādaśāha*) there are many *yajamānas* and not one; the *yajamānas* themselves are the priests (*ṛtvika*) in *sattras*; difference between *sattra* and *ahīna*, the former being enjoined in such words as '*āsate*' '*upayānti*' and having many *yajamānas*, while in the latter the injunction is in the form '*yajeta*' and the sacrificers are not many; it is not the whole animal that is one offering (*havis*) but its various limbs are the *havis*; discussion of *pratiṣedha* and *paryudāsa*; meaning of the negative '*nañ*'; it is either *paryudāsa*, or it may be mere *arthavāda* (as in '*na tau paśau karoti*' with reference to the two *ājyabhāgas*), or it may be a *pratiṣedha* (as in 'natiratre Sodasinam' &c.).

XI. This book deals with *tantra* and *avāpa*. That which is useful to many, though itself performed once, is called *tantra*, that which is useful to many only when repeated many times is called *avāpa*; the principal items such as Āgneya &c. in the *darśapūrṇamāsa* have *svarga* as the fruit in their entirety and there is no separate reward for each; the different *aṅgas* of a sacrifice serve a single purpose (viz. helping on the principal act) and hence have a single

fruit ; *Kāmya* rites may be repeated as often as desired ; those actions that are prescribed (such as pressing or beating the grains of rice) and have a seen result are to be repeated and continued until the result is accomplished, while those actions that have only an unseen result are not to be repeated ; such *aṅgas* as *prayājas* are to be performed only once ; the Kapiñjala maxim viz. the plural stands for three in the absence of anything to the contrary ; the time, place and the priests are to be the same in the case of the principal rites, Āgneya and others ; examples of *arthakarma* and *pratipattikarma* ; *ādhāna* (consecration of fires in spring, summer, autumn according to caste) is to be done only once and not repeated with each *iṣṭi, paśuyāga, somayāga* &c. ; the utensils of sacrifice are to be kept till the death of the sacrificer, as the sacrificer is to be cremated with them (so this is a *pratipattikarma* of the utensils).

XII. This book deals with the topic of *prasaṅga*, which means (the undersirable) possibility of certain items belonging to one act having to be employed or performed in another act. In the chapter about Agnīṣomīya *paśu*, a *paśupuroḍāśa* is laid down, with reference to which a doubt arises whether the several *aṅgas* of the *paśuyāga* are to be repeated with the *puroḍāśa* also ; the answer is no ; when there is an aggregate of several contradictory *dharmas*, the majority is to be followed ; if there are several things, each serving the same purpose (as rice and *yava*), then there is an option ; there is an option as to the *prāyaścittas* to be performed for doing something through mistake or heedlessness, but all *prāyaścittas* prescribed on an occasion other than the above are to be performed together ; the rules about not reciting the Vedas (*anadhyāya*) apply to the study of the Vedas and not to the repeating of Vedic texts in sacrifices ; actions are to be performed after the *mantras* appropriate to them are repeated (as in '*iṣe tvā*' *iti chintati*) ; there is no option as to *hautra mantras* ; mere *japa mantras* no-connected

with any rite, *mantras* containing praises, blessings and appellations or invokations are to be added up (there is *samuccaya* are not *vikalpa*) ; in a *sattra* such purificatory acts as *añjana* are to be done by all sacrificers ; only Brāhmaṇas can officiate as priests.

Hardly anything is known about Jaimini. There is a *Brāhmaṇa*, a *Śrauta-sūtra* and a *Gṛhyasūtra* ascribed to Jaimini. But it is hardly likely that they are the works of the founder of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā. In the *tarpaṇa* in the *Āśvalāyanagṛhya*[16] Jaimini occurs along with Sumantu, Vaiśampāyana &c. In the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* (XII. 6. 75) Jaimini is said to be the teacher of Sumantu and a promulgator of the *Sāmaveda.* The *Pañcatantra* tells us that an elephant crushed to death Jaimini, the author of the *mīmāṃsā.* Jaimini seems to have been a writer of northern India. He is familiar with Mleccha words according to Śabara and speaks of an inhabitant of Mathurā (I 3 21). His *sūtras* do not possess the compactness of even the *Brahmasūtras*, much less of Pāṇini's. By the time of Śabara not only were there several commentaries on the *sūtras*, but there had arisen various readings in the *sūtras.*[17] The *Tantravārtika* points out that Śabara omits some *sūtras* of Jaimini.[18] One of these six *sūtras* not commented upon by Śabara occurs in Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* (III. 4. & 20). The *Tantravārtika* remarks that Jaimini composed a few *sūtras* that do not contain much substance and so the *bhāṣyakāra* might have passed them over.[19]

A few words must be said about the commentators of the *sūtras* and about some of the important works on the Mīmāṃsā. This is not the place to attempt a complete list of such works. The earliest commentator seems to be the Vṛttikāra, who is frequently quoted by Śabara with

16. III. 4. 4.
17. Śabara on XI. 1. 14-15.
18. *Tantravārtika*, p. 646, p. 915. This occurs after III. 4. 9.
19. p 915

reverence (*atrabhavān* or *bhagavān*, II. 3. 16, III. I. 6, VII 1. 2), though Śabara frequently differs from him (I. 1. 3-5, VII. 2. 7) and criticizes him (II. 1. 33). It is not possible to give the name of the Vṛttikāra. Many Sanskrit writers like Ānadagiri identify Upavarṣa with the author of the *vṛtti*. M. M. Dr. Ganganath Jha also does the same. But this does not seem likely. Śabara himself quotes Upavarṣa in the long summary of Vṛttikāra's views on *sūtras* I. 1, 3-5. Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra* (1. 3. 28) quotes the same view of Upavarṣa and tells us that he commented upon both the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā (III. 3. 53). The *Tantravārtika* (p. 390 on II. 1. 12) uses the word Mahābhāṣyakāra for Upavarṣa (according to the *Nyayasudha* of Someśvara). The *Tantra-vārtika* speaks of the Vṛttikāra and *bhagavān* Upavarṣa in the same breath and appears to distinguish them both (p.607 *Tantra-vartika* on II. 3. 16). Hence it seems very likely that the Vṛttikāra was a different person from Upavarṣa. Śabara frequently proposes several interpretations of the same *sūtras* (IV. 1. 2, IV. 3. 27-28, VIII. 1. 34, 39 ; VIII 3. 14-15, IX. 1. 1 and 34-35 &c). Therefore it follows that he had several predecessors. Several other commentators of the *sūtras* are mentioned by other writers. Kumārila mentions Bhavadāsa (in *Ślokavārtika* I. 93), Bhartṛmitra is said by *Nyāyaratnākara* (on *Ślokavārtika* I. 10) to have made Mīmāṃsā atheistic and to have composed an ancient (*cirantana*) commentary on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, and Hari is quoted by the *Śāstradīpikā* (on X. 2. 59-60). The exact relationship of these to each other and to Śabara cannot be ascertained at present. They are no more than mere names to us. The information to be gathered from Śabara's *bhāṣya* has been collected by me elsewhere (JBBRAS for 1923, vol. 26 No. LXXIV, Art. V). Śabara knew Kātyāyana and also Patañjali, the metrical work of Piṅgala, the Pāṇinīya Śikṣā, the Baudhāyana and Āpastamba *dharmasūtras*, the *Manusmṛti*, the *Mahābhārata* and Purāṇas, the Bauddha Śūnya-vāda. He is frequently referred to and criticized by Kumārila and is mentioned

also by Śaṅkara (in his *Bhāṣya* on III. 3. 53). He is therefore certainly later than about 100 A D. and is earlier than 500 A.D. as the following discussion will show. About his home nothing can be said beyond this that he seems to be an inhabitant of north India. He speaks of the *Mlecchas* being clever in catching and rearing birds (on I. 3. 10) and speaks of the employment of the word '*rājan*' by the Andhras to a *kṣatriya* who does not live by protecting a country or a city (on II. 3. 3). Tradition says that Varāhamihira, Bhartṛhari, Vikrama, Hariścandra, Śaṅku and Amara were his sons.[20] According to tradition his real name was Ādityadeva, the name Śabara being due to his having protected himself from Jain persecution by passing off as a forester. The *Dattakamīmāṃsā* refers to the comment of Śabara on the *sūtra* of Satyaṣadha Hiraṇyakeśin. He is probably the same as the *bhāṣyakāra* of the Mīmāṃsā, Śabarasvāmin, son of Dīptasvāmin, wrote a commentary called *Sarvārthalakṣaṇī* on the *Liṅgānuśāsana*; whether he is identical with the *bhāṣyakāra* is doubtful.

Between Kumārila and Śabara several centuries must have intervened. The former is the most illustrious writer on the Mīmāṃsā. He wrote the *Ślokavārtika* (on I. 1) and the *Tantravārtika* (on I. 2, III) and the *Ṭup-ṭīkā* on selected *sūtras* of the last nine books. He is a thorough-going Mīmāṃsaka and his views are often diametrically opposed to those of Prabhākara. He frequently criticizes Śabara (*Tantravārtika* pp. 728, 817, 997, 1127, 1150). His remarks on the omission by the *bhāṣyakāra* of six *sūtras* establish that numerous commentaries on the *sūtras* and on Śabara's *bhāṣya* intervened between Śabara and himself (p.915 *Tantravārtika*). He refers to a *bhāṣyakāra* on the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā other than Śabara (and therefore spoken of as *bhāṣyāntarakāra*), who was later than Śabara (*Tantravārtika* pp. 616, 625, 1008 and *Nyāyasudhā* p. 480). Kumārila criticizes the *Vākyapadīya* (which according to the current interpretation of Itsing's words was composed about 650

20. *brāhmaṇyām abhavad varāhamihiro.........*

A.D.) and Vācaspatimiśra, who commented upon the *Vidhiviveka* of Maṇḍanamiśra, pupil of Kumārila, wrote one of his works in 898 of the Vikrama era i.e. 841 A. D. Therefore Kumārila must have flourished about 750 A. D. He is according to tradition an *avatāra* of Kumāra or Kārtikeya (probably his name suggested the idea). He seems to have been an inhabitant of the Tamil or Malayalam country in south India, as he mentions many words (p. 157 *Tantravārtika*) in these dialect of Lāṭa (district round modern Surat, p. 200, p. 989). Kumārila is often referred to as Bhaṭṭapāda (as done by Medhātithi) or simply Bhaṭṭa by later writers and his followers are styled Bhāṭṭas.

Prabhākara (also called *Guru*) wrote two commentaries on the *Bhāṣya*, of Śabara, one, a large one, called '*Bṛhatī*' and the other a more concise one called '*Laghvī*' (vide *Trantrarahasya* of Rāmānujācārya published in Gaikwad's Oriental Series). A ms. of the *Bṛhatī* is in the possession of the Asiatic Society of Bengal and in the colophons in that ms. only the name Prabhākara occurs and not Guru. M. M. Dr. Jha (*Prabhākara School* p. 9) suggests that the epithet '*guru*' was appllied to him by way of deprecating his elaborated or complicated views. It is not unlikely that the name stuck to him on account of his pupil Śālikanātha having frequently referred to him as simply '*guru*' in his works,[21] although he generally styles him Prabhākara-guru (pp. 1, 13, 32, 170, 171, 196, 202) and sometimes as Prabhākara (p. 17. 197). Śālikanātha speaks of his master's followers as 'Prābhākarāḥ' (*Prakaraṇa*—p.p. 74, 141, 188). He was called Nibandhanakāra by later writers (vide *Śāstradīpikā* on II. 1. 1. and the *Candrikā* comment on *Prabodhacandrodaya* II. 3). The relation of Prabhākara to Kumārila is a controversial matter. According to tradition Prabhākara was a pupil of Kumārila. This tradition is supported by the *Sarvasiddhānta-saṅgraha* attributed to Śaṅkarācārya.[22]

21. *Prakaraṇapañcikā* pp. 12, 44, 126 and 201.
22. Vide I. 18-19. The *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha* is not the work of

On the other hand, Dr. Jha is of oppinion that the internal evidence of the works of the two great protagonists is against this and that Prabhākara is earlier than Kumārila. There can be no doubt that they are very near each other in age. Śālikanātha was a pupil of Prabhākara. He also quotes and criticizes the *Ślokavārtika* of Kumārila (e. g. *Śloka,* I, 11 is quoted on p. 5, *Śloka.* Abhāva section, verse 28 on p. 122 of the *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā* and *Śloka,* Arthāpatti verse 21 on p. 114 of *Prakaraṇap*). Therefore both Kumārila and Prabhākara were contemporaries. According to the *Nyāyaratnākara,* Kumārila actually refers to Prabhākara (vide note 49). Apart from other grounds of proof, the difference in style between Prabhākara and Kumārila noted by Dr. Ganganatha Jha has nothing to do with difference in age in this case and the florid language of the latter and the simple but incisive style of the former are mere peculiarities of individual authors due to their difference of capabilities and difference in command over polemical language. It is not unlikely that Prabhākara might have been the older of the two. In the *Prabodhacandrodaya* four great writers on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā are arranged as follows :— Guru, Kumārila, Śārika (i.e. Śālikanātha) and Vācaspati.[23] Evidently the last three are arranged according to priority in time and hence we shall not be far wrong if we assume that Prabhākara was a little older than Kumārila. The *Prabodhacandrodaya* was written between 1050 and 1116 A.D. (*Epi. Ind.* Vol. I, p. 220). Prabhākara's work and his school sank into unmerited oblivion probably owing to the brilliance of his great rival Kumārila. Still in early works he is often referred to e.g. the *Mitākṣarā* (on *Yāj.* II. 114) quotes the words of Guru in connection with the

the great Ācārya for several reasons, which cannot be set out here. The great Ācārya fights very hard against regarding the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and the Uttaramīmāṃsā as one Śāstra (I. 1. 1), while the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* makes one *Śāstra* not only of the two, but adds also the *devatākāṇḍa.*

23. *Prabodhacandrodaya* II. 3.

question whether ownership is *laukika*.[24] It appears that in nooks and corners Prabhākara's work was studied and the traditions of his school were kept up so late as the 18th century (vide *Tantrarahasya* p. 1). It seems that Prabhākara was preceded by a Vārtikakāra whose views were the starting point for the school of Prabhākara. The *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā* quotes with respect a Vārtikakāramiśra (p. 3). This writer is different from Kumārila, in whose works the quotations are not found. Kumārila in his *Tantravārtika* seems to refer to a Vārtikakāra who came after the Vṛttikāra and probably before the Bhāṣyakāra Śabara.[25] It is probably owing to this that Kumārila's works are designated *Ślokavārtika* and *Tantravārtika* to distinguish them from the older *Vārtika*.

The important works of the Prabhākara school may be mentioned here in one place, On the two commentaries of Prabhākara called *Bṛhatī* and *Laghvī*, *Śālikanāthamiśra* (as he called himself in *Prakaraṇapañcikā* p. 38) wrote two commentaries respectively named *Ṛjuvimalā* and *Dīpaśikhā* (vide *Tantrarahasya* and the commentary *Chandrikā* on *Prabodhacandrodaya* II. 3). Śālikanātha also wrote an independent work called *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (published in the Chaukhamba series) which deals with certain important points, such as the purpose of the Mīmāṃsā *śāstra*, the *pramāṇas*, knowledge and its self-authoritativeness, nature of the soul &c. He quotes Dharmakīrti's definition of pratyakṣa (p. 47 of *Prakaraṇa*-p.). He flourished after Kumārila i. e. after about 750 A.D. Dr. Keith (*Karmamīmāṃsā* p. 9 n. 2) is wrong in placing him before Kumārila. The same learned author says that the *Prakaraṇapañcika* uses Uddyotakara, but the page of the former work (44) to which he refers contains only the definition of *pratyakṣa* given by Gautama and its explanations by others, Bhavanātha wrote the *Nayaviveka*, which summarieses the two commentaries of Śālikanātha and his

24. On *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* IV. 1. 2.
25. *Tantravārtika*, p. 606.

Prakaraṇapañcikā. This Bhavanātha is quoted by the *Smṛticandrikā* (about 1200 A.D.) on the question of the son's ownership by birth in ancestral property. The commentary *Candrikā* on the *Prabodhacandrodaya* (II. 3) says that Mahodadhi was a fellow-student of Śārikanātha and wrote an independent work on Prabhākara's views. One of the latest works of this school is the *Tantrarahasya* of Rāmānujācārya (published in the Gaikwad's Oriental Series).

The number of works composed by the followers of Kumārila is very large. The *Ślokavārtika* was commented upon by pārthasārathimiśra, the commentary being called *Nyāyaratnākara* (Published in the Chaukhamba Series) and by Sucaritamiśra in his *Kāśikā.* Pārthasārathimiśra is earlier than Mādhava. Pārthasārathi also wrote three other works, the *Śāstradīpikā* (commentary on the *sūtras* of Jaimini, published by the Nirnayasagar Press), the *Tantraratna* (explanation of important points occurring in the *sūtra* and *bhāṣya,* and the *Nyāyaratnamālā* (published at Benares), an independent work on the Mīmāṃsā commented upon by Rāmānuja (not the founder of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school) in his *Nayakaratna.* The *Ślokavārtika* seems also to have been commented upon by Bhaṭṭombeka, a pupil of Kumārila. The *Yuktisnehaprapūraṇī,* a commentary on the *Śāstradīpikā* (Nirn. Ed.), quotes a few words of Bhaṭṭombeka on the first verse of the *Ślokavārtika.*[26] A ms. of the *Mālati-Mādhava* attributes a drama to Umbekācārya, the pupil of Kumārila (Pandit's intro. to *Gauḍavaho* p. 206). Vide also *Citsukhī* (p. 265 Nirn. Ed.) for the identification of Umbeka with Bhavabūti made by the commentator (who flourished in the 14th century).[27] Umbeka's work has recently been unearthed. The *Tantravārtika* has been commented upon by Someśvara, son of Mahādeva, in his *Nyāyasudhā* also styled Ranaka (published at Benares).

26. p. 2.
27. The original passage of the *citsukhī* on which this indentification is made is very interesting. This shows that even Citsukha identified them.

Someśvara is at least earlier than 1500 A.D. as he is quoted in the *Dvaitanirṇaya* of Saṅkarabhatta and as a ms. is dated 1140 (Samvat or Saka ?). The *Ṭup-ṭīkā* of Kumārila was commented upon by Someśvara in his *Tārkikābharaṇa* and by Veṅkaṭeśvaradīkṣita in his *Vārtikābharaṇa*. Maṇḍanamiśra a pupil of Kumārila wrote the *Vidhiviveka* (an independent work) and the *Mīmāṃsānukramaṇī* (a summary of *Śabarabhāṣya*). The *Vidhiviveka* was explained by Vācaspatimiśra in his *Nyayakaṇīkā* (Published in the Benares Pandit) who wrote also *Tattvabindu*. Jayantabhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī* (850-900) is an important work. The commentary *Candrikā* on the *Prabodhacandrodaya* (II. 3) speaks of Mahāvrata as a follower of Bhaṭṭa and of Bhavadeva's work as the most popular one in its day. Bhavadeva was eulogised for his profound knowledge of Mīmāṃsā and Jyotiṣa in an inscription from Rāḍha in Bengal (*Epi. Ind.* Vol. VI p. 203 ff). Bhavadeva (about the second half of 11th century) wrote a work called *Tautātitamatatilaka* and also a commentary on the *Tantravārtika*.[27a] The *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara* of Mādhava (Anandasrama, Poona) gives the contents of the several *adhikaraṇas* of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* in *kārikās* and brief prose explanations. Appayyadīkṣita wrote the *Vidhirasāyana* (published at Benares). Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa finished a commentary on the *Śāstradipikā* begun by his father Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa, also wrote the *Mīmāṃsāsārasaṅgraha* (Chaukhamba Series), the *Mīmāsābalaprakāśa* (Chaukhamba Series) and the *Vidhirasāyanadūṣaṇa* refuting the work of Appayya. The *Mānameyodaya* (Trivandrum Series) gives Kumārila's views on the nature of proof and quotes the *Bṛhatī*, Śālikanātha and several other authors. Khaṇḍadeva (who died in 1665 A.D.) wrote the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* (published in the B. I. Series) and *Mīmāṃsākaustubha*. The *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi* of the famous Gāgābhaṭṭa who officiated at the coronation of the great Sivaji is a very learned work. Two more works dealing

27a. Vide M. M. Chakravarti in JASB 1912 pp. 332-338 for Bhavadeva and JASB, 1915 p. 312.

with the technical terms of the Mīmāṃsā and important points of dogma are the *Arthasaṅgraha* of Laugākṣi Bhāskara (printed in the Benares Series and translated by Dr. Thibaut) and the *Mīmāṃsānyayaprakāśa* of Āpadeva.

The Pūrvamimāṃsā is one of the six orthodox *darśanas* (or systems of philosophy), the other five being Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta. It has to be seen what contribution the Pūrvamīmāṃsā makes to the philosophy of India and how far its claim to be called a system of philosophy may be justified. It is not possible to enter here into all the numerous ramifications of the Mīmāṃsā down to the latest times. An attempt will be made to collect together the most striking of the dogmas of the system, as gathered from the Sūtra itself, the *bhaṣya* of Śabara, the works of Kumārila and of Prabhākara and his direct followers, without setting out in detail the processes of reasoning by which those dogmas were established.

The purpose of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā is the inquiry into *dharma* as opposed to the purpose of the Vedanta, which is to investigate into the nature *brahma.* The Mīmāṃsā defines *dharma* to be those duties that are prescribed by injunctive passages which urge men to action.[28] The next question is what is the source of these injunctions. The answer is that it is the eternal, infallible and self-existent Veda and not *pratyakṣa.* It is this theory that the Veda has existed from all eternity, was not created by any person, human or divine, that is the point of the whole system. According to the Vedānta the Veda proceeds from the omniscient *Brahma.*[29] According to Patañjali the order of the letters of the Veda is not eternal, though the meaning is so. The Veda being infallible and eternal, it is the final authority as Śabara says.[29a] Jaimini enters into elaborate arguments to establish the *nityatva* of Veda. As a corollary he has also to argue that the relation between

28. *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* I. 1. 2.
29. *Brahmasūtra* I. 1. 3.
29a. Śabara on III. 2. 25.

word and sense is eternal. But the mass of the Veda is vast and so Jaimini divides it into five heads, Vidhi, Pratiṣedha (prohibition), Arthavāda (expatiatory or commendatory texts), Nāmadheya (mere appellations like Śyena &c.) and *mantras* (that do not lay down *vidhis*, but are recited at the time of performing the several parts of a *yāga*). It is therefore Vidhis alone that lay down *dharma*. Vidhis are classified from various standpoints, such as *vidhis* proper, Niyama and Parisaṅkhyā: again into Nitya, Naimittika and Kāmya; into Utpatti-vidhi (as in *agnihotraṃ juhoti*). Viniyoga-vidhi (as in *dadhnā juhoti*), *prayoga-vidhi*, *adhikāra-vidhi* (as in *Rājā rājasūyena yajeta*); then again into *kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha*. Incidentally Jaimini recognises the binding force of Smṛtis and usages like the Holaka, provided they are not opposed to the Veda. The reward for carrying out the injunctions is often declared in the injunctive passages and where it is not so declared, the reward of the performance of all duties is *svarga*.[30] One of the most important questions in any system of philosophy is who regulates the world and the rewards and punishments of the good and evil deeds of men. The answer of the Mīmāṃsā on the latter point is that it is not God or the deity of a sacrifice that gives the reward, but that it is the *Apūrva* (an invisible potency) produced by the acts performed that gives the reward.[31] The views of Jaimini and his followers as regards the deity are startling in the extreme. Jaimini's position is that the deity in a sacrifice is only secondary (it is *guṇa*), that *havis* is more important than the *devatā* in case of a conflict between the two.[32] The Veda connects a deity

30. *Viśvajinnyāya*, *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* IV. 3. 15.
31. *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* II. 1. 5.
The *Brahmasūtrā* (III. 2. 40) refers to this view of Jaimini. Vide *Jaiminīya-nyāyamālā-vistara* on II. 1. 5. for a brief but clear exposition of Apūrva and for the various Apūrvas, such as *phalāpūrva*, *samudāyāp.*, *utpattyap.* *aṅgāpūrva*.
32. *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* VIII. 1. 32; IX. 1. 9.

with the sacrificial act and the offering is directed to be made to a deity. Therefore the agent has to do all that. But the deity does not enjoy the *havis*, the deity has no body, the sacrifice is not intended to please the deity, the deity is not lord of all things, it does not bestow favours and the fruit of the sacrifice does not proceed from the deity. These are the conclusions that follow from Jaimini's *sūtras* (IX. 1. 1-10) and the *bhāṣya* of Śabara thereon. In another place it is said by Śabara that the *devatās* connected with sacrificial acts are not those described in *itihāsa* and *purāṇas* as the denizens of heaven, but are those that have *sūktas* (Vedic hymns) addressed to them and those to whom *havis* is ordained to be offered,[33] that the *devatā* is a mere means (*sādhana*) in a sacrifice, that the *devatā* of a sacrifice is really a matter of words, and that where the *havis* is prescribed for Agni, a synonym for Agni such as Pāvaka or Suci cannot be employed. The views of Prabhākara and Kumārila are the same. Their remarks about the nature of the deity are more or less destructive of the popular views on the subject, but there is much vagueness left about their positive attitude about the deity.[34]

Another important question which all philosophy has to tackle is that of the creation of the world. Here also the attitude of the Mīmāṃsā borders more or less on atheism. Both Prabhākara and Kumārila deny the existence of a personal God who created the world or that by God's will movement was produced in the atoms and the world was produced (as the Vaiśeṣikas think).[35] Their position is that the world is without beginning and not created and that the Veda is not created by God but is self-existent. They practically deny the existence of an intelligent and omniscient creator and the periodic production and dissolution of the world.

33. Vide Śabara on X. 4. 23.
34. *Prakaraṇapañcikā* p. 185.
35. *Op. cit.* pp. 137-140.; *Ślokavārtika* (*sambandhākṣepaparihāra*, verses 43-117).

It is this attitude towards the creator, towards the creation of the world and the self-existence of the Veda independently of any author, human or divine, that earned for the Mīmāṃsakas the notoriety of their being atheists.[36] Kumārila himself admits that the Mīmāṃsā was brought to the level of the *lokāyata* view (rank atheism that denied God and soul, that denied that any actions were morally good or evil or yielded good or evil results and so forth) by some of his predecessors and that his endeavour would be directed to bring it on to the path of belief (in moral good or evil).

This topic of God and the creation of the world naturally introduces the topic of the existence of the individual self (*ātman*). It is worthy of note that Jaimini's system contains no *sūtra* or *sūtras* establishing the existence of a soul. But it appears that he took for granted the existence of the self (as indicated by such Vedic sentences as '*svarga-kāmo yajeta*') and he suggests this in his *sūtra*[37] (though it is a *pūrvapakṣa* on another point). Though Jaimini is silent, Śabara enters into an elaborate argument about the existence of the soul independent of the body, the senses and the cognitions of pleasure and pain &c. (pp. 18-24 of the B. I. edition). The position of Prabhākara and also of Kumārila is that the souls are many (in the several bodies), they are different from the body, the senses and *buddhi*, but they are all-pervading and eternal.[38] It is this tanet of the existence of individual souls that refutes according to Kumārila the charge of atheism brought against the Mīmāṃsā.[39] It is in this connection worthy of note how emphasis is differently laid on different parts of the Veda by the ritualists and the Vedāntins. According to the former, the purpose of the Veda is to ordain the

36. *Ślokavārtika* I. 10.
37. III. 7. 8.
38. Vide *Prakaraṇapañcikā* pp. 141 ff. for *ātmatattva*. *Ślokavārtika* pp. 689-724
39. Ātmavāda 148.

performance of actions of works and therefore the only utility[40] of the Upaniṣads (that speak of the knowledge of the self and its relation to Brahma) is to give information about the agent of the actions enjoined by the Veda and the knowledge contained in the Upaniṣads has no independent purpose of its own. The Vedāntin on the other hand says that the Veda which lays down works (Karmamārga) is only *aparā vidyā*, that the path of work is only a preparation for the path of higher knowledge and that the knowledge of *brahma* has an independent purpose of its own (as expressed in the words (*brahmavidāpnoti param*' or '*brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati*').

Both Prabhākara and Kumārila speak of *mokṣa*, but their idea of it is entirely different from that of the Vedāntin, who says *mokṣa* follows when *avidyā* vanishes. According to Prabhākara[41] *mokṣa* is the absolute cessation of body due to the disappearance of all *dharma* and *adharma* and the process is described as follows :—a person becomes disgusted with the troubles of *saṃsāra* and has no craving left even for the pleasures of the world as they are always intermixed with pain and wants to make an effort for *mokṣa* ; then he turns away from forbidden acts as they give rise to bondage and also from those that give rise to benefit in the next world ; he reduces the sum of his already accumulated *dharma* and *adharma* by undergoing their effects ; then with the help of the knowledge of the self reinforced by *śama*, *dama*, *brahmacarya*, which (knowledge) is enjoined by the (Upaniṣad) passage 'he does not return,' he destroys the sum of his entire *karma* and then becomes released (*mukta*). Practically the same view is held by Kumārila who says that such Upaniṣad passages as 'the soul must be known' *Bṛhadāranya* (II. 4. 5.) are not enjoined for securing the reward of *mokṣa*, but the knowledge of the self is the means of inducing men to engage in sacrificial rites and

40. *Tantravārtika*, p. 13.
41. Vide *Prakaraṇapañcika* pp. 154-160, 156-157.

that the reward which is pronounced in the Sruti (the Upaniṣad) from the knowledge of the self is a mere *arthavāda*[42] and is not an independent reward distinct from *svarga* (vide also *rātrisattranyāya*, IV. 3. 17-19).

Certain other important tenets of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā may be noticed here. According to the Pūrvāmīmāṃsā all cognitions are *prima facie* valid (*svataḥpramāṇa*) and their invalidity has to be established by other means. This view is opposed to that of the Sāṅkhyas who hold that both validity and invalidity do not require other means to establish them, to that of the Naiyāyikas who hold both as dependent on other means and to that of the Bauddhas who hold that invalidity is self-evident (i.e. all cognitions are *prima facie* invalid.), while validity has to be established.[43]

Another tenet of the Mīmāṃsā is that the principal part of a sentence is the verb (II. 1. 1-4).

Interminable controversies have raged on the import of words. The Pūrvamīmāṃsā declares that *jāti* (class) is the primary meaning of words (I. 3. 33),[44] as opposed to the grammarians who held *jāti, dravya, guṇa* or *kriyā* to be the import or to the older Naiyāyikas who held the individual as characterised by the *jāti* as the import.

Jaimini nowhere enters upon an investigation of the means of proof (*pramāṇa*), though he defines *pratyakṣa* and here and there speaks of *anumāna*. The Vṛttikāra (p. 10 of Śabara's *bhāṣya*) refers to the six *pramāṇas pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, śabda, arthāpatti* and *abhāva* or *anupalabdhi*.

The Pūrvamīmāṃsā elaborated a special method of investigation, the results of which were embodied in *adhika-*

42. Vide *Ślokavārtika* (*Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* verses 102-111), verses 103-104 ;
43. Vide *Ślokavārtika* on *sūtra* 2 verses 33-61 and *Prakaraṇapañcikā* pp. 32-38.
44. Vide *Ślokavā.* (*ākṛtivāda*) p. 545 ff.

raṇas (i. e. heads of investigation). The constituent parts of an *adhikaraṇa* are five, viz. the *viṣaya* (i.e. the text or subject for discussion and investigation), the doubt (*viśaya* or *saṃśaya*), the *pūrvapakṣa* (the plausible view of the matter), the refutation (*uttara*) of the *pūrvapakṣa* and the *siddhānta* (the authoritative conclusion). Some omit *uttara* as a constituent part and put *saṅgati* (the relation of the topic to what precedes and follows and to the whole *śāstra*) instead after the doubt. This method is a very convenient one and well adapted for the display of logical acumen and clarity of reasoning. This method has been adopted in the *Brahmasūtras* also.

Although there is a general agreement between the two great writers, Prabhākara and Kumārila, they differ on several matters of detail which are too numerous to mention. A few of the more important items of divergence are stated below.

(1) As regards the first *sūtra* Kumārila says that the *vidhi* in the sentence '*svādhyāyo*' *dhyetavyaḥ*' urges one on to investigate the meaning and interpretation of Vedic texts, Prabhākara[45] says that it is not the text laying down the study of Veda that is the moving spring of the Mīmāṃsā-śāstra, but it is the injunction about teaching (*aṣṭavarṣaṃ brāhmaṇam-upanayīta tamadhyāpaysta*) that urges one towards the Mīmāṃsāśāstra. The teacher requires a pupil and hence studying is implied in the act of teaching and the words '*svādhyāyo'dhyetavyaḥ*' are a mere *anuvāda* of what is well-known.

(2) According to Kumārila, the second *sūtra* meets the position that *dharma* cannot be defined and expressly declares a good definition of *dharma* and also implies that in the Veda we have the valid means of the knowledge of *dharma*; Prabhākara says that the first *sūtra* having declared that the investigation of *dharma* should follow the study of the Veda, that the meaning of the whole Veda

45. Vide Praka. pp 5-12; *Ślokavā*. on *sūtra* 1 verses 76-110.

is intended to be expressed, and that therefore the word *dharma* might comprehend the whole Veda, this *sūtra* declares that the Veda meant here is not the whole of it (including mere *arthavādas* and *mantras*) but only the injunctive parts of it that speak of something to be done (*kāryarūpa* as opposed to *siddharūpa*).[46]

(3) Prabhākara holds the view of Anvitābhidhāna i.e. words convey a sense only when joined together in a sentence ; while Kumārila holds the view of Abhihitānvaya i.e. words have each an independent meaning of their own and then are joined in sentence and convey the meaning of the sentence as a whole.

(4) Prabhākara[47] recognises only five *pramāṇas*, omitting *abhāva*, while Kumārila takes the *pramāṇas* to be six.

(5) They differ on the question of Arthāpatti. Kumārila[48] gives 'fat Devadatta does not eat by day' as an example of Śrutārthāpatti, but the Prābhākaras do not accept that it is Śrutārthāpatti.[49]

(6) The views of Prābhakara and Kumārila on many individual *adhikaraṇas* differ considerably ; vide for example the *Jaiminīyanyāya-mālā-vistara* on 1. 2. 19-25 (*vidhivannigadādhikaraṇa*), I. 3. 24-29 (*Sādhu-śabda-prayukty-adhikaraṇa*), I. 3. 31-35 (*Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa*), I. 4. 2 (*Udbhidādīnāṃ nāmadheyatādhikaraṇa*) I. 4. 9 (*Āgneyādīnām anāmadheyatā*), I. 4. 10 (*Barhirādiśabdānāṃ jātivācitā*), I, 4. 13-16 (*Vaiśvadevādiśabdānāṃ nāmadheyatā*), II. 1. 5. (*apūrvādhikaraṇa*), II. 1. 6-8 (*karmaṇāṃ guṇapradhānabhāva*), II. 2. 1 (*Aṅgapūrba*) &c.

(ABORI, VI, 19245. Selections)

46. Vide *Jaiminīya-nyāyamālāvistara* pp. 14-17 (Anandasrama ed.).
47. Vide *Praka.* dp. 13-16
48. Vide *Ślokavā.* pp. 473-492 ; *Praka.* p. 44 and pp. 118-124, pp. 129-132.
49. Vide *Ślokavā.* 51-60, *Praka.* pp. 116-118. It has escaped the notice of scholars that, according to the *Nyāyaratnākara* on *Tantravā.* (verse 9) Kumārila makes an express reference to Prabhākara's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā.*

THE MĪMĀṂSĀ DOCTRINE OF WORKS

K. A. Nilakanta Shastry

Of the so-called six systems of Indian Philosophy, Vedānta has been the most popular among modern scholars. The MĪMĀṂSĀ system has attracted comparatively little attention. The latter has always been viewed with suspicion as a store-house of soul-killing ritualism, and the question has often been asked as to why it ever came to be looked on as philosophy Undoubtedly, it gives great trouble to the modern student to understand the technique of Antique Ritualism, at least to such an extent as to enable him to follow the endless speculations on the minute details of rituals ; but anybody, who takes the trouble, can see that the Mīmāṃsā Darśana embodies much of philosophy, and what is perhaps of greater importance, more of common sense. It has next to no answer to the great problems of metaphysics. It simply does not concern itself with them. It is part of a relition of Works. It has for its main object the determination of doubtful points in the elaborate rituals enjoyined by the Vedas by discussion and interpretation. It raises and answers incidentally some questions of great interest. One of these is the question of the existence or non-existence of a personal god or gods. The object of this paper is to present in translation some of the chief texts, especially those from the great commentary of Śabara Svāmin on Jaimini's *Sūtras*, and to indicate the place of the Mīmāṃsist answer to this question in the development of Indian religious thought.

It is necessary to state briefly the Mīmāṃsist position regarding the Vedas at the outset. They are accepted as Eternal and Infallible. This belief the Mīmāṃsā system

shares with all the other orthodox systems. But it looks upon them also as *exclusively* Karmic or ritualistic in character, and it undertakes to interpret the whole scripture on this basis. This attitude towards scripture, strange as it may seem at first sight, is not altogether without a parallel. The Romanist position regarding the Bible is very similar to this. The Bible was looked upon as "a store-house... of doctrinal truths and rules for moral conduct—and *nothing-more*."[1] The position in either case is not without difficulty. The Vedas, as well as the Bible, contain much more than the Mīmāṃsist and Romanist positions allege. How the Romanists got over their difficulty need not be pursued here. The Mīmāṃsā holds[2] that the whole Veda falls under two main heads, M*antra* and *Brāhmaṇa*, the first comprising chiefly verses to be chanted in rituals in the manner laid down in the *Brāhmaṇas* and priestly manuals, and the latter made up of Ritualistic Injunctions (Vidhi) and Arthavādas, term which according to the Mīmāṃsist, applies to all portions of the Veda that are neither Mantra nor Vidhi. The Arthavādas may contain and very often do contain separate ideas of their own. And the modern historian has to rely most of his information on these portions of the Veda. But the Mīmāṃsist's position regarding them[3] is that all these texts of the Veda are somehow or other connected with Vidhis, intended to extol them in various ways and therefore subordinate to them in importance, and should be understood as parts or adjuncts of the Vidhis themselves. It is not possible here to discuss whether and how far this is a correct position. The matter will come up again in connection with the relative standpoints of Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. But some emphasis must be laid on the fact

1. Lindsay, *History of the Reformation*, vol. I, p. 455.
2. See Jaimini II, 1, 32-33. Also *Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra*, XXIV, I. 30-4 (Bibl. Ind.) for a clear and brief summary of the whole position. Haug—Introd. to *Aitareya Br.*, Part I, towards the end, is also instructive.
3. See Jaimini I. 2, 1-18, and Śabara thereon.

that the Mīmāṃsist understand by the Veda the whole body of revealed scripture that is understood to constitute the Veda by all the other orthodox systems of Indian philosophy. A distinguished Orientalist[4] has said: "In reality the teachers of the Mīmāṃsā associate the word Veda less with these ancient hymns (viz., *Rigveda*) than with the ritualistic texts of the second period of Vedic literature, in which the individuality of the authors is not so prominent." It will be equally true to say that in reality the teachers of the Vedānta associate the word Veda less with the ancient hymns of the *Ṛgveda* and the ritualistic texts of the Yajus and *Brāhmaṇas* than with the metaphysical and mystical texts (Upaniṣads) of the third period of Vedic literature, so to say. The reality, at least to an Indian student, seems to lie elsewhere. All the orthodox schools agree in accepting the whole body of the Veda as revealed and eternal.[5] The difference in the emphasis laid on the different parts of the scripture by the different schools arises from totally distinct views of life and religion. Any Indian Mīmāṃsist of the present day would be shocked to hear that his views on scripture deny the quality of scriptureness to any portion of the Veda. But it is beyond question that there is a decided difference in the adjustment of stress on various parts of the Veda among the rival schools.

Perhaps the most important general question that the Mīmāṃsist has to answer is as to the meaning and significance of a sacrificial act. According to him, he has to perform it because it is enjoyined on him as part of his duty by the Eternal Word; but this does not preclude him from seeking to understand the logic of his act. Is the sacrifice an act of worship of a personal Deity or what? With this is bound up the more general question—

4. R. Garbe on Mīmāṃsā in Hastings' Encyl. of Religion and Ethics, Vol. VIII. Contra Jaimini II. 1, 35-7.
5. The difference in the view of the eternity of Veda taken by Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta does not affect the argument here.

are we to recognise the existence of a god (or gods) or not? The answer to these questions is by no means easy for the Mīmāṃsist. He is faced with two difficulties. First, he is often enjoined by the Word to sacrifice to all sorts of curious things as well as to the well-known gods of the Vedic pantheon. Secondly, these better-known gods themselves are embedded in the Vedas in all stages of their making.[6] The nature of these difficulties may be explained by instances, before proceeding to give the texts containing the Mīmāṃsist solution of them. The instances quoted will also go to show that the difficulties had begun to be felt, perhaps long before the Mīmāṃsā school began to apply itself to the task of systematising the ritualism of the Vedic religion. The *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* in discussing the rituals of the famous Aśvamedha sacrifice comments on the *Mantras* in the corresponding portion of the *Saṃhitā*. In that sacrifice there occurs a curious *homa* to the actions, etc., of the horse, in which the *Mantras* are "*svāhā* to *Iṃkāra*, *svadhā* to the *Iṃkṛta*, etc.".[7] On this the *Brāhmaṇa* raises a doubt, which is settled in the true dogmatic style of the *Brāhmaṇas*. It says[8]: "So they say. The actions of the horse are verily unworthy of being sacrificed to; therefore these are not to be sacrificed to. But then (finally) they say this. They should be sacrificed to. For even here (i.e., at the very beginning of the Aśvamedha) one who knows like this and sacrifices to the actions of the horse completes the Aśvamedha." Here then is definitely enjoined a sacrifice to the actions of the Aśvamedha horse, which could not by any means be said to be gods, and even the *Brāhmaṇa* finds a difficulty in the way. Again, the gods of the Veda are sometimes concerete beings with human form and at others they are unmistakably inanimate things treated as persons. Yāska in his *Nirukta*

6. Bloomfield, *Religion of the Veda* brings this out very clearly.
7. Sāyaṇācārya naively explains that *Ingkāra* is the sound made by the horse when it sees its fodder; while *Ingkṛta* means that for which the sounding was made, viz. the fodder itself.
8. *Taitt. Br.*, III, 8.

devotes a section to a brief and suggestive discussion on this point.[9] This portion of Yāska's great work may be said to constitute the point of departure for the Mīmāṃsist view regarding gods. Yāska starts with the sentence: "Then (comes) the consideration of the form of gods." He then states one view saying that gods are like men, and quotes instances from the Veda in which gods are described as (1) having hands, feet, etc., like men, (2) possessing a house, wife property, etc., like men, and (3) eating, drinking, and doing all other things like men. He then states the opposite view that gods are not like men and quotes instances where inanimate things like wind, earth, sun, etc., are described in exactly the same manner as that just noticed in the case of the other gods. He concludes by suggesting that they may both be considered wise, or that the inanimate things may be considered to have their animate duplicates (*karmātmāṇaḥ*), and points out that the last constitutes the belief of the Ākhyānas (folklore, or the *Mahābhārata*, according to the comment of Durgā-cārya). The texts of the Veda quoted by Yāska furnish the standard instances of the Mīmāṃsā discussions on the matter.

Having thus indicated the nature of the question taken up for discussion by the Mīmāṃsā school, the discussion itself may now be reproduced. It takes the form of an enquiry as to whether the sacrifice is performed for the sake of pleasing a deity whose favour is solicited by the act or not. As happens generally in such discussions, the position to be refuted comes out in a lengthy *pūrvapakṣa*, and then follows the answer. The main stages in the argument will be indicated by prefixing capital letters to each stage in the *pūrvapakṣa* and repeating the same letters to indicate the corresponding answers in the *siddhānta*. The translation aims at being more literal than literary. Where the text has not been closely followed, this will be pointed out

9. VII, 6-7, pp. 754 and 761 of the Bombay Government Ednl. Series.

in foot-notes and the reasons stated for the course adopted. There are many extracts from the *Ṛgveda* in the *Bhāṣya*; these I have mostly traced out with the aid of the *Vedic Concordance* of Professor Bloomfield, and I have used Griffith's version of the *Ṛgveda* and modified it slightly in some places in the light of the great commentaries of Sāyaṇācārya on the Veda and Durgācārya on the *Nirukta*. The texts are marked off separately from my own elucidations and incidental comments.

TEXTS : No. 1

(*Jaimini* IX, 1. 6-10, *and Śabarasvāmī thereon*)

(SU.) Or, the deity shall cause the deed to be done (*prayojayet*) as the guest; the meal (sacrifice) is for the deity's sake (IX, 1, 6).

(COM.) It is *not* true that Agni and others are *not* the inducing agents (of the deed).[10] (On the other hand) all deities deserve to be (considered) the instigators of all sacred deeds. Why? Because the meal is for their sake. (E) For this, which is known as a sacrifice, is (no other than) the meal for the deity. Edible material is offered to the deity, saying, the deity shall eat. (A) The name of the deity is mentioned in this sacrifice in the Dative case[11], and the Dative case is employed when a thing is more directly aimed at than in the Accusative case. Therefore the deity is not secondary, (rather) the material (*dravya*) and the deed (sacrifice) are secondary, with reference to the deity.

10. This sentence of Śabara takes up the discussion from a conclusion arrived at in the preceding section.
11. Here the commentator employs the technical expressions of grammar. An attempt to transla tethem literally will make the translation cumbrous without helping to clear up the meaning. This remark applies to all places where the discussion hinges on case terminations.

(B) And moreover sacrifice is worship of the deity.[12] As wee see it in the world the worship is secondary to the object worshipped. (C) And it must be noted that here it is as in the case of a guest. Just as any little entertainment given to the guest is all for his sake (that is, to please him), so this sacrifice also (is performed to please the deity).

Now, the objection[13] arises that by saying this the deity comes to be accepted as having a form as eating (the offering). We reply, just so, the deity does have a form and does eat. Whence (is this seen)? From TRADITION, POPULAR BELIEF, AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.[14] (D) For tradition has it thus; the deity has form. And tradition is for us valid evidence. Again, people believe that the deity has a form. They paint Yama with a rod in his hand; and they say likewise. Similarly, Varuṇa with a nose in his hand, and Indra with a thunderbolt. And (thus) tradition is in our eyes strengthened by popular belief. So also there is CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE in favour of this view: for example. "Oh, Indra, the right arm we caught." There is a right hand and left hand only in a human figure. Thus again—"These two, heaven and earth, that are far apart, thou graspest, Oh, Maghavan; thy fist is great."[15] Kāśi means fist. That also fits in only with the human form. Again—"Indra,

12. Devapūjā is a meaning assigned to the root *yaj* in the *Dhātupāṭha*.
13. Here the commentator hints at the genuine Mīmāṃsist answer to the question under discussion in order to strengthen the case against it.
14. The terms in the text are respectively—*smṛti*, *upacāra*, and *anyārthadarśana*. The translation of *upacāra* by popular belief may appear bold, at first sight. But none of the meanings given in the dictionaries suits the context, and the whole trend of the commentary seems to support the translation given above. The capital letters must be a sufficient warning that the expression is half-technical in character. [*Upacāra* can perhaps be better translated by 'practice' and *anyārthadarśana* by 'extra evidence'—D. R. B.]
15. Ṛ̣V. III, 30, 5 and N. (*Nirukta*) 6. 1.

transported with the juice (of Soma), vast in his belly, strong in his neck, and stout arms, smites the Vṛtras down"[16] The neck, belly, arms indicate the human form here also. Therefore the deity does possess form and eats also.

(E) How is it known (that it eats also)? From tradition, popular Belief, and Circumstantial Evidence. Says Tradition: the deity eats. And so also they believe the deity eats; thus they bring to it various kinds of offerings. Circumstantial Evidence also leads us to infer that the deity eats. For example: "Eat Indra and drink of that which stirs to meet thee"[17]. So also, "All kinds of food within his maw he gathers."[18] Then (Indra) "at a single draught drank the contents of thirty pails".[19] It may be said—the deity does not eat, for if it did, the offering (*havis*) offered to it would diminish in quantity. In reply, we say that the deity is seen to absorb the essence of the food like the bee (taking honey from the flower). How? The food becomes tasteless after being offered to the deity; from this it is inferred the deity eats up the essence of the food.

(SU.) And because of the Lordship of material goods (the deity shall cause the deed to be done). (IX, 1. 7).

(COM.) If the deity is the Lord of any material good and if it bestows a favour on being entertained, then this worship of the deity may be undertaken in order to propitiate it. But (it may be said) both these things do not exist, (are not true). Hence (to meet this objection) it is said (in the *Sūtra*), (F) the deity is the Lord of material good. How is this known? From Tradition, Popular Belief and Circumstantial Evidence. Tradition clearly says that the deity is the master of all the good things of life. Thus again (the language of) Popular Belief—"the deity's village," "the deity's field"—strengthens the same Tradition.

16. Ṛ.V., VIII. 17. 8.
17. Ṛ.V.. X. 116. 7. N. 7., 6.
18. Ṛ.V., I, 95, 10.
19. Ṛ.V., VIII, 66, 4. N. 5, 11.

Likewise Circumstantial Evidence shows the lordship of the deity, e.g. ; "Indra is sovereign lord of heaven and earth. Indra is lord of waters and of clouds ; Indra is lord of prosperers and sages ; Indra must be invoked in rest and effort."[20] Also, "looker-on of every thing, lord of this moving world, lord, Indra, of what moveth not".[21]

Thus also we see from Tradition and Popular Belief (G) that deity bestows favours, Tradition says this distinctly, and there are likewise expressions of Popular Belief, e.g., Paśupati is pleased with him ; hence a son is born to him ; Vaiśravaṇa is pleased with him ; hence he has obtained wealth. Likewise there is Circumstantial Evidence. "It is as if one pleases the gods who are offering-eaters by means of fire-offerings and the gods in their pleasure give one food and sap of food."[22] (SU.) And thence (i.e., from the deity) (arises) the connection with it (the fruit of the deed). (IX. 1, 8).

(COM.) (H) From that deity comes the connection between the worshiper and the fruit (of the worship). Whoever attends on the deity with an offering, him the deity connects with the fruit (of his deed). How is this known ? From Tradition and Popular Belief, Tradition says that the deity rewards him who sacrifices. And the same tradition is strengthened by Popular Belief as, for example, Paśupati was worshipped by this man and he obtained a son. Again, Circumstantial Evidence shows this same, thing. "He with his folk, his house, his family, his sons, gains booty for himself, and with the heroes, wealth ; who, with oblation and a true believing heart serves Brahmaṇaspati the father of the Gods".[23] Again, "only when satisfied himself, does Indra satisfy this person (sacrificer) with offspring and cattle." Thus by offering of food and sayings of praise the deity

20. Ṛ.V., X, 89, 10. N. 7, 2.
21. Ṛ.V., VII, 32, 22.
22. The text is *Iṣamūrjam*, which Eggaling in his *Śat. Br.* renders "sap and pith."
23. Ṛ.V., II, 26, 3.

is worshipped and the deity being pleased (thereby) gives the fruit. That particular fruit, which Agni, worshipped by a particular deed, is master of, and which he gives to the doer, this could not be given (say) by Sūrya. And we learn from Verbal Testimony (Vedas) who gives what. Thus something is said of Agni but not of Sūrya.[24]

(SU.) Rather[25], on account of Verbal Testimony, the sacrificial act should be held primary and the mention of the deity secondary. (IX. 1. 9).

(COM.) By the expression "rather" the contention (of the preceding *Sūtras*) is set aside. The statement that the deity is the inducing agent is not tenable. The act of the sacrifice is the prime thing. From the sacrifice comes Apūrva[26]. Why ? Because of VERBAL TESTIMONY. The knowledge, that anything which gives fruit, i.e., any inducing agent gives a particular fruit, arises from VERBAL TESTIMONY and not from DIRECT PERCEPTION or other sources of knowledge.[27] (H) And VERBAL TESTIMONY derives the fruit from the sacrifice (literally, that which is indicated by the root *Yaj*) and not from the deity. How is this known ? Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices are referred to in the Instrumental case, as in—"He who desires heaven should sacrifice by the Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa". Thus again "He who desires heaven should sacrifice by the Jyotiṣṭoma." It is the sacrifice and not the deity that is mentioned simultaneously with the desire for heaven. But then, is not the sacrifice an operation with sacrificing material (*dravya*) and the deity (*devatā*) ? True it is. But the mention of

24. I. e., what is said of Agni does not apply to Sūrya.
25. Text, *Api Vā*. Here begins the reply, or Siddhānta.
26. This word literally means "not existing before." It is here a technical term of Mīmāṃsā by which is designated the resultant of any action (*karma*) in an invidisible stage which it is supposed to assume before producing visible results. See Jaimini, II, I. 5 and Śabara thereon.
27. It needs no mention that for the Mīmāṃsist, Śabda (VERBAL TESTIMONY of the Veda) is more valid evidence than Pratyakṣa (DIRECT PERCEPTION) and other Pramāṇas.

the deity is secondary. The *dravya* and *devatā* are there already ; it is the sacrifice which must be brought into existence. When something that exists is mentioned along with some other that has to be brought into existence, the existent is mentioned for the sake of the non-existent. Therefore the deity is not the inducing agent.

(A) As for the statement—"(the deity) is more directly aimed at (by the Dative) than when the Accusative (termination) is used",—(we say) we do not gainsay the fact of its being aimed at. It is clear from the SENTENCE[28] that the meaning of the term *devatā*, connected as it is with a *taddhita* form or a Dative ending, is being directly aimed at. But from the very same source (it is seen) that it is the sacrifice that is connected with the fruit ; for by EXPRESS REFERENCE we learn the instrumentality of that and not of the deity (in producing the fruit). Again, though we may infer that the sacrifice is for the deity, still this need not stand in the way of its being performed for the sake of its fruit. It is the fruit that is the *puruṣārtha* (the thing desired by man). And the endeavour for the sake of the *puruṣārtha* is ours, not the deity's. Therefore we do not do anything on account of any inducement from the deity. And the mention of the deity's name with the Dative ending quite fits in if it (deity) is a means to the (performance of the) fruitful sacrifie.

(B) And as for (the statement)—"sacrifice is worship to the deity and the object of worship is the primary thing in worship as we see it in the world"—(we reply), here it should not be as in the world. Here the worship of the worshipped is important. That which is fruitful is the inducing agent. Therefore the act of sacrifice is the inducing agent. Again by this view (that is being

28. Here it must be explained that there are grades of validity even in VERBAL TESTIMONY. For the present purpose it is enough to note that Śruti (EXPRESS REFERENCE) has greater force than *vākya* (SENTENCE). See Jaimini, III, 3, 14.

refuted now) we have to assume that the deity has a form and that it eats, as there can be no gift or meal for a formless and uneating deity.

(D)[29] As for the statement—"from TRADITION, POPULAR BELIEF, and CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (we see that) the deity has form and eats"—(we reply) it is not (true) ; TRADITION is based on *Mantras* and Arthavādas. It is a matter of DIRECT PERCEPTION that (all) the knowledge on which TRADITION rests is based on them. And we shall show (elsewhere)[30] that those *Mantras* and Arthavādas do not support this view. Says the objector : "If that is so, (i.e., if the *Mantras* and Arthavādas do not say that deities have form), then (I say) the knowledge on which TRADITION rests does not come from *Mantras* and Arthavāda". We reply that for those who take a superficial view of *Mantras* and Arthavāda, for them it (the knowledge thus gained by a superficial view) is the basis of TRADITION. (That is) even if it is invalidated for those who take a deeper view, still for some one or other it becomes the basis of TRADITION. Therefore TRADITION has only this source and POPULAR BELIEF is only based on TRADITION.

(D—Cont.) As for CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE like "Oh, Indra, thy right arm we caught," it does not mean that Indra has an arm. It only means—that which is his right arm, that we caught ; therefore, we do not learn from the SENTENCE the existence of Indra's arm.[31] Objection : If it does not exist, then it is not credible that we caught hold of the arm ; hence we have to infer

29. Attention may be drawn to the unique interest this paragraph possesses for the modern student of Comparative Religion.
30. See the next Extract, No. II.
31. This line of reasoning may appear queer at first sight. Still, not only is it perfectly logical, but is often found useful in modern discussions. Thus, there are two versions of the martyrdom of St. Thomas in India, but no proof that he was martyred at all, Cf. V. A. Smith, *Oxford History*, page 126.

the existence of the arm thus—there is this hand, that which we held. (Reply): This cannot be; for though there may be the arm, it is matter of DIRECT PERCEPTION that we did not hold it. So even thus (accepting your inference), there is still an incongruity. We have thus either to admit an absurdity or say this is mere praise (*stuti*, i.e., Arthavāda). But it may be said that this is the statement of a man who caught hold of Indra's arm. We reply, this should not be suggested as it would subject the Veda to the imperfection of having a commencement (in time).[32] Again, we are not told that there was a man who caught (the arm), for there is no evidence and it cannot be said that from the very statement, we infer the existence of him who caught the arm, for there occur (in the Vedas) also statements which are meaningless like "ten pomegranates, six cakes". Again, taking him who holds this view that Indra has a form, even according to him, the summoning by the term 'Indra' is for invoking the deity, and the invocation is a remembrancer.[33] In that case remembrancing is proper only if we have known that he is relevant (related to the sacrifice). But it is not known by any means that he is. That being so, the invocation is futile. And it cannot be held that we infer that he is invoked from the evidence of the WORD; for we have said[34] that when we assume an Adṛṣṭa (literally unseen, is equal to, Apūrva), there cannot be any assumption of the hand, etc. Further, it is by no means sure that he has been invoked; for there is no proof (to that effect). Therefore the Vocative word is not for the sake of an invocation, but only for a designation. Even in the case of the deity having no form, it might likewise be used for designation. The Vocative ending-word is for

32. The Mīmāṃsā system starts by "proving" the eternity of the WORD. In the 'proof' incidents like this are explained away. Muir, O. S. T., Vol. III, is still useful for the general reader.
33. The text is *anuvacana*, i.e., saying again what has been settled before.
34. I have not been able to trace this reference so far.

praise. Thus, this, which is called deity, is (only) the most important means (to the sacrifice), which is called by the Vocative word and entertained as if it were sentient in the belief that it procures some good. Likewise, the deity is indicated by the Vocative word and told "we have caught hold of thy hand," that is to say, we are dependents on you. This is only a reminder to us that we have to perform a deed connected with Indra (Indrakarma).

(D-cont.) Likewise, "these two, heaven and earth, are very far apart, and these you hold, Oh, Maghavan, thy fist is great" in this the fist is praised as if it exists. But there is no proof that it exists. For this is not to say thy fist is great. But what? That which is thy fist, that is great. These are different ideas, namely, "thy fist exists", and "thy fist is great." And it should not be said that a thing could be praised only if it exists; for even if a thing is not necessarily connected with (i.e., does not possess) human attributes, even that thing is (sometimes) praised as if it had human attributes, e.g., "They speak out like a hundred, like a thousand men; they cry aloud to us with their green tinted mouth; while, pious stones, they ply their task with piety and even before the Hotar, taste the offered food".[35] Again, "Sindhu hath yoked her car, light rolling, drawn by steeds".[36] Therefore there can be no Presumption[37] from Vedic Texts regarding the human likeness of the deity. Likewise, the expression "broad-necked Indra" does not say that Indra possesses a neck. What then? That which is the neck of Indra, that is broad. There is no proof of the existence of the neck. Nor can the praise of the neck necessitate any Presumption

35. RV., X, 94, 2. It may here be noticed that Durgācarya in his commentary on N. 7, 7, quotes this passage and comments on it in the exact manner of a Mīmāṃsist. He says in effect: Seeing that stones are referred to like this, it can be no proof of Indra being animate and human that he is referred to likewise.
36. RV., X, 75, 9. N. 7, 7. Here Sāyaṇa has 'Sindhurdevatā'.
37. Here the term in the text is Arthāpatti, the fifth of the six Pramāṇas generally accepted by Mīmāṃsakas.

(re: human form); for (such) praise is seen even in the absence of a human form.

(D.—cont.) Furthur, the word 'Indra' connected with the words "Indra smites his foes" could not come into any connection with (the words) "strong-necked, etc." For, in that case, a double pronunciation of the word will be necessitated. We shall have to understand that Indra was a broad neck and (also) that Indra smites his foes. Thus, there will be a break (into two sentences); but as we have it, the sentence is (a) single (whole).[38] It is appropriate, if we take it that 'broad-necked, etc.', are not laid down here as facts, but only mentioned for the same of prise, i.e., as much as to say, that he (Indra) being so and so in the transport (born) of the Soma juice, smites his foes. The form of the sentence is clearly calculated to tell us about the slaughter of Vṛtras (foes). And the sentences: "Thy two arms. Oh Indra, are hairy", "Thy two eyes, Oh Indra, are tawny"—tell us only of the hairiness of the arms and tawny colour of the eyes, and not of the existence of the arms or eyes. And even where we can infer the mention of the existence of eyes, as in "To thee I say it who hast eyes and hearest"[39] even there it is not the connection with the eyes (that is intended), but the connection with speech; thus, "I speak to you that has

38. Here we come to one of the most fundamental rules of interpretation adopted by Mīmāṃsakas. Vākya-bheda (lit. breach of sentence) is a fault that must be avoided. Says Śabara: "As many words as serve a single purpose, so many constitute one sentence" (on II, 2, 27) and one sentence cannot serve more than one purpose at a time. And Śabara's comment on II. 2. 25, makes it clearer still "We do not say that one thing cannot effect two purposes at a time; but we say that one sentence cannot serve to indicate both these purposes"—i.e., omitting the details of the discussion there, a word or a group of words pronounced only once can indicate only one purpose. If the correct position of Mīmāṃsists here is not grasped, most of their discussions would appear pointless.

39. RV. X. 18, 1.

eyes" ; and the sight is mentioned for the sake of praise, as if it exists. Whence is this known ? From the Dative ending (of *Cakṣuṣmate*). If we import the meaning of the substantive (*cakṣus*) then the sentence will break, as it will connote both the ideas : "You have eyes" and "I tell you who has eyes". Therefore there is absolutely no CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE that indicates that the deity has human likeness.

(E) And this (sacrifice) is not a meal. The deity does not eat. Hence the (reason alleged) "Because the meal is for the deity's sake" is erroneous.

(E—cont.) As for (the statement)—"From TRADITION, POPULAR BELIEF and CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (we learn that) the deity eats" this has been rebutted by proving that the deity has no form. Further, the meal offered to an eating deity will diminish. And there is no proof that the deities eat the essence of the food in the manner of the bee. There is DIRECT PERCEPTION in the case of the bees ; it is not so in case of the deity. Therefore the deity does not eat. The statement that the meal offered to the deity becomes tasteless creates no difficulty ; the food becomes tasteless and cold on account of exposure to the air.

(F) Nor is the deity lord of any material good, and being powerless, how can it give (anything) ? And it does not hold good that from TRADITION, POPULAR BELIEF and CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, we can infer the lordship of the deity. We have already said that TRADITION, is based on *Mantra* and Arthavāda ; and POPULAR BELIEF as in "the deity's village" and "the deity's field" is merely a belief. That which one can dispose of at his will, that (alone) is his property. And the deity does not dispose of either the 'village' or the 'field' at his own pleasure. Therefore (the deity) does not give (anything). And those who worship the deity get their prosperity from that which they have given up with the deity in their minds. And for the statement that CIRCUMSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE shows the lordship of the deity as in 'Indra is the lord of heaven, etc."—knowing by DIRECT PERCEPTION that the deity has no Lordship, we infer that these words are figurative. Here says (the opponent)—"We learn from VERBAL TESTIMONY the lordship of the deity, e.g. 'the gods distribute all good things,' and we infer that this is only because the gods will it." (We reply) it is not so. For we see by DIRECT PERCEPTION that this is only the will of those that worship the deity. And that (will) could not be superseded. Even those who describe the deity as omnipotent do not disguise (the part of the) will of the worshippers. They say further that the deity so does as is the will of the worshipper. And he is no lord who follows the will of another and who cannot distribute (favours) at his own will. Further, there is no such VERBAL TESTIMONY (as is alleged). On account of its present-tense form and its being opposed to DIRECT PERCEPTION, it (the sentence quoted) is seen to be mere praise. When such expressions could be (easily) explained as intended for praise, they cannot be used as VERBAL TESTIMONY to the lordship (of the deity). And the deity does not connect a man with the fruit for which it may be worshipped.

(G) And for the statement—"From TRADITION, POPULAR BELIEF and CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (we see that the deity) gives and bestows favours"—TRADITION and POPULAR BELIEF have already been disposed of. And there is no CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE in the statement, "Being pleased, the deity gives him food and sap of food", for there is another Vidhi enjoined, viz. "He says—'collect together to the right hand side."[40] Likewise in (the following):—"Only when satisfied himself does Indra satisfy this person (sacrificer) with off-spring and cattle." Here it is an Aindra (related to Indra)

40. This is for the priests to gather together and take their fee after the sacrifice—the fee in this case being food prepared in one of the sacrificial fires.

offering (Havis) that is enjoined. Therefore the deity is not the inducing agent.

(SU.) In the case of a guest he is primary, as his satisfaction is (the) primary (aim); it is not so in Karma.—IX, 1. 10.

(COM.) (C) The analogy of the guest is yet to be refuted. Hospitality must be guided by the guest; for there his satisfaction is enjoined. The guest is to be served, i.e., action must be so guided as to please him. A gift or a meal must be given (literally, made). Whatever is desired by the guest should be done. What does not please him should not be forced on him. But here in Karma there is no injunction of (the deity's pleasure). Therefore the analogy of the guest is false (lit. uneven, not on a par).

No. II.

(*Śabarasvāmin on Jaimini* X, 4, 23—*Extract.*)

Now what is this that we call deity (Devatā)? One view (is as follows): Those, Agni and others, who are, in the Itihāsas and Purāṇas said to reside in heaven, they are the deities. Here (again this) we remark that among these deities are not included day, etc., (Aharādi) and tiger, etc. (Śārdūlādi). But TRADITION includes words indicating time among deities, e.g., "This for the Kālas (times), the month is deity, the year is deity."

Another view is, that we use the word Devatā of those with reference to whom the word Devatā is heard in the *Mantras* and *Brāhmaṇas*, as in, "Fire is Devatā, wind is Devatā, sun is Devatā, moon is Devatā," and similar statements. Here again, days, etc., are not included. Further, the common term Devatā will cease to have any (definite) meaning as it will cease to be employed in every day language.

Hence, (we say) those that get Hymns (Sūkta) and

offering (Havis) are deities. Who are those that get hymns? "For Jātavedas worthy of our praise will we frame with our mind this eulogy as'twere a car; for good, in his assembly, is this care of ours. Let us not in thy friendship, Agni, suffer harm."[41] Those who got Havis, as in—"He shall prepare (the Puroḍāśa offering) pertaining to Agni on eight potsherds", That pertaining to Agni-Soma on eleven potsherds". Objection: If all those that get Havis are deities, then the potsherds become eligible to deityhood as they also get the Havis. Then (we say) that which gets the Havis and about which it can be said the Havis is intended for it, (that) is the deity. Likewise in the case of hymns The word Devatā is in TRADITION used thus:—"The hymn having Agni for its deity, the Havis having Agni for its deity." Likewise, "having the guest for deity, having Manes for deity". Thus deityhood comes to be (an attribute) of all embodied and abstract, animate and inanimate (objects) to which in accordance with VERBAL TESTIMONY, something or other comes to be devoted as being particularly intended for them. And the common word (Devatā) also becomes appropriate (gains a definite meaning). What hence? If that is so, then for a particular act, that is the deity, the word indicating which is intended or remembered, when the resolution is made, "I give up (this) Havis."

But[42] in that case, any word for Agni may be used to indicate (that deity in the Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices). Here we say that it might be so, if the word Agni is pronounced for conveying its meaning and if the meaning is conveyed for indicating its connection with the Havis. But here the word 'Agni' is not so pronounced for the sake of its meaning. Where an operation takes

41. RV., I. 94.

42. The point of the following discussion is whether in a sacrifice the meaning of the word for the deity is intended, or simply the word. If the former, two consequences follow. (1) Any other word conveying the same meaning may be substituted in the place of that mentioned in the Vidhi. (2) The concrete existence of the deity is also accepted.

place on the thing connoted, there the word is for conveying its meaning, as there is use for the meaning. But where the operation is on the word itself, there only the word must be conveyed which is intended to be connected with the operation. And the deity does not become a means to the sacrifice by its form (Rūpa). By what then ? By the connected word. Just as the Adhvaryu aids by both his hands, so the deity aids by the word. "He cleanses the Hotā's hand by twice rubbing (i.e., by two coatings of ghee)"—just as here, though there is (direct) connection with the hand, still it is only the Hotar that aids, likewise the deity that helps by the connected word is understood to aid (the sacrifice). Though the deity is enjoined as an aiding agent, still it is only the sound (word) that is connected with the sacrifice. Therefore the word is not pronounced for conveying its meaning ; for else, the meaning (conveyed) will once more convey the word and give rise to (the fault of) far-fetchedness.[43] Is it then (like this)—that only the word is connected with the Havis, and by its connection with the word the object connoted is also deity ; so that it is the deity whose name is so connected with the Havis that the latter is (intended) for the former ? (No.) It is only when there can be no operation on the word that it comes to be on the meaning. But here the operation is only on the word. Therefore the word is not for conveying its meaning (the object connoted by it). Hence it has been said by the Vṛttikāra—"The word comes first, the understanding of its meaning afterwards ; from the word arises the meaning". Thus the Havis is connected only with the word 'Agni,' and other words like Śuci, etc., have no place (in the sacrifice). And hence, it is only the word in the Vidhi that must be used as *Mantra*. It may be said that in such a case the word by itself becomes the deity. Our reply is that it is not our concern to refute this ; for it

43. Text has "Lakṣitalakṣaṇā."

by no means, invalidates our contention that the words "Śuci, etc." have absolutely no place (in the *Mantras*.)[44]

No. III

(*Śabarasvāmin on Jaimini* VIII, 1, 34—*Extract*.)

Now all this trouble is for propitiating the deity. The deity when pleased gives a man the fruit. Śruti says this—"Indra only when pleased himself pleases him with offspring and cattle". And that which has been known to be the method of pleasing Indra, the same has to be repeated whenever Indra has to be pleased * * * We say here (in reply)—this may be so, provided the fruit comes from the deity. But the fruit is from the sacrifice and Śruti says "He should sacrifice who desires heaven." As for "Indra only when pleased, etc.," we remark that the deity is mentioned in a secondary sense. The deity is part of (secondary to) the sacrifice and it is said figuratively (lit, for praise) to be the giver, as for instance in (the statements) "The minister gave me the village", "The general gave me the village". Neither "minister" nor "general" but only the king is lord of the village. While the others are secondary, the talk about their giving is merely for praise (figurative).

No. IV.

(*Śabarasvāmin on Jaimini*, III, 3, 44—*Extract*.)

He (Pūṣan) has no share (in the Havis). Objection : That which is given to a deity must be the share of the deity. Reply : This is simply renounced with an indication of the deity (with the deity in the mind). Mere renunciation does not constitute the proprietorship of the deity, for the property

44. This last reply is very interesting and must be very carefully noted.

—proprietor-relation can arise only from (the) acceptance (of the deity, for the property—proprietor-relation can arise only from (the) acceptance (of the thing renounced). And there is not the slightest evidence that the deity has accepted (it). For that which is got by one may be said to be his share. And the deity does not receive the Havis. Therefore, there is no Pūṣan's share.[45]

We are now in a position to estimate the correct Mīmāṃsā view of the nature and existence of gods. The texts translated above show the remarkable amount of dialectical skill displayed by the commentator—the only limits recognised by him being the Eternity and Infallibility of the Veda and the Duty to Action that follows from it. He spends great force in combating the idea of the personal nature of the deity; he argues by the dry light of reason and logic applied to the Veda, and his final position is an attitude of scepticism rather than of dogmatic atheism. His suggestion that TRADITION and POPULAR BELIEF are based on misunderstandings of the true meaning and purpose of the Veda might furnish the text for a treatise on the growth of popular Mythology, although one feels that these popular developments were perhaps more natural than the Mīmāṃsist's inferences and explanations. Is the sound "Indra", then, all that is left of the great Vedic hero and god? It may be so, Mīmāṃsā is not concerned with that, in effect it does not know. Does not then the Mīmāṃsist believe his own Veda when it talks about these gods? The answer is, how can anybody take such texts at all seriously when their neighbours make gods of stocks and stones? Either everything, down to the grass and the neighing of the steed, becomes a god or we have to go without having a god. The latter position seems far better to the Mīmāṃsist.[46]

45. The printed text here gives no sense. I have corrected it with the aid of a manuscript belonging to Pandit A. Chinnaswami Sastri of the College of Oriental Learning—B. H. U.

46. Reference may be made here to the trenchant remarks of

This has not always been correctly understood in modern times. It has been said, "The Mīmāṃsā does not recognise the existence of god. Nevertheless, this fact interferes as little here as in the Sāṅkhya and the other systems with belief in the supernatural beings of the popular Indian faith."[47] This is hard to maintain in the face of the texts translated above. The Sāṃkhya and other systems do not concern us now. The discussion of Śabarasvāmin is almost entirely an attempt to contradict and set aside what may with great propriety be called "popular Indian faith." Therefore to say that the Mīmāṃsist has "belief in supernatural beings" after all the trouble he has taken over the question is to make a statement that derives no support from the Mīmāṃsā system as such. It is true that the position of Jaimini and Śabarasvāmin fell in the course of centuries more and more out of touch with the realities of "popular Indian faith". But here, we seek to understand the Mīmāṃsā system as it was and its place in speculation. It is clear that no professed Mīmāṃsist of any great standing has ever swerved from the position of Jaimini. It is difficult to be dogmatic about the views of the Prābhākara school in the present state of knowledge; but there is perhaps no vital difference between Prabhākara and his more famous rival Kumārila Bhaṭṭa on this matter. Again, on the strength of one of Kumārila's verses in the introductory portion of the *Ślokavārtika*[48] it has sometimes been hastily assumed that Kumārila makes out the Mīmāṃsā to be theistic. The assumption, however, is proved to be wrong by (1) Kumārila's own *Ṭupṭīkā* on Texts I and II, translated above; (2) Pārthasārathi Miśra's comment on the verse of Kumārila in the introductory

Pārthasārathi Miśra in his *Śāstradīpikā* towards the close of his comments on Jaimini IX, 1, 6-10.

47. R. Garbe, *Loc. cit.*, note 4 above. Reference may here be made to the article on "Atheism" in the Encycl. Brit., XI Edn., which distinguishes three types of "Atheism," among which Mīmāṃsā may be said to be of the last or critical type.
48. Verse No. 10 and Muir, O. S. T., Vol. III, page 95.

portion of the *Ślokavārtika* which gives apparently the true explanation of Kumārila's words, and (3) the position of the same writer in his *Śāstra-Dīpikā* in which he follows Kumārila rather closely.[49] But it seems clear that Kumārila is somewhat reluctant to drive the agnostic conclusion hard. There is a note of hesitancy in his remarks on the question. Personally he seems to have been a theist. And his first verse in the *Ślokavārtika* which is, for instance, clearly a salutation to a personal deity is explained on the pure Mīmāṃsist basis by the annotator only by twisting the text in a rather merciless fashion. A later Mīmāṃsist was so saturated with the "popular Indian faith" that he stood aghast at what he had just written, following the lead of Jaimini and other great Mīmāṃsists after him, and exclaimed penitently."[50]

It is also not without significance that Vedānta-Deśika named one of his many productions Seśvara-Mīmāṃsā, which is sufficient indication that Mīmāṃsā has generally little to do with Īśvara. But this Seśvara version of Mīmāṃsā is that of a divine who was a Vedāntist first and Mīmāṃsist only by the way. It may also be stated that Vāsudeva Dīkṣita, an eloquent South Indian annotator of very recent times, seeks to quarrel with Śabarasvāmin for his interpretation of Jaimini's views and undertakes to show that Jaimini never meant what Śabarasvāmin holds and that Kumārila admitted the personal nature of the deity.[51]

It is thus abundantly clear that the genuine Mīmāṃsā position on the question appealed less and less to the Indian mind, especially after the great days of Śaṃkara. It is also clear that there is a strong and almost continuous Mīmāṃsist tradition against the acknowledgement of a

49. Vide note 46. See Dr. Jha's *Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā*, p. 85 ff.
50. Khaṇḍa Deva's *Bhāṭṭa Dipikā* (Mysore Edn.), Vol. III, page 53.
51. See his remarks in the *Kutūhala-Vṛtti*, Vol. I, page 47 (Srirangam Edn.). I have not access at present to the portions of his extensive work not yet printed.

personal deity or deities. But the voice of the Mīmāṃsist becomes fainter, and even professed Mīmāṃsists like Khaṇḍa Deva maintain their position only in theory, and in practice join the herd against whose beliefs Jaimini and Śabara had preached in their day. The attitude of Vāsudeva Dīkṣita is, like that of Vedānta Deśika, strongly coloured by his Vedantic prepossessions. In fact, he quotes the conclusions of the *Vedānta Sūtras* freely in support of his position in Mīmāṃsā. We can infer from the facts adduced so far—and several others of a like nature can be easily produced—that the true Mīmāṃsā position came to be looked upon as something close to the borderland of heredoxy, if not entirely on the other side of the frontier. At least two large developments may be traced in the later religious history of India, each of them in its own way hostile to the genuine Mīmāṃsā view. First came the great impetus given to the Vedānta by the life and teaching of Śaṃkara, probably the finest intellect of India. The Advaita system as developed by Śaṃkara furnished a common platform on which popular religion and metaphysical speculation might meet together and live in peace. At the same time, it set up an influential opposition to the Mīmāṃsā view on many important questions of religion by adopting a rival standpoint. The rivalry was to a large extent inherent in the two systems, but it was emphasised and developed by the life-work of Śaṃkara. The other great factor in the situation was a growth of a great longing for a personal god, communion with whom would be the highest form of bliss—a longing that accounts for the development and spread of various Bhakti cults in later-day India. In such an atmosphere the old Mīmāṃsā view was a perilous one to keep, and even the specialists in the system became afraid of themselves.[52] But the Mīmāṃsā system was at no time much fitted to be a popular one. Its great interest lies in its being an impor-

52. Cf. Barth. Religions of India, pages 94-5, for some very suggestive remarks on Neo-Hinduism.

tant phase of speculation, and it is easy to underrate the influence exerted by the Mīmāṃsā system on later speculation in our country.

But the allegation of Vāsudeva Dīkṣita that Jaimini did not mean what his Bhāṣyakāra holds is hardly one that can be accepted in the face of the unanimous verdict of other and greater writers on the position of Jaimini. The illustrious Śaṃkara had never any doubt on the correct Mīmāṃsā position, which he sums up with great force and characteristic terseness in his discussion on *Vedānta Sūtra*, I, 3, 32. Again, Sāyaṇācārya in one place records side by side the opposite views taken by the Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā, where he mentions Jaimini by name.[53] But the best authority on Jaiminis position is Jaimini himself, and his *Sūtras* do not leave us in the slightest doubt as to the intentions of the Sūtrakāra. He says that the deity is secondary (*guṇa*).[54] And again, he directly comes to the conclusion that the *havis* is more important than the deity in the elements that make up a sacrifice.[55] Further in discussing whether the prerogative (*adhikāra*) of sacrificing is confined to men or extends to others outside the human sphere, his *Sūtras*[56] are very significant and form a striking contrast to the corresponding portion of the *Vedānta Sūtras*.[57] In one *Sūtra*, Jaimini states that whoever desires the fruit can perform the sacrifice enjoined; in the next he says only they have the prerogative of doing it who can do it exactly as enjoined by the Veda. And this is supposed to be possible only by men. But in some texts of the *Sūtras*, two other *Sūtras* are ascribed to Jaimini in this place, one excluding gods and another excluding Ṛṣis from the prerogative of performing sacrifices. It is to say the least very doubtful if these are genuine *Sūtras* of Jaimini. For one thing, we find the sentences in

53. See his Com. on *Taitt.Brāh.* III, 8, 8 Text cited above (Note. 8).
54. *Ibid.*, IX, 1, 10.
55. *Ibid.*, VIII, 1, 32-4.
56. *Ibid.*, VI, 1, 4-5.
57. *Vedānta Sūtra*, I, 3, 25-33.

the text of Śabara's *Bhāṣya* on VI, I. 5, and they do not have the look of *Sūtras*,[58] though they are quite good enough to be the sentences of the great commentator. And it would be somewhat strange on Jaimini's part if, after having discussed the question of *Sarvādhikāra* (the prerogative of all) and restricted it to men, he added two more *Sūtras* regarding Devatās and Ṛṣis. On the other hand, it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that in discussing the question of *Sarvādhikāra* in the light of the two *Sūtras* laid down by Jaimini the expounder of his system adopted a division into men, and non-men[59] and sub-divided the latter group into three sections—Devatās, Ṛṣis, and animals and trees, for facility of discussion in the light of the Vedic texts quoted by him in the commentary on the *pūrva-pakṣa Sūtra*. It may also be pointed out that the manner in which Sankara quotes[60] the two sentences under discussion, gives no indication as to whether he understood them to be the words of Jaimini or Śabarasvāmin. Personally I have no doubt that these two sentences do not form part of the Jaiminīyadarśana.

As a matter of fact, Jaimini adopts that course which may most naturally be expected of a ritualist. To ignore a personal deity may appear rank heresy in an orthodox Hindu of, say, the seventh or eighth century A. D., but not of an earlier time. From the beginning there had been a vein of scepticism in the Vedas and *Brāhmaṇas*, and the ritualist most naturally developed it further as his primary concern was with a religion of self-contained ritualism "well-nigh independent of the gods whom it served"[61]. The old scholiast, Yāska, had summed up the results of previous speculation on the form (*ākāra*) of the Devatās and indicated several lines of advance for his successors. It

58. They are *nadevānaṃ devatāntarābhāvāt narṣīnāṃ ārṣeyāntarābhāt.*
59. The term *amanuṣya* is actually used by *Śabarasvāmin* here.
60. In his *Bhāṣya* on *Vedānta Sū.*, I, 3, 26. Ānandagiri in his comment on Śaṃkara treats them as *Sūtras.*
61. Barth, *op. cit.*, page 64.

would appear that, even before Jaimini's day, this ritualism had run riot and had led to somewhat strange results. A certain Bādari is somewhat frequently referred to by Jaimini in his *Sūtras*, who may be described as an extremist in ritualism. According to this Ācarya, there is no relation even between the sacrifice and its reward.[62] Jaimini's position is that the sacrifice is performed for the sake of heaven, whatever that may be; and that, in the language of Mīmāṃsā, karma is *śeṣa* (secondary) with reference to the fruit of the same. Bādari holds that the Karma is its own end, and, when it has been done, there is nothing else to do. This gives an idea of the fervid faith in ritualism that underlies the Mīmāṃsā. And Bādari's positions help us to understand how little gods had to do with the Mīmāṃsā ideal of the attainment of bliss by WORKS. When the WORKS are their own end there is no question as to who or what gives the fruits of the deed and all talk about god and supernatural beings is cut at the root. Jaimini's position is that the deed gives its own reward, and as for the gods, we have no proof that they exist.

The discussion of the place of Jaimini and Śabara in the history of Indian thought is considerably hampered by the absence of any reliable results regarding the dates of these writers and by the unsettled nature of the literary chronology of ancient India. It has been usually assumed that Jaimini and the author of the *Vedānta Sūtras* must have been contemporaries, and the suggestion has been made that the two sets of *Sūtras* must have been composed somewhere between 200 and 450 A.D.[63] The assumption that Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa were contemporaries rests on the occurence of Jaiminis's name in the *Vedānta Sūtras* and of Bādarāyaṇa's in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* and perhaps also on an ancient tradition current among the learned

62. Jaimini, III, 1. 3 and Śabarasvāmin thereon.

63. See R Garbe on Mīmāṃsā in Hast. ERE. Vol. VIII, where H. Jacobi is referred to on the question of dates.

divines of India that Jaimini was a pupil of Bādarāyaṇa. But this seems to be very doubtful. It is not however possible to undertake to settle the point here.[64] But still more doubtful is the view that the Mīmāṃsā system has "close connection with the Vedānta doctrine". Far more correct is the opinion expressed by Barth that the early "antagonism between the men of the ritual and the men of speculation" developed in later times into an antagonism between their successors of the Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā schools.[65] As the same writer very aptly suggests, the only thing in common between the two lines of development is that both of them, each in its own way, agreed to put the Vedic gods somewhere on the back shelf. In all other respects, the two systems are diametrically opposed. This in truth is the *rationale* of Śaṃkaras refusal to consider the so-called Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsās as one Śāstram.[66] A few points of opposition may be touched on here in order to bring out more fully the ultimate bearings of the Mīmāṃsā DOCTRINE OF WORKS.

Some idea has been given above as to how the Mīmāṃsist interprets the Veda. On this question there is a vital difference between the Mīmāmsā and the Vedānta. To the former the ritualistic portions of the Veda are the most important ones, and the others are to be explained or explained away as the case may be, in the light of those texts that enjoin the duty of Karma on every man, To the Vedāntist, the portions literally at the end of the Veda, constitute the end of Veda, its highest aim, all the other portions being subsidiary to this highest knowledge that comes at the end. The Vedāntist has not to take so much trouble to explain away the other texts that appear to go against him by their ritualism and other features. He is an idealist, and his is the unique privilege of letting wolf

64. See my paper on *Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa*, in I.A., 1921. pp. 167-74.
65. Barth, *op. cit.*, 64-5
66. See Śaṃkara on the word ATHA in *Ved. Sūt.* I. 1. 1.

and the lamb lie together in the same fold. To the Mīmāṃsist the thing is more vital. Hence to him what constitutes the highest end of the Veda for the Vedāntist is only a means to WORKS. The metaphysical texts are secondary, calculated only to tell a man that there is a soul apart from the body and another existence after death, in order that he might look about himself and prepare for it by WORKS while there is yet time. In fact, the Mīmāṃsā, in so far as it can be said to be a philosophy, is a philosophy of ACTION. This is distinctly recognised by Śaṃkara, who spends as much powder and shot in fighting out the notion that the Vedas tell a man to be up and doing[67] as Śabara does to combat the view that the deities have form. Jaimini is an unflinching exponent of *āmnāyasya kriyārthatvāt* (the actional end of Vedas, so to say)—a notion which Śaṃkara starts by refuting at the very outset. Again, Jaimini simply does not recognise the highest end of Vedantic endeavour, viz., Mokṣa. It does not exist for him. In truth, it is very doubtful what he would have said if the whole of the Vedantic position as Saṃkara expounds it—and Jaimini comes in for a good deal of adverse criticism at Śaṃkara's hands—were placed before him. As it is, he has nothing to say on it directly. But we may certainly infer with Bādarāyaṇa[68] that he would decline to consider that the knowledge of self led to any separate fruit, as the whole of it was for him only a means to an end, that end being the attainment of Svarga by *WORKS*. The result of Jaimini's position is that the highest thought of the Upaniṣads has to be treated as a handmaid of ritualism—a position intrinsically very hard to maintain. On the other hand, the Vedāntist has simply to ignore the bulk of the Vedas that consists of chants and rituals or somehow attempt a weak reconciliation between the two portions of the Veda, as for instance, by saying that the performance of WORKS pro-

67. See his elaborate and close discussion on I, 1, 4 of the *Vedānta Sūtra*.
68. *Ibid.*, III, 4, 2.

duces a Right frame of Mind (*cittaśuddhi*), and thus indirectly contributes to induce a desire for the knowledge of Brahmā. In one place, Vācaspati Miśra has attempted to prove a more direct connection between Ritualism and Soul-Knowledge,[69] and the performance cannot be held convincing. The point is that both the systems have agreed to accept the entire Veda as Revealed Scripture. But historically the Veda embodies different strata of religious thought and practice coming down from different ages. As is generally held at present, the Ritualistic portions of the Veda are anterior to the metaphysical Upaniṣads in their date of composition. The result is the Ritualist has been forced to subordinate the later religion of knowledge, while the Vedāntist has to subordinate the earlier religion of Ritualism. The Mīmāṃsist has been described as tradition-incarnate. He does really embody in his system a more ancient phase of India's religion that the Vedānta. The splendid, elaborate and costly Ritualism of the more antique period was certainly developed at a time when the material conditions of human existence were such that religion could be made costly. This is the element of truth that underlies the brilliant suggestion of Mr. A. K. Coomarswamy that the pessimistic vein in the philosophical thought of India is the result neither of climate nor of disgust with life born of a morbid mentality, but the result of drinking life of the lees.[70] If there is any truth in what has been said so far, the Mīmāṃsā system may be said to embody the philosophy of a fairly prosperous and somewhat materialistic age. But the spirit with which these people went to do their religious duties—gods or no gods—is a spirit that is remarkable in many ways. And the Ritualist, down to our own days in India, has held a place worthy of honour and of respect. Says Barth[71]—"No sectarian movement has on the whole produced anything of such solidity as the old Smṛtis, anything so indepen-

69. *Bhāmatī* on III, 2, 40.
70. See his *Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism.*
71. *Religions of India,* page 99.

dent and so purely intellectual as certain philosophical *Sūtras*. The *Vaidika*, who knows by heart and teaches to his disciples one or several Vedas, which he still understands at least in part, is superior to the sectarian *Guru*, with his unintelligible *Mantras*, his amulets, and his diagrams; the *Yājñika*, who possesses the complex science of ancient sacrifice, must be ranked above the illiterate attendant of a temple and an idol; and the *Agnihotrin*, who, while diligent in his own business, keeps up his sacred fires, and with his wife and children, conforms to the prescriptions of his hereditary ritual, is a more serviceable and moral being than the Fakir and even the Buddhist monk."

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MODIFICATIONS OF THE KARMA DOCTRINE-I

E. W. Hopkins

The Karma doctrine in its Brahmanistic form teaches that every individual in successive existences reaps the fruit of ignorance and desire as these were expressed in action performed in antecedent existences. As a man himself sows, so he himself reaps; no man inherits the good or evil act of another man: *nā 'yaṃ paraśya sukṛtaṃ duṣkṛtaṃ cā 'pi sevate* (*Mbh.* xii, 291, 22). The fruit is of the same quality with the action, and good or bad there is no destruction of the action: *na tu nāśo'sya vidyate.* The result is exactly as when just petribution follows a wrong; there can be no cessation till the account is squared; *ubhayaṃ tat samībhūtam.* Whether "with eye or thought or voice or deed, whatever kind of act one performs, one receives that kind of act in return"; *kurute* (v. 1. *karoti*) *yādṛśaṃ karma tādṛśaṃ pratipadyate* (*ib.* 16, 22; cf. 139, 24).

We may here ignore the metaphysical subtlety of the self as conceived by Buddhism, observing only that despite all efforts to conceive of an individuality which inherits Karma without being the self of the antecedent action, the fact that the Buddhist can remember previous existences shows that the new ego is practically, if not essentially, one with the previous ego, and may be regarded not only as a collective but as a recollective entity—and how such a self-entity differs from a soul, *ātam*, probably none save a metaphysician could ever have explained. Not all Buddhists, however, were metaphysicians. Though they were not supposed to believe in metempsychosis or even in transmigration, the many actually believed that the self of to-day atoned for the selfishness of the self of a previous birth, that the penalty was paid by the very

individual who had done the wrong—an individual identical with that self in memory and hence, in mental personality, equivalent to the self or soul of Brahminic, as of all popular theologies.

Thus logically the doer of the deed suffers, and not some other person. And most logically the doer suffers at the hands of the injured. He who has wronged another in one life is punished for it by that other in the next life : the *māṃsa* law, "me eat will he whose meat I eat". Or there is a slighter logical connection, as when the third of grain is reborn as a mouse, because 'mouse' means 'thief'. So too he who starves others will himself be starved. According as the act is mental or bodily, and according to the mental disposition, *bhāva*, with which one performs an act, one reaps its fruit hereafter in a body similarly endowed (*Mbh.* xv, 34, 18 ;) *Manu*, xii, 62 and 81). But analogy often fails, and a low birth of any kind, without further logical connection, rewards a low act. Thus the fruit of foolishness is simply rebirth "in this or a lower world" : *imaṃ lokaṃ hīnataraṃ cā 'viśanti* (*Muṇḍ. Up.*, i, 2. 7-10). Or hell-torture, which antedstes the systematic Karma doctrine,[1] may be adjuvant to the mechanical fruit of evil. Hell even in the Brahmanic system may take the place of metempsychosis altogether, as in *Manu*, xii, 18 and 22, which only a theological necessity can couple with the doctrine of Karma as a retributive power. Here, and elsewhere in many places, the only retribution is hell-torture, after which the soul receives a new body, but not a body conditioned by the acts already atoned for in hell. That the same lecture of Manu's code recognizes the full Karma doctrine does not

1. The doctrine of metempsychosis, without ethical bearing, has no necessary connection with ante-natal action, and this, transmigration pure and simple, was an older belief that in hell, Karma itself merely implies the fruit of action, and that fruit may be in terms of metempsychosis or in terms of hell or of both. Compare the *Aṅguttara Nik.*, iii, 99, on hell or rebirth, as alternatives.

make any difference. The view that hell alone punishes the guilty is older than the view that the individual is a self-adjusting moral mechanism such as is usually found in the Buddhistic interpretation. When hell and Karma both punish a sinner, he is sent to hell first and is then handed over to the working of Karma. A balance is struck between evil and good. Or the individual who, it is recognized, is never absolutely bad or absolutely good, may take his reward of joy and punishment in slices, first being rewarded for having been good and then being punished for having been bad. One canny hero, on being given this choice, said he would take his punishment first, and his reason was the one given by Dante—"nessun maggiore dolore che ricordarsi nel tempo felice," etc.

But there are various other theories which cross the theory of Karma, and if logically set beside it they must have annoyed not a little the religious consciousness of the Brahmins and Buddhists. Fortunately for man's peace of mind his theology may be illogical without upsetting his religion, and in India old and new beliefs seem to have met in a blend which, however incongruous, was accepted as the faith of the fathers, and hence was considered good enough for the sons. Just how far these incongruities were common to Brahminism and Buddhism it is difficult to say. In some cases they appear in both systems; but on the whole Buddhism is the more decided opponent of doctrines subversive of the Karma theory. Yet when we say Buddhism we must make an exception in the case of Lamaism and perhaps other exponents of the Mahāyāna, where, as in Brahminism, the Karma doctrine was modified in many ways.

In Brahminism itself Karma struck hard against the old belief in sacrifice, penance, and repentance as destroyers of sin. It is in the code of practical life, as well as in the esoteric teaching, that sacrifice, reading the Vedas, knowledge of God, destroy all sin; austerity destroys all sin; penance destroys almost every sin; penance and

repentance (i.e. public confession of sin and a promise not to sin in the same way again) at least mitigate, if they do not destroy, every sin ; while later, as is well known, in all the popular teaching, gifts made to the priests remove sins, just as do visits made to holy places (*Manu*, xi, 146, 228, 240-247). The older theologians indeed raised a question as to penance. Unintentional sin may be destroyed by penance ; but how about intentional sin ? Some said yes, even intentional sin ; but others said no, for "The deed does not die" : *na hi karma kṣiyate* (*Manu*, xi. 46 ; *Vaś.* xxii. 2-5 ; *Gaut.* xix. 5, etc.). The incongruity was recognised ; but orthodoxy prevailed and continued to preach both Karma and its logical antidote. Of all these factors, knowledge alone in the primitive Buddhistic belief can destroy the effect of Karma.

That the prayers for the dead, admitted into the Lamaistic service, presuppose the power to change the effect of Karma, goes without saying. The ritual employed to "elevate the fathers" is a parallel in Brahminism. Whether, however, a curse, or its practical equivalent in *Kṛtya*, witchcraft, may be construed in the same way, is doubtful. Imprecations and magic existed before Karma was thought of. The only question is whether, when an innocent person was entrapped by *kṛtya*, or a slight offence was punished out of all proportion by a curse, the resulting unhappiness was construed as being independent of Karma or as the real result of prenatal acts, the curse or act of sorcery being merely the means to the fulfilment of Karma's law. As to the effect of a curse, it is regarded either as the punishment of an act done in the present body or, when argued from a present state of being, as resulting from a curse uttered in previous existence.[2]

2. That is, a curse may take effect at once, an injury be thus punished in the present existence ; but (usually) a curse changes the next state of existence, as when Saudāsa, King of Kośala, is changed into a cannibal monster at the curse of a great seer (*Mbh.* xiii, 6, 32).

Another theory of man's lot also existed before Karma was known. In its simplest form it is the theory that man owes what he gets, not to his anterior self, but to the gods. What the gods arrange is, in any case, whether good or bad, the appointed lot ; the arrangement, *viddhi*, is fate. If the gods bestow a share,, *bhāga*, of good upon a man, that is his *bhāgya*. luck, divinely appointed, *diṣṭa*. As divine, the cause is *daiva*, which later becomes fate, and is then looked upon as a blind power, necessity, chance *haṭha*. So radical a blow at Karma as is given by this theory is formally repudiated in the words *bhāgyaṃ karma*, "luck is Karma," or some equivalent denial. It is *daiva*, fate, which according to *Manu*, xi. 47, causes a man to sin, for he is represented as performing penance on account either of an act committed before birth or 'by fate,'that is, as the commentators say, by chance (carelessness) in this life. But *daiva* elsewhere is a mere synonym of Karma, as in *daivamānuṣe* (*Manu*, vii 205), and is expressly explained to be such in the later code of Yājñavalkya, i. 348 ; *tatra daivam abhivyaktaṃ pauruṣaṃ paurvadaihikam*, "Fate is (the result of) a man's acts performed in a previous body." Nevertheless, although the Brahman here, as in the *Hitopadeśa* and other works, expressly declares that what is called *diṣṭa*, 'decreed,' or fate, and is said to be insuperable when writ upon the forehead, *likhitam api lalāṭe*, results really from man's own act, whether in the present or the past, yet the original notion of God's favour persists, until it leads in its logical conclusion to that complete abrogation of the Karma doctrine which is found in the fundamental teaching of the *Bhagavad Gītā* in its present form. This fundamental teaching (not historically but essentially) inculcates the view that the favour of God, here called *prasāda*, 'grace,' combined with the necessarily antecedent 'loving faith' of the worshipper, surpasses all effects of antenatal error. Thus, though starting with Karma, the *Gītā*, like all later sectarian works, finally annuls the doctrine, exactly as in Japan one sect of Buddhists finds that an expression of

faith in Amitābha Bhutsi transcends all other acts and secures salvation. This virtually does away altogether with the logic of Karma. In the same way Kṛṣṇa in the *Mahābhārata*, iv. 20. 7-29, is not led to believe that her present misfortunes are the result of acts in a previous existence, but that they are due to the Creator, Dhartar; "through whose grace, *prasāda*, I have obtained this misfortune," she says, owing to a "fault against the gods," *devānaṃ kilbiṣam*, committed not in a prenatal state, but when she was a foolish young girl, *bālā*, in her present life. It is the will of the god which is identified with *daiva* (*nā 'daivikam*, she says of her condition). Yet the formal denial of any cause save Karma is as vigorously made in the epic as elsewhere. "Not without seed is anything produced; not without the act does one receive the reward. I recognize no Fate. One's own nature predetermines one's condition; it is Karma that decides": *daivaṃ tato na paśyāmi*, opposed to *svabhāva* and Karma (xii. 291. 12-14). On the other hand, the fatalistic belief, despite this objection, is constantly cropping up. The length of a man's life is "determined at the beginning" (as is that of all creatures) by fate, under the form of Time, *kāla*, *āyur agre 'vatiṣṭhate* (*Mbh.* xii, 153, 56); through Kāla alone comes death (*ib.* xiii. I. 50). There is a long discussion in xiii. 6. 3 ff., of the relative importance of action in the present life and that action (or effort) in a preceding life which is virtually fate, and the conclusion here reached is that it is activity in this life which determines every man's lot, for "there is no determining power in fate": *nā'sti daive prabhutvam* (*ib.* 47). This is the manly view. The weaker sex adopts the opposite opinion (*Sak.*, p. 68). The theory of chance and accident is clearly expressed in Buddhism. According to the *Milinda*, it is an erroneous extension of the true belief when the ignorant (Brahmins and Buddhists) declare that "every pain is the fruit of Karma" (136 and 138).

The individual, besides having his Karma abrogated by divine grace, may secure a remittance of part of his evil

Karma involuntarily. The Karma doctrine demands that every individual shall reap what he has sown. But when the farmer, in the most literal sense, reaps the harvest he has sown, it is due not to his own Karma, but to the virtue of the king, and conversely, when, owing to the neglect or oppression of the king, the farmer does not reap his crop, then the blame attaches to the king. Thus, if his wife dies of hunger, he ought logically to say that it is due to his wife's or his own previous Karma. Instead of this, it is the fault of the king, and the king will reap hereafter the fruit of the sin. The king alone determines the character of the age, *rājai'va yugam ucyate* (*Mbh.* xii. 91. 6), and "drought, flood, and plague" are solely the fault, *doṣa*, of the king (*ib.* 90. 36). The same theory holds in Buddhism (*Jātaka* 194). The share of religious merit accruing to or abstracted from the king's account in accordance with this theory is mathematically fixed.

The relation of husband and wife, touched upon in the last paragraph, also interferes with Karma. In the unmodified theory, a wife is exalted only in this life by her husband ; her position in the next life depends upon her own acts. If she steals grain she becomes a female mouse, etc. (*Mānu,* xii. 69). But elsewhere in the code (v. 166 ; ix. 29) and in the epic, a woman's future fate is that of her husband if she is true to him. Faithfulness might logically be reckoned as her own act ; but the reward is in fact set in opposition to the operation of Karma, as is clearly seen in the words of Sītā in *Rām.* ii. 27. 4-5. Here the heroine says : "Father, mother, brother, son, and daughter-in-law reap each the fruit of individual acts[3] ; but the wife alone enjoys the lot of her husband......in this world and after death." It is evident that the words

3. The commentator understands *karmaphalam*, 'the fruit of acts', to be meant, and this is supported by the varied reading : *bhāryāi'kā patibhāgyāni bhuṅkte patiparāyaṇā pretya cāi've'ha,* "here and hereafter the faithful wife enjoys her husband's lot."

svāni puṇyāni bhuñjānaḥ svaṃ svaṃ bhāgyam upāsate, which express the Karma doctrine as operative in the case of others, are here placed in antithesis to the wife's reward, which is to share the fruit of her husband's acts. The faithful wife absorbs her husband's qualities, *guṇas,* but if unfaithful is reborn as a jackal (*Manu,* ix, 22. 30 ; v. 164).

To return to transferred Karma. A voluntary transfer occurs only in the case of good Karma. But transfer of evil Karmà is found in still other cases than that mentioned above. For not only are a subject's sins transferred to a bad king (*Manu,* viii, 334. 308), but the priestly guest who is not properly honoured transfers his evil deeds to the inhospitable host, and all the good Karma of the householder is transferred to the guest (*Manu,* iii. 100. etc.). Further, a perjurer's good Karma goes over to the person injured by the perjury (*Yāj.* ii, 75), or, according to *Manu,* viii. 90, "goes to the dogs," *śuno gacchet* ; but the latter expression merely means "is lost" (*Viṣṇu,* viii. 26). 'Brahman glory' can perhaps be interpreted as Karma-fruit. If so, it goes to the benefit of the gods when its possessor sins (*Manu,* xi. 122).

A voluntary transfer of good Karma is recognized, for example, in the epic tale of the saint who, having merited and obtained "a good world," offers to hand it over to a friend who has not earned it. It is hinted in this case that though acquired merit in the objective shape of a heavenly residence may be bestowed upon another, the gift ought not to be accepted (*Mbh.* i. 92. 11 f.). Strangely enough, the idea that good Karma is transferable is also common in Buddhism. Thus there is the Stūpa formula, *sapuyae matu pitu puyae,* (erected) "for (the builder's) own religious merit and for the religious merit of his mother and father," and also the formula[4] in the ordination service: "Let the merit that I have gained be shared by my lord. It is fitting to give me to share

4. Warren, *Buddhism in Translation,* p. 396 f.

in the merit gained by my lord. It is good, it is good. I share in it." We may compare also the *pattidana* formula: *aham te ito pattim dammi,* "I give thee my merit."

Most of these modifications of Karma are to be explained by the impact of divergent beliefs, which, older than Karma, survived in one form or another, interposing themselves between the believer's mind and his newer belief. Such also is that which accomplishes the most important modification in the whole series, namely, the belief in hereditary sin.

The belief that a man may inherit sin rises naturally when disease is regarded as the objective proof of sin. As disease is palpably inherited, so, since disease is the reward of sin, the inheritor of disease is the inheritor of sin. At the time of the *Ṛgveda* we find the doctrine of inherited sin already set forth. The poet in *ṚV.* vii. 86. 5 first inquires why the god is angry, what sin, *āgas*, has been committed, and then continues in supplication: "Loose from us paternal sins and loose what we in person have committed" (*āva drugdhāni pitryā sṛjā no'va yā vayaṃ cakṛmā tanūbhiḥ*). The collocation and parallel passages show that what is here called *drugdha* is identical with the preceding *āgas* (*enas*) and with *anhas*, found elsewhere, *ṚV.* ii, 28, 6, in the same connection; it is the oppressive sin-disease (either inherited or peculiar to the patient), which may be removed by the god, who has inflicted it as a sign of anger, and whose mercy, *mṛlika,* is sought in visible form, *abhi khyam.*

Obviously such a view as this is inconsistent with the doctrine of Karma. If a man's sin is inherited it cannot be the fruit of his own actions. Individual responsibility ceases, or at least is divided, and we approach the modern view that a man's ancestors are as guilty as himself when he has yielded to temptation. Not the self, in the orthodox view, or the confection that replaces soul (self) in the heterodox (Buddhistic view, but some other self or confection reaps the fruit. This view has indeed been

imputed to Buddhism, but it was in an endeavour to make it appear that Buddhism anticipates the general modern view of heredity and is therefore a 'scientific' religion. No examples, however, were proffered in support of this contention, and there was apparently a confusion in the mind of the writer between self-heredity (Karma) and heredity from one's parents. The fact that in Buddhism one inherits one's own sin in the form of fruit does not make it scientific in the modern sense of heredity. To find an analogue to the thought of to-day we must turn to Brahminism.

For although it would seem that after the pure Karma doctrine was once fully accepted such a view as that of inherited sin could find no place in either Buddhism or Brahminism, yet as little as the Hindu was troubled with the intrusion upon that doctrine of the counter-doctrine of God's sufficient grace, was he troubled with the logical muddle into which he fell by admitting this modification and restriction of the working of Karma. He admits it, not as an opposed theory, but as a modification. Thus in the *Great Epic*, i. 80, 2 f. : "When wrong is done, it does not bear fruit at once, but gradually destroys. ...... If the fruit (of Karma) does not appear in one's self, it is sure to come out in one's sons or descendants" :

nā'dharmaś carito, rājan, sadyaḥ phalati, gāur iva,
śanāir āvartyamāno hi kartur mūlāni kṛntati,
putreṣu vā naptṛṣu vā, na ced ātmani puśyati,
phalaty eva dhruvaṃ pāpam, gurubhuktam ivā'dare.

Almost the same words are used in xii. 139. 22 : "When, O king, any evil is done, if it does not appear in (the person of) this man (who commits the deed, it appears) in (the person of) his sons, his grandsons, or his other descendants" :

pāpaṃ karma kṛtaṃ kiṃcid, yadi tasmin na dṛśyate,
nṛpate, tasya putreṣu pautreṣv api ca naptṛṣu.

Strange as this doctrine appears in contrast with the Karma theory ("no one reaps the fruit of another's good

or evil deeds," cited above), it can, perhaps, be explained as an unconscious adaptation from the visible consequences of evil. Thus, when the god Justice, otherwise personified Punishment, judges a king, he decrees that if a king is unjust that "king together with his kin" is destroyed (*Manu*, vii. 28). But this is a natural obvious result, as it is said further "if the king through folly rashly harasses his kingdom, he, with his kin, soon loses his kingdom and life" (*ib.* 111, *sabāndhavaḥ*). It is such wrong that is particularly alluded to in one of the texts above,[5] but here the further step has been taken of incorporating the notion of divided punishment into the Karma system with its special terminology, so that it now appears as a modification of that system, whereby (divided punishment implying inherited sin) the sons and grandsons reap the Karma of another. It is improbable that the author of *Manu*, iv. 172-74, had any such notion. He simply states the observed fact that when a king is destroyed his relatives (i.e. his whole family) suffer also. But the later writer begins a fatal process of logical analysis. If the king's sons or grandsons suffer for ancestral sins, then clearly Karma works from father to son. In the second example[6] the generalization is complete; if the fruits of sin do not appear in the person of any sinner, such fruits may be looked for in the person of his descendants, even to the third generation. This forms a sharp contrast to the teaching of xii. 153. 38: *nā karmaṇā pituḥ putraḥ pitā vā putra-karmaṇā, mārgeṇā 'nyena gacchanti, baddhaḥ sukṛtaduṣkṛtaiḥ*,

5. Compare, in the continuation of the first selection, the seer's words, which express the punishment to be meted out to the king in this particular instance: *tyakṣyāmi tvāṃ sabāndhavam* (i. 80. 5).

6. This case is as follows: a bird revenges itself on a prince who has killed its young by picking out the prince's eyes, remarking that an instantaneous punishment comes to evil-doers in the shape of revenge, but that this revenge squares the account. If unavenged at once, the evil fruit will appear in a subsequent generation.

"neither the son by the Karma of his father nor the father by the Karma of his son go, bound by good and evil deeds, upon another course," for "what one does, that the doer alone enjoys" : *yat karoti......tat kartai 'va samaśnāti* (*Mbh.* xii, 153, 41). It agrees logically with that later explanation of the fate of Yayāti which sees in this seer's rehabilitation in heaven, not a purchase, or a gift accepted, but a "reward for the virtue of his grandchildren," for in one case a man's sins are paid for by his descendants and in the other the descendants' virtue affects the fate of the (still living) grandsire.[7]

It is due to the doctrine of inheritance that we find another suggestion made in Manu and the Great Epic. The child's disposition, one would think, must be his own, but when the subject of impure (mixed) birth is discussed we get a very clear intimation that the child inherits (from father or mother, or from both) his mental disposition, *bhāva*, just as, to use the epic's own simile, a tiger shows in his (outer) form the ancestral stripes. Interchanging with *bhāva* in the epic discussion is *śīla*, character, which is inherited. So *Manu*, x. 59-60, says that the parents' character, *śīla*, is inherited by the son. The epic has (*Mbh.* xiii. 48. 42) :

pitryaṃ vā bhajate śīlaṃ mātṛjaṃ vā, tatho 'bhayam,
na kathaṃ cana saṃkīrṇaḥ prakṛtiṃ svāṃ niyacchati,
(43) *yathai 'va sadṛśo rūpe mātāpitror hi jāyate*
vyāghraś citrais, tathā yoniṃ puruṣaḥ svāṃ niyacchati :

"A man shares his father's or his mother's character, or that of both. One of impure birth can never conceal his nature. As a tiger with his stripes is born like in form to its mother and father, so (little) can a man conceal his origin." It is clear from the *nānābhāva*, 'varied dis-

7. In the first passage cited above the sage receives a good world as a gift, or if ashamed to do this may "buy it for a straw," but in xiii. 6. 30. it is said, "Of old. Yayāti, fallen to earth, ascended to heaven again by virtue of his descendants' good works" (*punar dropitaḥ svargaṃ dauhitraiḥ puṇyakarmabhiḥ*).

position,' which opens the discussion, and from *sīla*, 'character,' as used in the cases here cited, that character as well as outer appearance is here regarded as inherited. Not only, then, may a man's sinful act be operative in his bodily descendant without that descendant being an earner of his own Karma, but the descendant's evil disposition (the seed of the active Karma) may be result, not of his own prenatal disposition, but of his bodily ancestors and their disposition. With this admission there is nothing left for the Karma doctrine to stand upon.

In conclusion, a refinement of the Karma theory leads to the view that the fruit of an act will appear at the corresponding period of life hereafter: "What good or evil one does as a child, a youth, or an old man, in that same stage (of life hereafter) one receives the fruit thereof":

> *bālo yuvā ca vṛddhaś ca*[8] yat *karoti śubhāśubham*
> *tasyāṃ tasyām avasthāyāṃ tatphalaṃ pratipadyate,*

as given in in *Mbh.* xii. 181. 15, which is repeated in xii. 323 14, with a change at the end, *bhuṅkte janmani janmani*, "birth by birth one reaps the fruit." A third version (xiii. 7. 4) combines these: "In whatsoever stage of life one does good or evil, in just that stage, birth by birth, one reaps the fruit":

> *yasyāṃ yasyām avasthāyāṃ yat karoti śubhāśubham*
> *tasyāṃ tasyām avasthāyāṃ bhuṅkte janmani janmani.*

That this is an after-thought is pretty certain.[9] The earlier expositions know nothing of such a restriction. It accounts for a man's misfortunes as being the fruit of acts committed at the same age in a precedent existence. But it is difficult to understand how it would cover the case of a child born blind, which the Karma doctrine, untouched by this refinement, easily explains as the penalty

8. Or, v. 1., *vā*.
9. There are other forms of this stanza with slight variations. It occurs several times in the pseudo-epic besides the places here cited.

of sin committed at any stage of a former life. Perhaps such infant misfortunes led in part to the conservation of the older theory of parental guilt, inherited and reaped in misfortune by the offspring. The same query arose elsewhere—"Was it this man's sin or his parents' that he was born blind?"[10]

(JRAS, 1906),

10. As a kind of modification may also be regarded the *quasi* personification of Karma, as if it were a shadowy person pursuing a man. In Brahminism this conception is common. In Buddhism an illustration will be found in the introduction to the *Sarabhaṅga Jātaka*, No. 522, where the lurking Deed waits long to catch a man, and finally, in his last birth, "seizes its opportunity," *okāsam labhi* (or *labhati*), and deprives him of magical power. On the barter of Karma as a price, in poetical metaphor, see Professor Rhys Davids on the *Questions of Milinda*, v. 6. Poetic fancy also suggests that even a manufactured article may suffer because of its demerit (*Sak.*, p. 84).

MODIFICATIONS OF THE KARMA DOCTRINE-II

E. W. Hopkins

...One of the most striking modifications of the Karma doctrine is found in the relation between father and son. Going to hell is the first effect of evil acts and the Karma doctrine has to do the best it can with so awkward a modification as was introduced into its logical system by the admission of hell, along with low births, as a fruit of evil. Of course, historically, two systems have here united. But it is quite another matter when evil is set aside altogether, or, in other words, when the course of Karma is obstructed by such an external accident as the birth of a son. Compare *Putra mā'vitha* in *Kauṣ. Up.* ii, 11 (7); *BAU.* i, 5, 17; and the better known passage in Manu, ix, 138. According to the earliest of these authorities, the son has even more to do with his father's fate hereafter, for he is expressly said to take upon himself the Karma of his father. The son, again, "releases his father from the wrong he has done." In one case the mere birth saves from hell, but in the other it is not till the father's death that the son formally "receives his father's Karma," when the latter lies at the point of dissolution, as is carefully told in *Kauṣ. Up.* ii, 15(10).

A still more curious modification is effected by the act of those devouring supernatural creatures who "destroy the good works" of a man. A man's merit, according to this view, is destroyed because he has not been properly buried. One thinks of Greece, but no, it is in India that certain of the dead fathers, called Śmaśas, are devourers, and "in yonder world they destroy the good works of a man who has not had a (square) tumulus made" over his remains, that is, of one who has been improperly buried, *Śat. Brāh.* xiii, 8, 1, 1, *śmaśā u hāi 'va nāma pitṛṇām*

attāras, te hā 'muṣminl loke 'kṛtaśmaśānasya sādhukṛtyām upadambhayanti.

According to another view, one who has died carries his works with him, but after passing the Ageless River, which is crossed with the mind alone (and thereafter "he will never grow old"), he mounts toward Brahma and leaves his Karma behind him. What now becomes of the Karma thus dropped like a bundle? "His relations who are dear to him receive his good deeds, and those who are not dear receive his evil deeds," *tasya priyā jñātayaḥ sukṛtam upayanti apriyā duṣkṛtam, Kauṣ. Up.* i. 4. This passage continues with a description of the exalted soul, thus freed, gazing upon pairs of opposites, as one stands above and looks down upon the wheels of a chariot, a simile which connects the passage with *Śat. Brāh.* ii, 3, 3, 11-12, where it is said that though day and night destroy man's righteousness, *sukṛtam,* in yonder world, yet, as one looks down upon revolving chariot wheels, so the freed soul looks down upon day and night, which, being below, do not destroy the reward of one who knows this release. With ordinary people, however, it results that the righteousness of men is destroyed by time (as is their evil), not shifted off upon their relatives, or devoured or handed over to an heir. These pretty tales are clearly contradictory, though perhaps only meant as poetical attempts to explain eschatological phenomena. Nevertheless, they represent to a certain extent the more or less real belief of a day when Karma was already recognized.

It is a cardinal tenet in Karma that it affects all creatures "even down to grass," and the formal systems describe in detail the fate of the smallest creatures. But in the *Chānd. Up.* v, 10, 1ff, "some creatures are only born to die," without having any share in the path of the good or the path of the wicked, clearly inconsistent with the usual belief.

As to nature being the result of Karma, action repeated becomes in the next life inherited nature, *sātmībhāva, sātmīkṛta* (*Jātakamālā,* xv, 1; xxix, 6) and though

the evil desire of children may be due to the fault of their mother, as in *Jātakamālā*, xxxi, yet usually the view is that expressed in the same work, xxix, 11, namely, that habits acquired in previous existences cause the difference between the *śīla* of children and the *bhāva* of parents. As I said above, these are exponents of Karma. Not so simple is the relation between good luck and Karma. To what I have already said in my former article, I would add this: Propitious "fortune," personified, Lakṣmīs, and good luck, *bhāgya*, may leave a "remnant" expressed as happiness, *Jātakamālā*, xxx, 7. It is luck (destiny) as well as sin, *aparādha*, that causes one to be treated with disrespect, ib. xxviii, 38. But Lakṣmīs is falsely regarded as some power apart from oneself, for luck and ill-luck are "self-made" (Jātaka, No. 382, p. 263):

Attanā kurute lakkhiṃ alakkhiṃ kurut' attanā,
na hi lakkhiṃ alakkhiṃ va añño aññassa kārako.[1]

The view in regard to the memory of former births seems at first to be not altogether consistent with itself, but on the whole, so far as my data go, the statements are fairly coherent, the point being that former births are remembered in accordance with the general intellectual clarity produced by greater enlightenment. The Bodhisat's brother remembers only one previous existence, the Bodhisat himself his whole previous life, Jātaka No. 498. In No. 415, however, the wife of the Bodhisat remembers as much as he does of the *jātissara*. On this point, the precise rule will be found in the thirteenth chapter of the *Viśuddhi Magga*, Warren, HOS, vol. iii. p. 315.

As to the theory of *pattidana*, transfer of merit, it is clearly repudiated by the Bodhisat in Jātaka No. 494, p. 358:

Na cā 'ham etaṃ icchāmi yam parato dānapaccayā,
sayaṃkatani puññāni tam *me dveṇiyaṃ dhanaṃ.*

1. The theory of fate "written on the forehead" (referred to in my last paper is found in Jātaka, No. 501, p. 417, *nalatena maccum adaya* (cf. modern Nuklo for Lucknow).

Acceptance of merit is here likened to the acceptance of worldly property, *yācitakaṃ yānam*, etc., for which one has begged, and as something beneath the dignity of a good Buddhist.

Prayer also is beneath the dignity of a consistent Buddhist, as it is quite illogical. Yet it is admitted that prayer may result in the birth of a son, *patthanaṃ katvā puttaṃ labhi*, Jātaka No. 432, p. 512, and this view leads direct to the later perversion of Buddhism, which ends in the prayers of the sinner for salvation, as among the Hindu sects it leads to the substitution of election, grace, and prayer for so professedly a Karma system as that of the *Gītā* and the modern sects sprung from it. We are apt to impute this more to the Mahāyāna than to the Hīnayāna, yet, if the Jātakas represent the latter school, it must be admitted that the same weakness is to be found there also. Thus in Jātaka No. 522, p. 150 (*karomi okasam*, etc.), we have a parallel to the *prasāda* idea. Here the kings say :

Karohi okasam anuggahāya
yathā gatiṃ te abhisambhavema,

and the Bodhisat grants them the grace, *karomi okāśam...... yathā gatiṃ me abhisambhavetha*, "I grant that ye attain my state of happiness." Here felicity is granted the more easily because the recipients are pure ; yet to bestow felicity is looked upon as a favour, *anuggaha*, and is accepted as such. This is contrary to the whole spirit of the Karma doctrine, as represented either in early Buddhism or in early Brahmanism ('election' first appears in the later Upaniṣads).

The fruit of the act is not necessarily in a subsequent existence. ......My kind critic says that I have "taken a somewhat wrong meaning" of the rule in regard to "inheriting the good and evil act of another man," and adds as his own the "real meaning," namely, that "no man inherits the good or evil act of another man (done in his previous existence, but not in the present life)". As I had said,

before stating that no man reaps the evil act of another man, that a man reaps the fruit of "action performed in antecedent existences," it is difficult to see why the one explanation is better than, or how it differs from, the other. But the Maharajah's following remarks seem to imply that his point lies in insisting on a future existence as the field of the fruit. If this be so, his view is as defective here as it is at the end of the paper, where he gives as sufficient "three classes of Karma". Karma blossoms and bears fruit. The fruit ripens in the life in the case of superlatively bad or good acts within four days, *tribhir dinais...... ihai 'va phalam aśnute, Hit.* i. 3. The Buddhists (perhaps the Brahmins also) allow the fruit to ripen not only according to the act, but also according to the actor. In the case of some people, the fruit ripens the very day of the act, *taṃ divasam,* while others, who have performed exactly the same act, are not rewarded till a future existence, Jātaka No. 415, introd. There is another point here. A good act, giving alms, for example, may be rewarded in this life by the attainment of wealth, but if the "thought back of the act," *aparacetana,* be not quite pure, then the wealth thus obtained cannot be enjoyed, Jātaka No. 390. Sometimes it seems as if the rule and exception were reversed; for it is the general rule that fruit appears in a future life; the exception, when it ripens in this life. But in *Jātakamālā,* xxvi, 18, 19, it is given as a general rule that if there is no counter-balancing good, one's acts come immediately to fulfilment, *karmāṇi sadyaḥ phalatāṃ vrajanti,* where the illustration is that a sinner's hand falls off "at once" in consequence of an evil deed done in this life. So, too, a king is swallowed up by the earth at once, *saayas,* on account of his cruelty, *ib.* xxviii, 58, and similarly, in the Jātakas, a king who puts out other kings' eyes, has his own eyes put out at once, because, "as one sows so he reaps": *Yādisaṃ vapate bījaṃ tādisaṃ harate phalaṃ* (No. 353, p. 158). Seed and fruit are here both in one existence. But the deed may bud without bearing fruit till later. This is one of

those neat little refinements which always seem so amusing to the onlooker at the struggle to know something beyond the knowable. One would think it enough to declare *ex cathedra* what is to be the general fate of the sinner hereafter, but the Hindu theologian, like his European brother, knows much more than this. A man has leprosy. Is this the fruit of evil Karma ? No. It is only the bud, *puṣpa*, of an evil act done in this life ; but the fruit will come in a future existence, and be much worse than this :

> *idaṃ puṣpaṃ tāvad upasthitam*
> *ataḥ kaṣṭataraṃ vyaktaṃ phalam anyad bhaviṣyati,*

Jātakamālā, xxiv, 38 ; cf. 40, *ihāi 'va.*

Sometimes it takes several years for a fault to ripen into its fruit. In Jātaka No. 491, p. 336, we read of a fault that had lain quiescent for seven thousand years, when it suddenly started up "like a cobra spreading its head at a blow" (compare the personification referred to in my former article, Jātaka No. 522). I hasten to add that I do not regard this as a modification of the true doctrine.

These random notes on Karma are not intended as an attack on a system which, for aught I know to the contrary, may hold the correct solution of the great conundrum of man's after-life. All I wish to show is how the Hindu people handled the doctrine. May I add that the orthodox explanation, so clearly set forth by the Maharajah of Bobbili in his illuminating reply to my former paper, is not entirely unknown to me, as he seems to think ? It was not my intent to discuss the whole subject, and I took a good deal for garnted, not supposing that the enlightened reader also take for granted that I did not know the difference between popular beliefs and systematized doctrine.

(JRAS, 1907)

VEDIC AND EPIC KṚṢṆA

S. K. De

There is some speculation regarding the identity of the epic Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa with the Kṛṣṇa of *Ṛgveda* viii. 74, whom the *Anukramaṇi* styles Kṛṣṇa Aṅgirasa, and with Kṛṣṇa Devakī-putra, who is described as the pupil of Ghora Aṅgirasa in the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* (iii. 17. 6); and it has been suggested that a tradition exists, from the time of the *Ṛgveda* and the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad*, of Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa as a Vedic seer or teacher. This speculation is necessitated by the fact that two important features of Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa emerge in the Epic, namely, Kṛṣṇa as the not-overscrupulous tribal chief, and Kṛṣṇa as the deified philosophical and religious teacher; and it is felt that the two features should be reconciled. It has been suggested that these figures belong to different cycles of legend. Some scholars have even gone to the length of separating these two aspects of Kṛṣṇa, although there is no conclusive evidence or tradition for this procedure in the Epic itself. We have R. G. Bhandarkar's suggestion, accepted by Grierson and Garbe, but rejected by Hopkins and Keith, that Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa was originally a local or tribal chief who was deified, or a legendary saint of the Vṛṣṇi-Sātvatas whom he taught a monotheistic religion, that he lived in the 6th century B. C., if not earlier, that originally he was quite different from the Kṛṣṇa of whom a tradition is supposed to exist from the time of the *Ṛgveda* and the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* as a seer or teacher, that Vāsudeva became identified with Viṣṇu earlier than with Kṛṣṇa, and that his legends came to be mixed up; but it must be said that these facile, though attractive, conjectures are not proved. Some scholars have even maintained that Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa did not figure at all in the original Epic,

but was introduced later, perhaps to justify the action of the *Pāṇḍavas* ; but this is also an unproved hypothesis of the same type. The existence of cycles of legend in an epic like the *Mahābhārata* is indeed not denied, but the assumption of two or several Kṛṣṇa is based upon the further *a priori* assumption, that the Kṛṣṇa-legend in the Epic must be analysed into several groups, and that each of these groups was originally concerned with different persons of the same name, but was subsequently mixed up to form one mass round one personality. Whatever plausibility these assumptions may possess, there is, unfortunately, nothing conclusive in the Epic itself, nor in the previous literature, to warrant such a complacent splitting up of the existing data.

It is noteworthy that the identity of the Vedic Kṛṣṇa with the Epic Kṛṣṇa is not at all supported by the Puranic tradition. We have no description, either in the Epic or in the Purāṇa, of Kṛṣṇa as a seer of Vedic Mantras or as a pupil of an Upaniṣadic Seer. In the Puranic tradition the name of Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa's teacher is given as Kasya Saṃdipaṇi of Avanti, and that of his initiator as Gārga. As a Kṛṣṇa, father of Viśvakāya, is mentioned in *Ṛgveda* i. 116. 23 and i. 117. 7, and a Kṛṣṇa Hārīta in *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, iii. 2. 6, it is clear that Kṛṣṇa is not an uncommon non-divine name ; but the attempts to connect of identify these Kṛṣṇas, or to establish the tradition of the sage Kṛṣṇa "from the time of the Ṛgvedic hymns to the time of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*", as R. G. Bhandarkar suggests, have not, so far, proved very successful. All that can be said without dogmatism is that there are the Vedic and Upaniṣadic Kṛṣṇas, on the one hand, and the Epic and Puranic Kṛṣṇa, son of Vāsudeva, on the other, but that the links which would connect or identify them beyond all doubt are unfortunately missing.

These missing links are supposed to be furnished, however, in the case at least of Kṛṣṇa of the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad*, by the fact that be is described therein as Devakī-putra,

and by the allegation that there is a close similarity between the doctrines taught to Kṛṣṇa Devakī-putra in the Upaniṣad and the doctrines taught by Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa in the *Bhagavad-gītā*. Althoug the possibility of accidental coincidence of names is not altogether excluded, there can be no doubt that a very strong point, and perhaps the only strong point, on this view lies in the similarity of the description Devakī-putra, as well as in the comparative rarity of the name Devakī. But this one circumstance alone cannot be taken as conclusively supplying the means of connexion between the two Kṛṣṇas. For coroboration, therefore, somewhat doubtful similarity has been industriously discovered between the teachings of Ghora Aṅgirasa to Kṛṣṇa Devakī-putra and the teachings of Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna. As this point has been argued in some detail.[1] it would be worthwhile to discuss it here.

In the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* iii. 17. 6, Ghora Aṅgirasa, who is described in the *Kauṣītakī-Brāhmaṇa* xxx. 6 as a priest of the Sun, teaches certain doctrines to Kṛṣṇa, son of Devakī, of which the three main points are the following : (i) a mystic interpretat on of certain ceremonies comprised in the Vedic sacrifice as representing various functions of life, (ii) the efficacy of the practice of certain virtues, which are declared to symbolise the *Dakṣiṇā* or priest's fee, an important element in the ritual ; the virtues being austerity (*Tapas*), liberality (*Dāna*), straightforwardness (*Ārjava*), non-injury (*Ahiṃsā*) and truthfulness (*Satyavacana*), and (iii) the importance of fixing one's last thoughts on three things, namely, the indestructible (*Akṣita*), the Unshaken (*Acyuta*) and the Essence of Life (*Prāṇasaṃśita*) ; and the whole passage concludes with the citation of some Vedic Mantras in praise of the Sun. It is argued that these doctrines

1. Hemchandra Raychaudhuri, *Early Hist. of the Vaiṣṇava Sect.* 2nd Ed., Calcutta University, 1936, pp. 79-83. See also L. D. Barnett, *Hindu Gods and Heroes*. London 1922, pp. 82-83, and in JRAS., 1929, pp. 123-29. BSOS., V. 1928-30, pp. 635-37. W. D. P. Hill, *Bhagavadgītā*. (Oxford Univ. Press), 1928, pp. 5-6.

reappear in the *Bhagavad-gītā*, and the coincidence of certain passages is held to be striking. In the *Gītā*, there is symbolical interpretation of sacrifice ; the virtues are also mentioned in xvi. 3 ; the importance of last thoughts is taught in viii. 5 and 10, while the epithets *Akṣara*, *Acyuta* etc. are also found ; and lastly, the traditional communication of the original doctrines of the *Gītā* to Vivasvat or the sun-god is mentioned in iv. I.

At first sight, these parallels appear striking enough to merit attention, but it is possible to make too much of them. It must be recognised that the teachings of Ghora Aṅgirasa, even if he is a sun-worshipper, are clearly Upaniṣadic. As the *Gītā* admittedly echoes some of the teaching of the Upaniṣads, and as some of its verses are easily shown to be made up of tags from the Upaniṣads, such verbal and other parallelisms are hardly surprising. The mystical interpretation of symbolic sacrifice or symbolising of the Vedic ritual is not at all rate in the Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka and Upaniṣad, and cannot be said to be exclusive to the teaching of Ghora Aṅgirasa. The *Bhagavad-gītā* probably borrows the idea from the general Brahmanic and Upaniṣadic literature, but there is nothing to connect it with the details of the particular interpretation given by Ghora Aṅgirasa. Unless this can be shown, the argument loses all its force. It is well-known that the *Gītā* interpretation of sacrifice is somewhat different, for it not only symbolises the sacrifice but also attempts to sanctify it by its theistic theory of desireless Karman. Not much capital need also be made of the enumeration of particular virtues in the *Gītā*, for it occurs in a fairly comprehensive list of godlike qualities, and forms in no sense and exclusive mention of those stated by Ghora Aṅgirasa. Nor is it a complete list of the outstanding virtues of the Bhāgavta cult, even though it mentions *Ahiṃsā*[2] on which Barnett

2. See Mrinal Dasgupta in I. H. Q., viii, 1932, pp. 79-81, where the question of *Ahiṃsā* is discussed, and it is rightly concluded : "In the *Bhagavadgītā Ahiṃsā* is mentioned as a laudable virtue and as a *śarīra-tapas*, bodily penance (x, 5 ; xiii, 7 ; xiv, 2 ; xvii, 14) ; but it is out of question that the Bhagavat should

lays a stress greater than that found in the text itself, and argues from the prominence given to this virtue in the later development of Vaiṣṇavism. Such lists occur also in other places in the *Mahābhārata*, as well as in the *Gītā*, in the descriptions of the ideal man from various points of view; and no definite deduction can be made from such laudatory enumerations of more or less general and recognised virtues. Nothing is gained by connecting these well known virtues with the three (*Dama*, *Tyāga* and *Apramāda*) mentioned in the Besnagar inscription, although the *Apramāda* of the inscription is missing in Ghora's exposition.[3] The fact is also overlooked that the doctrine of *Dama*, *Tyāga* and *Apramāda* is not unknown in other parts of the Epic, which parts have no palpable connexion with Bhāgavatism; it occurs, for instance, in the Sanatsujāta sub-parvan of Udyoga.[4] In the same way, the doctrine of last thoughts cannot be regarded as an essential doctrine of the *Gītā*, and the mention of *Akṣara*, *Acyuta* etc. hardly proves anything. The present writer has already dealt with the next argument of the alleged connexion of Bhāgavatism with Sun worship,[5] an argument which is even less convincing; for no worship of the Sun is taught anywhere in the *Gītā*, and even admitting the influence of the solar cult, the alleged solar origin of Bhāgavatism is an extremely doubtful proposition.

insist on this doctrine to Arjuna on the battle-field. To the *Gītā*-theory of desireless action, as well as of the immortality of the self, the distinction between injury and non-injury in itself is immaterial. It is remarkable, therefore, that while *Ahiṃsā* as a religious attitude is practically ignored in the *Bhagavadgīta*, it is insisted upon in the Nārāyaṇīya both by legend and precept; and in this respect, later Vaiṣṇava faiths follow the Nārāyaṇīya rule."

3. In spite of Barnett's very ingenious interpretation (BSOS., v, p. 139), one fails to see in the triad of the inscription "a rude summary of the same principles as that of the Gita."
4. Ed. Bhandarkar Institute, Poona 1940, 5. 43. 14; Bombay Ed. 5. 43. 22; *damas tyāgo' pramādaś ca eteṣu amṛtam abītam.*
5. In BSOS., vi. pt. 3. 1931, pp. 669-72.

Barnett admits that the particular parallels mentioned above are not very close, but he lays stress on their collective significance. On this there is room for reasonable difference of impression; but it would be surely too much to maintain, as Hemchandra Raychaudhuri does, that the doctrines taught by Ghora Aṅgirasa "formed the kernel of the poem known as the *Bhagavadgītā*", and build an entire edifice of hypothesis on such scanty and precarious materials as detailed above. It must not be forgotten that the parallels in question do not at all form the cardinal or essential doctrines of the *Gītā*, far less its *summa theologiae*, as they avowedly do in the case of Ghora Aṅgirasa's teaching; and their indebtedness or otherwise, and even their omission, in the *Gītā* would not materially affect the substance of the work.

(IHQ, 1942)

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE BHAGAVAD-GĪTĀ

D. D. Kosambi

The *Bhagavad-Gītā*,* "song of the Blessed One", forms part of the great Indian epic *Mahābhārata*, being *Mbh.* 6. 23-40 of the Poona critical edition.[1] Its 18 *adhyāya* chapters contain the report by Sañjaya of a dialogue between the Pāṇḍava hero Arjuna and his Yadu charioteer Kṛṣṇa, the eighth incarnation of Viṣṇu. The actual fighting is about to begin when Arjuna feels revulsion at the leading part which he must play in the impending slaughter of cousins and kinsmen. The exhortations of Lord Kṛṣṇa answer every doubt through complete philosophical cycle, till Arjuna is ready to bend his whole mind, no longer divided against itself, to the great killing. This *Gītā* has attracted minds of entirely different bent from each other and from that of Arjuna. Each has interpreted the supposedly divine

* The following abbreviations have been used : G—the *Bhagavad-gītā* ; Mbh—the *Mahābhārata* ; Up—Upaniṣad ; ṚV——the Ṛgveda ; JBBRAS—*Journal of the Asiatic Society*, Bombay (formerly Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society) ; ABORI—*Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Poona ; A—the *Arthaśtsīra* of Kauṭalya ; JRAS—*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London. For the historical background, my own *An Introduction to the Study of the Indian History* has been used without detailed reference.

1. The Poona edition of the *Mbh* was begun under the editorship of the late V. S. Sukthankar, and the Ādi, Sabhā, Āraṇyaka, Udyoga and Virāṭa *parvans* completed under his direction. Succeeding volumes have been less satisfactory, and the edition is not yet completed. For the *Gītā* in particular, the readings generally assumed to be Śaṃkara's have been retained against the norm accepted for the rest of the edition. Among the many useful translations of the *Gītā* are those of F. Edgerton (Harvard Oriental Series), K. T. Telang (Sacred Book of the East), and S. Radhakrishnan (London, 1948).

words so differently from all the others that the original seems far more suited to raise doubts and to split a personality than to heal an inner division. Any moral philosophy which managed to receive so many variant interpretations from minds developed in widely different types of society must be highly equivocal. No question remains of its basic validity if the meaning be so flexible. Yet the book has had its uses.

1. FOR WHAT CLASS? We know that the *Gītā* exercised a profound influence upon Mahatma Gandhi, B. G. Tilak, the 13th century Maharashtrian reformer *Jñāneśvara*, the earlier Vaiṣṇava *ācārya* Rāmānuja, and the still earlier Śaṃkara.[2] Though contemporaries fighting in the cause of India's liberation from British rule, Tilak and the Mahatma certainly did not draw concordant guidance for action from the *Gītā*, while Aurobindo Ghosh renounced the struggle for India's freedom to concentrate upon study of the *Gītā*. Lokamanya Tilak knew the *Jñāneśvarī* comment, but his *Gītā-rahasya* is far from being based upon the earlier work. *Jñāneśvara* himself did not paraphrase Śaṃkara on the *Gītā*, nor did he follow Rāmānuja; tradition ascribes to him membership of the rather fantastic Nātha sect. Rāmānuja's Vaiṣṇavism laid a secure foundation for the acrid controversy with the earlier followers of

2. R. G. Bhandarkar's *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, and Minor Religious Systems* (originally published in 1913 in the Grundriss d. Indo-Arischen Philologie u. Altertumskunde; re-issued, Poona, 1929, in vol. IV of his collected works) gives a good summary of the influence of the doctrine in the classical and medieval period, but without reference to the historical context. Its influence upon Bhandarkar himself led to a petty reformist movement, the Prarthana Samaj (an offshoot of the Brahmo Samaj) in which RGB was the dominant figure; and support of widow remarriage, then unheard of for brahmins, though practised by some 85% at least of the population. That he spoke for a very narrow class in the attempt to speak for the whole of India never struck him, nor for that matter other contemporary 'reformers'. Still, the silent change of emphasis from caste to class was a necessary advance.

Śiva who came into prominence with the great Śaṃkara. But then, why did Śaṃkara turn to the *Bhagavad-Gītā* too?

To discover just what common service the *Gītā* did for these people apart from the service it renders to all readers, we have to ask what else they possessed in common. What common need did these outstanding thinkers have that was at the same time not felt by ordinary people, even of their own class? That they belonged to one class is obvious; the leisure class of what, for lack of a better term, may be called Hindus. The class bias must not be ignored, for the great comparable poet-teachers from the common people did very well without the *Gītā*. Kabir, the Banaras weaver, had both Muslim and Hindu followers for his plain yet profound teaching. Tukaram knew the *Gītā* through the *Jñāneśvarī*, but worshipped Viṣṇu in his own way, meditating upon God and human affairs in the ancient caves (Buddhist and natural) near the junction of the Indrayani and Pauna rivers. Neither Jayadeva's *Gīta-gobinda*, so musical and supremely beautiful a literary effort charged with the love and mystery of Kṛṣṇa's cult, nor the reforms of Caitanya that swept the peasantry of Bengal off its feet are founded on the rock of the *Gītā*. *Jñāneśvara* ran foul of current brahmin belief at Alandi, and had to take refuge about 1290 A.D. on the south bank of the Godavari, in the domains of Ramacandra Yadava, to write his famous gloss in the common people's language. We know as little of the historic action taken or instigated by Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja and we should have known of Tilak's had only his *Gītā-rahasya* survived. Yet, about the year 800, Śaṃkara was active in some manner that resulted—according to tradition—in the abolition of many Buddhist monasteries. That he did it by his penetrating logic and sheer ability in disputation is the general belief. The mass of writing left in his name, and what is given therein as the Buddhist doctrine which he refutes, make only one thing clear: that he had not the remotest idea of the Buddha's teaching. If his opponents actually held such views. Buddhism had abolished itself successfully centuries before. It had in any

case degenerated into Lamaism with opulent monastic foundations which were a serious drain upon the economy of the country, and which had to be abolished. That Śaṃkara's activity provided a stimulus thereto, and Rāmānuja's some handle against the wealthier barons whose worship of Śiva was associated in the popular mind with their oppressive land-rent, seems a reasonable conclusion on the evidence before us. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain why the richer landholders opted for Śiva, the poorer overwhelmingly for Viṣṇu, in the bitter *smārta-vaiṣṇava* feuds. Neither side objected to rendering faithful service to beef-eating Muslim overlords, who knocked brahmins off without compunction or retribution.

The main conclusion is surely the following: Practically anything can be read into the *Gītā* by a determined person, without denying the validity of a class system. The *Gītā furnished the one scriptural source which could be used without violence to accepted brahmin methodology, to draw inspiration and justification for social actions in some way disagreeable to a branch of the ruling class* upon whose mercy the brahmins depended at the moment. That the action was not mere individual opportunism is obvious in each of the cases cited above. It remains to show how the document achieved this unique position.

2. A REMARKABLE INTERPOLATION. That the song divine is sung for the upper classes by the brahmins, and only through them for others, is clear. We hear from the mouth of Kṛṣṇa himself : G. 9. 32 : "For those who take refuge in Me, be they even of the sinful breeds such as women, *vaiśyas*, and *śūdras* ...". That is, all women, and all men of the working and producing classes are defiled by their very birth, though they may in after-life be freed by their faith in the god who degrades them so casually in this one. Not only that, the god himself had created such differences : G. 4. 13 : "The four-caste (—class) division has been created by Me" ; this is proclaimed in the list of great achievements.

The doctrines are certainly not timeless.[3] Ethics come into being only as they serve some social need. Food-producing society (as distinct from conflicting aggregates of food-gathering tribal groups) originated in the fairly recent and definite historical past, so that the principles upon which it may work at some given stage could not have been expressed from eternity. The *Gītā* sets out each preceding doctrine in a masterly and sympathetic way without naming or dissecting it, and with consummate skill passes smoothly on to another when Arjuna asks "why then do you ask me to do something so repulsive and clearly against this ?" Thus, we have a brilliant (if plagiarist) review-synthesis of many schools of thought which were in many respects mutually incompatible. The incompatibility is never brought out ; all views are simply facets of the one divine mind. The best in each system is derived, naturally, as from the high god. There is none of the polemic so characteristic of disputatious Indian philosophy, only the vedic ritual beloved of the *Mīmāṃsakas* is condemned outright. The Upaniṣads are well—if anonymously—represented, though only the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* contains the germ of *bhakti*, and none the theory of perfection through a large succession of rebirths. This function of *karma* is characteristically Buddhist. Without Buddhism fully developed, G. 2. 55-72 (recited daily as prayers at Mahatma Gandhi's *ashrama*) would be impossible. The *brahma-nirvāṇa* of G. 2. 72, and 5.25 is the Buddhist ideal state of escape from the effect of *karma*. We may similarly trace other—unlabelled—schools of thought such as *Sāṃkhya* and *Mīmāṃsā*

3. In particular, the translation of *dharma* as religion, or even a universal Law for all society was a new eoncept with Buddhism, not accepted even after the time of the G. For example : *Manusmṛti* 8.41 reads "The (king) must inquire into the laws (*dharma*) of each caste (*jāti*), district (*janapada*), guild (*śreṇī*), and household (*kula*), and only then give his own legal decision (*svadharma*)". A great deal of the confusion over the *Gītā* derives from ignorance of reality, of the actual practices of large social groups ; and from taking brahmin documents as representative of all Indian society.

down to early Vedānta (G. 15. 15 supported by the reference to the *Brahma-sūtra* in G. 13. 4). This helps date the work as somewhere between 150-350 A.D., near the later than the earlier date. The ideas are much older, and borrowed, not original, except perhaps for the novel use of *bhakti*. The language is high classical Sanskrit such as could not have been written much before the Guptas, though the metre still shows the occasional irregularity (G. 8. 10d, 8. 11b, 15. 3a & c) in *triṣṭubhs*, characteristic of the *Mbh.* as a whole. The Sanskrit of the high Gupta period, shortly after the time of the *Gītā*, would have been more careful in versification.

It is known in any case that the *Mbh.* and the Purāṇas suffered a major revision[4] in the period given above. The *Mbh.* in particular was in the hands of brahmins belonging to the Bhṛgu clan, who inflated it to about its present bulk (though the process of inflation continued afterwards) before the Gupta age came to flower. The Purāṇas also continued to be written or rewritten to assimilate some particular cult to brahminism. The last discernible redaction of the main Purāṇa group refers to the Guptas still as local princes between Fyzabad and Prayag. This context fits the *Gītā* quite well. The earliest dated mention of anything that could possibly represent the *Gītā* is by Hsiuen Chuang,[5] early in the seventh century, who refers to a brahmin having forged at his king's order such a text (supposedly of antiquity) which was then 'discovered', in

4. The standard reference work is F. E. Pargiter's *The Purāṇa Text of the Dynasties of the Kali Age* (Oxford, 1913). Some of the theories have been contested, e.g. A. B. Keith's review in the JRAS, but the work has survived and gained a well-deserved reputation for its synoptic edition of the historical kernel in the major Purāṇas.
5. Translated in S. Beal: *Buddhist Records of the Western World* (London 1884, vol. 1. pp. 184-86). The equivalent of G. 2. 37 does occur on p. 185, and the association with a great battle at Dharmakṣetra, where bones still whitened the earth, is explicit, in an otherwise garbled account.

order to foment war. The fact does remain that the *Mbh.* existed in two versions at the time of the *Āśvalāyana Gṛhya Sūtra*, which refers both to the *Bhārata* and the *Mahābhārata*.[6] The prologue of the present *Mbh.* repeats much the same information in such a way as to make it evident that the older 24,000 *śloka-Bhārata* was still current at the time the longer version was promulgated. Every attempt was made to ascribe both to the great 'expander', Vyāsa, to whom almost every Purāṇa is also ascribed. A common factor is the number 18, which had some particular sanctity for the whole complex, and for the brahmins connected therewith. There are 18 main *gotra* clan-groups of brahmins,[7]

6. V. S. Sukthankar: *The Nala episode and the Rāmāyaṇa* in Festschrift F. W. Thomas, pp. 294-303, especially p. 302, where he concludes that the two versions bracket the extant *Rāmāyaṇa*. The paper is reprinted in his memorial edition, (Poona 1944), pp. 406-415. For the mechanism of inflation, see his *Epic Studies VI*; and my notes on the *Parvasaṃgraha*, in the JAOS 69, 110-117; for the Bhīṣmaparvan and the 745 stanzas of the *Gītā*, *ibid.* 71. 21-25.
7. J. Brough: *The early Brahmanical system of gotra and pravara* (Cambridge, 1953), p. 27, notes that the *kevata* Aṅgirasas are completely omitted by Hiraṇyakeśi-Satyaśadha, but takes this to be a casual lacuna. So great and omission is highly improbable. My review in JAOS 73. 202-203 was mistaken for a polemic, when the point being made was that theoretical works on *gotra* need to be checked by independent observation. For expample the *śegrava* (=*śaigrava*) *gotra* found in Brahmi inscriptions at Mathura is not known to the books. Even more striking are the innumerable local brahmin groups whose conforming to theory has never been tested. City people in Maharashtra take brahmins to be primarily of the Sārasvat, citpavan, Deshastha and Karhada groups. The 1941 Census caste tables for Bombay province as published show that such categories are together outnumbered by the 'Other Brahmans', and that local brahmin groups are the rule, though the books and theory are in the hands of the major groups named. The Bhṛgus are specially connected with the *Mbh.* inflation, as was shown by V. S. Sukthankar in his magnificient *Epic Studies VI* (ABORI 18. 1-76; Mem. Ed. 1. 278-337). It is important to note that the Bhārgava inflation was independent of though not hostile to the Nārāyaṇīya inflation, which conti. nued after the first had tapered off. So much so, that the

thought the main *ṛṣi* sages are only seven in number; many of the 18 (e. g. the *kevala Bhārgava* and *kevala Aṅgirasas*) are difficult to fit into a rational scheme. Correspondingly, there are 18 main Purāṇas, and 18 *parvan* sections of the *Mbh.*, though the original division was into 100, as we learn from the prologue. The very action of the Bharatan war was fought over 18 days between 18 legions. The *Gītā* has also 18 *adhyāyas*, which is surely not without significance. That the older *Bhārata* epic had a shorter but similar *Gītā* is most unlikely. One could expect some sort of an exhortation to war, as is actually contained in G. 2. 37: "If slain, you gain heaven; if victorious, the earth; so up, son of Kuntī, and concentrate on fighting". These lines fit the occasion very well. Such pre-battle urging was customary in all lands at all times (advocated even by the supremely practical *Arthaśāstra*, 10.3) through invocations and incantations, songs of bards, proclamations by heralds, and speech of captain or king. What is highly improbable—except to the brahmin bent upon getting his *nīti* revisions into a popular lay of war—is an obscure three-hour discourse on moral philosophy after the battle-conches had blared out in mutual defiance and two vast armies begun their inexorable movement towards collision.

The *Gītā*, therefore, is a new composition, not expansion of some proportionately shorter religious instruction in the old version. I next propose to show that the effort did not take hold for some centuries after the composition.

3. NOT SUFFICIENT UNTO THE PURPOSE. The lower classes were necessary as an audience, and the heroic lays of ancient war drew them to the recitation. This made

famous benedictory stanza *Nārāyaṇam namaskṛtya* of the popular editions drops out of the critical text, but most of the properly Bhārgava inflations (e.g. needless emphasis upon Paraśurāma) all remain. In G. 10.25, the lord reveals himself as Bhṛgu among the great sages (*maharṣīṇām Bhṛgur aham*), though that sage occupies no position in vedic tradition, and a trifling one even later.

the epic a most convenient vehicle for any doctrine which the brahmins wanted to insert; even better than rewriting the Purāṇas, or faking new Purāṇas for age-old cults. The Sanskrit language was convenient, if kept simple, because the Prākrtis were breaking apart into far too many regional languages, and it was the language which the upper classes had begun to utilize more and more. Kushana and Satavahana inscriptions are in the popular *lingua franca* used by monk and trader. But from 150 A.D., there appears a new type of chief (oftener than not of foreign origin like Rudradāman) who brags[8] in ornate Sanskrit of his achievements, including knowledge of Sanskrit. The Buddhists had begun to ignore the Teacher's injunction to use the common people's languages; they too adopted Sanskrit. The high period of classical Sanskrit literature really begins with their religious passion-plays and poems, such as those written by Aśvaghoṣa.[9] A patrician class favouring Sanskrit as well as the Sanskrit-knowing priest class was in existence.

No one could object to the interpolation[10] of a story (*ākhyāna*) or episode. After all, the *Mbh.* purports to be the recitation in the Naimiṣa forest to the assembled sages and ascetics by a bard Ugraśravas, who repeated what Vyāsa had sung to Janamejaya as having been reported

8. *Epigraphia Indica* 8. 36 ff.

9. Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita* and *Saundarananda* still exist, not to speak of Subhāṣita verses scattered through anthologies in his name. The fragments of a play *Śāriputra-prakaraṇa* were arranged in order by H. Luders, from Central Asian (Turfan) finds. This or another play of the same name was acted by hired actors in Fa Hsien's time in the Gupta heartland, as were also similar plays on the conversion of Moggallana and Kassapa; note that all three disciples were brahmins.

10. The *Mbh.* diaskeuasts proclaim their desire to include everything. In *Mbh.* 1. 1-2, the work is successively an *itihāsa*, a *puraṇa*, an *upaniṣad*, a *veda*, and outweighs all four *vedas* together. It is the storehouse for poets. *Mbh.* 1. 56. 33 boasts: *yad ihāsti tad anyatra, yan nehāsti na tat kva-cit:* whatever is here might be elsewhere, but what was not here could hardly ever be found!

by Sañjaya to Dhṛtrarāṣtra ! The brahmins were dissatisfied with the profit derived from the *Gītā*, not with its authenticity. So, we have the *Aṇu-gītā*[11] as a prominent sequel in the 14th Canto (*Aśvamedha-parvan*). Arjuna confesses that he was forgotten all the fine things told before the battle, and prays for another lesson. Kṛṣṇa replies that it would be impossible even for him to dredge it out of his memory once again ; the great effort was not to be duplicated. However, incredibly shoddy second *Gītā* is offered instead which simply extols the brahmin. Clearly, that was felt necessary at the time by the inflators though no one reads it now, and it cannot be compared to the first *Gītā* even for a moment.

Secondly, the *Gītā* as it stands could not possibly help any *kṣatriya* in an imminent struggle, if indeed he could take his mind off the battle long enough to understand even a fraction. The ostensible moral is : "Kill your brother, if duty calls, without passion ; as long as you have faith in Me, all sins are forgiven". But the history of India always shows not only brothers but even father and son fighting to the death over the throne, without the slightest hesitation or need for divine guidance. Indra took his own father by the foot and smashed him (ṚV 4. 18. 12), a feet which the brahmin Vāmadeva applauds. Ajātaśatru, king of Magadha, imprisoned his father Bimbisāra to usurp the throne, and then had the old man killed in prison. Yet, even the Buddhists[12] and Jains as well as *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2. 1 praise the son (who was the founder of India's first great empire) as a wise and able king. The *Arthaśāstra* (A. 1. 17-18) devotes a chapter to precautions against such ambitious heirs-apparent ; could circumvent them if he were in a hurry to wear the crown.

11. Translated by K. T. Telang, see note I. There is an *Uttara-gītā*, a quite modern apocryphal work.

12. This is the second sutta of the *Dīgha-nikāya*, and has served as the model, in many ways, for the later *Milindpañho*, questions of king Menander.

Kṛṣṇa himself at Kurukṣetra had simply to point to the Yādava contingent, his own people, who were fighting in the opposite ranks. The legend tells us that all the Yādavas ultimately perished fighting among themselves. Earlier Kṛṣṇa had killed his maternal uncle Kaṃsa. The tale gains a new and peculiar force if it be remembered that under mother-right, the new chief must always be the sister's son of the old.

Thirdly, Kṛṣṇa as he appears in the *Mbh.* is singularly ill-suited to propound any really moral doctrine. The most venerable character of the epic, Bhīṣma, takes up the greatest of *Mbh. parvans* (Śānti) with preaching morality on three important questions: King-craft (*rāja-dharma*), conduct in distress (*āpad-dharma*), and emancipation (*mokṣa-dharma*). He seems eminently fitted for the task having administered as regent the kingdom to which he had freely surrendered his own right. He had shown irresistible prowess and incomparable knightly honour throughout a long life of unquestioned integrity. The sole reproach anyone can make is that he uses far to many words for a man shot full of arrows, dying like a hedgehog on a support of its own quills. But Kṛṣṇa? At every single crisis of the war, his advice wins the day by the crookedest of means which could never have occurred to the others. To kill Bhīṣma, Śikhaṇḍin was used as a living shield against whom that perfect knight would not raise a weapon, because of doubtful sex. Droṇa was polished off while stunned by the deliberate false report of his son's death. Karṇa was shot down against all rules of chivalry when dismounted and unarmed; Duryodhana battered to death after being disabled by a foul mace blow that shattered his thigh. This is by no means the complete list of iniquities. When taxed with these transgressions, Kṛṣṇa replies bluntly at the end of the *Śalya-parvan* that the man could not have been killed in any other way, that victory could never have been won otherwise. The calculated treachery of the *Arthaśāstra* saturates the actions of this divine exponent of the *Bhagavad-gītā*. It is perhaps in the same spirit that leading modern exponent of the *Gītā* and of *ahiṃsā* like Rajaji have declared openly that

non-violence is all very well as a method of gaining power, but to be scrapped when power has been captured: "When in the driver's seat, one must use the whip".[13]

4. WHY KṚṢṆA? Just as the *Mbh.* could be used as basis only because people came to hear the war-story recited, Kṛṣṇa could have been of importance only if his cult were rising in popularity. The cult, however, is clearly synthetic. The identification with Nārāyaṇa is a syncretism, i.e., a move towards taking originally distinct cults as one. In the same direction is the assimilation of many sages to a single Kṛṣṇa legend, whether the original heroes bore the name or epithet of Kṛṣṇa or not. There would, however, be no question of creating a new cult out of whole cloth; some worship or set of similar worships must already have been in existence among the common people before any brahmins could be attracted thereto. The best such recent example is that of *Satya-nārāyaṇa*, 'the true Nārāyaṇa', so popular all over the country, but which has no foundation whatever in scripture, and which is not even mentioned 200 years ago. Indeed, the origin seems to be in the popular legends of one Satya Pir,[14] in Bengal; the Pir himself became *Satyanārāyaṇa.*

The vedas have a Viṣṇu, but no *Nārāyaṇa.* The etimology seems to be 'he who sleeps upon the flowing waters (*nāra*)' and this is taken as the steady state of *Nārāyaṇa.*[15] It precisely describes the Mesopotamian *Ea* or *Enki,* who sleeps in his chamber in the midst of the waters, as Sumerian myth, and many a Sumerian seal, tell us. The word *nāra*

13. This was clearly stated by Mr. C. Rajagopalachari in a press interview.

14. The only published source I have been able to locate for the original cult is the *Satya Pīrer Kathā* in Bengali by Rameshvara Bhattacharyya (ed. by Sri Nagendranath Gupta, Calcutta University 1930).

15. This paragraph and the next are treated in greater detail in a paper of mine on the *avatāra* syncretism and possible sources of the *Bhagavad-gītā*, JBBRAS, vol. 24-25 (1948-9), pp. 121-134.

(plural) for 'the waters' is not Indo-Aryan. Both the word and the god might conceivably go back to the Indus Valley. The later appearance in Sanskrit only means that the peaceful assimilation of the people who transmitted the legend was late. At any rate, the flood-and-creation myth (so natural in a Monsoon country) connects the first three *avatārās*, Fish, Tortoise, and Boar—surely related to primitive totemic worships. One performance of this *Nārāyaṇa* is shared by Kṛṣṇa in the *Gīta*: the *viśva-rūpa-darśana* showing that the god contains the whole universe; he individually represents the best specimen of each species in it. Though familiar to most of us as in *Gītā* 10-11, there is a prototype version without Kṛṣṇa in *Mbh*. 3. 186. 39-112, which shows that an all-pervading *Nārāyaṇa* had been invented much earlier.

The speech-goddess *vāg-āmbhṛṇī*, in a famous but late hymn of the *Ṛgveda* (ṚV. 10. 125), declares that she draws Rudra's bow, and is herself Soma and the subtance of all that is best. The original god whose misdeeds are never sin is surely the Upaniṣadic Indra who says to Pratardana Daivodasi: "Know thou Me alone; this indeed do I deem man's supreme good—that he should know Me. I slew the three-headed Tvaṣṭrā, threw the Arurmagha ascetics to the wolves, and transgressing many a treaty, I pierced through and through the Prahladiyans in the heavens, the Paulomas in the upper air, and the *Kalakanjas* on this earth. Yet such was I then that I never turned a hair. So, he who understands Me, his world is not injured by any deed whatever of his: not by his killing his own mother, by killing his own father, by robbery, killing an embryo, or the commission of any sin whatever does his complexion fade" (*Kauṣ Brāh. Up*. 3. 2.) The 'breaking many a treaty' is again the *Arthaśāstra* king's normal practice, though that book mentions that in olden days even a treaty concluded by simple word of mouth was sacred (A. 7. 17). Indra performed all these dismal feats in vedic tradition but that tradition nowhere makes him proclaim himself as the supreme object for *bhakti*; *pāpa* and *bhakti* are not vedic concepts. No vedic god can bestow

plenary absolution as in G. 18. 66: "Having cast off all (other) beliefs, rites and observances, yield to Me alone; I shall deliver you from all sin, never fear". The reason Kṛṣṇa could do this and not Indra was that the older god was clearly circumscribed by immutable vedic *sūktas* and tied to the vedic *yajña* fire-ritual. He was the model of the ruffianly Aryan war-leader who could get drunk with his followers and lead them to victory in the fight. His lustre had been sadly tarnished by intervening Buddhism, which had flatly denied *yajña* and brought in a whole new conception of morality and social justice. The pastoral form of bronze-age society with which India was indissolublv connected had gone out of productive existence.

Kṛṣṇa or rather one of the many Kṛṣṇas also represented this antagonism. The legend of his enmity to India reflects in the *Ṛgveda*[16] the historical struggle of the dark pre-Aryans against the marauding Aryans. The black skin-colour was not an insurmountable obstacle, for we find a Kṛṣṇa *Aṅgirasa* as a vedic seer. The Yadus are a vedic tribe too, but no Kṛṣṇa seems associated with them though the 'bound Yadu' prisoner of war is mentioned. There was a 'Kṛṣṇa the son of Devakī' to whom *Ghora Aṅgirasa* imparted some moral discipline, according to *Chāndogya Up*. 3. 17. 1-7. The Mahānubhavas take *Saṃdipani* as Kṛṣṇa's *guru*, and a few include *Durvāsā* in the list of his teachers. Kṛṣṇa the athletic Kaṃsa-killer could beat anyone in the arena, whether or not he was the same Kṛṣṇa who wrestled down *Kālīya*, the many-headed *Nāga* snake-demon that infested the Yamunā river at Mathurā. Naturally the Greeks who saw his cult in India at the time of Alexander's invasion identified Kṛṣṇa with their own Herakles. (The taming of the *Nāga* has perhaps a deeper significance than Herakles decapitating the Hydra, a feat still earlier portrayed

16. ṚV. 8. 96. 13-14, but sometimes interpreted mystically as part of the Soma legend. The traditional explanation is that this Kṛṣṇa was an 'Asura', i.e. non-Aryan, and the fighting against Indra on the banks of the Aṃśumati river was real, not symbol of something else.

in Mesopotamian glyptic. The *Nāga* was the patron deity, perhaps aboriginal cult-object of the place. Such cults survive to this day, as for example that of *Maṇi-nāga*, which has come down through the centuries near Orissa. *Nīlamata-nāga*, for whom the brahmins wrote a special Purāṇa,[17] was the primitive patron deity of Kashmir. The *Nāga* Śrīkaṇṭha had to be faced in a duel by Pushyabhuti, king of Thanesar. Such local guardian *nāgas* are current down to the 10th century work *Navasāhasāṅkacarita*). So, our hero had a considerable following among the Indian people, even in the 4th century B. C. By the later Shunga period, he was called Bhagavat, originally the Buddha's title. A Greek ambassador Heliodoros[18] proclaims himself convert to the cult, on the pillar near Bhilsa. That Kṛṣṇa had risen from the pre-Aryan people is clear from a *Pāṇinian* reference (*Pāṇ*. 4. 3. 98, explained away by the commentator *Patañjali*) to the effect that neither Kṛṣṇa nor Arjuna counted as *kṣatriyas*. But his antiquity is considerable, for he is the one god who uses the sharp wheel, the missile discus, as his peculiar weapon. This particular weapon is not known to the Vedas and went out of fashion well before the time of the Buddha. Its historicity is attested only by cave paintings in Mirzapur which show raiding horse-charioteers (clearly enemies of the aboriginal stone-age artists) one of whom is about to hurl such a wheel. The event and the painting may fairly be put about 800 B.C.,[19]

17. Ed. K. de Vreese, Leiden 1936. This particular *nāga* cult had been virtually killed by the Buddhist monks (*Rājataraṅgiṇī* I. 177-8), while the brahmins had also been reduced to helplessness at the time of the Buddhist teacher Nāgārjuna. They made a come-back by writting the *purāṇa* (*Rāj*. 1. 182-6), Kalhaṇa informs us in passing.

18. ABORI 1. 59-66; JRAS 1909. 1055-6, 1087-92; 1910, 813-5, 815-7.

19. See a forthcoming article of mine '*At the Crossroads*' in the JRAS; for the cave painting (originally discovered by Carlleyle). Mrs. B. Allchin in *Man*, 58, 1958. article 217 plate M. (pp. 153-5).

by which date the dark god was on the side of the angels, no longer an aborigine himself.

Finally, there was also the useful messianic aspect as in G. 4. 7.[20] The many proto-historic Kṛṣṇas and current belief in transmigration made the *avatāra* syncretism possible. It could also lead the devotee in his misery to hope for a new *avatāra* to deliver him from oppression in this world, as he hoped for salvation in the next.

5. WHEN DOES A SYNTHESIS WORK? Like the *avatāras* of *Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa*, the various Kṛṣṇas gathered many different worships into one without doing violence to any, without smashing or antagonizing any. Kṛṣṇa the mischievous and beloved shepherd lad is not incompatible with Kṛṣṇa the extraordinarily virile husband of many women. His 'wives' were originally local mother-goddesses, each in her own right. The 'husband' eased the transition from mother-right to patriarchal life, and allowed the original cults to be practised on a subordinate level. This is even better seen in the marriage of Śiva and Pārvatī which was supplemented by the *Ardha-nārīśvara* hermaphrodite (half Śiva, half Pārvatī) just to prevent any separation. Mahiṣāsura (Mhasoba), the demon 'killed' by that once independent goddess, is still occasionally worshipped near her temple (as at the foot of Pārvatī hill[21] in Poona). The widespread *Nāga* cult was absorbed by putting the cobra about Śiva's neck, using him as the canopied (hooded) bed on which *Nārāyaṇa* floats in perpetual sleep upon the waters, and putting him also in the hand of Gaṇeśa. The

20. The assurance is unmistakable: "Whenever true belief (*dharma*) pales and unrighteousness flourishes, then do I throw out another offshoot of myself'. The next stanza proclaims: The god comes into being from age to age, to protect the good people, destroy the wicked, and to establish *dharma*. It need not be further emphasized that the superfluous incarnation in *Mbh.* times wasted a perfectly good *avatāra*, badly needed elsewhere.

21. The cult is coeval with the foundation of Parvati village, hence older than the Peshwa temple to the goddess who killed that demon. Cf. *Bombay Gazetter* vol. 18, pt. 3 (Poona district), p. 388.

bull Nandī was worshipped by stone-age people long before Śiva had been invented to ride on his back. The list can be extended by reference to our complex iconography, and study of the divine households. Gaṇeśa's animal head on a human body equates him to the 'sorcerers' and diablotins[22] painted by ice-age men in European caves.

This is "in the Indian character", and we have remarked that a similar attitude is reflected in the philosophy of the *Gītā.* No violence is done to any preceding doctrine except vedic *yajña.* The essential is taken from each by a remarkably keen mind capable of deep and sympathetic study; all are fitted together with consummate skill and literary ability, and cemented by *bhakti* without discussing their contradictions. The thing to mark is that the Indian character was not always so tolerant. There are periods when people came to blows over doctrine, ritual, and worship. Emperor Harṣa Śilāditya (*circa* 600-640 A.D.) of Kanauj found no difficulty in worshipping Gaurī, Maheśvara-Śiva, and the Sun, while at the same time he gave the fullest devotion to Buddhism.[23] His enemy Narendragupta-Śasāṅka, one of the last Gupta kings, raided Magadha from Bengal, cut down the Bodhi tree at Gaya, and wrecked Buddhist foundations wherever he could. What was the difference, and why was a synthesis of the two religions, actually practised by others (as literary references can show) besides Harṣa not successful?

Let me put it that the underlying difficulties were economic, Images locked up too much useful metal; monasteries and temples after the Gupta age withdrew far too much from circulation without replacement or compensation by

22. *Art in the Ice Age* by J. Maringer and H. G. Bandi, after Hugo Obermaier (London 1953); especially figures 30, 31, 70 (with mask, and arms imitating mammoth tusks), 142, 143, and perhaps 166.

23. This shows in Harṣa's inscriptions (e.g. *Epigraphia Indica* 7.155-60); benedictory verses at the beginning of his Buddhist dram Nāgānanda, addressed to Gaurī; Bāṇa's description in the *Harṣacarita* and Hsiuen Chuang's account (Beal 1.223; the *stūpa, vihāra,* fine Maheśvara temple and the sun-temple were all close

adding to or stimulating production in any way. Thus, the most thoroughgoing iconoclast in Indian history was another king Harṣa, (1089-1101 A.D.) who broke up all images[24] in Kashmir, except four that were spared. This was done systematically under a regular cabinet minister *devotpatana-nāyaka,* without adducing the least theological excuse, though one could easily have been found. The Kashmirian king remained a man of culture, patron of literature and the arts who presumably read the *Gītā* too. But he needed funds for his desperate fight against the *Damara* group of local barons. He won the particular campaign, at the cost of making feudalism stronger.

The conclusion to be drawn is that a dovetailing of the superstructure will be possible only when the underlying differences are not too great. Thus, the *Gītā* was a logical performance for the early Gupta period, when expanding village settlement brought in new wealth to a powerful central government. Trade was again on the increase, and many sects could obtain economic support in plenty. The situation had changed entirely by the time of Harṣa-Śilāditya though many generous donations to monasteries were still made. The villages had to be more or less self-contained and self-supporting. Tax-collection by a highly centralized but non-trading state was no longer a paying proposition, because commodity production per head and cash trade were low;[25] this is fully attested by the miser-

together near Kanuj, and all constantly thronged with worshippers).

24. For the iconoclasm of Harṣa of Kashmir, *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 7. 1080-1098. He had predecessors of similar bent, though less systematic: Jayāpīḍa in the 8th century (*Raj.* 631-3; 638-9) and Śaṃkaravarman (5. 168-70) in 883-902 A.D.

25. The Gupta gold coinage is impressive, but hardly useful for normal transactions. Their silver coinage is notoriously inferior to, say, pre-Mauryan punch-marked coins, and rather rare in hoards; of Harṣa, only one coinage is known, and even that rather doubtful, in silver. The Chinese travellers Fa Hsien and Hsiuen Chuang are emphatic in the assertion that most of the transactions were barter, and that cowry shells were also used, but

able coinage. The valuable, concentrated luxury trade of the Kushana-Satavahana era had gone down in spite of feudal and monastic accumulation of gold, silver, jewels, &c. Once magnificient cities like Patna, no longer necessary for production, had dwindled to villages containing ruins which people could regard only as the work of superhuman beings. There was no longer enough for all; one or the other group had to be driven to the wall. One such instance is the combined Hari-Hara cult (with an image half Śiva, half Viṣṇu) which had its brief day but could not remain in fashion much beyond the 11th century. The followers of Hari and Hara found their interests too widely separated, and we have the *smārta-vaiṣṇava* struggle instead. With Mughal prosperity at its height, Akbar could dream of a synthetic *din-e-ilahi*; Aurangzeb could only try to augment his falling revenue by increased religious persecution and the jizya tax on unbelievers.

To sum up, writing the *Gītā* was possible only in a period when it was not absolutely necessary. Śaṃkara could not do without intense polemic. To treat all views tolerantly and to merge them into one implies that the crisis in the means of production is not too acute. *Fusion and tolerance become impossible when the crisis deepens, when there is not enough of the surplus products to go around, and the synthetic method does not lead to increased production.* Marrying the gods to goddesses had worked earlier because the conjoint society produced much more after differences between matriarchal and patriarchal forms of property were thus reconciled. The primitive deities adopted into Śiva's or Viṣṇu's household helped enlist food-gathering aboriginals into a much greater food-producing society. The alternative would have been extermination or enslavement, each of which entailed violence with excessive strain upon contemporary production. The vedic

very little currency. The accumulation by temples, monasteries, and barons did nothing for the circulation of wealth or of commodities.

Aryans who tried naked force had ultimately to recombine with the autochthonous people. The *Gītā* could certainly not promote any fundamental change in the means of production. At best, it might reconcile certain factions of the ruling class, or stimulate some exceptional reformer to make the upper classes admit a new reality by recruiting new members.

6. THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF *BHAKTI*. However, the *Gītā* did contain one innovation which precisely fitted the needs of a later period: *bhakti*, personal devotion. To whoever composed that document, *bhakti* was the justification, the one way of deriving all views from a single divine source. As we have seen from the demand for the quite insipid *Aṇu-Gītā*, this did not suffice in its own day. But with the end of the great centralized personal empires in sight—Harṣa's being the last—the new state had to be feudal. The essence of fully developed feudalism is a chain of personal loyalty which binds retainer to chief, tenant to lord, and baron to king or emperor. This system was certainly not possible before the end of the 6th century AD. The *key* word[26] is *sāmanta* which till 532 at least meant 'neighbouring ruler' and by 592 AD had come to mean feudal baron. The new barons were personally responsible to the king, and part of a tax-gathering mechanism. The *Manusmṛti* king, for example, had no *sāmantas*; he had to administer everything himself, directly or through agents without independent status. The further development of feudalism 'from below' meant a class of people at the village level who had special rights over the land (whether of cultivation, occupation, or hereditary ownership) and performed special armed service as well as service in tax-collection. To hold this type of society and its state

26. This is discussed in a paper of mine to appear in the *Journal for the Economic and Social History of the Orient* (Leiden), on feudal trade charters. Yaśodharman of Malwa uses *sāmanta* as neighbouring ruler, whereas Viṣṇuṣena (a Maitraka king) issued a charter in 592 AD where *sāmanta* can only have the feudal meaning.

together, the best religion is one which emphasizes the role of *bhakti*, personal faith, even though the object of devotion may have clearly visible flaws.

Innumerable medieval 'hero' stones[27] commemorate the death in battle—usually a local cattle-raid—of an individual who was not on the same footing as the ordinary villager. In older days, the duty of protecting the disarmed villages would have been performed by the *gulma* garrisoning the locality. The right of bearing arms (with the concomitant obligation to answer a call to arms) was now distributed among a selected class of persons scattered through the villages. More striking is the *Gāṅga* barons' sacrifice of their own heads in front of some idol, to confer benefit upon their king. More than one inscription declares the local warrior's intention not to survive his chief.[28] Marco

27. The hero-stones carved in bas-relief are to be found in almost any village not recently settled, throughout Maharashtra and the south. A good collection is in the National Defence Academy's Museum at Khadakwasla, near Poona. The death in fending off cattle raiders seems to be symbolized in many cases by a pair of ox-heads in the lowest panels. The story progresses upwards, to the funeral, perhaps with a *satī*, and going to heaven. The top of the relief slab is generally carved in the semblance of a funerary urn, familiar since Buddhist days. For inscriptions, even a single volume (*Epigraphia Carnatica* X, for example): Kolar 79, feudal grant for family of baron killed in battle (about 890 AD), Kolar 226 (circa 950 AD), grant of a field, on account of the death of a warrior fighting against cattle raiders; Kolar 232 (750 AD), Kolar 233 (815 AD) Mulbagal 92, 780 AD; Mulbagal 93, 970 AD, &C, with the hero-relief in every case.

28. Less well known that Gāṅga inscriptions are the minor ones showing how widely the custom was spread: e.g. from the *Ep. Carnatica*, Goribindnur 73 (circa 900 AD), the village watchman sacrifices his own head; Cintāmaṇi 31 (1050 AD), when the Odeya of the village went to heaven, his servant had his own head cut off and a field was dedicated to his memory; oaths of not surviving the lord are taken in Kolar 129 (circa 1220 AD), Mulbagal 77 (1250 AD), Mulbagal 78 &c. Occasionally, a memorial was erected to a particularly able hound, as in Mulbagal 85 (975 AD), and Mulbagal 162, though the dog's prowess rather than *bhakti* is praised.

Polo[29] reported of the 13th century *Pandyas* that the seigneurs actually cast themselves upon the king's funeral pyre, to be consumed with the royal corpse. This suits the *bhakti* temperament very well. Though barbarous, it is not the type of loyalty that a savage tribal chief could expect or get from his followers, unless his tribe were in some abnormal situation.

7. THE *GĪTĀ* TODAY. We shall be unable to discuss here just what underlay *Jñāneśvara's* important decision to write on the *Gītā* in the vernacular, raher than in Sanskrit. The main social problem was put upon a new footing by Alauddin Khilji, who defeated the Yadava king within a couple of years of the *Jñāneśvarī* comment, and imposed payment of heavy tribute. This intensified the need for more effective tax collection, which meant powerful feudalism. Whether the tribute was actually paid or not, and even over regions not subject to tribute, the imposts and exactions grew steadily. The class that collected the surplus retained an increasing portion, so that the needs of the state could be satisfied only in the earlier period, when feudalism stimulated agrarian production. After that, the crisis deepended once again, to be resolved by another foreign conquest that introduced a totally different form of production, the bourgeois-capitalist. The modern independence movement did not challenge the productive form ; it only asked that the newly developed Indian bourgeoisie be in power.

It follows that a new commentary on the *Gītā* would accomplish nothing today. Anyone may peruse the original and appreciate it according to his leisure and his own aesthetic powers, purely as a literary exercise. To read some new social meaning into it is fatally easy, because it lumps together so many contradictory views ; but it would be futile and dangerous. Fūtile because the inner contradictions of the bourgeois-capitalist or any other class-

29. Penguin Classic L 57, *Travels of Marco Polo* (trans. R. E. Latham), pp. 236-8, for the cremation, and ritual suicide in front of some idol, by royal consent.

society can no longer be solved on a world basis. The system is bound to work in India, but not very well and not for long. There is no point in justifying it nor for criticizing it on the basis of proto-feudal theology. The future obviously belongs to a classless society, irreconcilable to any earlier form. Dangerous, because any such attempt would give the *Gītā* a sprious authority, which may then be used to divert attention from the essential problem. It would automatically lend undue weight to *bhakti*, which can easily be made to justify fascism, or any other cult of personality.

Individual human perfection on the spiritual plane is much easier if every individual's material needs are first satisfied on a scale agreed upon as reasonable[30] by the society of his day. That is, the main root of evil is social. The fundamental courses of social evil are no longer concealed from human sight. Their cure lies in socialism: the application of modern science, based upon logical deduction from planned experiement, to the structure of society itself. Science is at the basis of modern production; and no other tools of production are in sight for the satisfaction of man's needs. Moreover, the material needs could certainly be satisfied for all, if the relations of production did not hinder it; the most powerful country of today

30. By 'society' is meant not only the rulers but the ruled. If the śūdra should agree that he ought to starve for imaginary sins committed in some supposed previous birth, either his group will die out, or at best be unable as well as unwilling to fight against invaders. Feudal Indian history, however, is full of raids and counter-raids, not only by Muslims. It follows that the expropriated class will not show by its actions that they regard the expropriation as reasonable on religious grounds, particularly when they see the very same religion unable to defend its proponents against armed heretics. My point is simply that the fulfilment of certain material needs is as essential to health of the mind as it is to that of the body. It seems to me that the *Gītā* philosophy, like so much else in India's 'spiritual' heritage, is based in the final analysis upon the inability to satisfy the material needs of a large number.

takes pride in growing food by the most modern technique and then destroying it to keep up prices. Any loyalty now must be to principles, not primarily to individual leaders. From sound principles, correct reasoning tested by reality will furnish the guide to action. Without effective action, no philosophy has any substance.

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SCHOOLS OF VEDĀNTA PHILOSOPHY

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The name Vedānta (literally the end or terminus of the Vedas) is commonly used with reference to the concluding portions of the Vedic literature called the Upaniṣads and the aphoristic formulations of the Upaniṣadic teachings called the *Brahma Sūtras.* The commentaries on the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma Sūtras,* i.e. interpretations of the Upaniṣadic teachings and their aphoristic formulations thus constitute what may be called the philosophy of the Vedānta. Despite however a common basis or foundation in the Upaniṣads and Sūtras, it remains true that there are many widely divergent interpretations of the Vedānta teachings—a fact that proves the groundlessness of the charge that Vedānta is not reasoned system of thought but only exigesis of Śāstric texts. The very fact that not merely the different schools of Vedānta but also Nyāya, Sāṅkhya and other schools appeal to the self-same Vedic authority proves clearly that the so-called Śāstric foundation of these schools is more nominal than real and that the systems have to be judged on their intrinsic merits as intelligible accounts of experience and not as correct or incorrect interpretations of the Śāstras.

There are several interpretations of the *Brahma Sūtras* and the best known amongst these are :—

1) The Śaṅkarite interpretation known as Kevalādvaita or Absolute Non-Dualism ;

2) The Rāmānujist interpretation known as Viśiṣṭādvaita or Qualified Non-Dualism ;

3) The Vallabhite interpretation known as Śuddhadvaita or pure Non-Dualism ;

4) Nimbārka's interpretation known as Dvaitādvaita or Non-Dualism in Dualism ;

5) The Madhva interpretation known as Dvaita or Dualism ;

6) Baladeva's interpretation known as Acintyabhedābheda or unthinkable Non-Difference-in-Difference.

7) Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation known as Abibhāga-lakṣaṇādvaita or Non-Dualism-of-the-Non-Differentiated.

It may be remarked that while the first six of these represent schools of thought, the last named is the view of an individual commentator who founded no school. It is also noteworthy that amongst the seven different interpretations of Vedānta above named, the Śaṅkarite and the Madhva interpretations stand on a somewhat different footing from the rest. Thus while all other systems accept the reality of duality as well as non-duality and attempt a reconciliation of the opposed elements in a synthetic, inclusive view, the Śaṅkarites reject the reality of duality and the Madhvas that of non-duality. A further point to be noted is that with the exception of the Śaṅkarites and Vijñānabhikṣu, every other school of Vedānta recognises the necessity of devotion or Bhakti in addition to knowledge as a means to the attainment of *mokṣa* or freedom from bondage.

Śaṅkarite Absolutism is known as Kevalādvaita on its positive side and the Māyāvāda on its negative side. It is a metaphysic of absolute non-dualism based on the conception of the sole reality of consciousness and the falseness of all that is other than consciousness. On the Śāstric side it professes to be based on three different sets of Upaniṣadic texts, viz., (1) texts teaching non-dualism such as *ekameva advitīyam* (one only without a second), (2) texts teaching the unreality of duality such as *neha nānā kiñcana.* (There is no real plurality anywhere), and (3) texts teaching the nondual absolute to be the stuff of the universe : *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante* (From which all the elements, etc., have sprung forth). It may be remarked however that Śāstric texts do not constitute the only proof of the Śaṅkarite *advaita*, the texts in fact being used only as an authori-

tative support to what is also arrived at by a logical criticism of experience. And this holds both of the negative and the positive side of Śaṅkarite Absolutism. It is needless to say that at a metaphysic of absolute non-duality the Śaṅkarite philosophy necessarily involves a negative metaphysic of duality. Since Brahman is the non-dual reality, the world with its plurality must be a false appearance. The world is thus the self-alienation of Brahman, as eternally negated objectification of the unobjective reality. Hence the world is an apparent modification of Brahman while it is a substantial transformation of the nescience inherent in Brahman ; it is a *vivarta* of Brahman and a *pariṇāma* of *māyā*.

The Rāmānujist rejects the Śaṅkarite doctrine of *māyā* and with it the conception of the world as a false and an eternally cancelled appearance. The unity of the Absolute, according to the Rāmānujist, does not exclude the world and its plurality from itself. The Absolute in fact, is the substantive reality to which the world belongs as an adjectival determination. The relation of the Absolute to the world of things and beings is thus the relation of a substance to its attribute and not, as Śaṅkarites say, the relation of a substrate of reality to an unattached, false appearance. The substance-attribute relation within it such as the relation of soul and body, of whole and part, of subject and object, etc. Hence we may speak of Brahman as the soul of which the world is the body, as the whole of which the world is the part, as the subject of which the world is the object, etc.

The Vallabhites (Śuddhādvaitins) also reject *māyāvāda* and the Śaṅkarite view of the falsity of the world-appearance. The Absolute unity, according to the Vallabhite, comprises the world and its plurality within it, and the relation between the Absolute and the world is the relation between a whole and a part. Thus the relation is neither the relation of a real substrate to a floating appearance, nor the relation of a substantive to an adjective qualifying the substantive.

On the contrary, it is the relation of the unlimited to the limited, of the totality to a fragment of the totality. The part is not an adjective of the whole ; it is the whole itself under a limit, one amongst other possibilities in which the whole realises itself. Hence it is consubstantial with the whole and not a mere attribute of it as Rāmānujists think.

The Dvaitādvaitins—Nimbārka, Bhaska, etc.—also repudiate both Śaṅkarite and Rāmānujist *advaita*. The absolute Non-Duality comprises duality within it but it does not comprise the latter as an attribute distinguishing it. An attribute qualifying a substance distinguishes it from other substances. But the Absolute has no other outside itself from which it be differentiated by its attribute of duality. Hence the relation of the Absolute to the duality within it cannot be the relation of a substance to an attribute qualifying it. On the contrary, the relation is a relation between the independent and the dependent, between an autonomous and a subservient being. Hence duality has dependent, subordinate reality within the independent, autonomous reality of the Absolute. Duality is thus different as well as non-different from the non-dual independent reality, different as possessing a dependent subordinate existence and non-different as possessing no independent existence.

The Madhvas—followers of Madhvācāryya—go farther than the Rāmānujists, the Vallabhites, etc.—in their rejection of the non-dual reality of the Absolute. They are out-and-out *dvaitins* for whom duality is the reality and non-duality is a fiction of the imagination. The hard real world cannot be done away with, the true freedom comes only through right appreciation of its inherent distinctions. Thus the distinction between one thing and another, between a thing and an individual soul, between one individual soul and another, between an individual and God and between the material world and God are the five eternal distinctions that are inherent in the nature of reality. True freedom consists not in shutting one's eyes to these inherent distinctions but in a correct appraisment of their nature and significance. Through a

right comprehension of these eternal distinctions supplemented by Bhakti or devotion one comes to know of one's true place in reality and is thereby liberated from the futile desires and longings of saṃsāra.

Acintya-bhedābheda. This view supposed to be the view of Śrīcaitnya is preached by the Nadia school founded by Baladeva Vidyabhusana and his followers. It explains the relation between the Lord and the world as consisting in an unthinkable difference-in-non-difference. The Lord is endowed with three different Śaktis or powers, viz., *jīva-śakti, māyāśakti* and *svarūpaśakti.* Jivaśakti in the Lord is the power in the Lord that manifests itself in the innumerable individual souls in the universe. Māyāśakti is the power in the Lord that manifests itself as the material cause of non-sentient nature. Svarūpśakti is the power in the Lord that acts as the effecient cause directing and regulating the operations of the material cause towards the production of the effects proper to it. The *śakti* of the Lord is the Lord's power of self-concretion—the power whereby the abstract universal become concretised into a world of space-time events (*ghaṭana*). The power in the Lord is both different and non-different from the Lord and the relation between the Lord his creative *śakti* or power is an unthinkable difference-in-non-difference.

Avibhāgalakṣaṇa-advaita. Amongst the commentators on Vedānta, the position of Vijñānabhikṣu is unique. Vijñānabhikṣu's aim is synthetic, conciliatory, his *Commentary* being an attempt not to establish Vedānta absolutism by a refutation of other systems but to show the essential harmony of Vedānta with the doctrines of the other schools. He gives the name *avibhāga-lakṣaṇa-advaita* to his own interpretation of the Vedānta teachings and he means by it a form of non-dualism which is not inconsistent with the dualism of experience as taught by Nyāya, Sāṅkhya and other schools. Thus Vedānta absolutism, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, is non-dualism of the non-differentiated, i.e., the non-duality of non-empirical reality that appears as a differen-

tiated plurality in its manifest forms in the experience of individuals. For example, the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya in the transcendental state is an undifferentiated objective ground which as undifferenced and undivided may be regarded as a non-dual basis of the differentiated world of experience. And what holds of Prakṛti in the transcendental state applies *mutatis mutandis* to Prakṛti and Puruṣa in their reciprocal relation in the metempirical state prior to differentiation and manifestation as a world of experience. Thus what is a duality or plurality from the empirical standpoint may itself be regarded as a non-dual, non-divided reality in the transcendental *avibhakta* state preceding experience and manifestation. Hence the *dvaita* or duality taught in Sāṅkhya and Nyāya is nothing but the differentiated, distinguished form of a monistic undifferenced reality which is the Brahman of the Vedāntist.

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